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ABSTRACT 
This  thesis  is  a  legal  and  practical  analysis  of  the  Gulf  Co-operation  Council 
Security  Convention  of  December  1994.  The  study  commences  with  an 
explanation  of  the  structure,  operation  and  functions  of  the  G.  C.  C.,  in  particular 
its  role  in  matters  of  security.  Drafting  of  the  Convention  began  in  1982  and  its 
eventual  adoption  ,  some  12  years  later,  was  largely  the  result  of  the  two  Gulf 
Wars. 
This  study  provides,  for  the  first  time,  research  based  on  the  input  of  Senior 
Government  Officials  from  G.  C.  C.  Member  States  on  matters  of  security  and 
reveals  previously  unpublished  information. 
The  core  of  this  thesis  is  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  in 
which  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  are  identified.  This  analysis  required  the 
translation  of  the  Convention  into  English,  a  task  not  hitherto  undertaken.  This 
semi-official  translation  of  the  Convention  appears  in  Appendix  1.  Particular 
regard  is  had  to  the  reasons  that  some  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Member  States  have  not 
signed  or  ratified  the  Convention.  A  serious  drafting  defect  has  been  found  in 
Article  28  of  the  Convention;  the  text  is  contradictory  and,  if  applied  in  particular 
cases,  would  make  the  extradition  provisions  unworkable. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  is  compared  with  earlier  bilateral  agreements  and 
with  the  League  of  Arab  States,  the  Council  of  Europe  and  the  UN,  through  the 
Model  Extradition  Agreement.  These  comparative  studies  further  indicate 
strengths  and  weakness  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention.  A  further  analysis  is  given  of 
the  position  of  all  Member  States,  who  have  signed  or  ratified  the  Convention,  in 
relation  to  them  entering  into  any  other  treaty  or  agreement. 
1 ABSTRACT 
This  Convention 
,  the  first  comprehensive  security  agreement  in  any  part  of  the 
world,  is  a  possible  model  for  other  regional  organisations  concerned  about  their 
overall  security. 
, oA 
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Y ODUMON 
INTRODUTION 
There  is  a  shortage  of  scholars  and  literature  of  security  matters 
particularly  in  the  Arabic  World.  This  was  stated  by  H.  R.  H.  Prince  Naif  Ben 
Abdel-Aziz  Al-Saud,  the  Saudi  Minister  of  the  Interior().  This  is  an  admission 
that  the  literature  dealing  with  security  issues  is  limited.  "The  G.  C.  C. 
Comprehensive  Security  Convention,  an  Analytic  and  Strategic  Study"  is  a 
contribution  to  cope  with  this  shortage. 
No  single  writer  has  discussed  this  subject  matter  from  the  time  it  was  a  mere 
concept  in  1977  until  1994  when  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security  Convention 
was  ratified.  Therefore,  the  theme  of  this  research  is  new  and  never  discussed 
before. 
The  importance  of  the  study  emanates  from  the  importance  of  the  Gulf  region;  its 
strategic  location  and  its  great  petroleum  reserve.  Furthermore,  the  study  is 
important  since  it  deals  with  the  internal  security  of  the  G.  C.  C.  States. 
These  States  tend  to  preserve  their  internal  security  and  to  avoid  threats  and 
dangers  such  as;  the  import  of  the  Iranian  revolution,  any  attempts  to  overthrow 
governments  in  some  of  the  G.  C.  C.  States,  any  terrorist  and  other  activities  such 
as  bombing  aimed  at  destabilizing  internal  security  and  stability,  and  any  attempt 
by  the  superpowers  to  intervene  in  the  G.  C.  C.  States'  internal  affairs. 
AIMS. 
Amongst  the  purposes  of  this  study  is  to  give  the  world  a  clear  picture  of  the 
extent  of  security  co-operation  among  the  G.  C.  C.  States  through  the  G.  C.  C. 
Comprehensive  Security  Convention.  This  study  also  aims  to 
. 
assess  the 
advantages  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention:  particularly,  it  is  a  convention 
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which  is  new,  comprehensive  and  it  covers  many  aspects  of  security,  while  other 
security  conventions  are  relatively  older  and  specially  dedicated  to  extradition. 
This  study  targets  the  discussion  of  the  problems  and  obstacles  that  delayed  the 
ratification  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  from  its  1982  draft  until  its 
ratification  in  1994.  This  study  will  analyse  the  reasons  why  some  G.  C.  C.  States 
did  not  ratify  the  Convention.  It  will  also  discuss  the  attitude  of  the  non-signatory 
States  towards  the  signatory  States. 
This  study  further  aims  to  come  up  with  conclusions  related  to  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  by  means  of  an  analysis  of  the  legal  articles  of  the  Security 
Convention  and  comparing  them  with  those  of  other  conventions. 
METHODOLOGY 
To  reach  its  goal,  the  study  will  be  based  on  analysis,  comparison  and  assessment. 
It  will  be  also  academic  research  distinct  from  religious  or  ethnic  bias  and 
diplomatic  influence.  While  assessing  and  comparing  the  various  security 
conventions,  the  study  will  be  neutral  when  analysing  conflicting  points  of  view. 
There  have  been  difficulties  in  acquiring  necessary  materials  for  this  study 
because  of  the  lack  of  literature  concerning  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention, 
except  some  cursory  journalistic  articles.  The  confidentiality  of  security 
information  is  another  problem  in  obtaining  fruitful  sources  for  this  study. 
Efforts  have  been  exerted  in  meeting  decision-makers  and  those  responsible  in  the 
G.  C.  C.  States  to  obtain  the  information  directly  from  them.  Endeavours  have  been 
also  expended  to  systematize  interviews  with  such  high-ranking  officials  in  spite 
of  their  precious  time  and  important  responsibilities.  Among  those  who  were 
interviewed  are  30  high  ranking  ministers  and  officials  from  the  six  G.  C.  C.  states 
of  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General  including  a 
Minister.  (2) 
Crown  Prince  and  a  Prime 
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The  absence  of  an  official  translation  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security 
Convention  available  from  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General  was  another  obstacle  to 
overcome.  Consequently,  the  Arabic  text  of  the  Convention  will  be  translated  into 
English  (and  appears  as  Appendix  1).  Any  translation  will  require  the  permission 
of  officials  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General  to  ensure  conformity  of  the 
translated  text  with  the  original  one. 
STRUCTURE  AND  CONTENT. 
As  far  as  the  contents  of  the  study  are  concerned,  it  is  necessary  first  to  discuss  the 
G.  C.  C.  and  its  legal  regime,  since  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security 
Convention,  which  is  the  main  subject  of  the  study,  was  adopted  within  the 
framework  of  this  regional  arrangement.  The  G.  C.  C.  will  be  analysed  in 
Chapter  1. 
The  adoption  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security  Convention  was  due  to  many 
events,  principally  the  Gulf  Wars  and  the  instability  that  caused  in  the  region  and 
their  relative  effect  in  these  States.  In  fact,  Kuwait  and  Saudi  Arabia  were  badly 
affected  by  these  wars,  though  its  effects  extended  to  the  other  G.  C.  C.  States.  This 
is discussed  in  Chapter  2. 
The  1994  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  itself  will  be  analysed  and  discussed  in 
detail  in  Chapter  3. 
The  multi-lateral  security  co-operation  within  the  framework  of  the  G.  C.  C.  was 
initiated  by  bilateral  agreements  concluded  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  other 
G.  C.  C.  States.  Chapter  4  of  this  study  will  compare  and  analyze  the  provisions  of 
these  bilateral  agreements. 
The  study  will  move,  in  Chapter  5,  from  the  Gulf  framework  to  that  of  the  Arab 
World.  It  will  assess  and  analyse  the  Arab  Extradition  Convention  concluded  in 
1952  and  the  Riyadh  Convention  on  Judicial  Co-operation  of  1983.  The  Lockerbie 
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case  will  be  discussed  as  an  example  of  the  importance  of  the  Extradition 
Convention  as  an  agreement  between  an  Arab  State  and  a  Western  State. 
In  Chapter  6a  comparison  will  be  provided  between  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention,  the  European  Convention  on  Extradition  and  the  UN  Model  Treaty 
on  Extradition 
The  conclusion  of  this  study  will  discuss  the  merits  and  the  negative  remarks 
concerning  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security  Convention;  and  the 
recommendations,  to  be  taken  into  consideration,  which  will  be  submitted  to 
officials  to  remedy  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  perspective. 
THE  MN  6S  OF  SECURITY. 
Before  discussing  the  subject  matter  of  the  study,  it  is  appropriate  to  briefly 
identify  security  and  criminal  extradition. 
It  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  term  "security"  is  ambiguous  since  it  is  used  in 
many  different  fields  and  aspects  to  mean  quite  different  things. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  term  "security"  (3)  is difficult  to  define,  it  is  nonetheless 
necessary  to  offer  some  definition  for  the  purposes  of  this  study. 
From  the  very  beginning,  the  concept  of  security  provided  human  beings  with 
tranquillity  and  the  absence  of  fear.  Nowadays,  security  is  no  longer  confined  to 
crime;  it  extends  also  to  the  broader  human  right  regarded  as  fundamental  in 
contemporary  social  systems(4).  One  of  the  purposes  of  each  political  community 
is  the  preservation  of  fundamental  and  natural  rights,  among  which  is  the  right  to 
security;  or,  put  another  way,  the  right  to  be  free  of  oppression,  tyranny  and 
injustice.  The  UN  Universal  Declaration  on  Human  Rights(5)considers  the  right  to 
security  to  be  one  of  the  most  important  individual  rights(6). 
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New  forms  of  crime  have  emerged,  such  as  organized  crime,  which  transcend 
national  borders  and  threaten  more  than  one  state,  resulting  in  states  seeking  to 
apply  measures  to  protect  their  external  security(7). 
The  wider  meaning  of  security  concerns  both  internal  and  external  threats  and 
dangers.  Security  can  no  longer  be  concerned  only  with  traditional  threats  and 
dangers  to  a  state's  internal  order  to  be  addressed  by  traditional  measures  for  the 
prevention  of  crime,  the  detection  of  criminals  and  their  prosecution  and 
punishment.  Security  has  a  wider  meaning  and  includes  national  and  international 
security.  It  extends  to  new  forms  of  threats  and  dangers;  these  might  be  military  or 
economic(8)  or  social(9). 
Under  this  wider  concept  of  security(i  o),  it  is  not  enough  to  rely  on  military 
measures  of  protection.  It  is  necessary  to  add  to  military  measures  or  to  contain 
them  by  a  limited  degree  of  economic,  political  and  cultural  measures  to  protect 
society  against  the  onslaught  of  the  security  dangers  by  which  it  is  confronted. 
It  is  very  difficult  to  separate  internal  and  external  security  as  they  have  become 
inter-related.  The  importance  of  the  distinction  between  internal(i  >)  and  external 
security  lies  in  the  distribution  of  responsibilities  and  competence  among  the 
authorities  concerned  with  the  realization  of  security. 
Before  the  Second  World  War,  it  was  generally  accepted  that  the  protection  of  a 
state  from  external  threat  was  the  function  of  the  armed  forces(12).  Since  1945, 
states  have  reconsidered  the  concept  of  external  security.  Many  threats  do  not  need 
military  intervention;  on  the  contrary,  in  some  cases  a  military  solution  may 
aggravate  the  underlying  causes  of  the  problem  as  it  is  the  case  with  the  first  world 
war. 
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Modern  technology  allows  a  state  to  control  its  own  territory  and  to  observe  events 
in  the  territories  of  other  states.  This  technology  is  not  the  monopoly  of  any  single 
state,  but  is  accessible  by  others,  giving  them  the  ability  to  intervene  in  each  others 
affairs.  While  this  is  in  some  ways  positive,  it  also  represents  a  danger  to  state 
security.  It  was  these  technological  developments  which  led  states  to  relinquish 
their  policy  of  isolation  and  self-sufficiency  in  security  matters  and  to  cooperate 
with  other  states  to  solve  common  security  problems(13). 
Also,  the  traditional  state  has  adapted  to  become  the  multi-competence  state 
which  tends  to  seek  to  realize  the  general  well-being  by  involving  itself  in  fields 
which  were  formerly  not  regarded  as  part  of  the  functions  of  a  state.  Nonetheless, 
security,  in  the  widest  sense,  is  still  seen  as  the  primary  aim  and  function  of  a 
state(14). 
On  the  international  level,  a  similar  development  has  occurred.  From  a  pre- 
occupation  with  issues  of  peace  and  war,  states  now  seek  to  co-operate  in  a  variety 
of  fields  such  as  commerce,  investment  and  economic  development(15). 
Many  issues  are  related  to  security  such  as,  inter  alia,  combating  crime  and 
extradition  procedures.  The  international  community  witnesses  an  increase  in 
crime  commission  as  the  following  table(16)  shows: 
Year  Crimes  committed-  for 
each  100.000  inhabitants 
Crimes  annual  increase 
(percentage) 
accumulative  increase 
(percentage) 
1986  2.548  -  - 
1987  2.592  1.7  1.7 
1988  2.650  2.2  4.0 
1989  2.858  7.8  12.2 
1990  3.140  6.4  23.2 
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This  table,  the  latest  information  available,  gives  statistics  concerning  crime 
commission  in  the  world.  Crime  commission  is  not  limited  to  any  particular 
States.  Crime,  whatsoever  its  form,  is  most  frequently  committed  in  developed 
Countries  in  comparison  with  the  under  developed.  The  US  being  a  superpower 
could  not  avoid  the  civil  aviation  and  Oklahoma  bombings  which  cost  the  lives  of 
many  innocent  persons. 
Crime  has  negative  effects  on  the  community.  Therefore,  prosecution  of  criminals 
would  inhibit  whoever  avails  himself  the  possibility  to  commit  a  crime.  There  is 
no  problem  if  the  criminal  is  but  in  a  hand  length  of  the  competent  authorities  in 
his  country. 
Difficulties  arise  when  the  person  commits  a  crime  and  takes  refuge  in  another 
State.  The  boundaries  of  the  refuge  State  would  save  him  from  prosecution  and 
would  encourage  criminal  activities.  Furthermore,  a  crime  when  committed  in  a 
State  may  damage  the  benefits  of  a  second  State.  The  later  State  has  the  right  to 
prosecute  such  criminal  offender.  This  issue  has  only  one  remedy,  namely, 
extradition. 
This  remedy  is  not  new.  In  fact,  States  adopted  extradition  from  early  ages.  In 
1280  BC,  Rameses  II  of  Egypt  and  the  Hittite  prince  Hattushilish  III  concluded  an 
extradition  agreement  by  virtue  of  which  the  parties  are  obliged  to  extradite  to 
each  other  fugitive  persons  who  commit  political  offences  only(17).  This  rule  is  the 
opposite  to  what  is  known  in  the  modern  international  law. 
Islam,  in  its  beginning,  practiced  extradition;  Prophet  Mohammed  (Peace  Be 
Upon  Him)  concluded  an  agreement  with  Quoraish  tribe.  It  is  known  as  the 
Hodaibia  reconcilement.  It  provided  for  an  armistice  for  ten  years  between  the  two 
parties.  By  virtue  of  the  Hodaibia  reconcilement,  Quoraish  tribe  would  not 
extradite  an  apostate  Muslim  who  fled  to  Quoraish.  On  the  contrary,  Muslims 
would  extradite  to  Quoraish  any  Quoraishi  who  would  wish  to  embrace  Islam(i  8). 
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The  actual  practice  of  this  extradition  agreement  is  the  Re  Jundel  Ben  Sohail  Ben 
Amer(19).  He  fled  from  Quoraish  and  took  refuge  within  the  Muslims  for 
embracing  Islam.  This  person  effectively  embraced  Islam.  He  complained  when  he 
knew  that  he  would  be  extradited  by  virtue  of  the  Hodaibia  reconcilement, 
nonetheless,  Prophet  Mohammed  (PBUH)  was  obliged  to  extradite  him  to  fulfill 
his  obligation(2o),  in  accordance  with  the  Divine  Verse: 
.. 
And  fulfill  (every) 
covenant.  Verily!  The  covenant,  will  questioned  about  (21)  and  0,  you  who 
believe!  Fulfill(your)  obligations  (22). 
Extradition  is  a  procedure  by  virtue  of  which  a  requested  State  extradite  a  person, 
existing  in  its  territory,  to  a  requesting  State  for  prosecution  or  carrying  out  a 
declared  punishment(23).  Justice  is  the  main  basis  of  extradition  issue.  It  is  unjust 
that  an  offender  escapes  prosecution.  Prosecution  is  profitable  for  States  as  a 
whole.  The  collective  interest  of  States  necessitates  co-operation  and  co- 
ordination  to  preserve  their  security  and  stability(24). 
Criminal  extradition  has  many  sources;  the  domestic  regulations,  whereby  it  is 
possible  that  a  State  has  acts  governing  extradition  procedure;  International 
customs  and  Principle  of  Reciprocity  by  means  of  which  two  States  or  more 
extradite  persons  to  each  other(25);  and  the  international  agreements. 
International  agreements  that  regulate  extradition  procedures  may  be  multi-lateral 
and  ratified  by  a  group  of  States  for  example  the  European  Convention  on 
Extradition  of  1957.  The  latter  permits  the  accession  of  new  member  States; 
whereas,  there  are  close  conventions  which  are  limited  to  the  original  signatory 
States,  such  as  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security  Convention.  An  extradition 
agreement  may  be  bilateral,  the  case  of  the  Bilateral  Agreements  concluded 
between  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  rest  of  the  Gulf  States  in  1982. 
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Extradition  issue  may  be  dealt  with  as  a  main  subject  of  an  agreement  of 
Fraternity  and  Neighbourhood  as  the  one  concluded  between  Saudi  Arabia  and 
Yemen  in  1933.  This  issue  may  also  appear  in  Judicial  Agreement  which  includes 
many  other  issues  along  with  the  implementation  of  Judicial  Intimation  and 
Delegation  such  as  the  Arab  Riyadh  Convention  on  Judicial  co-operation  of  1983. 
Furthermore,  extradition  may  be  discussed  in  security  conventions  which  govern 
matters  such  as  the  exchange  of  security  informations  and  combating  illegal  entry 
and  exit  such  as  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security  Convention.  Other 
international  agreements  may  be  dedicated  to  extradition  such  as  the  Arab 
Extradition  Convention  of  1952  and  the  European  Convention  on  Extradition. 
The  G.  C.  C.  States  are  also  affected  by  international  changes..  They  have  witnessed 
crimes  that  threatened  their  security  and  stability  due  to  their  natural  richness  and 
strategic  location.  The  Governments  of  these  States  were  keen  to  find  a  collective 
security  formula  to  protect  their  internal  security  after  they  have  secured  their 
external  security  by  establishing  the  Peninsula  Shield,  developing  their  military 
defensive  systems  and  concluding  military  agreements  with  the  US  and  some 
European  States  particularly  after  the  Second  Gulf  War. 
Internal  security  is  as  important  as  external  security.  The  G.  C.  C.  States  are  not 
satisfied  with  bilateral  agreements  to  regulate  extradition.  They  agreed  to  conclude 
a  security  convention  governing  extradition,  combating  crime  and  combating 
illegal  entry  and  exit  and-  other  matters.  The  Convention  is  the  G.  C.  C. 
Comprehensive  Security  Convention. 
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CHAPTER  ONE 
LEGAL  R.  3J  E  THE  Ei.  C.  C. 
The  G.  C.  C.  is  one  of  a  number  of  Arab  regional  organizations(1).  Its 
Charter  was  signed  by  the  member  countries'  leaders  during  their  meeting  in  Abu 
Dhabi  on  25  May  1981.  The  G.  C.  C.  is  formed  by  the  six  Gulf  Arab  states:  the 
Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia,  United  Arab  Emirates,  Oman  Sultanate,  Kuwait, 
Bahrain,  and  Qatar.  The  G.  C.  C.,  as  a  regional  arrangement,  is  not  a  product  of 
coincidence;  it  is  a  product  of  many  factors,  particularly  to  establish  security  in 
the  Gulf  region.  Experts  and  specialists  drafted  the  rules  of  procedure  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  principal  organs:  the  Supreme  Council,  the  Ministerial  Council,  the 
General  Secretariat  and  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes. 
As  far  as  the  achievements  of  the  G.  C.  C.  are  concerned,  no  one  can  ignore  its  role 
in  the  sphere  of  international  relations  and  the  peaceful  settlement  of  local 
disputes.  The  G.  C.  C.  coordinates  with  other  regional  or  international 
organizations,  whether  general  or  specialized,  to  realize  its  purposes.  Therefore, 
there  is  a  close  relation  between  the  G.  C.  C.  and  the  UN  since  the  UN  is  the 
authorizing  source  for  the  different  regional  organizations(2).  Also  there  is  a  strong 
relation  between  the  G.  C.  C.  and  the  League  of  Arab  States  since  the  G.  C.  C.  is  an 
Arab  regional  organization  and  the  League  of  Arab  States  is  concerned  as  "the 
mother  organization"  for  the  different  regional  organizations  dealing  with  Arab- 
Arab  affairs(3). 
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THE  BACKGROUND  TO  THE  C.  C.  C.. 
Before  dealing  in  detail  with  the  circumstances  for  establishing  the  G.  C.  C.,  it  is 
useful  to  know  details  of  the  six  Gulf  countries'  area,  population,  date  of 
independence  and  national  incomes(4). 
K.  S.  A.  KUWAIT  U.  A.  E.  BAHRAIN  QATAR  OMAN 
Area/Km2  2149.690  17.820  83.600  620  11.000  212.460 
Population 
in  million  16  2  2.1  0.458  0.469  1.3 
Unification  Unified  in  Independe  Independe-  Independ-  Independ-  Independe- 
24/9/1932  nce  from  nce  from  ence  from  ence  from  nce  from 
or  by  King  UK  in  UK  in  UK  in  UK  in  UK  in  1971 
Abdulaziz  19/6/1961.  2/12/  1971  15/8/1971  3/9/1971 
Unity  Al-Saud. 
National 
total 
Income/  85843  31169  27350  2938  5675  7351 
million 
USA  $. 
Except  for  K.  S.  A.,  the  other  G.  C.  C.  countries  were  for  decades  under  a  United 
Kingdom  protectorate.  The  British  presence  withdrew  from  Kuwait  in  June 
1961(5).  The  British  Government  declared  its  intention  to  withdraw  from  them  in 
January  1968(6).  Later  Sheikh  Zaid  Ben  Sultan  Al-Nahian  and  Sheikh  Racheed 
Ben  Saad  A-Makhtoum  (governors  of  Abu  Dhabi  and  Dubai)  decided  to  form  a 
federal  union  between  them  and  invited  Bahrain,  Qatar,  and  the  Emirates  of 
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Chariqa,  Ajman,  Oum  qiwin,  Raas  Al  Khaima,  and  Al  fojaira,  to  join  the 
federation(7). 
By  the  end  of  February  1968,  a  meeting  was  held  in  Dubai  by  the  governors  of  the 
nine  States(8),  but  the  consultations  led  only  to  the  union  of  the  six  Arab  Emirates, 
without  Qatar,  Bahrain,  and  Raas  Al  Khaima;  in  December  1971(g);  in  1972(1  o), 
Raas  Al  Khaima  joined  the  Federal  Union  whose  constitution  permitted  any  Arab 
State  to  join  the  Federation(1  i). 
The  formation  of  the  G.  C.  C.  reflects  the  strong  desire  among  the  region's  peoples 
to  cooperate  with  each  other,  and  to  depend  on  themselves  in  realizing  their 
security(12).  The  security  factor  was  an  important  incentive  in  the  creation  the 
G.  C.  C.  since  the  Gulf  region  has  been  a  target  for  many  predators,  particularly 
after  major  international  political  upheavals.  The  conflict  between  the  two 
Superpowers  reached  as  far  as  the  Arab  Gulf  region,  for  the  region  has  a  strategic 
importance  for  Western  industry,  and  it  represented  a  major  security  concern 
because  of  its  geographic  proximity  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  American  Administration  had  chosen  Iran  as  a  powerful  "policeman"  to 
protect  American  interests  in  the  region(13).  To  assume  this  function,  the 
American  administration  provided  Iran's  Shah  with  essential  weapons,  until  the 
Islamic  revolution  in  Iran  in  February  1979.  The  American  administration  started 
looking  for  a  substitute  for  Iran  for  the  protection  of  the  region  and  proposed  this 
task  to  the  Saudi  Government.  This  was  refused(14),  despite  America's  cordial 
relationship  with  the  Gulf  leaders  and  its  consent  to  the  A.  W.  A.  C.  S.  contract  for 
Saudi  Arabia.  Yet  the  Gulf  States  did  not  forget  the  American  administration's 
negligence  of  Arab  concerns  in  the  conflict  with  Israel  (15),  nor  did  they  forget  the 
American  support  of  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  three  UAE.  islands  (Abu 
Moussa,  Greater  and  Lesser  Tanbs). 
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On  the  other  hand,  the  Soviet  leaders'  preoccupation  with  the  Gulf  region  was 
their  interest  in  the  region's  petroleum  resources  and  as  a  response  to  American 
diplomacy  in  the  region,  which  was  seen  to  endanger  Soviet  national  security.  The 
conflict  escalated  when  Soviet  troops  invaded  Afghanistan  in  December  1979(16). 
Because  Afghanistan  is  proximate  to  the  Gulf  region,  the  American  administration 
did  not  stand  by,  but  directly  menaced  the  Soviet  Union  through  the  declaration  of 
President  Jimmy  Carter  of  23  January  1980(17),  particularly  when  the  Soviet 
Union  gained  more  political  influence  in  Aden  and  in  the  African  Horn(i8).  The 
American  declaration  warned  that  any  threat  to  the  Gulf  region's  security  would 
be  considered  as  a  direct  aggression  against  US.,  and  that  the  American 
administration  would  not  hesitate  to  intervene  in  the  region  by  any  means.  The 
American  initiative  was  given  expression  when  the  American  administration 
formed  a  Rapid  Deployment  Force  to  be  used  if  necessary. 
As  a  reply  to  President  Carter's  declaration,  the  Soviet  leader,  Leonid  Brezhnev, 
declared  "the  Principle  of  Peace"  in  an  address  before  the  Indian  Parliament  in 
December  1980.  The  Soviet  leader's  position  was  to  consider  the  Gulf  region  as 
neutral  in  Superpower  conflicts,  taking  into  consideration  that  the  region's 
countries  are  non-aligned  and  not  members  of  any  military  alliances(1  9).  The 
position  was  to  respect  the  sovereignty  of  these  countries  over  their  natural 
resources(2o).  The  Gulf  countries  were  expected  to  accept  these  understandings. 
However,  because  of  the  continuation  of  the  situation  in  Afghanistan,  the  Gulf 
countries  mistrusted  the  Soviet  declaration  which  was  considered  only  as  a  reply 
to  that  of  America. 
The  Gulf  countries  frankly  declared  that  the  conflict  between  the  Superpowers  was 
the  greatest  menace  to  the  region's  security.  Thus,  the  Gulf  countries  had  to  find 
means  to  protect  their  security  and  political  systems  through  collective 
coordination  in  different  fields. 
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Several  Gulf  countries  put  forward  proposals  for  the  security  of  the  region. 
OMAN  Sultanate(21)  submitted  a  proposal  on  the  protection  of  navigation  in  the 
Hormuz  strait  in  the  light  of  its  strategic  importance.  The  proposal  stipulated  that 
each  Gulf  State  would  participate  in  the  expenses  of  the  necessary  militarization 
of  the  Strait  and  in  the  creation  of  a  joint  naval  force  from  the  naval  forces  of  each 
country  so  as  to  realize  Gulf  security(22).  The  project  was  rejected  particularly  by 
Kuwait  and  Iraq  because  it  would  inevitably  make  the  West  involved  in  Gulf 
security  and  protection(23). 
The  Saudi  proposed(24)  adopting  security  measures  for  the  guarantee  of  the  Gulf 
States'  internal  security.  The  same  bilateral  arrangements  were  to  be  undertaken 
with  the  other  G.  C.  C.  countries.  This  proposal  made  it  clear  that  Saudi  Arabia  did 
not  intend  to  make  the  organization  to  be  established  one  modeled  on  NATO  or 
the  WARSAW  Pact.  Saudi  Arabia  was  interested  in  the  military  question;  to  the 
end  that  any  country  in  the  organization  should  have  a  military  force  capable  of 
defending  its  sovereignty  against  any  external  aggression. 
The  Kuwaiti  proposal(25)  emphasized  economic,  cultural,  petroleum,  and  industrial 
cooperation  rather  than  military  and  security  measures.  In  mid-December  1980, 
Bahrain(26)  submitted  a  proposal  which  consisted  of  creating  a  joint  military  force 
in  which  it  would  take  part  along  with  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait,  Qatar,  and  Oman. 
The  security  situation  deteriorated  in  the  Gulf  region  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
Iraq-Iran  war.  The  Khomaini  revolution  was  not  well  established  when  the  Iraqi 
President  Saddam  Hussein  revoked  the  Shatt  El-Arab  Convention  which  had  been 
ratified  by  the  Governments  of  these  two  countries  in  Algeria  in  1975(27).  Saddam 
Hussein  was  himself  the  deputized  representative  of  his  country  in  Algeria.  The 
Iraq-Iran  war  contributed  to  the  feeling  of  insecurity  in  the  Gulf  countries(28).  The 
need  for  security  coordination  increased,  for  this  war  represented  a  direct  and 
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immediate  threat  to  the  region's  security(29).  Since  the  protagonists 
_were 
two  Gulf 
countries,  the  effects  of  the  war  extended  to  all  the  G.  C.  C.  countries.  Therefore, 
one  can  consider  the  outbreak  of  the  war  as  a  primary  factor  in  the  establishment 
of  the  G.  C.  C. 
A  further  complication  arose  when  Egypt  ratified  a  Peace  Treaty  with  Israel(30). 
The  Arab  leaders  met  in  summit  at  Baghdad  after  the  ratification  of  this  treaty  and 
decided  on  the  expulsion  of  Egypt  from  the  Arab  League  and  the  provisional 
transfer  of  the  Arab  League's  headquarters  from  Cairo  to  Tunis.  This  isolation  of 
Egypt  had  its  effects  on  the  political  dispositions  of  the  Arab  Gulf  leaders  since 
the  Egyptian-Israeli  peace  agreement  prevented  Egypt  from  supporting  the  other 
Arabs  in  their  conflict  with  Israel.  Therefore  the  G.  C.  C.  States  felt  the  importance 
of  cooperation  among  themselves,  particularly  after  the  loss  of  the  major  military 
power  in  the  Arab  world. 
It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  G.  C.  C.  countries  great  economic  expansion 
took  place  during  the  Egypt  and  Israel  war  in  October  1973.  The  G.  C.  C.  countries 
had  become  great  petroleum  exporters(3  i).  The  Arabs  entered  into  an  accord  which 
consisted  of  a  ban  of  petroleum  to  the  US  and  all  other  States  which  supported 
Israel  in  its  conflict  with  the  Arabs(32).  As  a  result  of  this  prohibition,  the 
international  economy  was  disrupted,  and  American  industry  paralyzed.  The 
petroleum  price  increased  and  the  Gulf  countries'  national  incomes  flourished. 
This  economic  boom  was  exploited  by  investing  in  development  ventures  and  by 
starting  major  projects.  Economic  coordination  between  Gulf  States  began  when 
they  created  many  joint  projects  even  before  the  creation  of  inter  alia,  The  Gulf 
News  Agency  and  the  International  Gulf  Bank(33).  Such  joint  ventures  and 
coordination  represented  strong  incentives  for  the  creating  of  a  regional 
organization  linking  the  six  Gulf  countries. 
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Common  bonds  link  the  six  Gulf  countries.  They  share  similar  political  systems 
(hereditary  ruling  houses)  and  similar  constitutional  institutions.  There  is  a  unity 
of  culture,  religion,  language,  linked  tribal  origins(34),  and  a  common  civilization 
and  history.  These  factors  all  make  the  six  Gulf  countries  distinguishable  from 
other  peoples  around  them.  There  is  also  a  similarity  in  the  economy;  in  each  of 
the  six  countries,  petroleum  exports  represent  the  main  source  of  foreign 
earnings  and  so  of  investment  resources. 
All  these  bonds  have  importance  for  the  coordination  of  policy  and  development, 
and  turning  the  G.  C.  C.  idea,  as  stated  in  the  Preamble  to  the  Charter,  into  reality. 
However,  of  greatest  importance  for  the  G.  C.  C.  countries  is  in  the  emergence  of 
an  organization  able  to  build  up  its  own  force  to  defend  its  members  against  any 
foreign  threats(35). 
These  are  the  main  factors  which  led  to  the  creation  of  the  G.  C.  C.  However,  the 
six  Gulf  countries'  constitutions  were  different  and  this  would  affect  the  manner 
of  co-ordination  and  those  fields  in  which  it  would  be  operational.  Indeed,  it  is  a 
basic  principle  of  the  G.  C.  C.,  though  this  is  not  expressly  stated  in  the  Charter, 
that  each  member  State  shall  implement  the  Resolutions  of  the  organization 
according  to  its  own  constitutional  and  other  legal  requirements(36). 
During  the  eleventh  Arab  Conference  Summit  held  in  Jordan  in  November 
1980(37),  the  proposal  for  a  Gulf  regional  organization  was  put  forward  and  this 
was  repeated  at  the  meeting  of  the  Gulf  countries  held  on  the  margin  of  the 
Islamic  Summit  Conference  in  Taif  at  the  end  of  January  1981(38).  Two  weeks 
later,  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  six  Gulf  States  met  in  Riyadh  in  4  February 
1981,  signing  a  declaration  calling  for  the  establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C.  (39). 
A  committee  of  experts  met  in  Riyadh  on  February  24(40)  and  in  Muscat  on  March 
4  to  prepare  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter,  and  in  Muscat  on  March  9  and  10,1981(41),  the 
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Foreign  Ministers  met  to  discuss  the  final  draft  form  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter.  In  Abu 
Dhabi,  on  May  19  and  20(42),  experts  discussed  the  organizational  rules  of  the 
Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes.  The  system  was  proposed  by  the 
Kuwaiti  Government  and  recommended  by  the  G.  C.  C  Foreign  Ministers.  They 
discussed  the  Council's  Secretariat-General,  and  the  requirements  for  immunities 
and  privileges  for  the  staff  and  representatives  of  the  organization. 
The  six  Gulf  Heads  of  States  decided  to  meet  in  summit  in  Abu  Dhabi  on  May  25 
and  26,1981(43).  The  Foreign  Ministers  met  on  May  23  to  25,1981,  to  prepare  the 
agenda  for  this  summit  which  was  to  discuss  the  experts'  recommendations.  They 
were,  in  the  event,  also  to  approve  the  nomination  of  Abdullah  Yacoub  Bishara, 
the  former  Kuwait's  permanent  representative  to  the  UN.,  as  the  first  Secretary- 
General  of  the  Council(44).  They  were  also  to  approve  the  Rules  for  Procedure  of 
the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes. 
During  the  Summit  meeting,  the  leaders  signed  the  G.  C.  C  Charter  and  created  five 
policy  area  committees(45):  the  Economic  and  Social  Planning  Committee,  the 
Financial  and  Economic  Co-operation  Committee,  the  Industrial  Co-operation 
Committee,  the  Petroleum  Committee,  and  the  Social  and  Cultural  Services 
Committee. 
The  establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C.  was  welcomed  by  the  leaders  of  Arab  World  and 
other  foreign  countries.  From  the  beginning,  the  G.  C.  C.  was  supported  by  the 
USA(46).  In  fact,  the  US.  Approval  was  expressed  by  the  US.  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State  for  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs  in  May  1982,  he  stated  that  the 
establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C.  was  an  "important  step  in  the  sustained  search  for 
co-operation..  that  is  an  objective  which  the  peoples  of  the  region  cherish,  and 
which  we  welcome  and  support,  for  such  co-operation  is  central  to  building 
prospects  for  peace  and  orderly  progress  "(47).  The  British  Prime  Minister, 
Margaret  Thatcher,  expressed  her  support  for  Gulf  cooperation  to  guarantee  its 
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own  defense(48).  The  French  Government  congratulated  the  G.  C.  C. 
_leaders 
on  this 
initiative  to  protect  themselves,  believing  the  security  of  the  Gulf  to  be  the 
responsibility  of  the  States  alone(49).  Belgium(5o),  Pakistans  1),  Turkey(52), 
Austria(53),  China(54)  and  the  Netherlands(55)  all  welcomed  the  establishment  of 
the  G.  C.  C.. 
In  the  Arab  World,  South  Yemen  was  silent  and  did  not  express  its  attitude 
towards  the  G.  C.  C.  establishment(56),  while  North  Yemen(57),  Iraq(58), 
Sudan(59)and  Tunisia(6o)  welcomed  the  establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C..  This  was  also 
supported  by  the  Egyptian  Minister  of  Information  in  a  speech  in  Oman  Sultanate 
on  February  1983(61). 
The  Soviet  Union's  attitude  was  reserved,  mainly  because  there  were  no 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  G.  C.  C.  States  at  that  time(62).  Jordan(63)  and 
Syrian(64)  attitudes  towards  the  establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C.  were  not  clear  for 
these  two  countries  followed  the  Soviet  Union's  policy.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Iranian  Government(65)  disapproved  this  union  and  expressed  its  anxiety  over  the 
G.  C.  C.  support  for  Iraq  with  which  Iran  was  in  conflict. 
As  far  as  international  organizations  were  concerned,  the  Secretariat-General  of 
the  UN  welcomed  the  establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C.  (66).  Moreover,  the  Secretary- 
General  of  the  Arab  League(67)  extolled  this  step  towards  the  reinforcement  of  the 
Arab  "complementarity".  The  General  Secretariat  of  the  Islamic  Conference 
organization(68)  also  considered  the  G.  C.  C.  a  strengthening  of  the  Arab  nation. 
The  G.  C.  C.  enjoys  the  international  legal  personality(69)  provided  by  the  actual 
practice  of  the  Council  reinforced  by  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter  which  reads: 
"The  Secretary-General  and  the  Assistant  Secretaries-General  and  all  Secretariat- 
General's  staff  shall  carry  out  their  duties  in  complete  independence  and  for  the  joint 
benefit  of  the  member  States...  "(70).  This  is  confirmed  in  the  Immunity  and 
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Privileges  Agreement  signed  in  Riyadh  in  1984(71).  The  staff  of  the_  Council  enjoy 
independent  status  within  the  Member  States.  They  enjoy  the  rights,  privileges  and 
obligations  of  international  personnel  in  States  that  recognize  the  organization  and 
grant  facilities  for  its  operations(72). 
The  G.  C.  C.  is  an  organization  of  wide  competence(73)  since  its  operations  or 
activities  are  not  limited  to  a  particular  field,  but  involve  coordination  in  a  wide 
range  of  interests  and  activities;  economic,  social,  political(74).  Military 
coordination  has  followed  from  the  establishment  of  The  Peninsula  Shield,  a 
programme  of  cooperation  and  mutual  assistance  in  military  training  and 
preparedness. 
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THE  C.  C.  C.  CHARTER. 
The  Charter  starts  with  a  Preamble  stating  the  names  of  the  six  signatory 
States(Member  States),  the  reasons  for  establishing  the  Council,  and  the  bonds 
(similar  economic  and  political  systems)  that  link  the  States,  and  the  Islamic 
bonds  that  unify  their  people.  The  Preamble  is  an  integral  and  essential  part  of  the 
treaty.  It  has  the  same  legal  force  as  the  substantive  articles  of  the  text(75). 
The  G.  C.  C.  was  established  by  the  Charter,  as  stated  in  art.  1  of  the  Charter.  Art.  2 
states  that  the  permanent  headquarters  of  the  G.  C.  C.  is  in  the  Saudi  capital, 
Riyadh.  Few  of  the  treaties  establishing  regional  organizations  identify  permanent 
headquarters.  In  the  case  of  the  Arab  Maghreb  Union,  its  establishing  treaty  does 
not  appoint  the  location  of  the  Secretariat-General,  but  the  treaty  states  that  the 
Secretariat-General  would  move  with  the  rotating  presidency(76).  However,  the 
work  and  conferences  of  the  G.  C.  C.  are  not  limited  to  the  permanent  headquarters 
of  the  Council. 
Art.  4  sets  out  the  objectives  of  the  Council  in  four  points.  In  brief,  they  are  the 
necessity  of  coordination  between  different  administrative  systems  within  the 
G.  C.  C.  countries  and  the  promotion  of  cooperation  between  the  member  States  in 
different  fields  to  achieve  a  comprehensive  economic  unity  through  progressive 
steps  that  would  unify  regulations  in  economic,  financial,  custom  commercial, 
cultural,  legislative,  information,  and  social  fields. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Charter  does  not  state  the  principles  to  be  adopted  to  achieve  its 
purposes.  It  does  not  state  fixed  principles,  since  the  drafters  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter 
judged  it  unnecessary  to  repeat  the  policies  adopted  by  the  UN'and  the  league  of 
Arab  States,  for  the  G.  C.  C.  countries  are  members  of  these  organizations.  The 
resolutions  of  the  G.  C.  C.  dealt  with  cooperation  principles  in  the  political  field, 
and  fixes  them  in  the  following(77): 
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"  Arab  Gulf  regional  security  is  the  responsibility  of  its  population  only, 
therefore  it  is  necessary  to  depend  on  the  forces  of  the  region's  States; 
"  Isolation  of  the  Gulf  region  from  international  conflicts; 
"  Detachment  from  military  alliances  and  the  maintenance  of  the  non-alignment 
principle; 
"  Respect  for  other  nations'  self-determination,  and  non-intervention  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  other  States; 
"  Settlement  of  regional  disputes  through  peaceful  means; 
"  Peaceful  coexistence  with  the  international  community  in  general  and  with 
Gulf  region  States  in  particular; 
9  Respect  for  international  co-operation. 
COUNCIL  MEMBERSWP. 
Art.  5  of  the  Charter  states  that  membership  of  the  G.  C.  C.  is limited  to  the  six 
Gulf  States  that  established  it(78),  that  is,  membership  of  the  G.  C.  C.  is  open  only 
to  the  original  members.  There  is  no  provision  in  the  Charter  for  the  accession  of 
new  members. 
Membership  of  the  G.  C.  C.  is  limited  to  the  original  six  signatory  States(79).  It  is 
therefore  a  closed  organization.  It  is  noticed  that  Art.  5  does  not  name  the  Member 
States.  These  are,  however,  cited  in  the  Preamble,  for  these  States  participated  in 
the  Foreign  Ministers'  meeting  held  at  Riyadh  on  4  February  1981. 
Art.  6  lays  down  the  main  organizations  of  the  G.  C.  C.:  these  are  the  Supreme 
Council  which  is  made  up  of  the  Member  States'  leaders  (Art.  7(1));  the 
Ministerial  Council,  formed  by  the  Foreign  Ministers  (or  their  representatives)  of 
the  G.  C.  C.  countries;  the  Secretariat-General,  formed  by  a  group  of  executive  and 
administrative  personnel  headed  by  the  Secretary-General  (Art.  14)  The 
Commission  for  Settlement  of  Disputes,  which  is  attached  to  the  Supreme 
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Council,  is  a  non-standing  body  with  quasi-judicial  functions(Art.  10).  These  are 
referred  to  generally  as  the  "organs"  of  G.  C.  C.  (Art.  6). 
Similarly  with  the  treaties  of  other  international  organizations,  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter 
establishes  a  Secretariat  invested  with  a  general  competence  to  administer  the 
affairs  of  the  organization  and  to  oversee  the  implementation  of  the  organization's 
objectives.  The  executive  functions  of  the  G.  C.  C.  are  undertaken  by  the 
Ministerial  Council  (Art.  12)  largely  in  conjunction  with  the  assistance  of  the 
Secretariat-General(MCRP).  The  Secretariat-General  is  the  bureaucracy  of  the 
Council.  The  Supreme  Council  is  the  decision-making  organ  and  the  Ministerial 
Council  the  executive.  Whilst  the  Secretariat-General  is  permanently  situated  at 
Riyadh,  the  Supreme  and  Ministerial  Councils  rotate  among  the  Member  States. 
However,  each  may,  as  it  finds  appropriate  and  practical,  establish  subsidiary 
bodies  in  other  places(Art.  6). 
Art.  17  deals  with  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  of  the  Co-operation  Council  and 
its  organizations.  The  Council  and  the  personnel  of  various  organizations 
operating  in  the  territories  of  the  Member  States,  enjoy  the  diplomatic  immunities 
and  privileges  established  for  similar  international  organizations. 
International  organizations  usually  enjoy  legal  competence  and  an  internationally 
independent  persona(8o)  to  carry  out  their  duties.  This  applies  also  with  respect  to 
their  relations  with  their  Member  States,  thereby  ensuring  office-holders  and 
officials.  in  such  organizations  are  not  prejudiced  in  the  performance  of  their 
duties  by  their  national  identities  and  attachment(81)  their  loyalties  and  obligations 
are  confined  within  the  organization  they  are  appointed  to  serve. 
Art.  18  of  the  Charter  deals  with  the  contribution  to  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General's 
budget:  contributions  to  the  G.  C.  C.  budget  shall  be  equal  for  all  Member  States. 
This  is  uncommon  since  in  international  organizations  contributions  to  the  budget 
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are  generally  fixed  for  each  Member  State  taking  into  consideration  the  Member 
State's  total  national  income  in  comparison  to  that  other  Member  States. 
However,  the  G.  C.  C.  seeks  to  avoid  the  application  of  international  organizations, 
and  the  influence  of  the  Member  States  will  be  proportional  to  their  contributions. 
Therefore,  The  G.  C.  C.  Member  States  have  sensibly  adopted  the  equality 
principle.  Even  though  the  Saudi  national  income  is  relatively  higher  than  the 
national  incomes  of  other  Member  States.  Therefore,  Saudi  Arabia  has  been  ready 
to  contribute  a  greater  amount  than  the  other  Member  States,  the  organization 
would  be  made  dependent  upon  this  member  State.. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Charter  became  effective,  at  the  date  when  the  Heads  of  State  signed 
the  Charter  (Art.  19(1)).  A  copy  of  the  Charter  was  deposited  at  the  Saudi  Foreign 
Affairs  Ministry  since  Saudi  Arabia  is  the  location  of  the  G.  C.  C.  headquarters 
and  "which  shall  act  as  Custodian"(82).  Thereafter  it  was  deposited  at  the  office  of 
the  Secretariat-General  of  the  G.  C.  C.  (Art.  19(2)). 
Art.  22  states  that,  by  a  resolution  of  the  Ministerial  Council,  the  G.  C.  C. 
Secretariat-General  shall  deposit  and  register  copies  of  G.  C.  C.  's  Charter  with 
the  League  of  Arab  States,  as  being  the  main  Arab  regional  organization  and  with 
the  UN  as  being  the  umbrella  international  organization. 
Art.  20  establishes  the  procedures  to  be  followed  to  amend  the  Charter(83).  Only 
one  amendment  has  been  made,  relating  to  the  frequency  of  meetings  of  the 
Ministerial  Council(84). 
A  member  State  presents  any  proposed  amendment  to  the  Secretary-General,  who 
in  turn  will  refer  it  to  the  Council  members  to  study  the  content  and  effect  of  the 
amendment.  The  proposed  amendment  must  be  presented  to  the  Member  States  at 
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least  four  months  prior  to  submission  to  the  Ministerial  Council.  The  amendment 
is  effective  when  it  is  unanimously  approved  by  the  Supreme  Council. 
In  international  and  regional  organizations,  any  amendment  of  the  Constitution 
usually  requires  the  approval  of  a  majority  of  the  Member  States:  UN  Charter,  art. 
108(including  the  permanent  members  in  the  Security  Council);  the  League  of 
Arab  States  Charter  art.  19;  and  O.  A.  U.,  art.  33..  Majorities  are  required  because  it 
is  difficult  to  reach  unanimity.  The  G.  C.  C.  Charter,  however,  stipulates  unanimity 
because  this  is  not  so  difficult  to  reach  as  in  other  organizations.  The  number  of 
Member  States  in  the  G.  C.  C.  is limited  and  most  of  the  time  they  have  attitudes  to 
important  matters.  Furthermore,  unanimity  is  not  consonant  with  the  principle  of 
cooperation. 
Art.  21  prohibits  reservations  in  respect  of  the  provisions  of  the  Charter(85).  In  the 
G.  C.  C.  Charter,  to  state  the  repercussions  of  the  reservations  voicing  would  avoid 
the  discussion  about  reservations  the  member  States  have  to  manifest. 
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THE  SUPREME  COUNCIL 
Art-7(1)  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter,  and  Art.  2  of  the  Supreme  Council  Rules  of 
Procedure  deal  with  the  composition  of  the  Supreme  Council.  It  is formed  by  the 
Heads  of  the  Member  States.  Its  presidency  is  rotated  among  the  Heads  of  State 
according  to  the  alphabetical  order  of  their  States. 
The  president  assumes  this  function  until  the  nomination  of  another  president  in 
the  next  ordinary  session,  provided  that  his  State  is  not  party  in  a  dispute  brought 
before  the  Supreme  Council.  In  this  event  another  president  is  provisionally 
designated  during  the  session  which  the  dispute  is  discussed(86).  Before  the 
Supreme  Council's  meetings,  each  Member  State  shall  notify  the  Secretary- 
General,  at  least  seven  days  prior  the  meeting,  of  the  names  of  the  members  of  its 
delegation(s). 
The  Supreme  Council's  competence  is  discussed  in  art.  8  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter 
and  in  separate  parts  of  the  Supreme  Council  Rules  of  Procedure:  its  competence 
is  as  follows(88): 
"  Sets  the  Principles  and  headlines  of  the  G.  C.  C.  's  framework. 
"  Considers  the  studies  and  reports  presented  by  the  ministerial  Council  or 
attributed  to  the  Secretary-General. 
"  Appoints  the  members  of  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes, 
promulgates  resolutions  according  to  the  counsel  of  the  commission. 
"  Nominates  the  Secretary-General,  as  it  is  the  case  for  many  other  international 
and  regional  organizations:  Art.  16  of  O.  A.  U.  Charter  entitles  the  heads  of  the 
member  States'  conference  to  nominate  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
organization(89). 
"  Amends  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter. 
9  Confirms  the  Secretariat-General's  budget. 
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"  Considers  the  important  affairs  in  the  member  countries,  and  sets  the  basis  of 
treatment  of  other  States  and  international  organizations. 
"  Appoints  members  of  the  technical  commissions  to  be  established,  members 
highly  qualified  in  their  fields  of  competence. 
"  Charges  one  or  more  of  its  members  with  the_  study  of  a  particular  subject 
before  bringing  it  before  a  session  for  discussion  and  giving  other  member 
States  enough  time  to  consider  the  subject  before  opening  the  discussion 
session. 
The  Supreme  Council  meets  in  ordinary  session,  commonly  called  "Summits" 
twice  a  year(9o).  This  article  also  allows  for  the  convening  of  extraordinary 
sessions.  The  annual  sessions  are  rotated  among  the  Member  States(9  i).  This  is 
common  in  regional  organizations  since  meeting  continuously  in  one  Member 
State  gives  this  State  domination  over  the  affairs  of  the  organization. 
The  Secretary-General  invites  representatives  from  the  Member  States  to  a 
meeting  held  before  the  session  to  consult  on  the  different  issues  to  be  included  in 
the  agenda(92).  The  Secretary-General  sets  the  opening  and  closing  dates(93)  and 
sends  invitations  to  the  States  at  least  thirty  days  before  the  session,  five  days  for 
extraordinary  sessions(94). 
The  Supreme  Council  holds.  an  extraordinary  session,  either  on  the  Supreme 
Council's  resolution  in  the  last  session  or  on  the  request  of  a  Member  State  with 
the  support  of  another  member  State.  An  extraordinary  session  is  held  no  more 
than  five  days  after  the  date  of  the  invitation  to  the  session.  The  Rules  of 
Procedure  prohibit  the  inclusion  on  the  agenda  of  items  other  than  those  for  which 
the  extraordinary  session  is held(95). 
The  session  may  be  closed  or  open  according  to  the  Supreme  Council's 
determination  at  the  beginning  of  the  session  of  whether  there  are  issues  that  need 
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to  be  discussed  behind  closed  doors(96)  or  whether  other  items  may  be  discussed 
publicly.  The  Supreme  Council's  session  is  legally  valid  if  two-thirds  of  the  Heads 
of  the  Member  States,  that  is  four  are  present(97). 
The  normal  agenda  contains  reports  from  the  Ministerial  Council  and  the 
Secretariat-General,  and  a  report  presented  by  the  Secretary-General  concerning 
the  work  performed  by  the  Supreme  Council  between  the  two  sessions  and  the 
measures  adopted  to  perform  such  work(98). 
The  draft.  agenda  may  include  items  that  a  Member  State  considers  necessary  to 
bring  before  the  Supreme.  Council.  also  we  may  find  matters  about  which  the 
Supreme  Council  promulgates  resolutions  to  include  them  in  its  draft  agenda. 
Any  member  of  the  Supreme  Council  has  the  right  to  require  the  inclusion  of 
extra  matters  on  the  draft  agenda  in  two  circumstances.  First,  if  the  matter  is  both 
important  and  urgent,  it  can  be  included  in  the  draft  agenda  at  any  time  prior  the 
session  opening(99).  Secondly,  if  the  matter  is  not  urgent,  it  can  be  included  in  the 
draft  agenda  at  least  fifteen  days  prior  the  opening  of  the  session  provided  it  is 
sent  to  the  Member  States  at  least  five  days  prior  the  opening  of  the  session(i  oo). 
An  ordinary  session  of  the  Council  is  adjourned  after  the  completion  of  the 
consideration  of  the  matters  placed  on  the  agenda.  The  Council  may  adjourn 
discussion  of  items  set  on  the  agenda  provided  that  the  Council  resumes 
discussion  at  a  later  date(i  oi). 
The  Supreme  Council's  Office  comprises  the  President  of  the  Supreme  Council, 
as  the  head  of  the  office,  the  Chairman  of  the  Ministerial  Council  and  the 
Secretary-General(  t  o2).  This  means  that  its  formation  is  not  fixed  and  changes 
with  the  change  of  the  Supreme  Council's  President  and  the  Chairman  of  the 
Ministerial  Council,  while  the  Secretary-General  is  the  only  fixed  member  in  the 
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office(103).  This  adds  to  the  influence  of  the  Secretariat-General  in  the  hierarchy  of 
the  G.  C.  C.. 
This  office  has  as  its  principal  task  assisting  the  President  of  the  Supreme 
Council  in  directing  the  session's  activities;  it  also  reviews  the  terms  of 
resolutions  passed  by  the  Supreme  Council,  and  assumes  other  functions  allocated 
by  the  Supreme  Council(1  o4). 
In  the  G.  C.  C.  's  Supreme  Council,  each  Member  State  has  one  vote(los)  regardless 
of  its  human  or  material  wealth,  or  its  size  as  political  weight.  No  State  has  the 
right  to  vote  on  behalf  of  another  State(1  o6). 
Each  member  State  has  the  right  to  abstain,  or  to  express  a  reservation  on  a 
procedural  matter  or  on  some  parts  of  it.  The  reservation  shall  be  duly  documented 
in  writing(t  07). 
In  the  case  of  an  amendment  to  a  proposition  approved  by  voting,  the  content  of 
the  amendment  would  be  exposed  to  the  Supreme  Council  for  the  voting  first.  If 
there  is  more  than  one  amendment,  the  amendment  which  changes  much  of  the 
substance  of  the  approved  initial  proposition  would  be  first  subject  to  voting.  The 
amendment  with  less  changes  would  be  next,  etc..,  finally  the  amended 
proposition  would  be  presented  to  voting(108). 
When  the  Supreme  Council  promulgates  a  resolution,  unanimous  approval  is 
required  when  dealing  with  substantive  matters,  while  resolutions  on  procedural 
matters  shall  be  carried  by  a  majority  vote(i  o9).  The  Charter  does  not  state  what  are 
substantive  and  procedural  matters(i  lo).  In  the  G.  C.  C.  the  distinction  between 
substantive  and  procedural  matters  submitted  to  the  Supreme  Council  is 
determined  by  the  Ministerial  Council(i  11)  for  it  is  the  organ  charged  with 
preparing  reports  and  studies  presented  to  the  Supreme  Council's  sessions. 
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Concerning  amendment  of  the  Supreme  Council's  Rules  of  Procedure,  any 
Member  State  can  make  a  proposal  which  the  Secretariat-General  circulates  to  all 
Member  States  at  least  thirty  days  prior  to  presenting  the  proposal  to  the 
Ministerial  Council.  It  is  also  impossible  to  attach  further  major  change  to  the 
proposed  amendment  unless  the  Secretariat-General  sends  it  to  the  Member  States 
at  least  fifteen  days  before  presentation  to  the  Ministerial  Council.  An  amendment 
must  be  approved  by  majority  vote  in  the  Supreme  Council(i  12). 
On  the  question  of  the  legal  effect  of  the  Supreme  Council's  resolutions(113),  are 
they  compulsory  and  binding  on  the  Member  States  or  are  they  just 
recommendations?  The  Charter  does  not  state  whether  the  Supreme  Council's 
resolutions  are  obligatory  or  mere  recommendations.  There  are  two  points  of 
view.  The  first  says  that  they  are  just  recommendations,  the  same  as  the  League  of 
Arab  States'  resolutions.  The  second  says  that  they  are  obligatory  resolutions.  The 
Member  States'  desire  to  achieve  co-ordination  and  cooperation  within  the  terms 
of  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter;  to  this  end,  they?  consider  these  resolutions  compulsory 
and  subject  to  implementation.  Failure  to  implement  resolutions  will  frustrate  the 
purposes  of  the  organization.  These  resolutions  are  unanimously  promulgated  by 
the  Heads  of  the  member  States  and  this  reinforces  their  binding  quality. 
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THE  MINISTERIAL  COUNCIL. 
The  Rules  of  Procedure  that  organize  the  work  of  the  Ministerial  Council  contain. 
thirty-nine  articles.  The  Ministerial  Council  is  composed  of  the  Member  States' 
Foreign  Ministers  or  other  delegated  Ministers(i  14).  The  member  States  must 
provide  the  Secretary-General  with  the  names  of  their  delegations  at  least  a  week 
prior  the  opening  of  an  ordinary  session,  and  at  least  three  days  prior  the  opening 
of  an  extraordinary  session(I  15). 
The  Charter  deals  with  the  functions  of  the  Ministerial  Council.  It  makes 
arrangements  for  Supreme  -  Council  sessions  and.  prepares  the  draft  agenda  and: 
other  necessary  preparatory  work  for  Supreme  Council  sessions.  It  appoints  the 
Assistant  Secretaries  General  on  the  nomination  of  the  Secretary-General.  The 
Ministerial  Committee  prepares  recommendations  or  resolutions  concerning  co- 
ordination  and  cooperation  between  the  Member  States  in  the  different  fields 
specified  in  the  Charter.  It  approves  the  periodic  administrative  and  financial 
reports  and  the  internal  regulations  proposed  by  the  Secretary-General  and 
implements  what  it  is  assigned  by  the  Supreme  Council 
The  Ministerial  Council  is  convened  in  ordinary  sessions  once  every  three 
months(116).  The  Secretary-  General  addresses  invitations  to  the  Member  States  at 
least  fifteen  days  prior  to  the  opening  of  an  ordinary  session(i  17)  and  five  days 
prior  to  the  convening  to  an  extraordinary  sessions(11  s). 
For  ordinary  sessions,  the  Secretary-General  prepares  the  draft  agenda  containing 
matters  sent  to  him  by  the  Supreme  Council,  matters  that  the  Ministerial  Council 
decides  to  include  in  the  agenda  and  his  report  on  the  work  of  the  G.  C.  C.  (119).  It  is 
possible  to  include  other  matters  in  the  agenda  provided  that  they  are  notified  ten 
days  prior  to  the  opening  of  the  ordinary  session  and  sent  to  the  member  States  at 
least  five  days  prior  the  opening  of  the  session(120).  If  these  items  are  both 
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important  and  urgent,  they  can  be  included  in  the  agenda  up  to  the  date  of  the 
opening  of  the  ordinary  session(121). 
The  Ministerial  Council's  Office  is  composed  of  the  Council's  Chairman,  the 
presidents  of  its  working  sub-commissions  and  the  Secretary-General(122).  The 
Council's  chairmanship  is  rotated  every  six  months  according  to  the  alphabetical 
order  of  the  States.  He  presides  over  ordinary  and  extraordinary  sessions  provided 
that  his  country  is  not  party  in  a  dispute  brought  before  the  session.  In  this  case, 
another  Chairman  is  temporarily  nominated(t  23). 
Sub-commissions  may  be  appointed  to  assist  the  Ministerial  Council  perform  its 
functions.  These  are  of  two  kinds;  working  sub-commissions  and  the  preparatory 
sub-commission(124).  Working  commissions  are  formed  by  the  Ministerial  Council 
to  perform  specific  functions(125).  Preparatory  commissions  are  formed  by  the 
Secretary-General  from  representatives  of  the  member  States  after  the  consultation 
with  the  Chairman  of  the  Ministerial  Council.  These  preparatory  commissions 
meet  at  least  three  days  before  the  opening  of  the  session  and  prepare  a  study  of 
matters  in  the  agenda(126). 
This  office  has  important  powers  assigned  to  it.  It  supervises  the  implementation 
of  resolutions  passed  by  the  Council.  It  co-ordinates  the  work  of  the  Council  and 
the  sub-commissions  and  assists  the  Council's  Chairman  in  the  management  of 
the  session's  work.  It  also  assumes  functions  assigned  by  the  Ministerial 
Council(127).  The  Ministerial  Council  holds  open  or  closed(12s)  sessions  according 
to  the  Council's  consideration  of  whether  a  matter  requires  secrecy. 
The  promulgation  of  resolution  by  the  ministerial  Council  is  identical  to  the 
Supreme  Council  in  promulgating  resolutions(129).  Ministerial  Council  substantive 
resolutions  require  approval  by  unanimity.  Procedural  matters  require  a 
majority(13o).  The  Council  itself  considers  by  a  majority  resolution  whether  a 
/ 
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matter  is  substantive  or  procedural(t  31).  Each  member  State  has  one  vote(t  32); 
voting  is  secret  if  a  member  State  requests  it(133)  or  if  the  Chairman  of  the  Council 
so  decides. 
The  Ministerial  Council  pursues  the  implementation  of  the  Supreme  Council 
resolutions  which  are  of  two  kinds.  First;  the  internal  resolutions  issued  by  the 
Supreme  Council  to  the  internal  organs  of  the  G.  C.  C..  Second;  resolutions 
directed  to  the  Member  States.  The  Ministerial  Council  can  not  oblige  the 
Member  States  to  implement  these  resolutions,  but  it  presents  reports  to  the 
Supreme  Council  showing  the  work  done  by  Member.  States  in  implementing 
these  resolutions(134). 
As  for  the  amendment(135)of  the  propositions  presented  to  the  Ministerial  Council, 
they  are  treated  the  same  way  as  those  presented  to  the  Supreme  Council;  as  for 
the  amendment  of  the  Ministerial  Council's  rules  of  procedure,  it  should  be 
presented  by  a  member  State  or  the  Secretary-General  pursuant  to  Art.  38(a)of  the 
Ministerial  Council's  rules  of  procedure,  while  in  the  Supreme  Council,  the 
Secretary-General  has  no  right  to  present  an  amendment  to  the  Supreme  Council's 
rules  of  procedure,  but  the  right  to  amendment  is  limited  to  the  member  States 
only. 
In  the  Ministerial  Council,  if  the  Secretary-General  or  a  Member  State  request  an 
amendment,  the  Secretariat  General  sends  this  request  to  all  member  States  at 
least  thirty  days  before  submission  to  the  Ministerial  Council,  and  if  they  want  to 
add  more  principal  changes  in  the  amendment  request,  it  should  be  sent  by  the 
Secretary-General  to  all  member  States  at  least  fifteen  days  prior  submission  to 
the  Ministerial  Council,  the  Council  considers  the  amendment  request  and  issues 
a  majority  resolution(136). 
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THE  C.  C.  C.  SECRETARIAT-EL  ISL. 
The  Secretariat-General  is  a  permanent  authority  in  the  G.  C.  C.  It  prepares  for  the 
Summit  meetings  and  for  the  commissions  working  within  the  framework  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  (137).  The  functions  of  the  Secretariat-General  dictate  that  it  shall  have  a 
permanent  headquarters(138).  Art.  2  of  the  Charter  establishes  that  this  shall  be 
located  in  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia.  The  Charter  provides  that  the  other  organs  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  shall  rotate  around  the  Member  States  or  establish  branches  among  them. 
Some  regional  organizations  do  not  require  a  permanent  headquarters,  for  example 
the  Arab  Maghreb  Union  in  which  the  Secretary-General  operates  in  the  rotating 
President's  home  State(139).  The  organization  of  African  Unity  Charter  does  not 
state  that  Adis  Ababa  should  be  the  headquarters  of  the  organization,  but  practice 
has  determined  that  it  is.  - 
The  Secretary-General  is  the  head  of  G.  C.  C.  's  administrative  organization.  He  is 
nominated,  from  among  the  member  States'  citizens,  and  appointed  by  a 
resolution  of  the  Supreme  Council.  He  is  appointed  for  a  three  year  period 
renewable  once(14o).  The  Supreme  Council,  at  its  first  session  held  at  Abu  Dhabi 
in  May  1981,  appointed  Abdullah  Yacoub  Beshara  as  the  first  Secretary-General 
of  the  G.  C.  C.  He  remained  in  his  position  until  21  December  1992(141)  when  he 
was  replaced  by  Cheikh  Fahim  El-Qassimi  of  the  United  Arab  Emirates. 
The  Secretary-General  is  responsible  for  the  effective  performance  of  the 
Secretariat-General's  functions(142).  He  appoints  most  of  the  personnel  of  the 
Secretariat-General.  He  prepares  the  draft  budget  of  the  Secretariat-General,  which 
is  then  subject  to  Supreme  Council  approval(143).  The  Secretary-General  arranges 
meeting  of  the  Supreme  Council  and  the  Ministerial  Council  and  sends  invitations 
and  papers  to  Member  States  to  attend  these  meetings.  He  represents  the  Council 
at  other  organizations.  Such  representation  demonstrates  the  international  persona 
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of  the  organization.  In  general  he  acts  within  the  framework  of  the_  competence  he 
is  charged  with(144). 
Under  the  Secretary-General  in  the  administrative  structure  are  the  Assistant 
Secretaries-General  appointed  by  the  Ministerial  Council(145),  on  the  nomination 
of  the  Secretary-General  for  a  three  year  renewable  period. 
The  Secretariat-General  is  also  formed  of  other  personnel  selected  by  the 
Secretary-General  from  among  the  citizens  of  Member  States.  As  far  as  possible,  a 
principle  of  equal  distribution  of  appointments  is  observed  among  the  Member 
States.  If  the  Secretary-General  wishes  to  nominate  an  official  from  a  non-member 
Country  of  the  G.  C.  C.,  this  exception  requires  the  approval  of  the  Ministerial 
Council(146). 
The  main  responsibilities  of  the  Secretariat-General  are  the  preparation  of  the 
periodic  reports  concerning  the  work  of  the  Co-operation  Council  and  in  following 
up  the  implementation  by  the  Member  States  of  the  resolutions  and 
recommendations  of  the  Supreme  and  Ministerial  Councils.  It  prepares  the 
budgets  and  the  closing  accounts  for  the  G.  C.  C.  and  prepares  draft  administrative 
and  financial  regulations  for  the  G.  C.  C.  Other  tasks  may  be  charged  by  the 
Supreme  and  Ministerial  Councils(147). 
The  Secretariat-General  enjoys  diplomatic  immunities  and  privilege  in  all  Member 
States,  even  in  the  State  of  which  the  person  is  a  citizen(148).  An  official  in  the 
service  of  the  G.  C.  C.  owes  his  first  loyalty  to  the  organization(149).  This  is, 
nonetheless  without  prejudice  to  his  identity  as  a  citizen  of  his  home  State.  During 
his  tenure,  a  G.  C.  C.  official  must  be  free  of  instructions  from  his  home  State(iso). 
State  representatives  to  the  G.  C.  C.,  however,  enjoy  the  immunities  and  he  is 
detached  from  his  State  identity  in  the  course  of  assuming  the  G.  C.  C.  duties(151). 
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G.  C.  C.  personnel  are  in  a  contractual  relationship(152)  with.  the  regional 
organization  and  their  conduct  must  be  wholly  consistent  with  this  primary 
obligation.  Obligations  of  confidentiality  and  secrecy  may  extend  beyond  the 
tenure  of  office  in  the  G.  C.  C.  (153). 
The  Secretariat-General  is  an  administrative  system  of  numerous  sectors.  Each  is 
headed  by  a  Director  who  is  responsible  before  the  Secretary-General  for  the 
affairs  of  his  sector.  The  main  administrative  structure  consists  of  the  Secretary- 
General's  Office  and  the  offices  of  the  Assistant  Secretaries-General  for  Economic 
and  Political  affairs(154).  The  four  Sectors: 
"  Human  resources  and  the  environment. 
"  Financial  and  administrative  affairs. 
"  Legal  affairs. 
"  Information,  and  the  Information  Center. 
Each  sector  is  divided  into  Departments  with  more  specific  responsibilities, 
and  each  Department  has  directorates  with  closely  defined  administrative, 
technical  and  professional  responsibilities. 
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THE  COMMISSION  FOR  THE  SETTLEMENT 
Of  DISPUTES  RULES  OF  PROCEDURE(CSDRP). 
A  commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes  is  provided  for  in  art.  10  of  the 
Charter.  Rules  and  Procedures  are  laid  down  in  a  separate  instrument  of  thirteen 
articles(155).  The  Commission  operates  under  the  Supreme  Council(156).  Art.  2  of 
the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes 
establishes  the  seat  of  the  Commission  at  Riyadh.  It  can,  however,  hold  meetings 
elsewhere. 
The  Commission  Settlement  of  Disputes  Rules  has  jurisdiction  to  consider  matters 
referred  to  it  by  the  Supreme  Council  concerning  disputes  between  Member 
States  and  differences  of  opinion  as  to  the  interpretation  or  execution  of  the 
Charter.  Findings  are  referred  to  the  Supreme  Council  for  appropriate  action(i  57). 
Art.  4  deals  with  the  composition  of  the  Commission.  Its  members  are  appointed 
by  the  Supreme  Council  from  among  the  citizens  of  the  member  States  provided 
that  their  countries  are  not  party  in  a  dispute  for  which  the  Commission  is  formed. 
The  Commission  is  not  a  permanent,  but  only  an  ad  hoc  body. 
The  members  of  the  Commission  shall  not  be  less  than  three(158),  but  may  refer  to 
experts  for  a  better  understanding  of  the  dispute.  They  have  only  one  vote  each, 
and  its  findings  are  issued  by  majority  of  its  members.  In  case  of  a  tie  in  the  vote. 
the  opinion  supported  by  the  Chairman  of  the  Commission  outweighs  the 
opposing  opinion(159). 
Art.  9  states  the  main  sources  of  law  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of 
Disputes  relies  on  in  issuing  its  findings: 
"  The  G.  C.  C.  Charter. 
"  International  Law. 
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"  International  Practice. 
"  Islamic  Shari'ah 
The  Commission's  recommendations  to  the  Supreme  Council  include  the 
particular  measures  to  be  taken  to  cope  with  the  circumstances  of  the  dispute(160). 
The  Commission's  recommendations  should  be  straight-forward  and  clear  and 
specify  the  reasons  for  making  such  recommendations(161).  If  a  member  has  a 
different  opinion,  the  dissenting  opinion  is  also  presented  and  documented(1  62). 
Members  of  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes  enjoy  such 
immunities  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Member  States  as  are  necessary  to  perform  their  duties 
without  impediment(]  63).  The  members  of  the  Commission  receive  remuneration 
established  by  the  Supreme  Council(164)  to  be  remitted  from  the  Secretariat 
budget(165). 
The  Rules  of  Procedure  explain  the  legal  nature  of  the  Commission.  This  is  not  a 
court  since  its  composition  is  not  fixed  and  permanent,  but  changes  with  the 
incidence  and  nature  of  the  dispute  in  hand.  The  Commission  does  not  have  the 
authority  to  promulgate  obligatory  resolutions.  The  Commission  for  the 
Settlement  of  Disputes  has  only  limited  consultative  competence  for  it  submits  its 
opinions  and  recommendations  to  the  Supreme  Council  to  take  the  appropriate 
measures.  The  Commission  is.  at  most  a  quasi-judicial  body. 
The  role  that  the  Commission  of  the  Settlement  of  Disputes  might  play  is  limited. 
In  international  relations,  political  disputes  are  very  difficult  to  settle  through 
judicial  means.  States  prefer  to  solve  them  in  diplomatic  ways.  Political  disputes 
commonly  require  concessions  among  the  disputing  parties. 
Up  to  now,  there  has  not  been  one  practical  settlement  of  a  dispute  through  the 
G.  C.  C.  's  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes(166).  The  Member  States 
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have  preferred  to  attempt  settlements  through  the  Supreme 
1 
or  Ministerial 
Councils,  that  is,  by  diplomatic  means.  The  dispute  between  Qatar  and  Bahrain 
(about  Howar  island(]  67))  is  a  case  in  point.  It  is  significant  that  in  this  dispute  the 
political-diplomatic  processes  within  the  G.  C.  C.  have  failed  and  the  parties  have 
turned  to  the  judicial  processes  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice(ICJ)  at  the 
Hague(168). 
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IMPLEMENTATION  OF  OBJECTIVES  OF  THE  G.  C.  C.. 
Though  the  G.  C.  C.  is  a  relatively  new  regional  organization,  it  has  achieved  a 
good  deal  by  comparison  with  other  regional  international  organizations.  The 
extent  to  which  the  G.  C.  C.  has  realized  its  objectives  differs  with  regard  to  the 
fields  of  cooperation;  it  has  succeeded  more  in  the  economic  field  than  in  the 
unification  of  policies  on  international  disputes  and  on  military  and  security  co- 
ordination. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Supreme  Council  second  session,  held  at  Riyadh  in  November  1981, 
issued  a  resolution  approving  Unified  Economic  Agreement(169)  and  established 
the  Industrial  Co-operation  Committee  as  a  permanent  committee.  Based  on  the 
Supreme  Council's  approval,  the  G.  C.  C.  Ministers  of  Finance  and  Economy  held  a 
meeting  in  January  1982  to  implement  the  provisions  of  the  Agreement.  The 
Unified  Economic  Agreement  is  a  comprehensive  programme  for  establishing  an 
integrated  market  among  the  Member  States  of  the  G.  C.  C.  (17o). 
During  the  Supreme  Council  second  session  in  Manama  Heads  of  the  Member 
States  agreed  to  establish  the  Gulf  Investment  Corporation(171).  The  G.  C.  C.  would 
establish  a  joint  investment  fund  and  Board  to  facilitate  economic  investment 
amongst  the  Member  States.  The  Agreement  was  made,  in  the  first  instance,  for 
unifying,  and  setting  the  national  Customs  tariffs  starting  from  March  1983.  The 
G.  C.  C.  Board  of  Specifications  and  Standards  was  established(]  72).  This  was 
accomplished  by  transforming  the  existing  Saudi  Arabian  Board  of  Specifications 
into  a  Gulf  Board.  By  virtue  of  the  Unified  Economic  Agreement(UEA)  it  was  to 
become  possible  for  citizens  of  the  Member  States  to  practice,  as  if  in  their  own 
country,  many  professions  for  instance;  medicine,  legal  practice,  consultancy, 
accountancy,  legal  accountancy,  administrative  consultancy,  economic  and 
agricultural  consultancy,  pharmacy,  translation,  computer  programming,  and 
computing(173  ). 
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It  was  decided(174),  that  any  person  holding  the  citizenship  of  any  Member  State 
may  establish  an  economic  activity  in  any  other  Member  State.  Moreover,  G.  C.  C. 
citizens  may  possess  real  estate  in  any  Member  State(175).  G.  C.  C.  States'  students 
are  to  be  granted  equal  opportunities  for  postgraduate  studies.  Commissions  have 
been  formed  to  unify  the  External  Custom  Tariffs(176)  and  to  co-ordinate 
monetary  policies  of  the  States. 
The  most  important  achievement  of  the  G.  C.  C.  in  the  political  field  is  the  adoption 
of  the  "Principle  of  limitations".  From  the  beginning,  the  G.  C.  C.  has  refused  to 
accept  foreign  military  bases  in  its  territories  and  asserted  its  complete  detachment 
from  military  alliances(]  77).  At  the  time  of  the  foundation  of  the  organization,  the 
superpowers'  conflict  was  at  its  most  menacing.  When  the  East-West  conflict 
subsided,  the  Iran-Iraq  war  blew  up.  The  G.  C.  C.  States'  important  and  strategic 
interests  became  directly  menaced  particularly  during  the  eight  years  of  Iran-Iraq 
war.  Consequently,  the  G.  C.  C.  States  came  to  accept  the  presence  of  American 
naval  vessels  in  the  Gulf.  The  vessels  were  to  be  engaged  as  escort  for  tankers 
from  the  Gulf  ports  to  safer  distance.  The  tankers  of  different  nationalities 
transporting  oil,  the  American  flag  as  a  symbol  of  American  protection  from  the 
Iranian  military  threat. 
American  and  European  military  presence  in  the  Gulf  became  apparent  during  the 
Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait(178).  These  military  forces  used  the  G.  C.  C.  territories  as 
bases  to  launch  land  operations  to  free  Kuwaiti  territory.  After  the  complete 
liberation  of  Kuwait  in  February  1991,  these  forces  were  withdrawn. 
The  G.  C.  C.  States  adopted  a  unified  stand  in  opposing  the  invasion  and  supported 
the  return  of  the  legitimate  Kuwaiti  Government  under  the  leadership  of  Sheikh  Al 
Sabah.  The  G.  C.  C.  States  endeavoured  to  limit  the  spread  of  war  and  to  settle  the 
dispute  through  common  pacific  means  within  the  framework  of  international  law. 
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This  principle  has  been  important  in  respect  of  Islamic  States  in  conflict, 
especially  where  one  is  an  aggressor  over  another.  The  G.  C.  C.  States  insisted  that 
States  comply  with  the  provisions  of  the  Security  Council's  Resolutions 
concerning  this  crises(179).  The  G.  C.  C.  States  spared  no  effort  or  cost  to  resist  and 
throw  back  Iraqi  oppression  and  to  restore  the  sovereignty  of  Kuwait. 
Concerning  the  Palestinian  affairs,  the  leaders  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Member  States  have 
insisted  that  the  Palestinian  population  should  be  restored  to  their  legitimate  right 
to  self-determination.  The  G.  C.  C.  has  also  reviled  Israeli  aggressive  policies  over 
the  Palestinian  people  and  Israeli  government  acts  of  arbitrary  settlement  of  its 
nationals.  Consequently,  the  G.  C.  C.  has  provided  the  representatives  of  the 
Palestinian  people  with  moral  and  material  supports(tso). 
Serbian  aggression  over  Bosnia  Herzegovina  has  attracted  the  attention  of  the 
G.  C.  C..  The  Council  Member  States  complained  at  this  aggression  and  backed 
the  Bosnian  Muslims  with  material  assistance.  Moreover,  they  have  supported 
international  efforts  to  lift  the  weapons  embargo  over  BOSNIA(181).  The  G.  C.  C. 
also  endeavoured  to  bring  to  an  end  the  civil  war  in  Somalia  and  has  supported 
international  efforts  to  persuade  the  belligerents  to  cease  the  bloody  war(i  82). 
At  the  First  meeting  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Interior  Ministers,  held  on  23-24  February 
1982  at  Riyadh,  seven  security  committees  were  formed.  These  committees  are 
presided  over  by  the  States  Interior  Ministers(]  83).  Heads  of  security  systems(as 
relevant.  to  be  specialized  committees)  are  invited  to  the  yearly  meetings,  or 
meetings  any  other  time  if  necessary.  These  committees  submit  their 
recommendations  to  Interior  Ministers'  meetings.  The  committees  are  as  follows: 
TRAFFIC  AWARENESS  (TRAFFIC  DIRECTORS) 
This  committee  has  published  materials  containing  statistics  concerning  traffic 
accidents  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Member  States.  The  nationals  of  any  Member  State  are 
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free  to  drive  in  any  Member  State,  they  can  drive  with  any  member  State'  driving 
license. 
RESIDENCE  (PASSPORTS  AND  IMMIGRATION) 
This  committee  issued  many  important  recommendations  for  instance:  abolishing 
exit-entry  cards  for  G.  C.  C.  citizens  and  the  unification  of  passports  in  G.  C.  C. 
countries. 
CITIZENSHIP. 
This  committee  has  agreed  many  criteria  to  guide  the  Member  States  in  the  field 
of  citizenship.  There  is  already  striking  similarity  of  the  regulations  of  citizenship 
in  the  member  States(184). 
DRUGS  CONTROL. 
This  committee  endeavours  to  prepare  a  unified  information  project  to  create 
public  awareness  about  drug-taking  and  about  the  bad  effects  of  drugs.  The  drug 
control  departments  in  the  Member  States  exchange  information  about  drugs 
traffic,  trade  and  control. 
CRIMINAL  INVESTIGATION. 
The  committee  conduct  special  studies  concerning  crimes  of  falsification  and 
forgery.  It  has  held  joined  training  courses  for  the  official  personnel  working  in 
this  field. 
AIRPORTS  SECURITY. 
Many  specialized  training  exercises  are  undertaken  jointly.  Security  operations  in 
the  Member  States'  airports  has  become  an  important  feature  of  G.  C.  C. 
Security(185).  The  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General  organized  the  first  common  course 
in  Britain  in  1989  and  the  second  in  France  in  1992. 
45 CHAPTER  ONE 
CIVIL  DEFENCE. 
This  committee  has  issued  recommendations  to  the  States'  Ministers  of  Interior, 
for  instance,  to  establish  a  unified  system  for  civil  defence  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Member 
States.  Studies  and  researches  are  exchanged  and  field  visits  are  made  between 
experts  in  the  sphere  of  civil  protection  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Member  States(186). 
PENAL  INSTITUTIONS. 
This  committee  endeavours  to  promote  the  efficiency  of  correctional  institutions 
(prisons)  and  to  approximate  policies  and  practices  in  these  institutions  in  the 
G.  C.  C.  Member  States.  It  is  also  a  function  of  this  committee  to  promote 
cooperation  and  coordination  among  the  competent  authorities  in  the  field  of  post- 
penal  responsibility  for  prisoners. 
CUSTOMHOUSE. 
The  committee  holds  periodical  meetings  in  order  to  promote  the  unification  of 
domestic  customs  control  systems  and  regulations  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Member  States. 
COMPUTER  SERVICES. 
Computer  facilities  in  the  various  Interior  Ministries  in  G.  C.  C.  Member  states 
connect  the  parallel  Departments  with  each  other.  Computer  facilities  are  used  for 
storing  the  information  related  to  Ministries  of  Interior(]  87)and  specialized 
functions. 
WEAPONS  AND  EXPLOSIVES. 
This  committee  holds  periodical  meetings  to  exchange  information  about  illegal 
smuggling  and  trade  in  weapons,  explosives  and  ammunitions.  Its  purpose  is  to 
create  a  special  system  for  the  control  of  weapons,  explosives,  and  ammunitions  in 
the  G.  C.  C.  member  States. 
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The  G.  C.  C.  Ministers  of  Interior  and  State  officials  responsible  for  security  have 
been  energetic  in  reaching  a  higher  level  of  coordination  between  the  States  in  the 
various  aspects  of  security.  This  is  vital  for  the  maintenance  of  stability  and 
security  of  the  political  systems  of  the  Gulf.  The  Supreme  Council  in  its  eighth 
session  of  1987  held  at  Riyadh(188),  approved  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security 
Strategy,  following  approval  by  the  G.  C.  C.  Ministers  of  Interior  at  the 
extraordinary  session  of  their  Committee  held  at  Muscat.  A  Comprehensive 
Security  Convention  was  approved  during  the  fifteenth  session  held  in  Manama  in 
1994.  Kuwait  and  Qatar  still  have  to  sign  this  convention(I  89).  This  is discussed  in 
Chapter  Three. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Member  States  have  established  rapid  deployment  forces  and  the 
"Peninsula  Shield".  Equipped  with  modern  weapons,  these  forces  are  convincing 
units  for  Gulf  defence.  The  G.  C.  C.  proposes  to  become  increasingly  reliant  on 
Gulf  military  expertise  and  self-sufficiency.  Programmes  for  joint  training  and 
field  exercises  were  promoted.  A  committee  of  Gulf  military  leaders  have  been 
established(19o). 
Co-operation  in  the  field  of  law  is  based  on  the  unification  of  laws  and 
coordination  between  the  legal  systems  of  the  Gulf  States.  The  common  source  of 
Islamic  law(Shari'ah)  provides  the  rationale  and  justification  for  seeking 
unification  of  law  among  the  Gulf  States  and  this  informs  the  many  studies  being 
undertaken  concerning  the  G.  C.  C.  States  legal  systems. 
Co-ordination  between  legislative  and  judicial  departments  in  the  Member  States 
aims  to  approximate  these  systems  gradually  to  form  a  unified  system  in  all  the 
Member  States.  The  most  important  advance  in  this  -field  is  approval  by  the 
G.  C.  C.  Ministers  of  Justice,  in  their  first  meeting  held  in  December  1982(19  i  ),  of 
the  Islamic  Shari'ah  as  the  common  source  of  legislation.  A  draft  convention, 
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concerning  the  implementation  of  judgments  and  judicial  delegation  is  under 
preparation. 
The  Secretariat-General  has  prepared  draft  laws  related  to  security  and  social  and 
economic  harmonization.  Numerous  "model  laws"  are  under  discussion  and 
preparation.  The  Secretariat  also  issues  a  periodical  law  publication,  Legal 
Bulletin.  This  is  distributed  to  all  member  States  and  information  centers.  Most 
importantly,  this  records  laws  promulgated  in  the  Member  States  pursuant  to  the 
resolutions  of  the  G.  C.  C.. 
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THE  C.  C.  C.  S,  CATIONS  WITH  REEiIONAL 
AND  INTERNATIONAL.  OREANIZATIONS. 
The  G.  C.  C.  has  relations  with  the  different  regional  and  international 
organizations.  High  level  visits  are  exchanged  with  other  organizations,  for 
instance  the  Organization  of  African  Unity.  The  G.  C.  C.  also  cooperates  with  other 
organizations,  such  as  the  European  Community,  with  which  it  signed  a  Co- 
operation  Treaty  in  June  1988.  The  G.  C.  C.  -E.  E.  C.  meetings  have  been  extended 
to  specialized  committees  formed  to  study  means  for  their  closer  cooperation(192). 
The  G.  C.  C.  is  diligent  in  its  relation  with  regional  and  international  organizations, 
particularly  those  which  conform  with  the  Council's  purposes  and  principles. 
While,  there  are  many  organizations  which  have  relations  with  the  G.  C.  C., 
reference  will  be  confined  to  relations  with  The  League  of  Arab  States  and  the 
United  Nations  Organization. 
The  G.  C.  C.  and  the  League  of  Arab  States(LAS)  have  a  strong  relations  since  the 
LAS  is  thought  of  as  a  "parent"  Arab  organization.  The  G.  C.  C.  Charter  agrees 
with  L.  A.  S.  Charter  in  its  stated  endeavour  to  achieve  similar  purposes(i93).  These 
are  articulated  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter  Preamble: 
"Having  the  conviction  that  co-ordination,  cooperation,  and  integration  between  them 
serve  the  sublime  objectives  of  the  Arab  Nation;  " 
The  G.  C.  C.  States  each  had  relations  with  the  LAS  before  the  establishment  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  In  fact,  Saudi  Arabia  was  among  the  founders  of  the  LAS  which  was 
established  in  1945(194);  Kuwait  requested  the  membership  of  the  League  after 
getting  independence(i  95),  and  became  a  member  of  LAS  in  July  1961.  Qatar, 
Bahrain,  U.  A.  E.  and  Oman  Sultanate  joined  the  LAS  in  the  year  of  their 
independence,  1971. 
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The  Secretariat-General  has  reinforced  relation  with  LAS  starting  in  1984,  since  it 
represented  the  Council  by  diplomatic  missions  to  the  temporary  headquarters  of 
LAS  in  Tunis(196).  The  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General  exchanges  documents  and 
information  with  the  League  and  the  Council's  visits  intensified  after  the  Iraqi 
invasion  of  Kuwait.  The  Heads  of  G.  C.  C.  States  stress  the  importance  of  Arab 
Unity  and  their  emancipation  from  foreign  occupation  or  aggression  at  their  end  of 
Summit  `communiques'.  The  G.  C.  C.  States  have  adopted  a  positive  role  in 
financing  developmental  economic.  projects  in  Arab  States.  they  lighten  debt 
burdens,  even  rescinding  debts  owed  by  some  Arab  States(197). 
It  is  established  in  international  law  that  all  international  treaties,  including  of 
course  the  Charters  of  regional  and  other  international  bodies,  shall  be  registered 
with  the  United  Nations(198).  The  G.  C.  C.  has  confirmed  its  relations  with  the  Arab 
League  by  similarity  registering  the  Charter  with  this  organization(199). 
The  UN  is  the  central  and  in  many  ways  the  umbrella  international  organization. 
The  G.  C.  C.,  regional  organization,  was  established  within  the  framework  of 
Chapter  Eight  of  the  UN  Charter.  Moreover  the  purposes  and  objectives  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  agree  with  the  UN(200).  The  G.  C.  C.  's  basic  principles  match  those  of  the 
UN.  The  G.  C.  C.  Member  States  are  members  of  the  UN,  Saudi  Arabia  was  among 
the  founder  nations  of  the  UN  in  1945.  It  was  at  the  time  the  only  independent 
G.  C.  C.  State(2o1),  thus  it  participated  in  the  work  of  the  San  Francisco 
Conference(2o2).  Kuwait  secured  independence  two  years  before  joining  the  UN  in 
May  19.63.  This  delay  was  caused  by  the  Soviet  objection  to  the  Kuwaiti  request 
for  UN  membership,  other  G.  C.  C.  States  joined  the  UN  immediately  after  their 
independence  a  decade  later. 
The  G.  C.  C.  contribution  to  the  UN  budget  (1994)  was  1.53%,  this  is  similar  to 
countries  such  as  Australia  and  Netherlands.  Saudi  Arabia  leads  the  G.  C.  C.  States 
in  the  contribution  in  the  UN  budget  of  0.96%,  next  Kuwait  contributes  0.25%, 
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U.  A.  E.  0.21%,  Qatar  0.05%,  and  Oman  and  Bahrain  0.03%  each(2o3).  G.  C.  C. 
States  have  assumed  many  positions  in  the  UN  systems  particularly  Kuwait,  Saudi 
Arabia  and  U.  A.  E.  (2o4),  demonstrating  both  commitment  and  influence  in  the 
organization. 
There  is  a  clear  relationship  between  the  UN  and  G.  C.  C.  with  regard  to  peace- 
keeping  and  international  security.  The  G.  C.  C.,  through  diplomatic  means, 
endeavour  to  settle  disputes  in  many  countries.  It  also  aims,  within  the  framework 
of  the  Gulf  security  arrangements,  to  keep  the  Gulf  region  free  from  international 
conflicts. 
The  G.  C.  C.  has  shown  keen  support  for  the  programmes  of  UN  agencies.  The 
G.  C.  C.  Secretary-General,  in  24  February  1986,  signed  the  UN  special  declaration 
related  to  the  comprehensive  inoculation  of  children  by  1990.  He  also  declared  the 
G.  C.  C.  's  support  of  UNICEF(2o5)  in 
purposes. 
achieving  its  important  humanitarian 
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1)  The  General  Secretary  registered  the  fundamental  statute  with  the  UN  Secretariat  on  20 
September  1982,  in  accordance  with  art.  102  of  the  UN.  Charter.  The  certificate  of 
registration  No  29203  done  at  New  York  on  20  August  1986.  The  Same  document  was 
registered  with  the  Arab  League  Secretariat  on  29  December  1982.  See:  26  ILM(1987), 
PP.  1138-1143. 
2)  The  UN  Charter,  art.  52(1),  (2)&(3). 
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Overview",  edt.  In  Sandwick  John,  The  Gulf  Co-operation  Council.  Westview  Press, 
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CHAPTER  TWO 
THE  EFFECT  OF  ULF  WARS  ON 
ELec.  C.,  SE.  CU 
i  1. 
Y 
The  Gulf  Co-operation  Council  was  seriously  affected  by  the  out-break  of 
the  Iraq-Kuwait  war.  The  effect  of  this  was  to  expedite  the  approval  of  the  Gulf 
Security  Convention  and  its  eventual  ratification.  The  Convention  itself  was  the 
subject  of  discussion  and  negotiation  between  the  Member  States  for  more  than  a 
decade  after  the  foundation  of  the  Council.  Final  approval  and  ratification  (by  four 
of  the  six  Member  States)  was  achieved  at  the  end  of  1994. 
Many  important  questions  are  raised.  For  example,  why  was  the  Security 
Convention  approved  only  after  the  Second  (Iraqi-Kuwaiti)  Gulf  War?.  Secondly, 
if  there  is  a  connection  between  the  conclusion  of  the  Security  Convention  and  the 
Second  Gulf  War,  then  what  is  the  role  of  the  First  Iran-Iraq  Gulf  War?. 
In  this  study  we  trace  the  effect  of  the  First  and  Second  Gulf  Wars  on  the  internal 
and  external  security  of  the  Gulf  region.  The  two  events  together  exerted  a  strong 
influence  on  decision-making  in  the  Gulf. 
The  Iran-Iraq  War  was  primarily  caused  by  the  issue  of  supremacy  over  the 
Shaft  Al-Arab  waterway(1),  the  river  separating  Iran  and  Iraq.  It  extends  from  the 
confluence  of  the  Dijia  and  Forat  rivers  to  Gulf  Cape.  The  two  countries  signed  a 
treaty  in  1937(2)  by  which  they  agreed  that  control  over  this  region  would  rest  in 
Iraq  provided,  however,  that  Iraq  guaranteed  freedom  of  Iranian  navigation  on  the 
river.  It  was  also  agreed  that  control  of  Abdan  Island  and  other  Islands  near  to  the 
eastern  bank  would  be  given  over  to  Iran. 
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Iran  tried  to  disclaim  this  treaty.  It  sought  to  apply  the  principle  established  in 
International  Law  whereby  an  imaginary  boundary  line  is  drawn  in  the  middle  of 
the  river.  Consequently,  the  Shah  of  Iran  annulled  the  treaty  of  1969(3).  Iraq 
resisted  this  and  the  Iranian  Government  responded  by  encouraging  the  Kurdish 
Revolution  to  destabilize  the  internal  security  of  Iraq.  However,  the  Iraqi 
Government  signed  a  peace  treaty  with  the  Kurds  in  1970(4)  granting  self- 
autonomy  intending  thereby  to  stabilize  the  internal  situation  in  Iraq.  However,  the 
Iraqi  government  procrastinated  in  the  implementation  of  this  treaty(5),  Iran 
continued  supporting  the  Kurds  until  Iraq  submitted  to  the  Iranian  request 
concerning  Shatt  Al-Arab.  An  agreement  was  ratified  in  Algiers  in  1975(6),  as  a 
marginal  event  at.  the 
. 
OPEC  Presidents'  meeting.  Saddam  Hussein,  then  vice- 
President  of  the  Iraqi  Republic,  and  the  Shah  of  Iran  were  the  signatories. 
When  the  Islamic  Iranian  Revolution  replaced  the  Shah's  regime  in  Iran  in  1979 
Saddam  Hussein  pursued  hostilities  against  Iran,  profiting  from  the  internal 
troubles  of  the  country.  He  also  sought  to  ensure  that  the  Iranian  revolution  would 
not  support  the  Shiite  unrest  in  Iraq(i). 
The  Iran-Iraq  war  broke  out  in  September  1980.  Iraqi  troops  won  victories  at  the 
beginning  of  the  War,  but  the  Iranians  were  to  regain  the  territories  occupied  by 
Iraq.  Some  states  and  international  organization  proposed  mediation  to  end  the 
War;  the  Iranian  Government  refused  any  mediation  without  the  implementation 
of  its  conditions  which  were  also  rejected  by  the  Iraqi  Government(8).  That  is  why 
the  war  continued  up  to  1987  though  the  belligerents  signed  a  cease-fire  in  1985. 
Iranian  troops  occupied  the  Iraqi  Fao  Peninsula  in  April  1988.  Therefore,  in 
regaining  this  territory  the  War  ended  up  without  a  victory  for  either  of  the 
belligerents,  and  both  parties  reached  a  cease-fire  accord  in  August  20,1988(9) 
under  international  supervision. 
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Though  the  belligerents  are  not  members  of  G.  C.  C.  (io),  the  war  has  had  dramatic 
effects  on  the  G.  C.  C..  The  effects  are  twofold,  positive  and  negative.  As  for  the 
negative  effects  on  internal  G.  C.  C.  security,  the  situation  was  unstable, 
particularly  if  we  take  into  account  the  large  proportion  of  Shiites(i  i)  in  the  G.  C.  C. 
countries.  As  such,  the  Shiites  would  naturally  support  the  Islamic  Revolution  in 
Iran,  and  resist  the  policies  of  their  governments.  Further,  their  aim  was  to 
"export"  the  revolution  to  these  countries  which  explains  the  number  of  security 
troubles  particularly  in  Bahrain  which  witnessed  violent  demonstrations  in 
December  1981(12).  The  manifestations  had  the  potential  to  turn  into  a  "coup 
d'etat"  if  Saudi  Arabia  had  not  intervened  to  re-establish  political  order(13). 
Among  the  G.  C.  C.  states,  Kuwait  suffered  particularly  from  the  continuation  of 
War  as  Iran  considered  Kuwait  as  a  strong  ally  of  Iraq.  Consequently,  there  were 
explosions  in  places  throughout  Kuwait(14),  Some  petroleum  depositories  were 
destroyed(15),  and  a  number  of  violent  disturbances  occurred  in  June  and  August 
1981(16)  and  September  1982.  These  activities  increased  in  December  1983;  and 
in  May  1985,  the  Kuwaiti  Crown  Prince  became  the  target  of  a  failed  murder 
attempt.  At  this  time,  there  were  many  secret  cells  aiming  to  overthrow  the 
governing  system  in  Kuwaiti  7). 
The  War  increased  the  superpowers(18)  involvement  in  Gulf  regional  affairs, 
particularly  in  the  militarization  of  facilities  in  the  Gulf  region  and  neighbouring 
regions.  As  a  consequence,  American  weapons  exports  increased  as  compared  to 
the  pre-War  period(i  9).  The  developmental  activities  of  the  region  were  slowed 
down  by  the  increased  militarization  and  the  financial  assistance,  allowances  and 
credits  granted  to  the  Iraqi  Government  when  Iran  revealed  its  intention  of 
bringing  an  end  to  the  war.  Because  of  this  the  G.  C.  C.  states,  particularly  Saudi 
Arabia  and  Kuwait,  changed  their  attitude  from  neutrality  to  one  of  support  for 
Iraq  when  Iranian  leaders  publicly  showed  their  eagerness  towards  these  states  and 
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attempted  to  export  the  Shiite  Revolution  there.  The  continuation  of  the  War 
increased  the  reliance  on  petroleum  reserves  to  meet  these  expenses(2o). 
Moreover,  navigation  in  the  region  was  disrupted  because  of  missile  attacks  on 
Kuwaiti  tankers.  Therefore,  the  Kuwaiti  Government  decreed  that  the  Kuwaiti 
tankers  would  fly  the  American  flag  to  avoid  such  missile  attacks(21). 
As  for  the  positive  side  of  the  War,  internal  unstable  conditions  led  to  the  G.  C.  C. 
Countries  increasing  coordination  between  themselves(22)  in  security  matters  to 
safeguard  their  respective  governing  systems  and  increase  regional  stability  in 
general.  They,  therefore,  concluded  bilateral  security  conventions  between  Saudi 
Arabia  and  the  other  G.  C.  C.  member  States(23). 
These  bilateral  security  conventions  were  not  sufficient  to  meet  the  needs  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  states,  and  they  started  looking  for  a  joint  security  formula  to  act  as  a 
unified  Gulf  security  strategy. 
Among  the  joint  security  convention  projects,  the  project  proposed  in  1984 
defined  the  means  for  security  cooperation  among  the  G.  G.  C.  security  systems  to 
promote  the  preservation  of  internal  security  and  deal  with  any  possible  foreign 
threat.  Security  cooperation  also  dealt  with  combating  crime,  illegal  entry, 
smuggling,  and  the  pursuit  and  extradition  of  criminals(24). 
Though  reservations  were  expressed  by  some  Governments  over  the  draft 
proposals,  they  reached,  after  a  long  terra  study,  a  preliminarily  agreement  at  the 
Riyadh  Summit  of  December  1987(25),  namely  the  Unified  Gulf  Security  Strategic 
Project  which  would  be  free  from  the  reservations  stated,  in  the  previous  project. 
Besides  security  coordination,  the  G.  C.  C.  States  moved  towards  democratic 
measures  designed  to  lighten  security  burdens  caused  by  the  then  current  troubles. 
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One  of  the  more  prominent  measures  was  the  one  put  forward  by  the  Kuwait 
Government  which  held  parliamentary  elections  in  February  1985  and  formed  the 
sixth  Kuwaiti  parliament  assembly(26). 
As  for  the  positive  effects  of  war  on  defence,  the  war  was  an  incentive  to  expedite 
the  establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C.,  though  the  idea  had  been  muted  before  that  time, 
and  to  form  a  forum  that  would  include  the  War's  belligerents  and  the  main  super- 
powers  of  the  Gulf  region.  The  war,  therefore,  encouraged  the  G.  C.  C.  countries  to 
establish  the  Peninsula  Shield.  In  spite  of  it  being  a  largely  symbolic  force,  it 
represents  the  potential  nucleus  of  a  Unified  Gulf  Army. 
With  regard  to  the  militarization  of  the  G.  C.  C.  States,  each  state  spent  a  lot  on  the 
modernization  of  its  military  arsenals  and  the  development  of  its  forces  in  an 
attempt  to  preserve  external  security  which  in  turn  had  a  great  effect  on  internal 
security. 
In  fact,  Saudi  Arabia  received  five  AWACS  from  the  US  in  1981(27).  In  June 
1984,  these  aircraft  detected  Iranian  spy  aircraft  attempting  to  enter  Saudi  air 
space  and  succeeded  in  shooting  down  an  Iranian  "Phantom"  aircraft(28),  forcing 
Iran  to  abandon  future  missions.  Saudi  Arabia  also  bought  Chinese  long  range 
missiles  capable  of  reaching  Iraqi  and  Iranian  territories(29).  Further 
reconnaissance  aircraft  and  electronic  radar  networks  were  also  acquired  in  the 
region  to  counter  Iranian  threat  to  navigation(30). 
The  G.  C.  C.  was  affected,  to  a  great  extent,  by  the  First  Gulf  War  even  though  not 
a  party  to  it.  The  situation  was  aggravated  in  the  Second  Gulf  War  as  the  G.  C.  C. 
was  a  major  party  and  therefore,  any  ensuing  effects  served  only  to  intensify  those 
consequences  of  the  First  Gulf  War. 
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The  out-break  of  the  Second  Gulf  War  can  be  seen  to  be  due  to  Iraq's  insistence 
not  to  withdraw  its  forces  from  occupied  Kuwait  in  August  1990(31).  The 
occupation  lasted  seven  months  during  which  Iraq  refused  all  attempts  to  end  the 
crisis  through  mediation,  nor  did  Iraq  comply  with  the  appropriate  Security 
Council  Resolutions.  In  this  context,  the  Security  Council  issued  its  Resolution  No 
678  of  November  29,1990,  the  G.  C.  C.  gave  Iraq  a  window  of  opportunity,  (up  to 
mid-January  1991),  to  comply  with  Security  Council  Resolutions.  If  Iraq  failed  to 
do  so,  the  International  Coalition  Force(ICF),  based  in  the  region,  was  "authorised" 
to  "take  necessary  measures  "  to  make  Iraq  submit  to  the  resolutions.  Because  of 
the  Iraqi  Government's  obstinacy(32)  and  refusal  to  comply,  war  was  declared  on 
January  17,1991  followed  by  an  ICF  air  attack.  The  consequences  were  dramatic 
for  Iraq  and  the  terrestrial  war  was  soon  over(33). 
The  consistent  and  united  G.  C.  C.  front  played  an  important  role  at  the  outset  of 
the  crisis.  Security  riots  and  demonstrations  were  expected  to  occur  because  of  the 
presence  of  the  "west"  in  the  region.  However,  the  seriousness  of  the  Iraqi  threat 
helped  in  the  prevention  of  such  occurrences. 
The  Second  Gulf  War  ended  with  victory  for  the  ICF  over  Iraq  which  submitted  to 
those  Security  Council  Resolutions  relating  to  the  conflict(34).  The  war  ended  but 
its  impact  still  exerts  a  strong  influence  because  of  the  immense  infrastructural 
damage  caused  in  Iraq  and  Kuwait  in  particular  and  to  a  lesser  degree  in  G.  C.  C. 
States  and  neighbouring  countries. 
In  Iraq,  the  main  victims  of  the  Iraqi  leaders  aggressive  posturing  was  the 
population  in  general  and  the  war  inflicted  a  great  many  civilian  casualties.  As  a 
direct  consequence,  the  Iraqi  people  revolted.  Thus  the  Shiites(35)  in  the  South 
rioted  against  the  Government  and  occupied  some  regions  in  the  South(36).  They 
were  swiftly  put  down  by  Iraq  which  used  aircraft  capable  of  chemical  attacks. 
68 CHAPTER  TWO 
Those  territories  occupied  by  the  Shiites  were  regained  and  the  Shiites  themselves 
were  on  the  verge  of  being  exterminated  without  some  international  intervention. 
The  Kurds  (37)  in  the  North  profiting  from  the  defeat  of  Iraqi  troops  organized  a 
demonstration  in  March  1991(38).  They  occupied  police  stations  and  other 
government  buildings  in  an  attempt  to  revenge  themselves  on  Iraqi  Government 
retaliation  operations  carried  out  against  them  in  the  past.  Prominent  among  them 
all  is  the  incidents  of  Halbaja  in  1988(39).  To  realize  their  hope  of  implementing 
the  1970  Treaty,  Iraqi  forces  launched  air  attacks  against  the  Kurds.  To  avoid  their 
obliteration,  the  Security  Council  issued  its  Resolution  No  688  which  condemned 
the  Iraqi  Government  aggression  over  their  nationals  and  urged  the  Iraqi 
Government  to  provide  the  Kurds  in  the  north  with  humanitarian  relief  aid. 
American  and  Western  troops  set  up  refugee  camps  and  security  zones  for  the 
Kurds  in  the  North(4o). 
As  for  living  conditions  in  Iraq,  which  have  an  effect  on  internal  security  matters, 
the  economic  situation  increasingly  deteriorated  after  the  War,  and  the  Iraqi  Dinar 
reached  its  lowest  level  ever  because  of  the  economic  embargo  imposed  on  Iraq, 
and  which  is  still  in  effect  today.  There  was  increased  economic  disarray  and  a 
surge  in  crime,  representing  an  ever-present  danger  for  the  Iraqi  population.  The 
situation  forced  many  Iraqis  to  flee  to  neighbouring  States(41).  The  G.  C.  C.  states, 
because  of  their  geographic  proximity,  were  the  destination  of  many  Iraqis  fleeing 
from  the  worsening  conditions  in  Iraq(42). 
The  occupation  of  Kuwait  and  the  War  that  followed  affected  the  Gulf  region,  the 
G.  C.  C.  countries  and  more  particularly  Kuwait  which  was  occupied  during  most 
of  the  war.  During  this  time  Kuwaiti  and  non-national  residents  in  Kuwait  were 
victims  of  all  kinds  of  torture  in  particular  members  of  Kuwaiti  resistance. 
The  Iraqi  troops  engaged  in  looting  and  the  general  destruction  of  private  and 
public  property(43).  They  committed  all  kinds  of  atrocities(44)  since  there  was  no 
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internal  security  at  that  time.  They  turned  schools  and  sport  clubs  into  military 
barracks.  The  most  dangerous  act  committed  by  Iraqi  troops  was  the  burning  of  oil 
wells(45)  and  pouring  petroleum  into  Gulf  waters  causing  devastating 
environmental  pollution  in  the  Gulf  and  neighbouring  regions  from  which  they 
will  suffer  for  decades  to  come  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  different  bodies  and 
organizations  concerned  with  the  environment  to  eliminate  the  consequences  of 
this  ecological  catastrophe  or  at  least  to  lessen  its  effects(46). 
There  was  also  the  problem  of  the  Kuwaiti  prisoners  detained  by  the  Iraqi 
Government(47).  The  problem  that  preoccupied  Kuwait  (together  with  the 
existence  of  the  same  Iraqi  dictatorship  headed  by  Saddam  Hussein)  was  the 
unsolved  Iraq-Kuwait  boundary  demarcation  by  an  international  Committee,  and 
the  throngs  of  Iraqi  troops  along  the  Iraqi-Kuwait  borders  as  of  October  1994(48). 
Such  critical  issues  were  the  main  obstacle  towards  the  Arab  "entente"  called  for 
by  some  Arab  leaders  and  the  main  causes  of  Arab  discord  which  predicts  the  out- 
break  of  the  conflict  once  again. 
As  for  the  Kuwaiti  post-war  political  scene,  it  is  now  more  than  ever  in  need  of 
increased  democracy.  The  population  demanded  a  calling  to  account  of  defaulters 
and  those  responsible  for  their  being  occupied  by  Iraq.  Both  Kuwaiti  leaders  and 
the  population  were  preoccupied  with  post  war  deterioration  of  the  economy.  This 
was  in  turn  exploited  by  the  opposition.  On  the  first  day  of  the  Kuwait's 
liberation,  a  crisis  erupted  between  the  authorities  and  the  opposition.  As  a 
consequence,  the  Custom  Laws  were  declared(49),  increasing  the  influence  of  the 
popular  opposition  and  leading  to  the  standing  down  of  the  Kuwaiti  Government 
in  20  March  1991.  The  Kuwaiti  Government  took  additional  measures  to  reduce 
popular  tension  and  disturbances  in  the  country(50). 
Concerning  the  effect  of  the  war  on  the  internal  security  of  Kuwait,  violence 
increased  dramatically.  Many  citizens  still  held  an  approximately  100,000  items  of 
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weaponry  (51  in  spite  of  the  Government's  frequent  request  that  citizens  hand  them 
in.  Shooting  police  agents  became  frequent,  crime  and  the  escape  of  the  convicted 
persons  to  G.  C.  C.  States  also  increased.  Drug-taking  and  murder  also  rose 
sharply.  Comparing  the  1992  to  1989  statistics,  one  notices  that  crime  of  theft 
proportionally  increased  by  9.3%,  delicts  by  5.5%,  assault  by  52.7%.  New  crime 
came  the  forefront,  such  as  rape  and  drug  dealing.  The  divorce  rate  increased  from 
1928  before  the  war  to  2193  in  the  post-war(52). 
The  War  caused  huge  financial  losses  exceeding  $240  billion(53),  most  of  which 
was  incurred  by  Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait.  Such  material  loss  led  to  the 
contraction  of  Kuwaiti.  assistance  to  some  Arab  States  and  a  decrease  in  living 
standards  as  compared  to  the  pre-war  situation.  These  losses  were  further 
compounded  by  the  military  expenditure  of  the  war(54). 
In  Saudi  Arabia(55),  the  second  State  in  G.  C.  C.  to  be  affected  by  the  crisis,  the 
State  faced  destabilization  from  the  throng  of  Iraqi  troops  on  Saudi  borders  and 
the  menace  of  infiltration  into  Saudi  territory  of  destructive  elements  to  destabilize 
internal  security.  Therefore,  Saudi  Arabia  allotted  substantial  amounts  to  ICF 
expenses  and  the  construction  of  camps  for  refugees(56). 
Saudi  Arabia  was  estimated  to  have  lost  in  this  war  $64  billion(57),  and  it  is  the 
first  time  the  country  resorted  to  debt  aid  from  financial  institutions.  The 
deficit  reached  $34  billion  in  1991  compared  to  between  $6(58)  and  $9  billion  in 
1990(59). 
In  Bahrain,  one  notices  that  the  financial  markets,  which  represents  15%  of  the 
gross  domestic  product,  were  harmed  by  the  provisional  closing  of  the  financial 
and  commercial  institutions,  with  knock-on  social  consequences(60).  This  again 
resulted  in  the  demand  for  increased  political  representation  in  the  governing 
institutions  of  the  country. 
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In  Qatar,  the  prominent  post-war  change  was  the  taking  control  of  the  Qatari 
Government  by  Sheik  Hamad  Ben  Khalifa  Al-Taani  after  dethroning  his  father  in 
an  attempt  "to  correct  political  imbalances"  within  the  country. 
In  Oman,  some  terrorist  cells,  profiting  from  the  prevalent  conditions,  targeted  the 
state'  security  and  its  political  institutions(61).  Some  of  them  demanded 
participation  in  the  governing  of  the  country. 
In  UAE,  $2  billions  were  transferred  in  August  1990,  causing  the  destabilization 
of  the  Gulf  monetary  market(62).  Its  action was  carried  out  in  reparation  for  some 
states  which  suffered  from  the  Iraqi  occupation  of  Kuwait.  It  further  dropped 
outstanding  debts  of  some  countries. 
The  war  also  helped  to  re-open  Gulf  State  border  problems.  Among  the  more 
serious  incidents  is  the  Iranian  occupation  of  three  UAE  islands,  the  Qatar- 
Bahrain(63)  border  conflict  and  the  Saudi-Qatar  border  conflict(64)  which  led  to 
Qatar  boycott  G.  C.  C.  Ministerial  Council  meetings  for  a  period  of  time. 
The  Iraq-Kuwait  conflict  not  only  effected  the  main  belligerents  and  other  G.  C.  C. 
States,  but  also  its  effects  extended  to  include  many  neighbouring  countries.  For 
instance,  Syria,  because  of  its  attitude  towards  the  conflict  and  compliance  to 
International  Law  (65),  regained  its  place  within  the  Arab  ranks.  However  its 
budget  suffered  due  to  militarization  in  its  attempt  to  create  a  strategic  equilibrium 
with  Israel  and  because  of  the  reduction  of  income  transferred  home  by  its 
nationals  residing  in  the  G.  C.  C.  countries(66).  These  conditions  represented  a 
burden  on  the  Syrian  economy  affected  internal  conditions. 
Jordan's  relationship  with  the  G.  C.  C.  states  was  disturbed  because  of  the 
Jordanian  attitude  towards  the  conflict.  It  lost  assistance  from  the  G.  C.  C.  states, 
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and  was  harmed  by  the  return  of  Jordanian  workers  from  G.  C.  C.  countries  and 
non-national  workers  residing  in  Iraq  and  Kuwait.  This  situation  represented  a 
heavy  burden  on  the  Jordanian  Government(67),  Many  demonstrations  were  held, 
in  Jordan,  in  support  of  the  Iraqi  Policy  against  the  ICF.  The  Jordanian 
Government  was  forced  to  drift  along  with  public  opinion  to  avoid  internal  riots. 
As  for  the  Palestinian  situation(68),  the  Iraq-Kuwait  conflict  occurred  at  the  time  of 
the  Palestinian  'Intifada'.  and  it  was  an  appropriate  opportunity  for  Israeli 
Government,  under  the  leadership  of  Yitzhak  Shamir,  to  oppress  and  to 
exterminate  Palestinian  `Intifada'  as  witnessed  in  the  carnage  at  Al-Qods  on  8 
October  1990.  This  was  followed  by  other  massacres  in  Gaza  and  the  West 
Bank(69).  Moshe  Arens,  Isreali  Minister  of  Defence  also  declared  that  Israel  would 
continue  its  occupation  of  Lebanese  territories.  Israel  profited  from  being  targeted 
by  Iraqi  Scud  Missiles(7o).  Israel  stated  they  would  not  reply  to  such  Iraqi  attacks 
and  would  show  self-restraint(71)  as  required  by  the  American  administration  and 
other  Western  powers.  This  was  in  response  to  the  threat  posed  to  the  ICF  caused 
by  the  influence  of  internal  public  opinion  of  Arab  States  parties(72)  in  the  ICF  in 
the  event  of  Israeli  retaliation.  Consequently,  Israel  received  "Patriot"  missiles 
along  with  their  operation  systems;  Israel  also  received  grants  and  assistance  from 
US  and  EC  countries(73). 
The  Palestinians  suffered  due  to  the  PLO's  attitude  towards  the  conflict.  Kuwait 
evicted  the  "Palestinian  population  undesirable  "traitors  ""(74)  adding  further 
obstacles  to  the  Palestinian  peace  process(75). 
The  Iraq-Kuwait  conflict  did  have  positive  benefits  for  the  PLO.  The  holding  of  an 
International  Peace  Conference  in  the  Middle  East  resulted  in  lightening  the 
criticism  of  American  Policy  which  dealt  with  some  affairs  and  neglected  others. 
Consequently,  there  was  some  improvement  in  the  Israeli-PLO  Peace  Process 
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which,  in  turn,  led  to  the  "Oslo  Declaration  of  Principles"  treaty,  signed  in 
September  1993(76). 
j  Not  only  did  Israel  profit  from  this  conflict,  but  Iran  also  did.  In  mid-August  1990, 
Iraq  declared  its  compliance  with  the  Algiers  Agreement  signed  by  both  states  in 
1975.  This  concession  was  intended  to  gain  the  sympathy  and  support  of  Iran(77), 
yet  Iran  stuck  to  its  neutral  stance  that  helped  improve,  to  certain  extent,  G.  C.  C.  - 
Iranian  relations(78). 
Concerning  Turkey(79),  it  has  lost  a  great  deal  because  of  its  extensive  commercial 
and  economic  relations  with  Iraq(so).  Turkey  moved  its  forces  to  its  southern 
borders,  it  being  considered  a  NATO  member(8  i),  there  was  a  variance  among  the 
Turkish  leadership(82)  concerning  cooperation  with  the  ICF  which  caused  internal 
instability  in  relation  to  the  Kurd  crisis.  As  a  result  Turkish  troops  penetrated 
many  kilometers  into  Northern  Iraq  to  pursue  members  of  the  Kurdish  Labor 
party(83). 
As  far  as  Yemen  is  concerned  and  because  of  the  Yemeni  attitude  towards  the 
conflict,  it  has  lost  the  transfer  of  income  home  by  Yemeni  workers  in  Saudi 
Arabia.  They  represented  the  largest  group  of  expatriate  workers(84)  in  Saudi 
Arabia  and  the  Saudi  Government  requested  they  legalize  their  residence  status  as 
Arab  workers  in  the  Kingdom,  Saudi  Arabia  wanted  to  control  security  matters 
whenever  a  Yemeni  national  resident  in  the  Kingdom  intended  to  support  his 
government  attitude  towards  the  conflict;  consequently,  many  Yemeni  returned  to 
their  home  country. 
In  spite  of  the  shock  that  struck  Yemeni  unity,  causing  a  civil  war  between  north 
and  south  Yemen,  (a  war  that  took  thousands  of  Yemeni  lives(85)),  Yemen 
recovered  but  with  a  deep  wound  that  harboured  the  out-break  of  conflict  once 
again. 
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The  positive  effects  of  the  Second  Gulf  War  can  be  seen  in  the  G.  C.  C.  's 
endeavours  to  bring  the  proposals  and  resolutions  of  the  security  convention  into 
practice.  They  thus  re-drafted  the  security  convention  into  a  unified  draft  within 
the  framework  of  various  security  fields  to  be  coordinated  by  the  G.  C.  C..  After 
marathon  negotiations,  the  Security  Convention  was  signed  by  G.  C.  C.  Interior 
Ministers  (excepting  those  of  Kuwait  and  Qatar),  in  Riyadh  on  28  November 
1994. 
This  Security  Convention  represents  the  main  pillar  in  the  implementation  of  the 
security  strategy  signed  in  1987(86).  It  is  certainly  realizable  as  there  is  a  harmony 
in  the  G.  C.  C.  states'  general  structure  enabling  competent  authorities  to  enact 
appropriate  collective  resolutions. 
The  G.  C.  C.  states  established  constitutional  institutions  to  widen  popular 
participation  in  the  management  of  their  affairs.  In  fact,  Saudi  Arabia  formed  the 
Consultative  Council,  the  Provinces  Councils  and  the  governing  rules  of 
procedure  were  declared.  After  the  conflict,  the  Oman  Sultanate  established  a 
Consultative  Council,  the  same  occurred  in  Bahrain  when  the  Prime  Minister 
endorsed  the  return  of  the  Bahraini  Parliament  that  had  been  dissolved  in  1975(87). 
As  for  external  security  coordination,  because  of  its  reciprocal  relationship  with 
internal  security,  G.  C.  C.  States,  along  with  Egypt  and  Syria,  participated  in  the 
"Damascus  Declaration  "(88)  ending  with  the  military  coordination  between 
G.  C.  C.  states,  Egypt  and  Syria.  This  was  to  satisfy  internal  public  opinion  that 
requested  an  Arab  security  protection  force.  There  would,  therefore,  be  Egyptian 
and  Syrian  forces  permanently  in  the  Gulf  region  which  would  represent  the 
nucleus  of  an  Arab  Peace  Force(89)to  protect  security  in  the  Gulf.  However,  the 
Iranian  position  (9o)  towards  the  Declaration  made  the  G.  C.  C.  states  change  a 
basic  principle  of  this  Declaration.  As  such,  the  presence  of  this  force  in  the  Gulf 
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region  and  its  use  would  be  related  to  the  perceived  needs  of  the  G.  C.  C..  As  a 
consequence,  some  G.  C.  C.  states  ratified  defense  treaties  with  the  superpowers  to 
protect  them  from  external  threats.  Kuwait  and  US  signed  a  Defense  Treaty  on 
September  1991(91),  Bahrain  did  the  same  with  the  US  in  October  1991  and  with 
Great  Britain  in  July  1992(92). 
Moreover,  the  G.  C.  C.  States  developed  its  capabilities  and  training  on  modem 
weapons  and  increased  the  number  of  these  armies  comparatively  with  the  pre-war 
period. 
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THE  (i, 
". 
C.  C..  SECURM?  r 
CONVEAMON 
The  idea  of  security  coordination  between  the  G.  C.  C.  States  started  long  ago. 
Saudi  Arabia  ratified  a  treaty  with  the  Kuwait  Sheikdom  in  1942(1).  The  idea  for 
security  coordination  emerged  gradually  due  to  the  contemporary  political  and 
security  events  in  the  Gulf  region  in  particular,  and  in  the  Middle  East  in  general. 
One  notes  that  the  military  conflicts  in  the  region  led  directly  to  the  G.  C.  C.  States' 
comprehensive  security  cooperation. 
His  excellency  Sheikh  Mohammed  Al  Khalifa,  Bahraini  Minister  of  Interior 
declared  that:  "the  idea  of  the  comprehensive.  Security  Convention  emanated 
during  the  1  S`  Conference  of  the  Arab  Ministers  of  Interior  in  1977  in  Egypt,  the 
Gulf  Ministers  of  Interior  met  in  the  residence  of  Sheikh  SaadAssabah,  the  then 
Minister  of  Interior,  we  all  agreed  to  actually  consider  the  issue  "(2). 
Later  on  the  -  project  was  concretized  in  1982(3)  within  the  framework  of  a 
comprehensive  security  strategy.  It  is  noteworthy  that  there  has  been  security 
cooperation  between  the  Gulf  States  before  the  conclusion  of  the  Security 
Convention  and  before  the  establishment  of  G.  C.  C..  H.  R.  H.  Prince  Ahmed  Ben 
Abdul  Aziz,  the  Saudi  Vice-Minister  of  Interior,  declares  that:  "the  security 
cooperation  between  the  Gulf  States  was  in  existence  for  a  long  time  basically 
because  of  the  religious,  social,  cultural  and  other  bonds  "(4). 
It  is  noteworthy  that  this  strategy  was  proposed  firstly  by  Saudi  Arabia(5).  Bahrain 
later  required  that  the  Bahrain-Saudi  Arabia  bilateral  convention  would  be 
adopted  and  extended  to  the  other  member  States.  The  Bahraini  proposal  was 
discussed  during  the  first  meeting  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Interior  Ministers  in  February 
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1982  in  Riyadh.  They  considered  the  bilateral  treaties  signed  by  Saudi  Arabia  with 
other  G.  C.  C.  member  States  as  the  minimum  level  of  cooperation  in  the  security 
field  and  as  a  complementary  part  to  the  Security  Convention.  That  is  what  Sheikh 
Fahem  Al-Kassimi,  the  Secretary-General  of  the  G.  C.  C.,  assured  the  author  by 
declaring  that:  "a  decision  was  reached  by  the  G.  C.  C  Ministers  of  Interior, 
namely  that  the  bilateral  agreements  concluded  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  the 
Gulf  States  is  considered  the  minimum  level  of  security  cooperation  when  drafting 
the  comprehensive  Security  Convention  within  the  member  States  of  the 
Council  "(6). 
Many  points  were  raised  by  the  Gulf  States  which  led  to  a  number  of  studies  into 
the  preparation  of  a  new  draft  that  would  take  into  consideration  the  different 
points  of  view.  It  was  only  in  1993(7),  ten  years  later,  that  a  draft  was  agreed  on.  It 
was  further  modified  when  it  was  submitted  to  the  G.  C.  C.  Supreme  Council 
during  its  fourteenth  session  in  1993  which  mandated  the  G.  C.  C.  Interior 
Ministers  to  re-draft  and  sign  the  Security  Convention. 
The  new  draft  was  signed  by  the  Interior  Ministers  of  four  G.  C.  C.  States  on  28 
November  1994.  The  co-signatories  to  the  new  draft  are:  Saudi  Arabia,  United 
Arab  Emirates,  Oman  Sultanate  and  Bahrain.  Kuwait  and  Qatar  did  not  sign  this 
Convention;  consequently,  these  two  States,  with  respect  to  the  Rules  of 
Procedure(s),  are  not  bound  by  the  provisions  of  this  Convention. 
The  Kuwaiti  position  was  based  on  criminal  extradition  and  the  pursuit  of 
criminals  beyond  the  borders  of  neighbouring  states.  In  fact,  Kuwait  justified  its 
attitude  on  the  grounds  of  its  November  1962  Constitution  which  states,  in  Article 
28,  that:  "no  Kuwaiti  national  is  to  be  deported  from  Kuwait  nor  prevented  from 
returning  back  to  it".  This  means  that  a  Kuwaiti  national  cannot  be  extradited 
from  Kuwait,  while  Art.  28  of  the  Security  Convention  permits  the  national's 
extradition  in  the  following  words:  "...  The  last  two  paragraphs  shall  be  applied 
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even  if  the  accused  person  whose  extradition  is  sought  is  a  citizen  of  the  requested 
State  "(9). 
His  excellency  Sheikh  Ali  Assabah,  the  Kuwaiti  Minister  of  Interior,  declared  the 
following:  "I  am  ready  to  sign  the  comprehensive  Security  Convention  if  Art.  28  is 
omitted  If  its  omission  can  not  occur,  I  propose  that  the  member  States  would 
conclude  bilateral  agreements  without  Art.  28  which  contravenes  the  Kuwaiti 
Constitution  "(10). 
As  for  Qatar,  two  points  were  raised.  First,  it  argued  that  the  Convention  would 
repeal  bilateral  treaties,  yet  Qatar  withdrew  this  suggestion  after  recognizing  the 
effect  of  Art.  41(11  which  permits  any  two  States  to  apply  in  their  reciprocal 
relationship  the  provisions  of  either  the  bilateral  convention  or  those  of  the  G.  C.  C. 
Security  Convention.  This  is  discussed  in  Chapter  Four.  Secondly,  in  the  case  of 
dual  nationality,  agreed  upon  by  G.  C.  C.  member  States  and  stated  in  the  internal 
committees  during  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the  Security 
Convention;  the  Qatari  ministerial  Council  approved  the  Convention  and 
submitted  it  to  Shoura  Council  which  has  so  far  not  decided  on  its  approval.  To 
the  author's  point  of  view,  Qatar  signature  of  the  Convention  is  related  to  a 
political  decision.  In  fact,  Sheikh  Abdullah  Al-Thani,  the  Qatari  vice-President  of 
the  Ministerial  Council  and  Minister  of  Interior  revealed  to  the  author  that:  "The 
project  of  the  security  convention  is  submitted  to  the  Shoura  Council  and  it  is  still 
under  study  ".  To  the  question  about  the  expected  date  of  signing  the  Convention, 
his  Excellency  replied:  "I  think  it  will  be  signed  during  the  four  coming 
months  "(12). 
The  author  asked  his  excellency  Badr  Ben  Saud  Ben  Harb,  the  Omani  Minister  of 
Interior  (president  of  the  present  session  of  both  Arab  and  Gulf  Ministers  of 
Interior)  about  extradition  to  non-signatory  member  States,  namely  Kuwait  and 
Qatar,  He  replied: 
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"Oman  prefers  that  Kuwait  and  Qatar  would  sign  the  security  convention,  but  as 
far  as  criminal  extradition  is  concerned,  Oman  would  apply  reciprocity,  and  up  to 
now  no  criminal  extradition  has  occurred  between  Oman  and  the  Gulf  States 
except  with  Saudi  Arabia  and  UAE  because  we  are  neighbours  "(13). 
If  one  examines  the  Convention's  provisions(14),  it  is  formed  of  six  chapters 
containing  forty-five  articles(  Appendix  1  ).  Like  any  international  convention,  the 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  opens  with  a  preamble  which  emphasizes  the 
Security  Convention's  aims  to  protect  security  and  basic  principles  from  the 
penetration  of  destructive  ideas  which  corrode  the  basis  of  society.  Further,  the 
stability  of  the  G.  C.  C.  states  is  their  collective  responsibility. 
After  the  preamble,  the  first  chapter(i  5)contains  the  general  principles  in  ten 
articles  which  urge  the  G.  C.  C.  member  States  not  to  give  refuge  or  shelter  to 
criminals  regardless  of  their  citizenship.  The  Convention  applies  to  the  citizens  of 
the  G.  C.  C.  States  and  of  other  States(16)  resident  in  the  G.  C.  C.  territories.  Also, 
the  authorities  of  G.  C.  C.  States  are  exhorted  not  to  provide  criminals,  in  any  way, 
with  assistance  that  could  enable  them  to  perform  acts  of  violence  and  destruction 
against  any  G.  C.  C.  member  State(17). 
The  G.  C.  C.  States  are  obliged  to  prevent  their  nationals  and  their  residents  from 
committing  acts  that  might  pose  a  threat  to  the  internal  security  of  any  other 
G.  C.  C.  member  State(18). 
As  for  security  cooperation,  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  compel  the 
exchange  of  security  information,  research,  and  study  data  and  any  expertise  in 
security  matters(19);  and  the  exchange  of  books  and  bulletins  issued  by  security 
organizations(20).  Each  member  state  has  to  inform  the  relevant  bodies  in  other 
member  States  at  least  one  month  prior  the  opening  of  any  conference  or  seminar 
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covering  security  matters  in  order  that the  concerned  authorities  can  profit  from 
the  information(21). 
Also  the  cooperation  in  security  fields  was  initiated  within  the  administrations  of 
general  relations  of  the  police  in  the  G.  C.  C.  member  States  through  the  exchange 
of  expertise,  information,  visits,  the  reinforcement  of  relations  with  the 
international  organizations  dealing  with  the  police  systems(22). 
In  addition,  G.  C.  C.  member  States  should  exert  their  utmost  efforts  in  unifying  the 
system  of  penal  laws,  to  facilitate  security  measures  and  unify  regulations  dealing 
with  immigration,  passports,  residence  permits  and  other  matters  pertaining  to 
security  organizations  in  general(23). 
Art.  3  of  the  Convention  states  that  the  member  States  are  banned  from  the 
exportation  of  weapons  and  explosives  and  their  components  without  the  consent 
of  the  competent  authorities(24)  in  accordance  with  current  legal'procedures,  and 
that  they  should  not  allow  the  circulation  of  pamphlets  or  any  printed  matter  that 
contradict  Islamic  instructions  or  oppose  the  stability  of  G.  C.  C.  security. 
The  second  chapter  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  formed  of  five  articles, 
deals  with  the  integration  of  security  organizations  in  the  G.  C.  C.  States.  The 
Secretariat-General  of  the  G.  C.  C.  is  charged  with  preparing  and  organizing  joint 
training  sessions  for  the  personnel  of  different  security  systems  in  the  G.  C.  C 
member  States(25).  The  Secretariat-General  is  also  empowered  to  invite  experts 
to  establish  security  training  centers  and  to  set  up  dedicated  communications 
networks  to  be  used  by  the  Interior  Ministries  of  the  G.  C.  C.  member  States(26). 
To  attain  a  complete  integration  of  security  organizations,  Art.  15  of  the 
Convention  states  the  necessity  to  carry  out  field  visit  exchanges  with  the 
personnel  of  member  security  organizations  and  to  organize  periodic  meetings  to 
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increase  coordination  between  them  and  to  acquaint  them  with,  up  to  date 
instruments  used  in  the  security  field.  Art.  14  prohibits  the  appointment,  in  the 
security  field,  by  any  G.  C.  C.  State  of  any  non-national  without  the  consent  of  the 
Interior  Minister  of  the  State  in  which  the  person  previously  worked. 
Chapter  three  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  deals  with  smuggling  and  illegal 
entry  and  departure.  This  chapter  is  also  formed  of  five  articles.  The  provisions  of 
the  Convention  require  the  utmost  effort  in  preventing  illegal  entry  and  departure 
from  member  States(27).  Security  authorities  of  the  member  States  are  required  to 
arrest  illegal  aliens  and  extradite  them  to  the  boundary  security  post  of  the  country 
which  they  have  illegally  entered. 
As  for  any  unidentified  persons  who  illegally  enter  a  country  after  previously 
entering  another  country  the  same  way,  any  authority  which  arrests  such  persons  is 
required  to  ascertain  their  status  and  inform  the  relevant  authorities  of  the  State 
through  whose  territory  he  has  passed(28). 
As  for  fugitives  from  a  member  state,  the  authorities  of  the  neighbouring  states 
have  to  pursue  these  persons  if  they  trespass  a  state's  boundaries(29);  the  pursuit 
should  be  carried  out  only  by  bodies  empowered  for  this  purpose.  It  is  stipulated 
that  pursuit  should  be  carried  out  by  vehicles  with  distinguishable  official 
emblems.  Land  pursuit  differs  slightly  from  maritime  pursuit(30).  In  land  pursuit, 
the  number  of  patrol  cars  used  should  not  exceed  three  cars  and  twelve  persons. 
As  for  maritime  pursuit,  the  number  of  cruisers  used  in  the  chase  should  not 
exceed  two  cruisers,  nor  exceed  the  registered  crew  of  these  cruisers.  The  pursuing 
vehicles  should  be  lightly  armed  in  accordance  with  what  is  agreed  upon  by  the 
Interior  Ministers  of  the  G.  C.  C.  member  States(3  i  ).  When  discussing  pursuit,  one 
notices  that  the  Convention  allows  pursuit  patrols  to  pursue  the  criminals  into  the 
territory  of  another  State.  A  question  arises,  as  to  the  extent  these  patrols  can 
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operate,  and  if  there  is  a  limited  distance,  who  is  responsible  for  pursuit  beyond 
this  limit? 
Art.  19  answers  this  question  by  stating  that  the  pursuing  patrols  cannot  cross  the 
boundary  of  the  neighbouring  State  beyond  the  boundary  positions  agreed  upon  by 
the  neighbouring  States(32),  whether  land  or  maritime  boundaries.  The  pursuit  and 
arrest  of  the  pursued  persons  who  enter  the  territories  of  a  neighbouring  State 
would  then  be  the  responsibility  of  the  authorities  of  this  State. 
The  problem  experienced  by  some  of  the  G.  C.  C.  neighbouring  States  is  that  they 
still  have  not  demarcated  their  international  boundaries.  This  jeopardizes  their 
mutual  relationships  and  internal  security;  thus  the  Convention  avoids  this 
problem  by  insisting  that  the  patrols'  meeting  points  (on  land  or  at  sea)  shall  be 
agreed  by  the  neighbouring  States(33). 
Because  of  the  importance  of  boundary  security  in  coping  with  smuggling  and 
illegal  entry  and  departure,  the  Convention  imposes  responsibilities  on  G.  C.  C. 
boundary  patrol  authorities  to  meet  regularly  to  organize  joint  patrols  in  the 
boundary  region(34). 
The  fourth  chapter  of  the  Convention,  constituting  six  articles,  deals  with 
combating  crime  and  compels  the  authorities  in  the  member  States  to  exchange 
the  names  of  dangerous  criminals  and  undesirable  persons,  to  control  their 
movements  and,  if  necessary,  to  restrict  their  ability  to  travel(35). 
Any  G.  C.  C.  member  State  can  be  asked  to  provide  other  States  with  available 
information  concerning  criminal  activities  that  pose  a  threat  to  a  member  or  non- 
member  State(36),  and  new  means  of  criminal  detection(37).  The  provisions  of  the 
Convention  urge  the  relevant  authorities  in  the  member  States  to  oblige  those 
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officers  in  the  field  of  investigation  and  detection  to  attend  preliminary 
interviews  to  supply  official  documentary  proof  as  to  their  competence(38). 
As  this  might  involve  secret  information,  considered  to  be  too  sensitive  to  be 
revealed  at  a  particular  time,  Art.  26  compels  G.  C.  C.  member  States  to  take 
appropriate  and  necessary  measures  to  keep  such  information  out  of  the  public 
domain. 
The  fifth  chapter  of  the  Convention  tackles  the  most  important  items  of  the 
Convention,  namely  criminal  extradition.  It  is  the  longest  chapter  in  the  G.  C.  C. 
Security  Convention  since  it  covers  the  Articles  from  27  up  to  40.  In  this  chapter, 
it  is  stated  that  the  member  States  should  extradite  criminals  from  their 
territories(39).  Any  such  extradition  is  covered  by  conditions  that  should  be 
satisfied  by  the  member  states  party  to  the  extradition. 
Particularly  problematic  is  art.  28  which  reads: 
"Extradition  shalt  be  obligatory  between  the  member  States  if  the  request  satisfies  two 
conditions: 
a.  If  the  acts  alleged  to  have  been  committed  by  the  accused,  in  accordance  with  the 
Laws  and  Statutes  of  the  requesting  States,  constitute  crimes  which  are  within  the  crimes 
of  divine  ordinance  punishment,  retribution  punishment  or  discretionary  punishment,  or 
crimes  which  are  punishable  by  ä  deprivation  of  liberty  of  not  less  six  months. 
This  provision  shall  apply  even  if  the  crime  has  been  committed  outside  the  territories  of 
the  two  States  provided  the  Laws  or  Regulations  of  the  requesting  State  provide  for  the 
punishment  of  this  crime  if  committed  inside  or  outside  its  territory. 
b.  If  judgment  has  been  passed  by  the  judicial  authority  in  the  requesting  State,  whether 
in  the  accused  person's  presence  or  in  absentia,  in  relation  to  crimes  punishable  by 
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divine  ordinance  punishment  or  retribution  punishment  or  discretionary  punishment,  or 
deprivation  of  liberty  of  a  period  of  not  less  than  six  months...  ". 
This  text  appears  contrary  to  a  strict  legal  conclusion  since  "..  satisfies  two 
conditions  "  in  this  context  defeats  the  purpose  of  the  Convention  and  it  must  be 
replaced  by  "..  satisfies  one  of  the  two  conditions"  because  it  is  impossible  that  a 
person  can  be  alleged  and  convicted  at  the  same  time.  It  is  noteworthy  that  art.  27 
reads:  "..  who  are  accused  or  have been  convicted..  ".  The  author  has  retraced  this 
issue  in  the  bilateral  Conventions  and  finds  it  different  from  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  and  the  1982  draft  security  convention.  For  example,  art.  22  of  the 
1982  draft  security  convention  reads: 
"Extradition  shall  be  obligatory  between  the  member  States  if  the  request  satisfies  two 
conditions: 
a.  If  the  authorities  in  the  requesting  State  consider  the  offence,  by  virtue  of  their 
regulations,  punishable  by  imprisonment  for  no  less  than  six months. 
b.  If  the  offence  is  committed  inside  the  territory  of  the  requesting  State  or  committed 
outside  the  territory  of  both  the  requesting  and  requested  States  and  their  legal  systems 
punish  offences  if  committed  outside  their  territories  ". 
Paragraphs(a)  and  (b)  of  art.  22  of  the  1982  draft  convention  are  amalgamated 
with  some  changes  to  form  paragraph(a)  of  art.  28  of  the  1994  Convention. 
Paragraph(b)  is  added  without  changing  the  introduction  to  art.  28.  The  author  has 
discovered  that  paragraph(b)  of  art.  28  is  taken  from  the  Riyadh  Convention  of 
1983,  art.  40  paragraphs(c)  and(d),  with  some  changes. 
This  important  finding  is  worth  submitting  before  the  Ministerial  Councils  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  States  to  take  the  appropriate  measures  to  remedy  the  defect  in  art.  28. 
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Indeed  the  author,  during  the  course  of  this  study,  interviewed  three  Ministers  who 
agreed  that  such  change  was  essential. 
However,  Art.  28  deals  with  extradition  of  an  accused  person.  Such  a  person,  to  be 
extradited,  has  to  have  committed  offences  punishable  by  divine  ordinance 
punishment,  retribution  punishment  or  discretionary  punishment(4o).  The 
conditions  are  not  only  limited  to  these  crimes,  but  also  to  crimes  punishable  by  at 
least  six  months  imprisonment. 
These  offences  are  dealt  with  in  the  Islamic  Shari'ah(41).  The  offences  subject  to 
the  divine  ordinance  punishment  (fixed  penalties)  are  highway  robbery,  theft, 
fornication,  accusation  of  adultery,  and  drinking  alcohol(42).  From  the  Holy  Quran 
(the  main  source  of  the  Islamic  law),  we  read  "...  provided  they  feel  that  they  can 
keep  the  limits  ordained  by  Allah.  Such  are  the  limits  ordained  by  Allah  which  He 
makes  plain  to  those  who  understand  "(2:  230).  This  category  of  offences  are  clear 
and  their  punishment  is  fixed  in  advance  and  known  by  "those  who 
understand  "(43). 
The  offences  punished  by  retribution(44)  punishment  (disciplinary  or  talion 
punishment)(45)  are  premeditated  murder  or  wounding;  from  the  Holy  Quran,  we 
read:  "We  ordained  therein  for  them:  `life  for  life,  eye  for  eye,  nose  for  nose,  ear 
for  ear,  tooth  for  tooth,  and  wounds  equal  for  equal'.  But  if  any  one  remits  the 
retaliation  by  way  of  charity,  it  is  an  act  of  atonement  for  himself.  And  if  any  fail 
to  judge  by  (the  light  of)  what  Allah  hath  revealed,  they  are  (no  better  than) 
wrong-doers  "(5:  45).  This  statement  is  a  clear  explanation  of  the  law  of 
retribution.  If  any  person  premeditatedly  kills  or  wounds  another  person,  he  shall 
be  killed  or  wounded  similarly;  this  is  an  aspect  of  the  principle  of  the  Islamic 
equality(46).  Allah  puts  it  as  "In  the  law  of  equality  there  is  (saving  ofi  life  to  you, 
O  ye  men  of  understanding:  that  ye  may  restrain  yourselves"  (2:  179).  In  case  of 
unpremeditated  murder  or  wounding,  the  law  of  retribution  is  not  applied. 
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Discretionary  punishment  is  imposed  on  offences  not  subject  to  divine  ordinance 
or  retribution(47).  Discretionary  punishment  penalises  any  felony.  The  provisions 
of  the  Islamic  Shari'ah  do  not  define  such  offences  or  their  punishment  which  is 
left  to  the  judge's  consideration  to  the  offence;  he  has  the  right  to  sentence  the 
offender  taking  into  consideration  the  general  well-being  of  the  community(48). 
A  question  might  arise  when  the  person  subject  to  extradition  commits  a  crime 
outside  the  territories  of  both  requesting  and  requested  states.  The  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  states  that  it  is  possible  that  a  previous  judgment  could  apply  provided 
that  the  law  in  force  in  the  state  requesting  extradition  is  capable  of  punishing  the 
crime  both  inside  and  outside  its  territory.  The  second  condition  for  extradition  is 
that  the  judgment  should  be  issued  by  the  judicial  authorities  of  the  requesting 
State  for  a  crime  punishable  with  a  minimum  six  months  imprisonment.  The 
same  requirement  was  laid  down  in  Art.  22  of  the  1982  draft  convention  that 
defined  the  extradition  request  as  follows.  First,  the  crime  must  be  punishable  to 
six  months  imprisonment.  Secondly,  the  crime  should  be  committed  in  the 
territory  of  the  requesting  State,  or  outside  the  territories  of  the  requesting  or  the 
requested  States  provided  that  the  laws  of  both  States  punish  the  commission  of 
crimes  outside  their  territories. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  Kuwaiti  constitution  forbids  the  deportation  of 
nationals  and  the  Security  Convention  states  the  extradition  of  nationals  is 
competent(49).  There  is,  however,  a  difference  between  deportation  and 
extradition(so).  Extradition  is  a  procedure  by  which  a  State  surrenders  a  person, 
located  in  its  territory,  to  another  State  which  requests  his  extradition  to  be  tried 
for  an  offence  he  is  charged  with  or  to  execute  a  punishment  to  which  he  is 
sentenced.  Deportation  is  the  call  upon  a  foreigner  to  leave  the  State  where  he  is 
living  due  to  reasons  related  with  the  State's  internal  or  external  security.  In 
international  law(51),  nationals  should  not  be  deported,  a  measure  adopted  by  all 
the  governments  either  stated  in  their  constitutions  or  in  custom. 
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It  should  be  noted  that  Art.  37  of  the  UAE  Constitution  and  Art.  16  of  the  Oman 
Constitution  also  ban  the  deportation  of  their  nationals  which  is  similar  to  the 
Kuwaiti  text.  The  UAE  Constitution  is  more  problematic  than  the  Kuwaiti 
particularly  in  this  regard  since  it  completely  forbids  the  extradition  of  nationals  in 
Art.  38,  yet  UAE  signed  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  for  the  benefit  of  overall 
regional  security. 
It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  1982  draft  convention  did  not  permit  the 
extradition  of  nationals,  since  it  classified  the  extradition  of  nationals  within  the 
cases  in  which  extradition  is  not  permitted,  with  the  proviso  that  the  State,  of 
which  the  criminal  holds  citizenship,  tries  him  in  accordance  with  its  laws  and 
based  on  the  accusation  file  presented  by  the  requesting  State;  this  is  stated  in  Art. 
23(1). 
Where,  for  example,  by  virtue  of  a  judgment  issued  by  the  Saudi  judicial 
authority,  Saudi  security  authorities  require  from  Bahrain  the  extradition  of  a 
Bahraini  citizen,  and  if  the  case  of  the  person  to  be  extradited  satisfies  all  of  the 
extradition  conditions.  Therefore,  the  Bahraini  authorities  should  not  refuse 
extradition  just  because  the  accused  is  a  Bahraini  national.  Art.  28  of  the  G.  C.  C. 
Security  Convention  confirms  this  by  obliging  the  extradition  if  the  conditions  are 
satisfied  whether  the  person  to  be  extradited  is  a  national  or  a  non-national. 
The  requested  State  may  refuse  to  extradite  a  person  when  one  of  the  following 
conditions  is  satisfied,  i.  e.  if  the  offence  subject  of  the  extradition  request  is 
considered  as  a  political  offence.  The  description  of  a  political  offence  is  subject 
to  various  interpretations  and  its  definition  is  imprecise(52).  In  fact,  jurists  disagree 
over  the  definition  of  the  concept(53). 
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In  the  past,  political  offences  were  subject  to  extradition(54),  yet  such  offences 
have  been  gradually  become  impermissible  for  extradition  by  the  international 
community  starting  from  the  recommendations  of  the  International  Law 
Conference  held  in  Oxford  in  1870(55). 
Internal  laws(56),  international  agreements(57)  and  jurists  do  not  set  a  plain 
definition  for  the  political  offence.  Some  jurists  define  the  concept  with  relation  to 
the  political  motives  of  the  offender(58);  for  others,  the  offence  is  political  if  the 
acts  forming  the  offence  are  of  political  nature  such  as  the  infringement  of  the 
security  and  the  political  system  of  the  State. 
Terrorist  activities(59)  (eg.  air  and  maritime  hijacking(6o),  explosions,  etc..  )  are  not 
considered  political  offences  since  these  offences  target  the  social  system  of  the 
State  in  general.  Therefore,  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  tried  the 
negotiation  of  an  international  convention  for  the  prevention  and  punishment  of 
crimes  of  political  nature  described  as  acts  of  political  terrorism(61).  Moreover,  the 
international  community  aims  to  exclude  terrorist  acts  from  political  offences  by 
concluding  a  series  of  conventions  such  as:  Hague  Convention  of  1970(62), 
Montreal  Convention  of  1971(63)(and  protocol  of  1988),  Rome  Convention  of 
1988(64)(and  protocol). 
The  definition  of  whether  an  offence  is  a  political  offence  depends  on  the 
requested  State's  consideration(65).  In  case  of  a  discrepancy  between  the  asylum 
and  requesting  States  over  the  definition  of  a  political  offence,  the  State  soliciting 
extradition  has  the  right  to  submit  the  dispute  before  international  arbitration  and 
justice(66). 
Since  the  concept  of  political  crime  is  very  wide  ranging,  Art.  30  of  the  Security 
Convention  lists  criminal  acts  excluded  from  the  concept  of  political  crime,  e.  g. 
those  offences  committed  against  Heads  of  States,  Crown  princes,  members  of  the 
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royal  family,  ministers  and  persons  of  their  rank,  military  crimes,  terrorism  and 
acts  of  sabotage,  high  treason,  pre-meditated  murder  and  theft,  and  any  such 
attempt  at  committing  the  above  crimes,  if  they  are  punished  by  the  laws  in  force 
of  the  State  that  requests  the  extradition(67). 
There  are  two  categories  of  military  offences(68);  first,  purely  military  crimes,  for 
instance,  the  desertion  of  the  military  duty,  the  transgression  of  military  order.  In 
such  acts,  extradition  is  not  competent(69).  Secondly,  common  offences  committed 
by  military  persons,  such  acts  are  considered  to  be  military  offences  because  of  the 
status  of  the  offenders;  for  this  category  of  military  offences,  extradition  is 
applicable(7o).  This  distinction  was  approved  by  the  Oxford  International  Law 
Conference  of  1880(71).  It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  lacks  a  definition  of  the  military  crime  for  which  extradition  is 
applicable,  but  it  states  that  military  crimes  are  extraditable  without  specification. 
Extradition  cannot  apply  if  the  person  whose  extradition  is  solicited  commits  the 
offence  in  the  territory  of  the  requested  State(72). 
Extradition  is  not  allowed  if  the  persons  requested  to  be  extradited  enjoy 
diplomatic  immunity  whether  they  carry  out  diplomatic  functions  or  not,  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  international  law  or  by  virtue  of  the  international 
agreements(73).  Further,  extradition  is  not  permitted  if  the  person  subject  to  the 
extradition  is  tried  or  is  being  tried  for  the  crime  to  which  his  extradition  is 
requested  and  the  procedures  are  carried  out  in  the  requested  State  or  in  the  State 
the  crime  is  committed  in  provided  that  this  latter  state  is  not  the  requesting 
State(74). 
Extradition  is  not  permissible(75)  in  cases  where  the  criminal  proceedings  are 
dropped  or  if  the  acts,  committed  by  the  person  subject  to  the  extradition,  are 
described  not  to  be  criminal  acts  in  accordance  with  the  effective  laws  of  the 
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requesting  State.  In  fact,  some  acts  are  considered  offences  at  a  particular  time,  yet 
by  virtue  of  newly  enacted  Laws  and  regulations,  such  acts  are  no  longer  offences 
and  their  criminal  character  is  removed  and  their  penalty  is  rescinded.  The 
criminal  would  therefore  benefit  from  such  an  enactment. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  1993  and  1994  draft  conventions  state  only  one  case  in 
which  extradition  is  banned,  while  the  1982  draft  convention  states  four  cases  in 
Art.  23.  These  cases  are;  if  the  person  requested  for  extradition  is  a  national;  if  the 
crime  is  committed  outside  the  territories  of  both  requesting  and  requested  States 
and  their  effective  laws  do  not  punish  such  acts;  if  the  crime  is  committed  in  the 
territories  of  the  requesting  State  and  the  person  subject  to  the  extradition  demand 
is  not  one  of  its  nationals  and  the  acts  are  punishable  by  virtue  of  laws  of  the 
requested  State;  if  the  crime  and  the  punishment  are  rescinded. 
What  are  the  formal  conditions  for  the  extradition  request?  Art.  31(b)  answers  this 
question  by  stating  that  the  requesting  file  should  contain  a  detailed  report 
concerning  the  person  requested,  his  identity,  his  description  and  his  photograph; 
an  arresting  report  issued  by  the  competent  authority  showing  that,  by  virtue  of  its 
effective  laws,  punishment  is  not  to  be  dropped  and  that  the  act  committed  by  the 
person  requested  for  the  extradition  still  considered  a  criminal  offence.  Moreover 
the  file  should  contain  a  certified  copy  of  the  provisions  that  penalize  the  crimes 
committed  by  the  person  subject  to  the  extradition;  the  evidence,  issued  by  the 
competent  authorities,  that  prove  the  culpability  of  the  person  requested;  and  a 
certified  copy  of  the  judgment  against  the  person.  If  there  is  no  judgment  issued 
against  the  person  an  attendance  warrant  issued  by  the  competent  authorities  is 
also  presented  along  with  a  document  that  indicates  that  the  request  conforms  with 
the  provisions  of  the  Convention. 
When  the  request  file  contains  all  the  required  documents,  it  is  conveyed  from  the 
authority  of  the  State  demanding  the  extradition  of  the  person  to  the  authority  of 
99 CHAPTER  THREE 
the  requested  State.  The  Convention  laid  down  exceptions  to  the  provisions  of 
Art.  31.  It  states  that  the  extradition  is  obligatory  if  the  person  to  be  extradited 
confesses  guilt  to  the  crime  and  the  crime  committed  is  included  under  acts  of 
crime  for  which  extradition  is  obligatory.  In  such  cases,  the  requested  State  is 
obliged  to  extradite  the  person  required(76). 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  provisions  of  Art.  32  of  the  1994  draft  Convention  are  not 
referred  to  in  the  1993  draft  convention;  it  is  the  only  article  that  is  not  stated  in 
the  1993  draft.  Thus,  there  are  44  articles  in  the  1993  draft,  while  in  the  1994  draft 
there  are  45  as  noted  above. 
The  1982  draft  convention  (Art.  28)  does  not  ignore  the  provisions  laid  down  in 
the  1994  Convention  (Art.  32).  Both  Articles  are  similar  in  spirit  but  with  a  slight 
difference  as  far  as  the  textual  level  is  concerned,  particularly  in  the  end  of  Art. 
28(77). 
When  dealing  with  an  extradition  demand  file,  attention  should  be  paid  to  the 
effective  judicial  systems  in  the  G.  C.  C.  member  States  at  the  time  of  the 
extradition  request.  In  other  words,  if  the  laws  of  the  requesting  or  requested 
States  are  amended  after  the  date  of  the  demand,  these  changes  are  not  effective  on 
the  demand  since  the  request  was  based  on  the  laws  and  regulations  in  effect  at  the 
time  of  the  request(s). 
The  extradition  demand  should  be  dealt  with  in  a  fixed  period  of  time  after  which 
the  requested  State  is  obliged  to  inform  the  requesting  State  of  its  decision.  In  the 
case  of  a  negative  reply,  the  requested  State  has  to  justify  its  refusal.  The 
Convention  fixed  the  period  of  time  for  reply  to  two  months  starting  from  the  date 
of  receiving  the  request  for  extradition(79).  In  the  case  of  a  positive  reply,  the 
requesting  State  has  to  attend  the  collection  of  the  person  to  be  extradited  within 
thirty  days  after  the  date  of  receiving  a  telegram  concerning  the  extradition 
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decision.  If  the  requesting  State  does  not  respect  the  time  limit  for  reply,  it  will 
not  have  the  right  to  extradite  the  person  in  question  unless  a  new  demand  for 
extradition  is  made.  This  is  because  the  requested  State,  due  to  the  expiry  of  the 
fixed  date,  may  release  the  detained  person  (80)  subject  to  the  extradition  request. 
On  the  practical  level  of  criminal  extradition,  it  may  happen  that  a  State  receives, 
from  other  States,  numerous  demands  for  extradition  of  the  same  person  and  for 
the  same  crime;  to  avoid  such  a  case,  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  addresses 
the  matter  by  stating  that  the  requested  State  should  give  priority  to  the  State 
which  has  suffered  the  greater  damage  and,  secondly,  the  state  where  the  crime 
was  committed(81). 
Extradition  demands  may  be  for  different  crimes.  In  this  case  a  decision  will 
depend  upon  the  circumstances  and  in  particular  the  gravity  of  the  crime,  the  place 
where  the  crime  was  committed  and  the  date  of  receipt  of  the  extradition 
demand(82). 
Art.  35  points  out  that  if  the  requested  person  is  sentenced  to  a  crime  committed  in 
the  requested  State,  this  State  has  to  inform  the  requesting  State  of  its  decision 
concerning  the  extradition  demand  either  positively  or  negatively,  and  has  to 
postpone  the  extradition  until  the  person  subject  to  the  extradition  demand  serves 
their  term  of  imprisonment  or  is  found  innocent  of  the  crime.  The  requested  State 
may  provisionally  deliver  the  person  to  the  requesting  State  to  appear  before  the 
competent  authorities  of  the  requesting  State  provided  that  the  person  is  returned 
to  the  requested  State. 
Art.  36  deals  with  the  precautionary  detention  of  the  person  to  be  extradited  in  the 
requested  State.  The  detention  should  not  exceed  thirty  days.  The  authorities  of  the 
requested  State  should  release  him  unless  it  receives,  during  this  period  of  time,.  a 
renewed  demand  for  extradition,  or  the  authorities  of  the  requested  State  decide 
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that  his  imprisonment  for  another  thirty  days  as  a  maximum  if  the  requesting  State 
demands  so,  provided  that  this  period  of  imprisonment  is  taken  off  any  prison 
sentence  that  has  been  handed  down  in  the  requesting  State. 
By  virtue  of  Art.  37,  the  requested  State  has  to  deliver  incriminating  evidence  to 
the  requesting  State  in  accordance  with  the  effective  laws  and  regulations  in  the 
requested  State. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  competent  authorities  in  the  requesting  State  would  not  try 
the  person  requested  except  for  the  crimes  in  the  extradition  demand;  yet,  by 
virtue  of  Art.  38(83),  the  person  can  be  tried  for  other  crimes  if  he  consents. 
Concerning  extradition  expenses,  the  requesting  State  incurs  all  extradition 
charges  and  the  charges  for  the  return  of  the  person  extradited,  to  the  place  he  is 
extradited  from,  if  the  person  is  proved  innocent(84). 
The  sixth  and  last  chapter  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  deals  with  the  final 
provisions.  Art.  41  settles  the  case  when  the  provisions  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  contradict  the  provisions  of  bilateral  treaties  (concluded  between 
Saudi  Arabia  and  other  G.  C.  C.  member  States)  to  which  the  G.  C.  C.  member 
States  comply.  Therefore,  the  application  of  extradition  would  be  governed  by  the 
provisions  which  easily  realize  a  comprehensive  security  cooperation(85). 
The  provisions  of  Art.  41  come  in  Art.  35  of  the  1982  draft.  Art.  35  gives  priority 
in  practice  in  case  of  a  contradiction,  to  the  easiest  provisions  as  far  as  the 
criminal  extradition  is  concerned,  while  the  1993  draft  convention  completely 
omits  mention  of  the  Bilateral  Security  Treaties  signed  by  the  G.  C.  C.  member 
States  with  each  other.  This  draft  also  indicates  that  in  case  of  conflict  between  a 
provision  of  the  1993  draft  Convention  and  any  national  law,  the  priority  in 
practice  would  go  to  the  provision  of  this  draft  Convention.  As  for  the  ratification 
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of  the  provisions  of  this  Convention,  it  shall  be  ratified  during  the  four  months 
from  the  date  of  signature  and  in  accordance  with  the  constitutional  conditions  in 
force  in  each  member  state. 
Although  the  UAE  signed  the  Convention,  it  did  not  ratify  it.  The  author  asked  his 
Excellency  Lieutenant  General  Dr.  Mohammed  Ben  Badi,  the  Minister  of  Interior, 
about  the  reasons  for  which  the  UAE  ratification  is  delayed.  His  Excellency  said: 
"the  delay  in  ratifying  the  comprehensive  security  convention  is  because  the 
convention  is  still  under  study  in  the.  Shoura  Council,  which  is  just  a  routine 
procedure.  It  will  be  finished  soon,  the  cooperation  is  going  on,  the  convention  is 
in  force,  the  directives  of  President  Sheikh  Zaid  are  clear  and  straightforward 
concerning  the  signing  of  the  convention  ".  The  author  pointed  out  that  UAE 
Constitution  forbids  the  extradition  of  nationals.  His  Excellency  replied  that:  "I  do 
not  think  there  is  a  contradiction  between  the  Convention  and  the  Constitution 
because  the  G.  C.  C.  has  a  special  priority  and  the  text  [of  the  constitution]  would 
not  apply  to  the  G.  C.  C.  States,  but  it  does  to  other  States  "(86). 
The  instruments  of  ratification  are  to  be  deposited  with  the  Secretariat-General  of 
the  G.  C.  C.  which  in  turn  prepares  a  report  of  deposit  of  the  instrument  of 
ratification  of  each  State  and  informs  the  other  member  States  of  any  State 
deposition(87). 
Art.  43  deals  with  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Convention.  It  is  effective  one  month 
after  the  completion  of  deposition  of  ratification  documents  of  two  thirds  of  the 
signatory  States.  For  the  Convention  to  enter  into  effect,  the  instruments  of 
ratification  of  three  member  States  are  to  be  deposited  with  the  Secretariat- 
General,  and  a  month  would  elapse  after  the  third.  State's  deposition  of  its 
instrument  of  ratification.  Three  member  States  have  now  completed  the 
deposition  of  ratification  documents  namely  Saudi  Arabia,  Bahrain  and  Oman.  As 
a  result,  the  Convention  has  entered  into  force  as  from  22/6/1995(88). 
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It  would  be  illogical  if  the  Convention  stipulates,  for  its  provisions  to  enter  into 
effect,  the  deposition  of  the  instrument  of  ratification  of  two  thirds  of  the  G.  C.  C. 
member  States,  since  what  matters  for  the  effectiveness  of  any  convention  is  the 
agreement  of  the  Contracting  Parties  upon  provisions  of  the  convention. 
As  far  as  the  entry  into  effect  is  concerned,  the  1982  draft  convention  (Art.  37) 
categorically  differs  from  the  1993  draft  convention  and  the  1994  Convention.  The 
1982  text  stipulates  the  expiry  of  one  month  from  the  date  of  the  deposition  of 
instruments  of  ratification  of  all  signatory  States;  whereas,  the  1993  draft 
convention  and  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  require  the  deposition  of 
instruments  of  ratification  of  two  thirds  of  the  signatory  States. 
As  far  as  the  amendment  of  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  (89)  is  concerned,  the 
consent  of  the  Supreme  Council  is  necessary  to  amend  the  provisions  of  the 
Convention.  It  is  natural  that  the  non-signatory  States  do  not  participate  in  this 
process. 
Concerning  the  amendment  of  the  convention's  provisions,  the  1982  draft 
convention  (Art.  38)  requires  the  approval  of  two  thirds  of  the  signatory  States, 
whereas,  the  text  of  the  1993  draft  convention  (Art.  43)  agrees  with  the  text  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention's  conditions  laid  down  in  Art.  44. 
A  question  arises,  namely,  does  the  amendment  require  a  majority  decision  or 
not?.  In  fact,  the  Convention  does  not  define  what  kind  of  acceptance  an 
amendment  necessitates.  The  kind  of  acceptance  relies  on  whether  the  amended 
provision  is  related  to  substantive  matters  which  requires  unanimous  approval,  or 
to  procedural  matters  which  require  only  a  majority.  To  decide  whether  a  matter  is 
procedural  or  substantive  is  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Council, 
but  that  of  the  Ministerial  Council(9o). 
104 CHAPTER  THREE 
To  amend  the  G.  C.  C.  Charter  requires  the  unanimous  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Council(9l),  while  a  majority  is  sufficient  to  amend  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the 
Supreme  Council  or  the  Ministerial  Council  unless  the  provisions  to  be  amended 
rely  on  the  provisions  of  the  Charter.  If  they  rely  on  such  provisions,  amendment 
approval  requires  unanimous  decision(92). 
The  last  Article  of  the  Convention  deals  with  any  member  State  s  withdrawal  from 
the  Convention.  It  states  that  the  withdrawing  state  must  declare  its  withdrawal  by 
conveying  a  letter  to  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretary-General.  The  withdrawal  is  not 
effective  until.  after  the  termination  of  six  months  from  the  date  of  the  withdrawal 
notification(93). 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  idea  of  the  Security  Convention  emerged  since  1977,  yet 
its  signature  occurred  but  in  1994,  namely  after  the  Second  Gulf  War.  This  delay 
is  mainly  due  to  many  reasons:  the  numerous  studies  of  the  Convention  by  the 
member  States,  the  many  proposals  made  in  drafts  of  the  Convention  and  their 
amendments  by  the  member  States.  The  Contracting  Parties  were  conscientious  on 
the  signature  of  all  the  members  to  the  Council,  particularly  Kuwait  which 
expressed,  from  the  beginning,  its  disapproval  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention.  This  was 
ensured  to  the  author  by  Dr.  Mohammed  Bin  Saud  Al-Sayari(94),  the  Director- 
General  of  the  Legal  Affairs  iii  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General,  by  Mohammed  Al- 
Doussari(95),  the  vice-Director  of  the  Security  Department  in  the  Secretariat- 
General  of  the  G.  C.  C.,  and  by  Ahmad  Assa'doun(96),  the  Chairman  of  the  Kuwaiti 
Oma'h  Council  (Parliament). 
It  was  thought  that  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  would  make  Kuwait  change  its 
attitude  towards  the  signature  of  the  Convention.  Yet  Kuwait  is  still  holding  to  its 
stand. 
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As  far  as  Qatar  is  concerned,  it  did  not  oppose  neither  the  Security  Convention  nor 
the  proposals  related  to  the  Convention.  In  the  author's  point  of  view,  in  the  light 
basically  of  his  meetings  with  officials  in  Qatar  and  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat- 
General,  the  Qatari  attitude  is  due  to:  the  recently  escalating  boundary  disputes 
with  neighbouring  States,  the  internal  troubles  immediately  after  the  over-throw  of 
Sheikh  Khalifa  Al-Thani  by  his  son  Sheikh  Hamad  Bin  Khalifa  and  the  formation 
of  a  new  Government;.  the  recent  divergence  with  the  G.  C.  C.  member  States 
during  the  Muscat 
. 
Summit  Conference  of  December  1995(97)  concerning  the 
Qatari  desire  to  nominate  its  candidate  to  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General.  The 
withdrawal  of  Sheikh  Hamad  Al-Thani.  from  the  final  session  of  the  summit  is  a 
precedent  in  the  inter-G.  C.  C.  relationship. 
Nevertheless,  Qatar  should  manage  to  overcome  these  problem  with  the 
support  of  the  G.  C.  C.  leaders;  consequently,  it  is  expected  that  Qatar  will 
sign  the  Convention  soon. 
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CHAPTER  FOUR 
SAUDI  ARABIA'S  STAND  VIS-A-VIS  BILATERAL  SECURITY 
AGREEMENTS  CONCLUDED  MTH 
THE  GUI,  STATES. 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia  has  long  shown  an  interest  in  co-ordinating 
security  operations.  However,  before  investigating  these  co-ordinating  operations 
themselves,  one  needs  to  discuss  the  causes  which  urged  the  Saudi  Government 
towards  co-operation  with  other  States  whether  on  the  international,  Arab,  Gulf  or 
bilateral  level. 
At  the  turn  of  the  century,  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia  was  divided  into 
numerous  Provinces  before  the  emergence  of  King  Abdul  Aziz  Ben  Abdu  Rahman 
Al-Saud  who  unified  these  Provinces  and  Emirates  in  1932(1).  An  era  of 
development  and  progress  started  following  upon  the  discovery  and  production  of 
petroleum(2).  To  preserve  such  acquisitions,  the  Saudi  Government  had  to 
secure  peace  and  stability  by  strengthening  relations  with  friendly  and 
neighbouring  countries,  and  by  setting  security  plans  to  be  adopted.  These  are  the 
main  causes  behind  the  Saudi  Government's  ratification  of  security  conventions. 
There  was  also  an  increase  in  smuggling  operations  on  the  Saudi  borders,  which 
together  with  the  escape  of  fugitive  criminals  to  neighbouring  countries  and  the 
increase  in  foreign  manpower  which  accompanied  the  economic  renaissance 
added  impetus  to  those  causes(3). 
The  question  arises  then,  has  Saudi  Arabia  first  ratified  security  conventions  in  a 
bilateral  framework  or  within  the  framework  of  the  League  of  Arab  States  in 
1952? 
In  fact,  Saudi  Arabia  did  not  start  ratifying  security  conventions  in  1953,  within 
the  framework  of  the  Arab  League,  but  in  a  bilateral  framework  and  precisely  in 
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1931  with  the  Iraqi  Kingdom,  one  year  before  the  final  unification  of  the  Saudi 
Kingdom. 
From  that  date  on,  Saudi  Arabia  ratified  other  bilateral  conventions.  Thus  in 
1353H.  (1933),  Saudi  Arabia  ratified  with  the  Yemeni  Kingdom  an  Islamic  and 
Arab  Fraternity  Treaty.  It  later  ratified  with  Kuwait  an  Extradition  Convention  in 
1362H.  (1942).  Later  on  other  extradition  conventions  were  ratified  between 
Saudi  and  Bahrain,  the  Sultanate  of  Oman,  Qatar  and  the  UAE.  These  were  all 
bilateral  conventions  which  the  Kingdom  ratified  with  each  State  separately. 
One  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  Saudi  government  ratified  bilateral  security 
conventions  with  other  non-Gulf  States,  such  as  Pakistan,  which  is,  however, 
beyond  the  concern  of  the  present  thesis. 
In  the  present  thesis,  each  of  these  security  conventions  will  be  studied  in  a 
chronological  order;  each  will  be  analysed  and  compared  with  the  Comprehensive 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention.  However,  only  the  major  differences  in  these 
Conventions  will  be  highlighted. 
TRADITION  TREATY  BETWEEN  THE  KINEMOM  OF  HIJAZ  AND  NAJD 
WITZ  ITS  AP{>URTNA  C  AND  THE  IRAQI  K1N(DQ  C4). 
Before  the  final  unification  of  the  Kingdom,  Prince  Faisal  Ben  Abdel  Aziz,  then 
deputizing  for  the  King,  ratified,  in  1351H.  (1931)  in  Makkah,  an  extradition 
agreement  on  behalf  of  the  Kingdom  of  Hij  az  and  Najd  with  its  appurtenance,  and 
the  Iraqi  Kingdom.  The  latter  represented  by  Nori  Al-Said,  the  Iraqi  Prime 
Minister.  This  agreement  was  made  up  of  eight  articles  dealing  with  the 
extradition  of  criminals  between  the  two  States.  By  virtue  of  the  Convention,  the 
Iraqi  government  is  compelled  to  extradite  any  Saudi  national  who  commits 
extraditable  crimes  in  the  Saudi  territories  and  flees  to  the  Iraq  territories(5).  In  its 
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turn,  the  Saudi  government  is  compelled  to  extradite  any  Iraqi_  national  who 
likewise  commits  an  extraditable  crime  in  the  Iraqi  territory  and  flees  to  the 
Kingdom  of  Hij  az  and  Najd  with  its  appurtenances(6). 
It  is  noteworthy  that  articles  (1)  and  (2)  reveal  the  limited  applicability  to  criminal 
extradition  of  this  convention  since  extradition  is  confined  only  to  the  nationals  of 
the  requesting  State.  Current  security  conventions,  on  the  other  hand,  mostly 
permit  the  extradition  of  persons  regardless  of  their  nationality,  whether,  that  is, 
they  hold  the  nationality  of  the  requesting  State  or  that  of  other  States.  The  only 
exception  is  the  nationals  of  the  requested  State;  what  is  referred  to  as  "nationals' 
extradition"  is  a  bone  of  contention  in  extradition  conventions. 
Extraditable  crimes  are  defined  in  this  Convention  as:  banditry,  robbery,  pillage, 
spoliation,  murder,  laceration,  illegal  entry  and  assault.  It  also  forbids  the 
extradition  of  persons  convicted  of  political  crimes.  While  this  is  usually  the  rule, 
this  article  excludes  those  who  commit  crimes  against  a  member  of  the  Royal 
families  of  both  Kingdoms(7). 
One  needs,  here,  to  notice  that  the  non-inclusion,  in  this  article  of  detailed 
reference  to  political  offences,  is  neither  new  nor  unheard.  The  absence  of  a 
definition  for  a  political  offence  in  this  Convention  leaves  it  open  to  the  discretion 
of  the  authorities  in  both  states. 
As  for  the  formalities  of  the  extradition  request  file  and  its  components,  the 
Convention  cites  the  required  documents  therein  to  be:  a  description  of  the  person 
whose  extradition  is  required,  a  brief  statement  about  the  offence  committed  and  a 
copy  of  any  sentence  passed  against  such  person(s).  These  documents  should  all 
be  validated  by  the  competent  authorities  of  the  requesting  State(s). 
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Furthermore,  the  Convention  provides  that  it  does  not  apply  to  crimes  committed 
prior  to  its  implementation(9).  Hence,  if  the  Iraqi  authorities  request  the  extradition 
of  an  Iraqi  national  who  has  committed  an  offence  and  fled  to  the  Saudi  territories 
before  the  implementation  of  the  said  convention,  the  Saudi  authorities  can  refuse 
to  comply  with  the  request  even  if  it  is  submitted  after  that  implementation.  In 
doing  so,  the  Saudi  authorities  will  not  have  contravened  the  convention  since  Art. 
(6)  clearly  covers  this  eventuality  and  supports  such  a  decision. 
The  Convention  also  mentions  the  principle  that  the  person  extradited  can  not  be 
tried  for  an  offence  other  than  that  for  which  extradition  request 
, 
has  been  made. 
Nor  can  he  be  tried  for  offences  he  has  committed  prior  to  the  date  of  the 
extradition  request  unless  he  has  been  granted  opportunity  to  leave  the  territories 
and  he  fails  to  do  so(i  o).  The  Convention  thus  states  the  provision  and  its 
exception:  that  the  extradited  person  should  be  tried  solely  for  the  offence  subject 
of  the  extradition  request  while  he  might  be  liable  to  punishment  for  offences  he 
has  committed  prior  to  extradition  request  and  for  which  no  such  request  has  been 
made  if  he  does  not  leave  that  State  after  having  been  given  the  opportunity  to  do 
SO. 
This  Convention  concludes  with  expounding  on  its  implementation  and 
validity(11).  As  regards  the  latter,  the  Convention  is  valid  for  three  years, 
automatically  renewable,  a  renewal  request  being  unnecessary,  unless  either  party, 
i.  e.,  Iraq  and  Saudi  Arabia,  expresses  a  desire  to  amend  or  modify  any  of  its 
provisions  during  the  last  three  months  before  its  expiry  date.  In  point  of  fact,  the 
Convention  is  still  valid  provided  that  none  of  its  provisions  contradicts  with  those 
of  the  extradition  Convention  ratified  within  the  framework  of  the  League  of  Arab 
States  in  1952. 
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AN  ISLAMIC  AND  ARAB  FRATERNITY  T 
. 
EATY  BETWEEN: 
.- 
THE  K  EIDOM  OF  SAUDI.  ARABIA  AND  THE  YEMEN!  KIN  DO'ME12?. 
While  the  unification  of  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia  was  still  nascent,  the  Saudi 
government  ratified  a  treaty  with  the  Yemeni  Kingdom  on  6  February  1933(13).  It 
was  signed  by  Imam  Abdu  Aziz  Ben  Abdurahman  on  behalf  of  Saudi  Arabia,  and 
Imam  Yahya  Ben  Muhammad  Hamid  Eddine  on  behalf  of  Yemen.  In  this  Treaty, 
only  two  articles,  i.  e.,  (9  and  10)  are  relevant  here  since  they  deal  with  the 
question  of  the  extradition  of  criminals. 
Article  9  urges  each  of  the  Contracting  Parties  to  take  steps  to  prevent  any  hostile 
activities  directed  or  even  merely  initiated  against  the  other.  The  two  Parties 
should  carry  out  all  necessary  measures  to  ensure  that.  Hence,  the  State  that 
receives  the  extradition  request  should  extradite  the  person(s)  in  question  who 
bear  the  nationality  of  the  requesting  State.  However,  if  that  person  bears  the 
nationality  of  a  State  other  than  that  of  the  two  Parties,  then  such  person(s)  should 
be  only  deported,  considered  non-grata  and  forbidden  re-entry  into  the  expelling 
country  since  they  obviously  seek  to  spread  evil  in  the  territories  of  either  State. 
Moreover,  one  needs  to  mention  two  striking  points  as  regards  Art-(9).  The  first 
one  is  that this  Treaty  resembles  the  Extradition  Convention  of  1931  between  the 
Iraqi  and  the  Saudi  governments  in  the  fact  that  both  restrict  extradition  to 
persons  holding  the  nationality  of  the  requesting  State,  and  do  not  touch  upon  the 
extradition  of  citizens  or  nationals  of  the  recipient  of  the  extradition  request.  It 
differs,  however,  in  going  further  than  the  earlier  treaties  to  cover  persons  who 
hold  the  nationality  of  a  third  State,  i.  e.,  a  State  other  than  the  requesting  and 
recipient  Parties.  In  regards  to  such  persons  who  commit  evil  in  the  State  the 
territories  of  which  those  persons  happen  to  be  has  the  right  to  deport  them 
without  notifying  the  authorities  of  the  State  which  has  required  the  taking  of  such 
measures.  The  second  point  is  that  this  Article  does  not  specify  the  offences  or 
punishments  due  to  which  the  person  requested  would  be  extradited  or  deported.  It 
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merely  states  those  "who  commit  evil";  needless  to  say,  the  term  "evil"  is loose 
enough  to  allude  to  numerous  matters,  and  is  rarely  used  in  extradition 
conventions. 
This  Treaty  also  urges  the  closure  of  the  State's  borders  against  any  political 
dissenter,  whether  an  individual  or  a  group,  an  official  or  a  non-official.  In  case 
such  person  manages  to  enter  the  territories  of  either  Party,  he  should  then  be 
arrested  in  preparation  for  extraditing  him  to  the  authorities  of  his  State. 
Otherwise,  measures  should  be  taken  for  his  expulsion. 
BILATERAL  CONVENTIONS  WITH  THE  C.  C.  C.  STAT  (14): 
The  Convention  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait  initiated  bilateral  security 
conventions  between  the  former  and  the  G.  C.  C.  States.  It  was  ratified  four  decades 
before  the  establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C..  The  agreement  for  the  extradition  of 
criminals  between  Saudi  and  Kuwait  was  entered  into  in  1942  and  ratified  in 
1943.  It  was  signed,  on  behalf  of  the  Saudi  government,  by  Sheikh  Yossouf 
Yassin,  the  King's  private  secretary  and  head  of  the  political  department,  and  on 
behalf  of  the  British  government,  acting  for  the  Sheikh  of  Kuwait,  by  Francis  Hew 
William,  the  British  Commissioned  Minister  in  Jeddah.  This  Convention  is  made 
up  of  nine  Articles. 
The  first  part  of  this  Convention  stipulates  that  the  two  Contracting  Parties  are 
committed  to  extraditing  persons  who  have  committed  extraditable  offences  in  the 
territories  of  one  of  them,  provided  that  the  person  required  holds  the  nationality 
of  the  requesting  State  or  of  any  other  Arab  State(i  s).  In  other  words,  if  a  person  of 
Kuwaiti  nationality  commits  an  extraditable  offence  in  Saudi  territories,  and 
Kuwait  requests  his  extradition,  the  Saudi  authorities  should  extradite  him.  The 
same  applies  to  persons  of  Syrian,  Jordanian,  Egyptian  or  other  Arab 
nationalities.  If,  however,  the  person  whose  extradition  is  requested  happens  to 
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be  an  Italian  or  a  Belgian,  or  someone  who  holds  any  non-Arab  nationality,  the 
Saudi  authorities  have  the  option  to  extradite  the  person  or  not  since  the 
Convention  is  silent  on  such  cases. 
The  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Convention  thus  widened  the  range  of  persons  to  whom 
extradition  applies  in  comparison  with  the  Saudi-Iraqi  Convention  of  1931  and 
the  Saudi-Yemeni  Treaty  of  1933.  The  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Convention  extends  the 
definition  of  persons  to  be  extradited  to  include  those  who  hold  any  Arab 
nationality.  It  nevertheless  agrees  with  the  other  two  in  the  fact  that  it  does  not 
tackle  the  extradition  of  the  citizens  or  nationals  of  the  State  recipient  of  the 
extradition  request. 
The  range  of  persons  to  be  extradited,  under  the  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Convention,  is, 
however,  restricted  in  comparison  with  its  counterpart  under  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention,  Article  28  of  which  permits  the  extradition  of  the  requested  State's 
nationals.  This  provision  was  among.  the  major  causes  behind  the  Kuwaiti  non- 
ratification  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Convention  forbids  extradition  for  political 
offences.  Hence  paragraphs  (b&c)  which  seek  to  exclude  the  erroneous  inclusion 
within  the  concept  of  the  political  offence  such  crimes  as:  assault  on  the  Saudi 
King  or  the  Kuwaiti  Sheikh  or  any  member  of  their  respective  families,  murder, 
injury,  plunder  and  highway  robbery(]  6).  As  with  the  Saudi-Iraqi  Convention,  this 
section,  too,  omits  to  define  the  term  "political  offences". 
The  Saudi-Kuwait  Convention  includes  mention  of  the  contents  of  the  extradition 
request  file.  These  are:  any  data  that  would  help  in  identifying  the  person  whose 
extradition  is  requested,  an  authenticated  copy  of  the  sentence  issued  by  the 
judicial  authority  in  the  requesting  State  against  the  person  in  question,  and  a 
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resume  of  the  criminal  acts  committed  by  him.  The  Saudi  or  Kuwaiti  extradition 
request  is  to  be  presented  through  the  British  legation  in  Jeddah(17). 
It  is  pertinent  here  to  note  that  the  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Convention  urges  the 
Contracting  Parties  to  inform  each  other  of  the  extradition  request  by  the  fastest 
means  possible,  pending  the  arrival  of  the  extradition  request  file(ts). 
The  Convention  also  includes  mention  of  the  principle  stating  that  these 
provisions  do  not  apply  to  offences  committed  prior  the  ratification  of  the 
Convention.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  not  permissible  to  extradite  a  person  for 
committing  an  extraditable  offence  before  the  Convention  was  ratified(19).  The 
same  principle  is  also  stated,  as  already  noted,  in  the  Saudi-Iraqi  Extradition 
Convention. 
The  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Convention  stipulates,  too,  'the  rule  that  a  person  cannot  be 
tried  but  for  the  offence  stated  in  the  extradition  request.  There  is,  however,  an 
exception  to  this  rule;  the  person  extradited  could  be  tried  for  offences  other  than 
the  offence  subject  of  the  request  when  he  is  given  the  opportunity  to  leave  the 
territories  and  fails  to  do  so.  The  principle  is  annulled  if  the  person  commits  an 
offence  after  being  delivered  to  the  authorities  of  the  requesting  State(20). 
The  Saudi-Kuwait  Convention  has  not  ignored  the  neutral  zone  which  is 
specifically  said  to  fall  under  the  provisions  of  the  Convention(21).  The  neutrality 
region  has  been  defined  by  the  Protocol  for  the  demarcation  of  borders  Najd  and 
Kuwait(22).  Thus,  whoever  commits  an  offence  and  flees  to  the  neutrality  region  is 
considered  to  be  in  the  territory  of  the  State  where  he  has  committed  the  offence; 
hence  its  competent  authorities  have  the  right  to  try  the  offender.  When,  however, 
such  crimes  as  banditry,  robbery,  pillage,  spoliation,  murder,  or  grievous  bodily 
harm  are  committed  in  the  neutrality  region,  and  the  offender  succeeds  in 
fleeing  to  his  own  country,  he  is  then  considered  to  have  committed  the  offence  in 
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his  own  country.  Hence  the  authorities  of  his  own  State  alone  are  responsible  for 
his  trial.  If  the  aforementioned  offences  are  committed  in  the  neutrality  region  by  a 
Saudi  or  a  Kuwaiti  national  who  manages  to  flee  to  a  state  other  than  his  own,  the 
offence  then  is  considered  to  have  been  committed  in  the  State  whose  nationality 
he  holds  and  extradition  procedures  can  be  embarked  upon. 
The  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Convention  concludes  with  articles  dealing  with  the  validity  of 
the  Convention(23)  The  Convention  entered  into  force  upon  the  exchange  of 
instruments  of  ratification,  and  remains  valid  for  five  years.  During  the  last  six 
months  before  the  expiry  date,  the  Contracting  Parties  have  the  right  to  require  the 
termination  of  the  Convention.  Such.  termination,  however,  becomes  valid  only  six 
months  after  the  date  of  the  termination  request. 
It  is  pertinent,  here,  to  ask  whether  the  provisions  of  the  Saudi-Kuwaiti 
Convention  remain  valid  in  the  absence  of  a  termination  request  or  whether  a 
demand  for  renewal  is  necessary. 
The  Convention  itself  answers  such  a  query  by  stipulating  that  its  validity  does  not 
require  a  formal  request  for  renewal  but  that  it  occurs  automatically  so  long  as  no 
request  for  termination  has  been  received. 
The  similarity  between  the  Saudi-Kuwaiti  and  the  Saudi-Iraqi  Extradition 
Conventions  is  quite  obvious.  herein  regards  to  the  treaty's  validity  for  a  limited 
period  which  is  automatically  renewable  without  a  request.  However,  the  length  of 
that  validity,  constitutes  the  difference  between  them,  being  five  years  for  the 
Saudi-Kuwaiti  Convention  and  only  three  years  for  the  Saudi-Iraqi  Convention. 
Another  difference  resides  in  the  fact  that,  when  a  Contracting  Party  desires  the 
termination  of  the  Convention,  the  request  thereof  has  to  be  submitted  during  the 
last  six  months  before  the  expiry  date  in  the  case  of  the  Saudi-Kuwaiti 
Convention,  while  for  the  Saudi-Iraqi  Convention,  such  presentation  should  take 
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place  during  the  last  three  months  before  the  expiry  date.  Compared  with  these 
two  Conventions,  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  is distinguished  by  the  fact  that 
its  validity  is  not  limited  down  to  a  specific  period(24). 
OTHER  Ae 
. 
EEMENTS. 
During  the  period  between  the  ratification  of  the  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Convention  and 
the  ratification  of  security  agreements  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  other  G.  C.  C. 
states,  the  Kingdom  witnessed  further  growth  with  a  concomitant  increase  in  the 
care  given  to  co-ordination  of  security  matters  with  neighbouring  States(25). 
Hence  the  frequent  visits  of  the  Saudi  Minister  of  the  Interior,  as  the  head  of  the 
security  apparatus  in  the  Kingdom,  to  different  States  to  foster  security  co- 
operation,  to  check  the  rise  in  the  incidence  of  crime,  and  to  stem  the  phenomenon 
of  numerous  offenders  committing  crimes  in  the  Kingdom  and  seeking  asylum  in 
other  States.  These  efforts  bore  fruit  when  Saudi  Arabia  ratified  Bilateral 
Extradition  Conventions  with  Bahrain,  the  UAE,  the  Sultanate  of  Oman  and 
Qatar. 
This  series  of  conventions  began  with  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Security  Convention, 
signed  by  Prince  Naif  Ben  Abdel  Aziz,  the  Saudi  Minister  of  the  Interior,  and 
Muhammad  Ben  Khalifs 
. 
Al-Khalifa,  his  Bahraini  counterpart(26).  This 
Convention  was  entered  into  on  9/3/1402  H.  (1982),  and  ratified  on  2/4/1402 
H.  (1982)  and  came  into  force  one  month  after  its  ratification.  Later  the  Saudi 
government  signed  Extradition  Conventions  separately  with  the  Sultanate  of 
Oman,  the  UAE  and  Qatar  on  2/5/1402  H.  (1982).  These  Conventions  were  ratified 
on  28/5/1402  H.  (1982),  and  also  came  into  force  one  month  after  their  ratification. 
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As  for  the  contents  of  these  Conventions,  the  Saudi-Bahrain,  the  Saudi-Omani,  the 
Saudi-UAE,  and  the  Saudi-Qatari  Extradition  Conventions  are  each  made  up  of 
sixteen  articles. 
The  Saudi-Bahraini  Extradition  Convention  starts  off  by  expounding  on  the 
obligatory  conditions  of  extradition(27),  namely:  if  the  person  to  be  extradited  has 
committed  crimes  punishable  by  divine  ordinance,  retribution  punishment,  or 
discretionary  punishment  over  and  above  incarceration  for  no  less  than  six  months 
and  the  crime  in  question  having  been  committed  in  the  territory  of  the  requesting 
State.  However,  a  crime  committed  outside  the  territories  of  both  the  requesting 
and  the  requested  States  might  yet  lead  to  extradition  provided  that  the  current 
laws  and  regulations  in  the  requesting  State  punish  crimes  committed  outside  its 
territories.  This  paragraph  also  allows  for  the  extradition  of  nationals  without 
restrictions,  since  it  adds  that:  "extradition  includes  all  person(s)  in  question  even 
if  they  are  nationals  of  the  requested  Party.  " 
Under  this  Convention,  the  range  of  the  persons  to  be  extradited  has  thus  extended 
to  the  maximum  possible  since  it  covers  the  extradition  of  all  persons  whatever 
their  nationalities.  Hence  if  a  Syrian,  a  Korean,  or  a  Bahraini  commits  an 
extraditable  offence  in  Bahrain,  is later  found  in  the  Saudi  territories,  and  a  request 
for  his  extradition  is  placed  by  the  Bahraini  authorities,  the  Saudi  authorities  are 
committed,  under  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Extradition  Convention,  to  extradite  him 
even  if  he  also  happens  to  be  a  Saudi  national.  This  is due,  as  already  pointed  out, 
to  Art..  1  of  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Convention  that  permits  the  extradition  of 
nationals  ,a  point  of  dire  contention  during  the  signature  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention. 
One  needs  to  add,  here,  that  the  Saudi-Bahraini  extradition  obligatory  conditions 
overlook  the  second  condition  stipulated  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Extradition  Convention 
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according  to  which  the  person  to  be  extradited  must  have  been  sentenced  for  the 
extraditable  offence  in  his  presence  or  in  absentia. 
As  for  the  security  bilateral  convention  concluded  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  each 
of  Oman,  Qatar  and  the  UAE,  they  all  have  obligatory  conditions(28)  similar  to 
those  stipulated  in  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Convention,  as  far  as  the  first  condition  is 
concerned.  They  differ,  however,  in  regards  to  the  second  condition.  Thus,  the 
Saudi-UAE  Bilateral  Security  Convention  resembles  the  Saudi-Bahraini  one  in 
stipulating  extradition  whether: 
"the  offence  has  been  committed  in  the  territories  of  the  requesting  State  or 
outside  the  territories  of  the  Contracting  Parties  provided,  the  laws  and 
regulations  of  the  requesting  State  punish  offences  committed  outside  its 
territories  ". 
Nevertheless  it  says  nothing  whatsoever  about  the  extradition  of  nationals,  neither 
condoning,  nor  forbidding  nor  yet  allowing  it  under  specific  conditions. 
The  Saudi-Omani  and  Saudi-Qatari  Bilateral  Security  Conventions,  on  the  other 
hand,  agree  upon  the  second  condition.  Hence  the  following  provision  occurs  in 
both  Conventions:  "if  the  offence  has  been  committed  outside  the  territory  of  the 
requesting  State  or  outside  the  territories  of  the  Contracting  Parties  provided  the 
laws  and  regulations  therein  punish  such  offences  when  committed  outside  the  two 
States,  extradition,  however,  this  does  not  include  the  requested  State's  nationals 
by  whom  the  attributed  offence  has  been  committed  outside  the  requesting  and 
requested  States'  territories  ". 
The  difference  between  this  text  and  what  has  been  -stipulated  in  the  earlier 
conventions,  with  Bahrain  and  the  UAE,  is  the  following.  In  the  Saudi-Qatari  and 
the  Saudi-Omani  Bilateral  Security  Conventions,  if  the  offence  has  been 
committed  outside  the  territories  of  both  Parties  and  thus  the  territorial  jurisdiction 
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of  their  laws  and  regulations  which  punish  such  offences,  it  is  necessary,  that  the 
laws  and  regulations  of  the  requested  State,  punish  such  offences  extra- 
territorially.  But  supposing  the  laws  and  regulations  of  the  requested  State  do  not 
punish  offences  committed  outside  its  territories  and  outside  the  territories  of  the 
requesting  State,  in  this  case  the  extradition  conditions  are  not  satisfied.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  texts  of  the  Saudi-Bahraini  and  the  Saudi-UAE  Bilateral  Security 
Conventions,  make  it  sufficient  that  the  laws  of  the  requesting  State  punish 
offences  committed  outside  the  territories  of  both  Parties,  the  requesting  and 
requested  States.  Consequently,  in  the  Saudi-Bahraini  and  the  Saudi-UAE 
Bilateral  Security  Conventions,  the  range  of  the  persons  to  be  extradited  is  wider 
than  the  range  decided  upon  in  the  Saudi-Qatari  and  the  Saudi-Omani  Bilateral 
Security  Conventions. 
The  extradition  of  nationals  is  another  major  difference  between  these  bilateral 
security  conventions.  Thus,  unlike  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security 
Convention,  the  Saudi-Omani  and  Saudi-Qatari  Bilateral  Security  Conventions  do 
not  allow  the  unconditional  extradition  of  nationals,  although  they  do  not  overlook 
this  matter  as  is  the  case  with  the  Saudi-UAE  Bilateral  Security  Convention.  The 
two  latter  Conventions  permit  the  extradition  of  nationals  except  when  they  have 
committed  extraditable  offences  outside  the  territories  of  the  requesting  and 
requested  States.  The  provisions  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  however,  are 
in  accordance  with  those  of  the  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Security  Convention  in 
permitting  the  unconditional  extradition  of  nationals. 
One  needs,  here,  to  note  that  Saudi  Arabia,  Bahrain,  the  UAE,  the  Sultanate  of 
Oman  are  the  four  States  which  have  signed  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention. 
Hence,  supposing  a  Saudi  national  had  committed  an  extraditable  offence  in  the 
Emirates'  territories  and  had  managed  to  flee  to  the  Saudi  territories,  the  Saudi 
authorities  could  have,  if  the  UAE  authorities  had  presented  an  extradition 
request,  refused  to  comply  with  that  request  under  the  Saudi-UAE  Bilateral 
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Security  Convention  which  does  not  contain  a  provision  concerning  the 
extradition  of  nationals.  But  after  the  ratification,  in  1994,  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention,  the  Saudi  authorities  are  obliged  to  extradite  its  nationals  to  the  UAE 
The  same  is  true  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  Sultanate  of  Oman  whose  Bilateral 
Security  Convention  lays  down  a  condition  for  the  extradition  of  nationals; 
namely  the  presence  of  the  offender  in  the  territories  of  either  of  the  Contacting 
Parties  when  the  extraditable  offence(s)  had  been  committed.  If  this  was  not  the 
case,  the  extradition  request  would  be  turned  down  as  not  fulfilling  the  stipulated 
conditions.  But  with  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  signed  by  both  States,  and 
in  particular  due  to  Article  28,  the  extradition  of  nationals  is  permissible 
regardless  of  the  conditions  laid  down  in  the  Saudi-Omani  Bilateral  Security 
Convention. 
Besides,  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  stipulates  for  a  case  of 
rejection  of  an  extradition  request.  The  only  condition  for  this  to  happen  is  that  the 
offence  ceases  to  be  considered  criminal,  or  that  the  punishment  consequential 
upon  the  act,  subject  of  the  extradition  request,  is  rescinded  by  virtue  of  the 
regulations  of  the  requesting  State(29). 
In  this  regard,  this  Convention  agrees  with  the  Saudi-UAE  Bilateral  Extradition 
Convention  in  which  a  similar  text  occurs(30).  Moreover  these  Conventions  agree 
with  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  in  citing  only  one  case  of  refusing 
extradition,  that  stipulated  in  Article  29  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention. 
Contrary  to  this,  one  finds  that  the  Saudi-Omani  and  the  Saudi-Qatari  Bilateral 
Conventions  have  one  point  in  common.  The  two  lay  down  three  cases  for 
refusing  extradition(3  i).  The  texts  in  each  is  almost  identical,  in  word  and  spirit, 
defining  those  cases  as: 
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-If  the  offence  is  committed  in  the  territories  of  the  requesting  State,  while  the 
offender  does  not  hold  its  nationality,  and  the  acts  he  is  charged  with  are  not 
punishable  by  the  laws  of  the  requested  State. 
-If  the  offence  is  committed  outside  the  territories  of  the  requesting  and 
requested  States,  while  the  latter's  current  laws.  and  regulations  do  not  levy 
punishment  for  offences  committed  outside  its  territories,  and  the  person  subject 
to  the  extradition  request  does  not  hold  the  nationality  of  the  requesting  State. 
-If  the  offence  ceases  to  be  considered  criminal  under  the  current  laws  and 
regulations  of  the  requested  State  where  the  act  has  been  committed  and  provided 
that  the  person  required  does  not  hold  the  nationality  of  the  requesting  State,  and 
the  offence  in  question  is  not  murder. 
The  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  also  provides  for  cases  of 
extradition  rejection(32),  namely  political  offences.  Aggression  against  members  of 
the  royal  family,  ministers  and  anyone  of  their  rank  is  not  considered  a  political 
offence;  nor  are  murder,  plunder,  robbery,  aircraft  hijacking,  vandalism,  terrorism, 
and  the  attempt  of  any  of  the  aforementioned  offences,  provided  that  the  current 
laws  and  regulations  of  the  requesting  and  the  requested  States  punish  such 
offences. 
The  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  stipulates  other  cases  of 
rejecting  extradition:  for  instance,  if  the  offence  is  committed  in  the  territory  of  the 
requested  State  while  the  person  whose  extradition  is  requested  enjoys  diplomatic 
immunity  in  accordance  with  International  Law  or  any  other  treaties;  or  if  the 
person  in  question  has  been  tried  or  is  being  tried  for  the  offence  subject  of  the 
extradition  request.  This  article  resembles  others  in  the  Bilateral  Security 
Conventions  of  Saudi  Arabia  with  each  of  Qatar,  the  UAE  and  Oman  (33). 
It  is  necessary,  here,  to  add  that  these  Conventions  are  similar  to  the  Saudi-Iraqi 
and  the  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Bilateral  Security  Conventions  because  they  lack  a 
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definition  for  the  term  "political  offences".  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  does 
the  same  in  referring  to  the  term  without  defining  it(34). 
As  for  cases  of  extradition  rejection  as  stated  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention, 
they  are  quite  similar  to  their  counterparts  as  stated  in  the  Saudi-Bahraini,  the 
Saudi-Qatari,  the  Saudi-Omani,  and  the  Saudi-UAE  Bilateral  Security 
Conventions. 
The  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  further  provides  for  the  case  of 
concurrent  extradition  requests  from  different  States(35),  concerning  the  same 
person  and  for  the  same  offence.  The  Convention  stipulates  that  priority  in 
extradition  would  be  given  to  the  Party  whose  interests  have  been  most  damaged 
by  the  offence  and  then  to  the.  State  in  whose  territory  the  offence  has  been 
committed.  If,  however,  the  concurrent  extradition  requests  concern  different 
offences,  extradition  priority  would  then  depend  on  the  incidence  and 
circumstances,  especially  the  gravity  of  the  offences  committed,  its  locus  and  the 
date  the  extradition  request  was  received.  In  this  regard,  the  Saudi-Bahraini 
convention  is  Similar(36)  to  the  bilateral  security  conventions  concluded  with  the 
UAE,  Qatar  and  Oman.  It  also  agrees  with  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention(37). 
The  Saudi-Bahraini  Convention  also  provides  for  the  case  where  the  person  whose 
extradition  is  requested  is  charged  with  an  offence  committed  in  the  requested 
State.  The  latter  State  wound  then  look  into,  but  postpone  taking  a  decision 
concerning,  the  extradition  request  pending  the  result  of  its  investigations  or  trial, 
i.  e.,  the  offender  being  proven  innocent  or  guilty  of  that  charge.  Otherwise,  the 
requested  State  may  hand  over  the  required  person  to  the  requesting  State  to  stand 
trial  before  its  judicial  authorities  on  the  understanding  that  the  requesting  State 
would  return  the  extradited  person  after  being  investigated  or  tried  for  the  offence 
specified  in  the  extradition  request(38). 
127 CHAPTER  FOUR 
It  is  necessary,  here,  to  add  that  the  conventions  Saudi  Arabia  concluded  with 
Qatar,  the  UAE  and  Oman  are 
Similar(39)in  this  regard  with  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention, 
and  with  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  too(40). 
As  for  the  formal  contents  of  the  extradition  request  file,  the  Saudi-Bahraini 
Bilateral  Security  Convention  stipulates(41)  that  it  should  include:  a  detailed 
statement  enabling  the  identification  of  the  person  required,  including  his  identity, 
his  description  and  his  photograph.  It  should  also  contain  a  report  issued  by  the 
competent  authorities  of  the  requesting  State  certifying  that,  under  the  legal 
system  of  the  State  of  the  person  subject  to  the  extradition  request,  the  sentence 
against  the  person  required  has  not  been  waived  and  that  the  acts  committed  have 
not  ceased  to  be  considered  criminal.  Also  enclosed  should  be  a  certified  copy  of 
the  legislation  text(s)  according  to  which  the  offence  committed  by  the  person  to 
be  extradited  is  punishable  and  the  evidence  held  by  the  competent  authorities 
against  him,  together  with  a  certified  copy  of  the  sentence  passed  thereon.  In  the 
absence  of  such  a  sentence,  the  extradition  request  should  be  issued  by  the 
competent  authority  and  presented  with  a  clear  indication  that  the  request 
conforms  with  the  provisions  of  the  Convention.  The  extradition  request  file 
should  then  be  sent  by  the  competent  authorities  of  the  requesting  State  to  the 
competent  authorities  of  the  requested  State. 
One  needs  to  note,  here,  that  all  extradition  conventions  concluded  bilaterally 
between  Saudi  Arabia  and  Qatar,  Oman,  and  the  UAE(42)  include  the  same 
provision  concerning  the  extradition  request  file  as  the  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral 
Security  Convention. 
However,  as  regards  the  formal  documents  contained  in  the  extradition  request  file 
within  the  framework  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention(43),  there  is  one  point  of 
difference  which  distinguishes  this  from  the  Bilateral  Conventions.  The  G.  C.  C. 
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Convention  stipulates  that  the  report  ascertaining  that  the  sentence  against  the 
person  required  has  not  been  waived  and  that  the  acts  he  is  charged  with,  are  still 
considered  criminal  should  accord  with  the  current  legal  system  of  the  requesting 
State,  whereas,  in  the  Bilateral  Conventions,  the  decision  is  taken  in  accordance 
with  the  legal  system  of  the  national  State  of  the  requested  person. 
The  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  cites  an  exception  in  regards  to 
the  formal  contents  of  the  extradition  request  file(44).  It  is  possible  to  dispense 
with  the  aforementioned  documents  if  the  person  arrested  admits  that  he  is  the 
person  wanted  and  confesses  to  having  committed  the  offence(s)  provided  it  is  an 
extraditable  crime  according  to  the  Convention's  provisions.  The  same  exception 
is  cited  in  the  Saudi-Omani,  the  Saudi-Qatari  and  the  Saudi-UAE  Bilateral 
Security  Conventions  (45),  while  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention(46),  it  also 
occurs  but  with  a  difference.  The  Bilateral  Conventions  stipulate  that,  "...  these 
authorities  have  the  right  to  order  his  extradition  ".  This  obviously  means  that  it  is 
discretionary  and  not  obligatory.  In  case  such  a  person  is in  the  territories  of  a 
Party  to  the  Convention,  its  authorities  might  order  his  extradition;  but  then  again 
they  might  not.  Within  the  framework  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  things 
are  different.  The  latter  states  that  "The  competent  authority  in  the  requested  State 
shall..  "  which  indicates  obligation  not  discretion.  Hence,  the  competent 
authorities  in  the  detaining  State  have  no  alternative  but  to  extradite  him  once  his 
case  satisfies  the  required  exception  conditions. 
As  for  dealing  with  the  extradition  requests,  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security 
Convention  stipulates  that  when  dealing  with  those  requests  the  current 
regulations  of  both  States,  at  the  time  of  the  request  should  be  taken  into 
consideration.  Such  a  request  should  be  reviewed  within  a  specific  period,  not 
exceeding  two  months.  During  that  period,  the  requested  State  should  inform  the 
requesting  State  of  its  response,  whether  positively  or  negatively,  to  the 
extradition  request.  In  case  of  a  negative  reply  to  the  extradition  request;  the 
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requested  State  should  provide  reasons  for  the  rejection(47).  This  same  provision  is 
echoed  in  the  Saudi-Qatari,  the  Saudi-UAE  and  the  Saudi-Omani  Bilateral 
Security  Conventions(48),  as  well  as  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention(49). 
Furthermore,  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  permits  the 
exceptional  dispatch  of  the  extradition  request  by  telegraph  or  telephone  to  give 
the  competent  authorities,  in  the  requesting  State,  time  to  prepare  and  gather  the 
necessary  documents  for  the  extradition  request  file.  The  competent  authorities,  in 
the  requested  State,  should  put  the  person  required  under  surveillance  or  arrest 
him  on  a  precautionary  basis  for  a  period  not  exceeding  thirty  days.  During  this 
time,  if  the  requesting  Party  fails  to  send  the  extradition  request  file,  the  requested 
State  has  the  right  to  release  the  person  requested  or  it  might  renew  his 
precautionary  arrest  for  another  thirty  days  -  if  the  requesting  State  so  demands  - 
provided  that  such  period(s)  would  be  subtracted  from  any  custodial  sentence 
imposed  on  that  person  by  the  requesting  Party(so). 
In  this  regard  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention,  the  other  Bilateral 
Security  Conventions(51),  and  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention(52)  all  agree. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  stipulates  the 
handing  over,  to  the  requesting  State,  of  the  person  in  question  along  with  the 
evidence  held  against  him  as  far  as  that  is  possible  in  accordance  with  the  current 
legal  system  of  the  requested  State(53).  The  Saudi-Qatari,  the  Saudi-UAE  and  the 
Saudi-Omani  Bilateral  Security  Conventions(54)  have  the  same  provision  as  the 
Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  convention,  as  does  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention(55). 
Moreover,  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  prohibits  the 
punishment,  by  the  competent  authorities  in  the  requesting  State,  of  the  person 
extradited  except  for  the  offences  specified  in  the  extradition  request(56),  or  for 
any  other  acts  related  to  them  or  for  offences  committed  by  him  after  having  been 
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extradited  to  the  requesting  State.  Nevertheless,  that  person  could,  in  exceptional 
circumstances,  be  punished  for  offences  other  than  those  specified  in  the 
extradition  request  or  related  acts  in  two  cases:  Firstly,  when  the  person  consents 
to  such  a  step;  and  secondly,  when  the  person  has  had  the  opportunity  to  leave  that 
State,  to  which  he  has  been  extradited,  and  fails  to  seize  the  opportunity  within 
thirty  days.  Hence,  for  the  sake  of  illustration,  if  a  Jordanian  commits  an  offence 
in  Saudi  territory  and  then  flees  to  the  UAE,  the  competent  authorities  there  could, 
on  a  Saudi  extradition  request,  extradite  this  person  to  Saudi  Arabia  for  this 
offence,  or  for  any  acts  related  it.  That  person  could  then  be  punished  for  those 
and  other  crimes  committed  by  him  in  Saudi  territories  after  extradition,  if  he 
agrees  to  that  or  if  he  is  offered  the  opportunity  to  leave  the  Saudi  territory  and 
fails  to  do  so  within  thirty  days.  On  this  provision,  all  the  Bilateral  Security 
Conventions(57)  agree,  as  does  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention(58). 
As  for  which  Party  bears  the  expenses  of  the  extradition,  the  Saudi-Bahraini 
Bilateral  Security  Convention  stipulates  that  the  expenses  incurred  by  the 
extradition  are  to  be  borne  in  the  requesting  Party,  together  with  expenses 
incurred  by  the  extradited  person  returning  home  if  he  is  found  innocent  of  the 
charges(59).  The  Saudi-Qatari,  the  Saudi-UAE  and  the  Saudi-Omani  Bilateral 
Security  Conventions(6o)agree  with  the  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Security 
Convention,  as  does  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention(61)  in  terms  of  this  provision. 
Moreover,.  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  urges  the  Contracting 
Parties  to  co-operate  in  the  precautionary  arrest  of  criminals(62),  and  the  exchange 
of  information  about  criminals  either  through  visits  or  some  other  means  of 
communication.  The  Saudi-Omani,  the  Saudi-UAE  and  the  Saudi-Qatari  Bilateral 
Security  Conventions(63)  contain  similar  provisions.  There  is,  however,  no  similar 
specific  article  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention;  nevertheless,  this  idea  is  clearly 
stated  in  more  than  one  place  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention. 
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The  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  stipulates,  moreover,  that  the 
requesting  State  should  arrange  to  receive  the  person  whose  extradition  it  has 
demanded  within  thirty  days  from  the  date  of  the  positive  reply,  by  the  requested 
State(&t).  If  the  requesting  State  fails  to  do  so,  the  requested  State  has  the  right  to 
release  the  person  arrested.  In  this  case,  the  former  has  no  right  to  re-petition  for 
the  extradition  of  the  same  person,  for  the  same  offence. 
This  provision  is  also  found  in  the  Saudi-Qatari,  the  Saudi-UAE  and  the  Saudi- 
Omani  Bilateral  Security  Conventions(65).  However,  in  regards  to  this  provision, 
there  is  a  difference  between  the  Bilateral  Security  Conventions  and  the  G.  C.  C. 
Security  Convention.  The  latter  stipulates,  in  this  connection,  the  need  for  a  new 
extradition  request  to  receive  a  person  who  has  formerly  been  the  subject  of  an 
extradition  request,  but  for  whose  reception  the  requesting  Party  did  not  make 
arrangements  within  thirty  days.  This  is  totally  different  from  the  bilateral 
conventions  which  do  not  require  a  new  request  for  the  same  person  in  connection 
with  the  same  offence. 
As  for  the  validity  of  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention(66),  it  lasts 
for  five  years  from  date  of  ratification.  The  five  year  period  is  automatically 
renewable  unless  a  Contracting  Party  expresses  its  desire  to  terminate  the 
Convention,  provided  that  desire  is  expressed  during  the  last  six  months  before  the 
natural  expiry  date.  Amending  the  provisions  of  the  Convention,  on  the  other 
hand,  can  be  arranged  with  the  approval  of  both  Parties.  The  same  article 
stipulates  that,  "..  it  is  yet  permissible,  with  the  approval  of  both  Contracting 
Parties,  to  amend  Articles  during  the  validity  period  of  the  Convention  ". 
This  means  that  there  is  a  divergence  between  the  Bilateral  Security  Conventions 
and  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention.  The  Bilateral  Conventions  do  not  specify  the 
competent  authorities  in  both  Parties  which  are  charged  with  the  duty  of  amending 
the  Convention's  texts.  The  approval  could  ,  therefore,  be  given  by  the  State's 
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representatives  signing  the  Convention.  On  the  other  hand,  any  amendment  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  has  to  be  approved  by  the  Supreme  Council(67)  of  the 
G.  C.  C..  This  means  that  the  approval  of  any  such  amendment  is  restricted  to  the 
member  States'  Heads  of  State. 
Another  difference  is  that,  in  the  case  of  bilateral  security  conventions,  the  validity 
is  tied  to  a  specific  period  even  though  it  is  automatically  renewable.  They  lack  a 
sense of  true  permanence,  while  for  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  the  validity 
is  not  temporary  but  permanent.  In  this  regard,  all  bilateral  conventions  share  that 
temporary  nature,  whether  it  is  the  Saudi-Omani,  the  Saudi-Qatari,  or  the  Saudi- 
UAE  Bilateral  Security  Conventions,  they  all  agree  with  the  Saudi-Bahrain  one. 
The  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Security  Convention  concludes  its  provisions  with 
formal  articles  on  its  approval  and  entry  into  force  two  months  after  the  exchange 
of  the  ratification  instruments  between  the  two  Contracting  Parties(68).  This 
Article  makes  null  and  void  any  previous  agreement,  between  the  two  countries, 
dealing  with  the  same  topic.  The  same  is  true  of  the  Saudi-Qatari,  the  Saudi-UAE 
and  the  Saudi-Omani  Bilateral  Security  Conventions(69). 
In  this,  too,  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention's  provisions  differ  from  those  of  the 
Bilateral  Conventions.  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  states  that  its  provisions 
enter  into  force  one  month  after  the  date  of  the  deposit  of  the  instruments  of 
ratification  of  two-thirds  of  the  signatory  member  States(7o).  Moreover,  the  G.  C.  C. 
Security.  Convention  does  not  annul  any  previous  Conventions  ratified  by  any 
member,  State;  it  specifically  urges  the  member  States  to  retain  any  Bilateral 
Security  Conventions  ratified  by  them  even  if  the  provisions  of  a  bilateral 
convention  conflict  with  those  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention.  As  discussed  earlier,  the 
articles  of  the  latter  do  not  annul  those  of  the  earlier  bilateral  provision,  nor  do 
they  assume  priority  over  them.  The  G.  C.  C.  Convention  stipulates  that  priority  in 
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this  case  should  be  given  to  the  provision  which  involves  comprehensive  security 
co-operation(71). 
From  this  discussion  of  bilateral  security  conventions  ratified  by  the  Saudi 
government  with  G.  C.  C.  States,  one  realises  the  extent  of  the  similarity  between 
the  provisions  of  these  conventions  and  those  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention, 
but  especially  between  the  latter  and  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security 
Convention(72).  Thus,  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  permits  the  unconditional 
extradition  of  nationals  if  the  extradition  satisfies  the  conditions  required,  as  does 
Article.  (1)  of  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Convention.  This  approach  indicates 
that  the.  G.  C.  C.  member.  States  wish  to  widen  the  range  of  extraditable  persons  and 
specifically  to  allow  the  extradition  of  nationals.  Hence  one  may  rightly  argue  that 
these  states  have  reached  a  higher  stage  of  development  in  regards  to  the 
extradition  of  criminals. 
However,  the  question  arises  here:  since  Qatar  and  Oman  are  not  party  to  the 
extradition  treaty  concluded  within  the  framework  of  the  League  of  the  Arab 
States  in  1952(73),  nor  to  the  Arab  Judicial  Co-operation  Treaty  of  Riyadh  in 
1983(74),  how  would  Saudi  Arabia  handle  extradition  questions  with  Qatar  and 
Oman,  and  how  would  the  latter,  i.  e.,  Qatar  and  Oman,  handle  theirs  ? 
Before  ratifying  bilateral  security  conventions  with  Qatar  and  the  Sultanate  of 
Oman,  Saudi  Arabia,  as  far  as  extradition  is  concerned,  resorted  to  prevailing 
international  practices  which  usually  begin  with  the  principle  of  reciprocity  as  is 
the  case  in  the  international  relations  between  any  two  States  not  bound  by  any 
agreement  regulating  extradition  matters.  Added  to  these  international  relations 
and  principles  would  be  the  special  relations  that  link  -these  States  to  each  other 
which  play  a  major  role  in  extradition  transactions.  It  is  pertinent,  here,  to  add  that 
the  ratification  of  such  bilateral  security  conventions  by  Saudi  Arabia  bore  fruit  in 
an  increase  in  the  incidence  of  returned  fugitives.  Thus,  for  instance,  the 
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statistics(75)  conducted  between  1403  H.  (1983)  and  1412  H.  (1992),  reveal  that  553 
offenders  had  fled  from  Saudi  Arabian  territories,  and  that  the  Saudi  government 
captured  88  fugitives  out  of  the  553.  This  fixes  the  rate  of  return  at  20%  of  the 
total  number  of  fugitives.  Actually  the  rate  is low  but  it  is better  than  before  the 
ratification  of  the  bilateral  security  conventions. 
The  year  The  number  of  offenders  who  fled  The  number  of  offenders  extradited 
from  Saudi  Arabia  to  another  I  from  other  States  to  Saudi  Arabia. 
State. 
1403  H.  52  14 
1404  H.  61  16 
1405  H.  41  7 
1406  H.  57  17 
1407  H.  62  16 
1408  H.  71  4 
1409  H.  53  4 
1410  H.  64  4 
1411  H.  52  3 
1412  H.  40  3 
As  for  the  executive  aspect  of  the  extradition  system  adopted  by  Saudi  Arabia,  that 
was  left  to  the  competence  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  by  virtue  of  a  Saudi 
Ministerial  Council  Resolution,  No  83  dated  on  1/2/1395H..  The  Ministry  of  the 
Interior  then  mandated  a  committee  formed  of  legal  advisers  to  research  the 
question  of  criminal  extradition. 
It  often  happens  that  the  embassy  or  consulate  of  the  State  requesting  extradition 
presents  a  provisional  extradition  request  or  a  demand  for  house-arrest  until  the 
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documents  necessary  for  the  extradition  file(76)  are  prepared.  The..  Ministry  of 
Foreign  affairs  receives  the  request  file  and  sends  it  to  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior 
which,  in  its  turn,  sends  it  to  the  competent  committee,  formed  of  three  legal 
advisers.  The  latter  has  the  right  to  question  the  person  requested  and  it  has  the 
right  to  arrest  or  release  him,  just  like  judges.  However,  yet  it  may  mandate  this 
I  task  to  an  investigator.  If  extradition  is  chosen  as  the  result  of  a  house-arrest 
demand,  the  committee  issues  its  orders  to  arrest  the  person  requested  and  informs 
the  competent  authorities  in  the  requesting  State.  If  after  one  month  from  the  arrest 
date,  the  requesting  State  has  not  arranged  to  receive  the  person  requested,  the 
committee  has  the  right  to  set  that  person  free.  Nevertheless  if  the  committee 
receives  a  renewed  request,  and  is  convinced  of  the  reasons  that  have  prevented 
the  requesting  State  from  collecting  the  required  person,  the  committee  may 
decide  to  re-arrest  the  person  for  a  renewed  period.  Should  the  extradition 
committee  decide  to  reject  the  extradition  request,  it  releases  the  person  for  lack  of 
justifiable  reasons  for  arresting  him.  In  principle,  the  requesting  State  should 
assume  the  charges  incurred  for  the  return  of  the  person  to  his  country,  yet  Saudi 
Arabia  often  pays  such  expenses  in  order  to  encourage  crime  prevention. 
When,  on  the  other  hand,  Saudi  Arabia  wishes  to  recapture  from  abroad  a 
fugitive(77)  who  has  committed  an  offence  in  Saudi  territories,  the  Interpol 
Communication  department(78)  notifies  the  Public  Rights  Administration  which,  in 
its  turn,  sends  the  extradition  request  file  through  diplomatic  channels  in  no  more 
than  five  days  from  the  date  of  reception  of  notification  from  the  Interpol 
Communication  department.  The  latter  might  demand  the  prolongation  of  the 
arrest  period  if  it  expires  before  the  completion  of  the  extradition  request  file.  An 
Interpol  or  a  Public  Rights  official  may  be  charged  with  the  completion  and 
following  up  of  tasks  when  it  is  sent  to  the  Ministry  of-Foreign  Affairs,  which  in 
its  turn,  sends  the  file  to  the  Saudi  Embassy  in  the  requested  State.  The  Saudi 
Embassy  conveys  the  file  to  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  requested  State 
which,  in  its  turn,  sends  it  to  the  competent  domestic  authorities. 
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There  is,  as  is  apparently  noticed,  a  strong  relation  between  the  Saudi  International 
Police  (InterPol)  and  the  recapture  committee  (the  Public  Rights  Administration). 
Co-operation  and  co-ordination  always  holds  good  between  them  whether 
Saudi  Arabia  is  a  requested  or  requesting  Party. 
One  can  say  in  conclusion  that  in  regards  to  recapture,  the  Saudi  Arabia  adopts  a 
twofold  system,  which  mixes  the  administrative  and  the  judicial.  However  as  the 
executive  authority  plays  a  major  role  in  the  extradition  of  criminals,  the  system 
tends  more  to  the  administrative  than  to.  the  judicial  approach(79).  As  for  the 
bilateral  security  conventions,.  they  do  not  specify  a  system  for  the  extradition  of 
criminals(80). 
Hence,  the  systems  of  extraditing  criminals  varies  according  to  the  approach 
adopted  by  each  contracting  party. 
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NOTES 
1)  The  establishment  of  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia  passed  through  three  stages: 
-The  first  stage:  from  1744  to  1819  under  the  leadership  of  Imam  Muhammad  Ben  Saud,  the 
Emir  of  Dari'ah  who  was  supported  by  Sheikh  Muhammad  Ben  Abdel  Wahhab. 
-The  second  stage:  in  1825  under  the  leadership  of  Imam  Torki  Ben  Abdullah  who  regained 
the  reign  of  his  ancestors. 
-The  third  stage  was  started  in  1902  by  King  Abdul  Aziz  and  continued  until  the  unification 
of  all  the  Kingdom's  regions  in  1932  when  a  decree  was  issued  proclaiming  the  appellation 
of  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia.  For  more  details,  see:  Said  Ahmed  Dahlan,  A  Study  of  the 
Domestic  Policy  of  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia,  Dar  al  shorouk,  Jeddah  1985,2nd  Ed., 
PP.  29-33. 
2)  Saudi  Arabia  is  the  largest  petroleum  producer  in  the  world  and  has  the  greatest  reserves. 
3)  The  large  foreign  manpower  in  Saudi  Arabia  of  different  nationalities,  cultures  and  behavioral 
patterns  has  led  to  an  increase  of  criminality  and  of  escape  from  justice.  On  this  topic,  see: 
Muhammad  Ben  Ibrahim  Ben  Abdurahman  Assif,  The  Criminal  Phenomenon  in  the  Saudi 
Society's  Structure  and  Culture,  Dar  Ibn  Laghboun  for  publication  and  distribution,  Riyadh 
1995,  PP.  186-188. 
4)  The  author's  personal  reference. 
5)  Art.  2  of  the  Extradition  Convention  between  the  Kingdom  of  Hijaz  and  Najd  with  its 
appurtenances,  and  the  Iraqi  Kingdom. 
6)  Ibid,  Art.  1. 
7)  Ibid,  Art.  3. 
8)  Ibid,  Art.  4  and  5. 
9)  Ibid,  Art.  6  specifies  that:  "According  to  this  Convention,  it  is  not  permissible  to  extradite  a 
person  for  an  offence  committed  before  the  entry  into  effect  of  the  said  Convention". 
10)  Ibid,  Art.  7. 
11)  Ibid,  Art.  8. 
12)  The  author's  personal  reference. 
13)  Uwaidh  Muhammad  Huzail,  OP  CIT,  Vol.  II,  P.  389. 
14)  The  author's  personal  reference. 
15)  Articles  I  and  2  of  the  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Bilateral  Convention. 
16)  Ibid,  Art.  3. 
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17)  Ibid,  Art.  4. 
18)  Ibid,  Art.  5  stipulates  the  following:  "In  order  to  punish  the  offender  and  avoid  his  escape  from 
the  territories,  the  competent  authorities  in  the  Contracting  Parties  should  correspond  through 
the  fastest  means  possible  to  insure  arresting  the  offender  pending  the  arrival  of  the  request 
documents  listed  above  in  Article  4.  " 
19)  Ibid,  Art.  6. 
20)  Ibid,  Art.  7. 
21)  Ibid,  Art.  8. 
22)  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  Protocol  for  the  demarcation  of  the  borders  of  Najd  and  Kuwait 
was  entered  into  in  the  Okair  region  on  the  2°d.  of  December,  1922.  The  Okair  Protocol 
stipulates  the  establishment  of  a  neutral  region  of  2000  square  miles  the  riches  of  which  and  its 
. 
riches  are  to  be  equally  exploited  by  Najd  and  Kuwait.  Another  treaty  was  ratified  in  1965 
between  Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait  to  regulate  the.  status  of  this  region.  For  more  details,  see:  4 
ILM  1134(1965);  Muhammad  Mostafa  Shahata,  "The  Saudi  Borders  with  the  Gulf  States", 
OP  CIT. 
23)  The  Saudi-Kuwaiti  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  9. 
24)  Any  member  State  desiring  to  withdraw  from  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  presents  a 
withdrawal  request  to  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretary-General,  such  withdrawal  becoming  valid  only  six 
months  after  the  date  of  its  presentation  while  extradition  requests  received  before  the  expiry 
date  remain  valid. 
25)  Among  these  prominent  matters  is  the  search  for  an  ideal  G.  C.  C.  security  formula  and  the 
Saudi  proposal  to  establish  an  Arab  "InterPol".  At  the  establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C.,  Saudi 
Arabia  was  also  the  first  to  call  upon  it  to  take  charge  of  security  and  military  affairs.  For  more 
details,  see:  "The  Gulf  and  Arab  Peninsula  Documents,  1975",  Bulletins  of  the  Gulf  and 
Arab  Peninsula  Studies  Magazine,  Kuwait  University,  Kuwait  1983,  P.  776. 
26)  It  is  pertinent  here  to  note  that  when  Sheikh  Muhammad  Ben  Khalifa,  the  Bahraini  Minister  of 
Interior,  was  asked  about  the  reasons  for  signing  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Convention,  whether  it  was 
because  of  the  late  1981  cabal,  supported  by  Iran  to  overthrow  the  Bahraini  political  system,  or 
because  of  other  reasons,  his  answer  was  that  security  co-operation  between  the  Kingdom  and 
Bahrain  was  strong  and  based  on  mutual  understanding.  He  added  that  the  signing  of  the 
Bilateral  Convention  was  not  because  of  that  conspiracy  but  because  of  Prince  Naif  s  visit  to 
Bahrain  at  that  time.  The  Bahraini  Prime  Minister  confirmed  this  by  declaring  that  the  Saudi- 
Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  had  been  entered  into  before  those  events  and  that  its 
ratification  was  decided  during  those  circumstances  to  highlight  the  common  destiny  with  Saudi 
Arabia  and  to  show  the  latter's  willingness  to  support  sister  states  in  their  prosperity  and 
adversity.  For  more  details,  see:  Fatima  Saad  Eddine,  The  Gulf  and  the  Arab  Peninsula 
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Documents,  1982,  Bulletins  Of  Gulf  and  Arab  Peninsula  Studies  Magazine, 
-OP 
CIT,  PP.  393- 
396;  Essam  Al-Adib,  OP  CIT,  PP.  87-88. 
27)  The  Saudi-Bahrain  Extradition  Convention,  Art.  1. 
28)  Art.  I  in  the  Saudi-UAE,  the  Saudi-Qatar  and  the  Saudi-Oman  Bilateral  Security  Conventions. 
29)  Art.  2  of  the  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Security  Convention  reads:  "Rejection  of  Extradition, 
Extradition  might  be  rejected  if  the  criminality  of  the  act  ceases  or  the  punishment  is  rescinded 
in  accordance  with  the  regulations  of  the  requesting  State.  " 
30)  The  Saudi-UAE  Bilateral  Security  Convention,  Art.  2. 
31)  The  Saudi-Oman  and  the  Saudi-Qatar  Bilateral  Security  Conventions,  Art.  2. 
32)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  3. 
33)  Three  above-mentioned  Conventions,  Art.  3. 
34)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art.  30. 
35)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  4. 
36)  Art.  4  of  the  Saudi-UAE,  the  Saudi-Qatar,  the  Saudi-Oman  Bilateral  Security  Conventions. 
37)  Art.  34  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention. 
38)  Art.  5  of  the  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Security  Convention. 
39)  Art.  5  of  the  Conventions  of  all  three  instances. 
40)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art  35. 
41)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art  6. 
42)  Art.  6  of  all  three  Conventions. 
43)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art.  31. 
44)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  7. 
45)  Art.  7  of  the  three  Bilateral  Conventions. 
46)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art.  32. 
47)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  8. 
48)  Art.  8  of  all  three  Conventions. 
49)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art.  33. 
50)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  9. 
51)  Art.  9  of  all  three  Conventions. 
52)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art.  36. 
53)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  10. 
54)  Art.  10  of  all  three  Conventions. 
55)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art.  37. 
56)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  11. 
57)  Art.  11  of  all  the  Bilateral  Security  Conventions. 
58)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art.  38. 
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59)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  12. 
60)  Art.  12  of  the  other  Bilateral  Security  Conventions. 
61)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art.  39. 
62)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  13. 
63)  Art.  13  of  the  other  Bilateral  Security  Conventions. 
64)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  14. 
65)  Art.  14  of  all  three  Conventions. 
66)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  15. 
67)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art.  44. 
68)  Saudi-Bahrain  Bilateral  Convention,  Art.  16. 
69)  Art.  16  of  all  three  Conventions. 
70)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  Art.  43. 
71)  Ibid,  Art.  41. 
72)  In  a  meeting  with  the  author,  Sheikh  Fahim  Al-Kassimi  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretary-General,  declared 
that  the  Saudi-Bahraini  Bilateral  Security  Convention  represented  the  minimum  of  co-operation 
compared  to  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention. 
73)  These  two  Countries  do  not  appear  on  the  list  of  the  Signatory  States  of  the  Extradition  Treaty 
concluded  within  the  framework  of  the  League  of  the  Arab  States. 
74)  Uwaidh  Muhammad  Huzail,  OP  CIT,  Vol.  I,  P  IT 
75)  Ibid,  P.  5. 
76)  Mohammed  Zafer  Ashehri,  Research  in  The  Efficiency  of  Ways  to  Chase  The  Criminals  are 
away  Across  The  Borders,  a  Master  Thesis  submitted  to  the  Arab  Centre  for  Security  and 
Training,  Riyadh  1991,  P.  189. 
77)  Ibid,  P.  191. 
78)  Saudi  Arabia  joined  Interpol  in  1956.  The  Interpol  communications  Dept.  in  Saudi  Arabia  is 
made  up  of.  the  recapture  and  investigations  section;  research  and  translation;  drugs;  economic 
offences;  a  secretariat;  and  a  section  for  forgery  and  falsification.  This  administration  is  charged 
with  pursuing  fugitive  offenders;  helping  other  agencies  in  recapturing  those  criminals;  and 
also  helping  to  extradite  offenders  who  have  fled  to  Saudi  Arabia  when  a  request  for  them  is 
made.  For  more  details,  see:  Mohammed  Zafer  Ashehri,  OP  CIT,  P.  159;  see  also:  Uwaidh 
Muhammad  Huzail,  OP  CIT,  Vol.  II,  P  361. 
79)  Mohammed  Zafer  Ashehri,  OP  CIT,  P.  57. 
80)  The  ways  adopted  in  the  extradition  of  criminals  are:  The  administrative  system:  in  which  the 
acceptance  of  extradition  requests  is  the  duty  of  the  executive  authority  in  the  requested  State. 
The  system  is  easy  and  fast  yet  it  lacks  legal  guarantees  for  the  person  required.  It  fosters  the 
benefits  of  the  requesting  State  over  the  legally  necessary  guarantees  of  the  person  extradited. 
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Among  the  States  that  adopt  this  system  are  Spain  and  Egypt.  The  judicial  system:  in  which  the 
acceptance  of  extradition  requests  is  the  duty  of  the  judicial  authority.  It  is  neither  as  easy  nor 
as  fast  as  the  administrative  system,  yet  it  assures  legal  guarantees  for  the  person  to  be 
extradited  since  the  demand  of  extradition  and  evidence  are  examined  by  the  judiciary 
authority.  This  system  is  operational  in  Britain  and  other  countries.  The  administrative/judicial 
system  mixed):  it  enjoys  the  advantages  of  the  two  previous  systems  and  avoids  their 
drawbacks.  In  terms  of  this  system,  the  executive  and  judicial  authorities  both  have  a  say  in 
deciding  extradition  requests.  It  considers  the  judicial  point  of  view  as  a  consultative  view, 
but  the  executive  authority  takes  the  final  decision  concerning  the  extradition  request.  This 
system  was  first  adopted  in  Belgium  that  is  why  it  is  known  as  the  Belgian  system.  It  is 
considered  as  the  best  criminal  extradition  system  adopted.  The  voluntary  system:  not  an 
independent  criminal  extradition  system,  but  it  allows  extradition  to  be  accepted  if  the  person 
to  be  extradited  confesses  himself  to  be  guilty  of  the  charges,  admits  that  he  is  the  person  in 
question,  and  accepts  his  extradition  without  any  extradition  request.  See  Muhammad  Zafer 
Ashehri,  OP  CIT,  P.  46  Et.  Seq;  Uwaidh  Muhammad  Huzail,  OP  CIT,  Vol.  II,  P  43  Et.  Seq. 
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CHAPTER  FIVE 
SECURITY  AND  T  DITION  THE  I  ('E 
Ory"  ARAB  STATES 
The  League  of  Arab  States(1),  is  a  regional  organisation,  established  to 
promote  co-ordination  and  co-operation  between  the  member  States  in  different 
fields.  The  security  field  is  given  much  prominence.  In  fact,  the  Council  of  the 
L.  A.  S.  agreed,  on  14  September  1952,  upon  three  Conventions  dealing  with 
security  and  judicial  co-operation  during  the  16thordinary  session.  The  three 
agreements  are  the  Judicial  Intimation  and  Delegation  Convention,  the  Judgement 
Execution  Convention,  and  the  Criminal  Extradition  Convention,  which  is  the 
subject  of  this  study. 
It  is  important  to  note  that there  were  not  many  signatory  States  to  the  Criminal 
Extradition  Convention  at  that  time.  They  were  the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of 
Jordan,  the  Republic  of  Lebanon,  the  Syrian  Republic,  the  '  Kingdom  of  Saudi 
Arabia,  the  Egyptian  Kingdom  and  the  Iraqi  Kingdom(2).  Later,  the  Convention 
was  acceded  to  by  Libya,  the  UAE,  Bahrain,  Kuwait  and  South  Yemen. 
Later,  the  Judicial  Intimation  and  Delegation  Convention  and  the  Judgement 
Execution  Convention  were  superseded  by  another  Convention  comprehensive 
enough  to  cope  with  renewed  security  concerns  in  Arab  society;  this  convention  is 
the  Riyadh  Judicial  Co-operation  Convention  of  1983. 
The  section  will  discuss  the  Arab  Criminal  Extradition  Convention,  what  is 
important  as  far  as  this  study  is  concerned  in  the  Riyadh  Judicial  Co-operation 
Convention,  and  the  work  of  the  Council  of  the  Arab  Ministers  of  the  Interior,  the 
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important  organs  that  work  within  its  framework  and  the  most  important  activities 
undertaken. 
Our  study  will  be  twofold,  the  first  aspect  is  theoretical  which  discusses  the 
provisions  of  the  two  Conventions  and  analyses  their  differences  from  the 
comprehensive  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  while  the  second  is  practical  and 
deals  with  the  mechanisms  that  implement  the  provisions  related  to  the  criminal 
extradition  within  the  Arab  States. 
THE  CRIMINAL  EXTRADITION  CONYENTIONQ  1952)(3). 
The  Convention  begins  with  the  obligation  on  the  signatory  Arab  States  to 
extradite  criminals  if  any  one  of  these  States  requires  their  extradition(4).  This 
article  is  similar  to  Art.  27  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention.  The  Convention 
lays  down  that  extradition  is  permissible:  When  the  person  whose  extradition  is 
sought  is  convicted  of  an  extraditable  offence  and  that  offence  is  committed  in  the 
territory  of  the  requesting  State(s).  If  the  offence  is  committed  outside  the 
territories  of  both  the  requested  and  requesting  States,  it  is  necessary  that  both 
their  legal  systems  punish  an  offence  committed  outside  the  territories  of  the 
States(6). 
In  this  regard,  there  is  a  difference  between  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  and 
the  provisions  of  the  L.  A.  S.  Criminal  Extradition  Convention.  If  the  offence  is 
committed  outside  the  territories  of  the  requesting  and  requested  States,  the 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  stipulates  that,  in  such  a  case,  extradition  is 
permissible  if  the  legal  system  in  force  in  the  requesting  State  declares  the  offence 
punishable.  It  does  not,  however,  require  that  the  offence  be  punishable  by  the 
legal  systems  of  both  States,  as  is  stated  in  the  L.  A.  S.  Extradition  Convention(). 
It  is  also  stipulated  that  the  offence  should  be  either  a  serious  crime  or  a 
misdemeanour  punishable  by  a  deprivation  of  liberty  for  one  year  or  more 
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according  to  the  laws  of  the  requesting  and  requested  States,  or  if  the  person  is 
adjudicated  to  a  deprivation  of  liberty  of  at  least  two  months(s). 
A  point  to  note  is  that  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  stipulates  that  the  offence 
subject  of  an  extradition  request  must  be  an  offence  punishable  by  Divine 
Ordinance(9),  discretionary  punishment(i  o)  or  retribution  punishment(i  i),  or  a 
crime  punishable  by  a  deprivation  of  liberty  for  at  least  six  months(12). 
Extradition  is  not  obligatory  if  the  law  in  the  requested  State  does  not  impose 
punishment  for  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested,  or  does  not  carry  an 
equivalent  punishment  in  the  requesting  State(13).  An  exception  to  this  rule  is  the 
case  where  the  requested  person  is  a  national  of  the  requesting  State  or  a  national 
of  a  third  State  whose  law  establishes  a  similar  punishment. 
As  is  the  case  of  other  extradition  conventions,  this  Convention  prohibits 
extradition  for  political  offences(14),  without  defining  this  term.  However,  it  states 
that  whether  the  offence  is.  a  political  offence  or  not  is  within  the  competence  of 
the  requested  State.  The  Convention  excludes  some  offences  from  being 
considered  political:  terrorism,  pre-meditated  murder,  assault  on  Crown  Princes, 
and  assault  on  the  States'  Kings  or  Presidents  and  their  families(is). 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  L.  A.  S.  Extradition  Convention  is  clearer  as  far  as  the 
definition  of  the  offence  is  concerned  as  compared  with  both  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  and  the  Riyadh  Arab  Judicial  Co-operation  Convention.  In  terms  of 
the  Convention,  extradition  is  not  permissible  in  the  case  where  the  person  who  is 
subject  to  the  extradition  request  is  convicted  of  the  extraditable  offence  and  the 
sentence  is  carried  out;  or  he  is  adjudicated  innocent  in  the  requested  State;  or  if 
he  is  still  under  interrogation  procedures(16). 
Extradition  of  a  person  is  postponed  when  he  is  under  investigation  or  trial  for 
another  offence  in  the  requested  State,  until  such  time  as  he  is  adjudicated  or  he 
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carries  out  the  period  for  which  he  is  sentenced.  He  may  be  temporarily  and 
exceptionally  extradited  provided  he  is  returned  to  the  requested  State  after  his 
trial  is  over  and  before  the  passing  of  the  sentence  on  him  in  the  requesting 
State(17). 
Extradition  is  not  applicable  if  the  sentence  or  crime  has  been  prescribed  by  the 
expiry  of  time  in  accordance  with  the  legal  systems  of  the  requesting  and 
requested  States.  There  is,  however,  an  exception  to  this  provision:  extradition  is 
possible  when  there  is  in  the  law  of  the  requesting  State  neither  prescription  of  the 
crime  nor  of  the  judgement  with  the  passage  of  time  and  when  the  person  subject 
of  the  extradition  request  is  either  a  national  of  the  requesting  State  or  a  national 
of  a  third  State  where  the  principle  of  the  prescription  of  the  punishment  is  not 
applied(i  s). 
Art.  7.  entitles  States  Parties  to  decline  to  extradite  their  nationals(i9)  provided  that 
the  requested  State  tries  its  national  for  the  offence  which  is  the  subject  of  the 
extradition  request,  relying  on  the  affair's  file  (proces-verbal  minute)  compiled  in 
the  requesting  State.  As  for  this  principle,  there  is  a  great  difference  between  the 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  and  the  L.  A.  S.  Extradition  Convention.  In  fact,  the 
former,  in  Art.  28,  obliges  the  extradition  of  nationals,  while  the  L.  A.  S. 
Extradition  Convention  permits  the  requested  State  not  to  extradite  its  nationals. 
By  virtue  of  the  L.  A.  S:  Convention,  the  presentation  and  consideration  of  the 
extradition  requests  are  carried  out  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  each  member 
State.  The  presentation  of  the  extradition  request  is  dependent  on  the  law  of  the 
requesting  State,  and  its  consideration  is  in  respect  of  the  law  of  the  requested 
State(2o). 
The  documents  to  be  contained  in  the  extradition  request  file  should  include  a 
report  about  the  identity  of  the  person  whose  extradition  is  sought;  his  description 
and  documents  proving  his  being  a  national  of  the  requesting  State;  an  official 
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copy  if  he  has  been  adjudicated  in  presence  or  in  absentia;  or  an  arrest  warrant  if 
he  has  not  been  tried;  in  addition  to  these  documents,  it  is  preferable  to  attach  a 
copy  of  the  legal  text  which  declares  the  offence  and  an  official  copy  of  the 
proces-verbal  minute(2  1). 
In  exceptional  situations  and  regardless  of  the  formal  procedure,  it  is  permitted  to 
convey  the  extradition  request  through  telegraph  or  telephone  or  through  other 
means(22).  Consequently,  the  requested  State  is  entitled  to  arrest  the  person  whose 
extradition  is  requested  for  a  period  not  exceeding  thirty  days  after  which,  if  it 
does  not  receive  the  necessary  extradition  documents  or  a  request  to  renew  the 
arrest  for  another  thirty  days,  it  is  obliged  to  release  the  person(23). 
In  a  case  where  the  person  whose  extradition  is  requested  is  adjudicated,  any 
period  he  has  spent  under  arrest  in  the  requested  State  would  be  deducted  from  the 
sentence  imposed  in  the  requesting  State(24).  The  requested  State  must  surrender 
any  item  in  the  person's  possession  when  he  is  arrested  and  any  evidence  which 
incriminates  the  person  within  the  limits  permitted  by  the  laws  of  the  requested 
State(25). 
If  a  State  receives  concurrent  extradition  request  files  concerning  the  same  person 
for  the  same  offence,  the  requested  State  is  to  give  priority  to  the  extradition  file 
presented  by  the  State  whose  interests  are  more  damaged  by  the  offence; 
thereafter,  to  the  State  in  whose  territory  the  offence  is  committed;  then  to  the 
State  whose  nationality  is  held  by  the  person  who  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition 
request(26).  This  text  is  similar  to  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention,  Art.  34(a);  yet  art.  13  of 
the  L.  A.  S.  Convention  omits  mention  of  the  request  of  the  State  of  which  the 
person  is  a  national. 
In  the  L.  A.  S.  Extradition  Convention,  if  concurrent  extradition  requests  are  related 
to  different  offences,  priority  is  given  to  the  State  which  first  presents  the 
extradition  request.  As  is  the  case  of  any  convention  dealing  with  extradition,  the 
147 CHAPTER  FIVE 
person  to  be  extradited  shall  not  be  tried  for  anything  other  than  the  offence  and 
related  acts  which  are  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request(27).  If  the  person 
commits  offence(s)  after  his  extradition  to  the  requesting,  it  is  permitted  to  try  him 
for  these  offences,  if  he  is  offered  the  opportunity  to  leave  the  State  to  which  he  is 
extradited,  and  does  not  profit  from  this  opportunity  within  thirty  days  time,  it 
would  be  permitted,  in  this  case,  to  try  him  for  the  offence(s)  other  than  the  one 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request(28). 
One  notices  that  this  broadly  agrees  with  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  Art.  38. 
which,  moreover,  adds  another  case:  when  the  accused  person  consents  to  be  tried 
for  offences  other  than  those  subject  to  the  extradition  request. 
The  L.  A.  S.  Extradition  Convention  contains  a  provision  by  virtue  of  which  the 
signatory  States  are  required  to  facilitate  the  transit  of  extradited  persons  through 
their  territories  and  assume  responsibility  for  their  surveillance  after  receiving  a 
copy  of  the  extradition  decision(29).  This  provision  is  included  for  two  reasons: 
first,  because  of  the  large  expanse  of  the  Arab  "plot";  secondly,  the  inadequate 
means  of  communication  at  that time. 
The  requesting  State  bears  the  expenses  incurred  by  the  extradition  request  and  the 
return  of  the  person  extradited  to  the  place  from  which  he  is  extradited  if  he  is 
adjudicated  innocent(3o).  By  virtue  of  this  Convention,  a  judgement  issued  by  a 
judicial  authority  in  any  member  State  can  be  executed  in  the  State  in  whose 
territory  the  adjudicated  person  is  located,  but  only  with  the  consent  of  this 
State(31).  The  point  is  ignored  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention. 
The  Convention  also  deals  with  a  conflict  between  the  provisions  of  this 
Convention  and  the  provisions  of  any  bilateral  conventions  concluded  by  member 
States.  The  rule  is  for  the  application  of  provisions  which  guarantee  the  easiest 
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extradition  procedure(32),  thus  adding  more  flexibility  to  the  application  of  Arab 
bilateral  security  conventions(33). 
THE  RIYADH  ARAB  CONVENTION  ON  THE  JUDICIAL 
CO-OPERATION  (1963)(34). 
The  Arab  States  were  keen  to  set  up  an  Arab  Charter  dealing  with  co-operation  in 
legislative  and  judicial  fields  to  remain  up  to  date  with  what  was  achieved  by 
international  conventions  concerned  with  such  matters.  In  the  Prelude  to  this 
Convention,  it  is  stated  that  it  came  about  as  a  result  of  the  declaration  issued  by 
the  First  Conference  of  the  Arab  Ministers  of  Justice  held  in  the  Moroccan  capital, 
Rabat  on  December  1977(35).  The  Arab  States  approved  the  Riyadh  Arab 
Convention  on  the  Judicial  Co-operation  (hereafter  referred  to  as  the  Riyadh 
Convention)  by  virtue  of  the  approval  of  the  Council  of  the  Arab  Ministers  of 
Justice  by  the  decree  No  (1)  of  6  April  1983.  The  Convention  entered  into  effect 
on  30  October  1985. 
The  Riyadh  Convention  is  formed  of  eight  chapters  containing  seventy  two 
articles.  The  first  Chapter  deals  with  the  general  principles,  and  the  eighth  tackles 
the  concluding  principles.  Its  provisions  cover,  inter  alia,  the  declaration  and 
notification  of  judicial  and  non  judicial  documents  and  papers;  the  judicial 
appointment;  the  attendance  of  witnesses  and  experts  in  penal  or  criminal  affairs; 
the  recognition  and  execution  of  adjudication  issued  in  civil,  personal  status, 
commercial  and  administrative  actions.  Discussion  is  limited  to  the  sixth  and 
eighth  Chapters.  The  former,  deals  with  the  extradition  of  criminals  and 
adjudicated  persons,  which  is  the  subject  of  this  study. 
Chapter  (VI)  begins  with  the  obligation  of  the  signatory  States  to  extradite 
convicted  persons  and  those  adjudicated  by  their  judicial  authorities(36).  Refusal  to 
extradite  is  permissible  if  the  person  sought  for  extradition  is  a  national  of  the 
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requested  State  provided  that  this  State  tries  this  person  for  the  offence  which 
must  be  punishable  by  the  laws  of  both  member  Parties(37). 
There  is  concern  about  the  difficulty  in  defining  the  nationality  of  the  person, 
since  it  is  possible  that  a  person  holds  more  than  one  nationality.  Such  definition 
is  determined  at  the  date  of  the  commission  of  the  offence  which  is  the  subject  of 
the  extradition  request(38).  In  the  case  when  extradition  is  permissible,  the 
requested  State  shall  make  such  determination  even  if  the  extradition  conditions 
are  not  fully  satisfied.  The  situation  would  be  different  in  cases  where  extradition 
is  obligatory  and  the  cases  satisfy  the  extradition  conditions.  With  the  satisfaction 
of  one  of  these  cases,  the  requested  State  is  obliged  to  extradite  the  person. 
Such  cases  are(39):  - 
"  When  a  person  is  convicted  of  an  offence  sanctioned  by  the  laws  in  force  in  the 
requesting  and  requested  States  by  a  deprivation  of  liberty  for  at  least  one  year, 
by  the  Law  of  either  of  the  these  two  States; 
"  If  not  punished  by  the  law  of  the  requested  State,  or  if  the  law  of  the  requesting 
State  declares  the  commission  of  such  acts  while  the  Law  of  the  requested  State 
does  not,  (particularly  when  this  person  is  a  national  of  the  requesting  State  or  a 
national  of  a  third  State)  punish  such  acts; 
"  If  the  judicial  authority  in  the  requesting  State  adjudicates  a  person  to  a 
deprivation  of  liberty  for  one  year  or  more  either  in  presence  or  in  absentia; 
"  If  a  person  is  adjudicated  by  the  judicial  authority  in  the  requesting  State  for  an 
offence  not  punished  by  the  law  of  the  requested  -  State,  or  punishable  by  a 
different  punishment  than  that  imposed  in  the  requesting  State,  since  the  person 
holds  the  nationality  of  the  requesting  State  or  the  nationality  of  a  third 
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contracting  State  which  declares  similar  punishment  to  that  decreed  in  the 
requesting  State. 
The  text  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security  Convention,  Art.  28(b),  is  taken 
from  Art.  40(c&d)  of  the  Riyadh  Convention.  The  introduction  of  Art.  40  reads: 
"The  extradition  shall  be  obligatory  for  the  following  persons  ".  From  this  one 
may  understand  that  these  are  not  conditions  for  extradition,  but  cases  where 
extradition  is  obligatory.  One  understands  from  the  introduction  of  Art.  28.  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  that  these  are  conditions  for  extradition,  and  not 
cases,  an  issue  previously  discussed(4o). 
Concerning  the  cases,  listed  by  the  Riyadh  Convention,  where  extradition  is  not 
permissible(41):  - 
"  Where  the  offence  which  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request  is  of  a 
political  nature  according  to  the  legal  system  adopted  in  the  requested  State.  In 
this  situation,  the  definition  of  the  term  "political  offence"  is  within  the 
competence  of  the  requested  State.  This  broadly  agrees  with  what  is  laid  down 
in  the  Extradition  Convention  concluded  within  the  framework  of  the  League 
of  Arab  States;  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  however,  omits  mentioning 
who  would  define  whether  the  offence  is  political  or  not; 
"  If  the  offence  which  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request  is  the  transgression 
of  the  military  duties(42); 
"  The  case  when  the  offence  which  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request  is 
committed  in  the  territory  of  the  requested  State.  But  this  offence  damages  the 
benefits  of  the  requesting  State,  and  its  law  permits  the  pursuit  and  punishment 
of  such  offenders; 
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"  If  a  final  judgement  is  issued  in  the  requested  State  concerning  the  offence 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request; 
"  The  case  where  the  offence  is  repealed  or  the  punishment  has  prescribed  in 
accordance  with  the  current  legal  system  in  the  requesting  State(43); 
"  The  case  where  the  offence  which  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request  is 
committed  outside  the  territory  of  the  requesting  State,  and  the  offender  is  not  a 
national  of  the  requesting  State  and  the  legal  system  applicable  in  the  requested 
State  does  not  convict  such  a  person  if  he  commits  an  offence-outside  its 
territory; 
"  The  case  when  an  amnesty  (44)  is  granted  in  the  requesting  State; 
"  The  case  where  a  person,  whose  extradition  is  sought,  is  convicted  for  an 
offence  he  has  committed  in  the  territory  of  the  requested  State,  or  a  judgement 
is  issued  by  the  judicial  authority  of  a  third  contracting  State. 
This  article  excludes  some  offences  (45)  that  may  not  otherwise  be  considered  as 
political  offences  such  as:  assault  against  the  Kings  and  Presidents  of  the  member 
States  and  the  members  of  their  families,  assault  against  the  Crown  Princes  and 
the  vice-presidents  of  the  member  States,  pre-meditated  murder  and  robbery. 
It  is  of  value  to  note  the  difference  between  the  Riyadh  Convention  and  the  G.  C.  C. 
Security  Convention  with  regard  to  the  cases  where  extradition  is  not  permissible, 
the  Riyadh  Convention  contains  more  such  cases  than  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention.  The  latter  records  only  four  cases  in  addition  to  the  one  where  the 
criminal  description  is  repealed  and  the  punishment  has  prescribed.  This 
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demonstrates  the  drafters'  desire  to  limit  the  cases  where  extradition  is  not 
permitted  in  order  to  achieve  a  wider  range  of  extradition  cases. 
When  limiting  the  offences  that  cannot  be  considered  as  political  offences,  the 
Riyadh  Convention  states  that  these  offences  can  not  be  considered  political  even 
if  purposes  thereof  are  political(46).  However,  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention, 
Art.  30(a),  lays  down  those  offences  which  are  excluded  from  being  considered 
political  offences  without  mentioning  whether  their  purposes  are  political  or  not. 
The  extradition  request  file  should  contain(47)  a  report  concerning  the  nationality, 
the  description  and  the  identity  of  the  person  to  be  extradited;  a  warrant  of  arrest 
of  the  person  or  an  official  copy  of  a  judgement  issued  by  the  judicial  authority  in 
the  requesting  State.  A  statement  of  particulars  concerning  the  convicting  proofs, 
the  legal  description,  date  and  place  of  the  offence  which  is  subject  of  the 
extradition  request. 
The  authorities  in  the  requested  State  may  arrest(48)  the  person  to  be  extradited  by 
virtue  of  a  request  from  the  requesting  member  State  before  the  receipt  of  the 
extradition  request  file.  The  arrest  request  would  be  sent  either  by  post  or  by  any 
other  written  means.  The  person  would  be  arrested  for  thirty  days.  This  period 
would  be  renewed  for  another  thirty  days  if  the  competent  authorities  in  the 
requesting  State  presents  a  request  for  renewal.  If  this  authority  fails  to  be  present 
for  the  delivery  of  the  person  in  question  during  the  first  thirty  days,  or  fails  to  sent 
an  arrest  renewal  request(49),  the  requested  State  should  release  the  person. 
This  Convention  also  covers  the  case  of  concurrent  extradition 
requests(so)presented  by  different  signatory  States.  The  order  of  priority  is  similar 
to  that  laid  down  in  the  Convention  concluded  within  the  framework  of  the 
League  of  Arab  States:  priority  is  given  first  to  the  contracting  State  whose 
interests  are  most  damaged  by  the  offence;  second  to  the  contracting  State  in 
whose  territory  the  offence  is  committed;  third  to  the  contracting  State  whose 
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nationality  is  held  by  the  offender  at  the  time  of  the  offence.  If  all  these  conditions 
are  satisfied  simultaneously,  the  priority  for  extradition  would  be  to  the  State 
which  first  presents  the  request  for  extradition. 
It  is  worth  noting  that,  in  the  case  of  concurrent  extradition  requests  for  the  same 
person,  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  limits  the  priority  to  two  contracting 
States:  to  the  State  whose  interests  are  damaged  by  the  offence  first,  and  then  to 
the  State  where  the  offence  is  cornmitted(51).  The  situation  is  different  when  the 
extradition  requests  deal  with  different  offences;  priority,  here,  is  defined  by 
taking  into  consideration  the  circumstances,  the  gravity  and  the  date  of  the 
commission  of  the  offence(52). 
Concerning  any  items  used  in  the  commission  of  the  offence,  when  extraditing  a 
person  the  requested  State  shall  hand  over  all  items  in  its  possession  used  in  the 
commission  of  the  offence.  In  the  case  when  extradition  is  not  competent,  the 
requested  State  must  nonetheless  deliver  such  items(53). 
The  consideration  of  the  extradition  requests  is  carried  out  taking  into  account  the 
legal  system  applied  in  the  requested  State  at  the  time  of  the  extradition 
request(54).  When  extradition  is  refused,  the  requested  State  shall  justify  the 
reasons  for  its  refusal(55). 
The  competent  authorities  in  the  requesting  State  are  to  receive  the  requested 
person  according  to  an  agreed  date  and  place.  If  such  authorities  fail  to  receive  the 
person  in  question,  the  authorities  in  the  requested  State  may  release  him  fifteen 
days  after  the  date  fixed  by  the  authorities  in  both  States.  The  person  must  be 
released  thirty  days  after  the  agreed  date  if  the  authorities  in  the  requesting  State 
fail  to  receive  the  person,  and  the  requested  State  would  not  have  the  right  to 
present  an  extradition  request  concerning  the  same  person  for  the  same  offence.  It 
is  possible  that  the  authorities  in  the  requesting  State  may  face  circumstances 
which  prevent  it  from  delivering  the  person  within  a  limited  period  of  time;  in  this 
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case,  this  authority  should  inform  the  authorities  in  the  requested  State  about  such 
circumstances  and  both  authorities  would  fix  another  date  on  which  extradition 
would  take  place(56). 
When  the  person  whose  extradition  is  sought  is  convicted  or  tried  by  the  judicial 
authority  in  the  requested  State  for  an  offence  other  than  the  offence  which  is  the 
subject  of  the  extradition  request,  extradition  would  be  postponed  until  the 
judicial  authority  in  the  requested  State  concludes  the  trial  or  the  sentence  is 
carried  out(57). 
The  Riyadh  Convention,  Art.  50  deals  with  the  case  when  the  crime  has  been 
repealed.  The  new  elements  of  the  offence  should  fall  under  the  category  of 
offences  for  which  extradition  is  obligatory.  As  is  the  case  of  the  security 
conventions,  the  1983  Riyadh  Convention  adopts  the  principle  of  deducting  the 
period  spent  under  arrest  in  the  requested  State  from  the  punishment  imposed  in 
the  requesting  State(58). 
Art.  52.  lays  down  the  cases  when  it  is  possible  to  proceed  against  the  extradited 
person  for  offences  other  than  the  offence  which  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition 
request.  When  the  person  is  given  the  chance  to  leave  the  State  to  which  he  is 
extradited  and  fails  to  do  so  thirty  days  after  his  final  release,  or  he  has  left  the 
State  and  returns  to  it  deliberately;  when  the  extraditing  member  State  agrees 
provided  that  a  new  extradition  request  is  placed  along  with  a  judicial  minute 
containing  the  proces-verbal  related  to  the  prolongation  of  the  extradition. 
The  contracting  State  to  which  a  person  is  extradited  cannot  extradite  him  to  a 
third  State,  except  in  two  cases(59):  when  the  person  is  given  the  opportunity  to 
leave  the  State  to  which  he  is  extradited  and  fails  to  do  so  within  thirty  days  after 
his  final  release;  and  if  the  extraditing  member  State  accepts  such  a  procedure. 
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The  Riyadh  Convention  deals  with  facilitating  the  transit  of  persons,  whose 
extradition  is  decided  upon,  through  the  territories  of  the  States  which  are 
members  of  this  Convention  provided  that the  State  to  which  the  person  is  to  be 
extradited  places  a  request  containing  documents  justifying  this  extradition. 
The  subsequent  articles  of  Convention  deal  with  the  means  of  executing  the 
judgements  issued  in  a  member  State;  such  judgements  must  be  final.  The 
Convention  records  that  the  expenses  incurred  by  the  extradition  are  to  be  borne 
by  both  States(6o);  the  requested  State  assumes  the  expenses  until  the  person 
leaves  its  territory,  while  the  requesting  State  is  charged  with  the  expenses  from 
the  territory  of  the  extraditing  State  to  its  territory  and  the  expenses  of  the  return 
of  the  person  if  he  is  found  innocent. 
The  Riyadh  Convention  divided  the  expenses  between  the  two  States,  while  the 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  art.  39  states  that  these  expenses  are  to  be  borne  by 
the  requesting  State.  These  expenses  may  cover  either  the  cost  of  the  extradition 
procedure  or  the  return  of  the  person  to  the  place  from  which  he  is  extradited  if  he 
is  found  innocent. 
Formal  extradition  requests  among  the  member  States  are  carried  out  by  the  Arab 
Office  of  Criminal  Police(61),  through  the  Communication  Department  referred  to 
in  the  Convention  establishing  the  Arab  Organisation  for  Social  Security(62),  as  we 
shall  see  soon. 
The  Riyadh  Convention,  art.  69  states  that  its  provisions  are  binding.  Art.  69(a) 
stipulates  that  the  Contracting  States  are  not  permitted  to  conclude  other 
agreements  whose  provisions  contravene  the  provisions  of  the  Riyadh 
Convention.  The  provisions  of  the  1983  Riyadh  Convention  are  part  of  the  general 
system  of  the  signatory  States,  and  if  any  signatory  State  applies  provisions  other 
than  those  of  the  Riyadh  Convention,  such  provisions  are  revoked  and  invalid. 
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This  point  is  the  reason  behind  the  attitude  of  the  G.  C.  C.  States  towards  the 
Riyadh  Convention  since  the  provisions  of  the  Riyadh  Convention  do  not  satisfy 
the  desire  of  these  States  who  wish  wider  co-operation  in  the  field  of  extradition. 
These  States  thus  did  not  ratify  the  Convention  though  their  delegates  have  signed 
it.  Their  attitude  becomes  clearer  with  the  1994  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  in 
which  extradition  of  nationals  is  obligatory  without  restraint  by  virtue  of  Art.  28 
which  conflicts  with  the  Riyadh  Convention(63). 
If  there  is  any  conflict  between  a  provision  of  a  previous  convention  and  a 
provision  of  the  Riyadh  Convention,  the  former  is  not  invalidated,  but  priority  in 
execution  is  given  to  the  provision  that  best  realises  the  extradition  of  convicted 
and  criminal  persons(64). 
The  1983  Riyadh  Convention  does  not  permit  the  Contracting  Parties  to  place 
reservations(65).  Withdrawal  from  the  Convention  is  carried  out  by  means  of  a 
written  notification  to  be  sent  to  the  Secretary-general  of  the  League  of  Arab 
States.  The  withdrawal  would  be  effective  six  months  after  such  notification(66).  In 
other  words,  the  provisions  of  this  Convention  are  applicable  with  regard  to  the 
extradition  requests  placed  during  this  time(67).  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention 
has  a  similar  provision  on  withdrawal. 
The  Riyadh  Convention  concludes  by  considering  its  attitude  towards  the  Arab 
States  which  do  not  accede  to  the  Convention.  Such  States  must  comply  with  the 
provisions  of  any  Extradition  Convention  concluded  within  the  framework  of  the 
League  of  Arab  States.  Whereas,  the  acceding  States  must  apply  the  provisions  of 
the  Riyadh  Convention  which  supersedes  all  agreements  governing  execution  of 
judgements  and  extradition  concluded  within  the  L.  A.  S  in  1952(68). 
Whilst  all  the  twenty-one  Arab  States  which  attended  the  conference  on  the 
Riyadh  Convention  signed  it,  only  the  following  States  ratified  it;  Palestine,  Iraq, 
The  Yemen  Popular  Democratic  Republic,  The  Yemen Republic,  Sudan  Republic, 
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Mauritania,  Syria,  Somalia,  Tunisia,  Jordan,  Morocco  and  Libya(69).  It  is 
necessary  to  understand  the  operation  and  structure  of  the  mechanism  of  operating 
the  Arab  security,  namely  the  Council  of  the  Arab  Ministers  of  the  interior. 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  ARAB  MINISTERS  OF  THE  INT  IOR(C.  A.  M.  I). 
The  idea  to  establish  C.  A.  M.  I.  emanated  from  the  Arab  Ministers  of  the  Interior's 
Conference  held  in  Cairo  on  1977(70).  The  Resolution  that  establishes  it  was 
issued  during  the  Tbird  Conference  held  in  Taif  on  1980.  The  provisions  of  its 
Principal  System  were  ratified  on  1982  during  the  Arab  Ministers  of  the  Interior. 
extraordinary  session  held  in  Riyadh(?  1).  In  the  same  year,  the  League  of  Arab 
States  approved  its  establishment  and  its  Principal  System  by  virtue  of  the  decree 
issued  on  23  September  1982(72). 
The  Principal  System  of  the  C.  A.  M.  I.  is formed  of  sixteen  articles.  Art.  1  defines 
the  terms  used  in  this  Principal  System;  in  addition,  the  Principal  System  states 
that  the  Council  is  formed  by  the  Arab  Ministers  of  the  Interior  to  which  the  Arab 
Centre  for  Security  Studies  and  Training(73)is  affiliated. 
This  Council(74)  is  established  to  co-ordinate  the  efforts  to  guarantee  the  internal 
security  and  to  prevent  the  commission  of  crimes  in  the  Arab  States.  To  reach 
such  targets,  the  Council  assumes  some  responsibilities  that  aim  to,  inter  alia, 
sustain  the  Arab  Security  -Organs  whose  capabilities  are  limited;  to  declare 
common  Arab  security  plans  to  implement  the  general  policy  taking  into  account 
the  internal  security  of  these  States;  to  establish  the  appropriate  systems  and 
committees  to  execute  its  purposes;  and  to  establish  committees  formed  of  experts 
and  advisers  to  supervise  the  studies  to  be  carried  out(s). 
Its  Resolutions  are  adopted  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  attending  member  States. 
One  may  ask  about  the  nature  of  the  persons  attending  the  meetings  of  the 
C.  A.  M.  L.  The  Principal  System  lays  down  an  answer  to  the  inquiry  when  stating 
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that  the  attending  persons  are:  the  Ministers  of  the  Interior  or  their  deputised 
representatives,  the  Secretary-general  of  the  League  of  Arab  States,  or  when 
absent,  an  Assistant  Secretary  would  act  on  his  behalf;  and  the  Chairman  of  the 
Arab  Centre  of  Security  Studies  and  Training(76). 
The  Secretariat-General  of  the  Council  is  an  important  organ  of  the 
Council(77)because  of  the  many  competences  it  assumes.  The  Secretary- 
General(78)is  the  head  of  this  organ;  he  is  appointed  by  the  Arab  Ministers  of  the 
Interior  from  among  the  candidates  proposed  by  the  member  States.  The 
Secretary-General  is  appointed  for  a  three  year  renewable  mandate.  He  is  assisted 
by  four  assistant  Secretaries-General  nominated  as  follows:  two  assistant 
Secretaries-General  from  the  States  according  to  their  sequence  in  descending 
alphabetical  order  and  two  from  States  according  to  the  ascending  alphabetical 
order. 
Among  the  competences  of  the  Secretariat-General:  it  supervises  the  systems, 
committees  and  organs  established  by  the  Council;  it  follows  up  the 
implementation  of  works  and  recommendations  issued  from  the  Council, 
Conferences  and  symposiums  held  within  the  framework  of  the  Council;  it 
convenes  of  the  meetings  of  the  Council  and  the  established  committees;  and  the 
Secretariat-General  prepares  for  the  budget  project,  for  the  annual  plan  and  for  the 
different  studies  recommended  by  the  Council(79). 
There  are  four  specialised  offices  affiliated  to  the  Secretariat-General  of  the 
C.  A.  M.  I.;  these  are(80):  The  Arab  Office  for  Combating  Crime,  situated  in 
Baghdad.  Among  its  competence  is  to  find  out  the  causes  and  solutions  to  crime, 
to  revise  the  punishment  of  such  crimes  and  to  determine  annual  statistics  for  the 
crimes  committed  in  the  member  States.  The  Arab  Office  for  Drugs'  Affairs, 
located  in  Amman,  which  strengthens  co-operation  between  the  authorities  in  the 
member  States  in  the  field  of  drug  combating.  The  Arab  Office  for  the  Civil 
Protection  and  Rescue,  in  Casablanca;  which  strengthens  the  co-operation  in  the 
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field  of  civil  protection,  rescue  and  relief  from  natural  and  unnatural  catastrophes. 
The  Arab  Office  for  Criminal  Police,  with  its  head  office  is  in  Damascus;  it 
promotes  and  strengthens  co-operation  among  the  Arab  Police  Systems.  The 
Riyadh  Convention  on  Judicial  Co-operation,  Art.  57,  mentions  that  the  Arab 
Office  for  the  Criminal  Police  co-ordinates  between  the  member  States  as  far  as 
extradition  requests  are  concerned. 
These  specialised  offices  are  under  the  supervision  of  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
C.  A.  M.  L.  Their  works  are  managed  by  directors  appointed,  from  among 
candidates  proposed  by  the  member  States,  for  five  year  mandate.  Each  director  is 
assisted  by  a  group  of  personnel.  Another  office  is  established,  namely  the  Arab 
Office  for  Security  Information  in  Cairo(s  1)  which  co-ordinates  information  in 
efforts  to  cope  with  crimes  commission  in  the  member  States;  it  characterises  the 
activities  of  the  C.  A.  M.  I.  and  its  affiliated  systems.  Besides  the  Arab  Police  Sports 
Union,  it  is  also  affiliated  to  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  C.  A.  M.  I.  It  is  situated 
in  Cairo(82),  it  promotes  relations  between  the  Police  Sports  Teams  from  the 
member  States. 
Up  to  now,  the  Council  has  held  thirteen  sessions  since  its  establishment(83);  the 
first  of  these  was  the  session  held  in  Casablanca  on  December  1982,  the  last  was 
in  Tunis  on  January  1996.  As  far  as  the  achievements  of  the  Council  are 
concerned,  it  has  attained  some  of  its  purposes  through  security  plans  set  up  and 
executed  within  its  framework.  Its  major  accomplishments  are  the  ratifications  of 
the  Arab  Security  Strategy  of  1983(84),  the  Arab  Security  Plan  of  1986(85),  the 
Second  Arab  Security  Plan  of  1992(86)  and  the  Arab  Convention  on  the  Drug 
Contention  of  1994(87). 
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THE  ARAB  SECURITY  STRATEGY. 
The  C.  A.  M.  I.  ratified  the  Arab  Security  Strategy(88)  during  the  Second  session  by 
virtue  of  the  Resolution  (18)  of  8  December  1983(89).  This  strategy  comprises  four 
sections,  the  purposes,  elements,  programmes  and  mechanisms.  The  purposes  of 
the  Arab  Security  Strategy  are  to  realise  the  security  complementarity  pursuant  to 
the  Arab  security  unity  under  the  guidance  of  the  Islamic  Shari'ah,  to  combat 
crime  in  all  its  traditional  and  modem  forms,  to  preserve  the  security  of 
individuals  and  to  guarantee  their  safety,  liberty,  rights  and  properties,  to  preserve 
the  security  of  the  Arab  nation  and  to  protect  it  from  internal  or  external  terrorism 
and  from  acts  of  sabotage  and  to  preserve  the  security  of  public  institutions  and 
utilities  and  to  protect  them  from  any  aggression.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  these 
purposes  are  general  and  span  the  Arab  World(9o). 
There  are  nine  elements  and  programmes  of  this  Strategy.  They  are(91),  inter  alia, 
the  establishment  of  a  Model  Arab  Unified  Criminal  Law  which  has  Islamic 
Shari'ah  as  a  main  source.  When  this  law  is  established,  the  Arab  States  would 
revise  their  Criminal  Laws  in  accordance  with  this  Model  Law.  The  Arab  States 
should  take  advantage  from  modern  technology  in  the  field  of  security  and  should 
initiate  security  studies  and  research.  The  Arab  States  should  strengthen  security 
co-operation  and  establish  a  comprehensive  Arab  Security  System  through 
meetings  of  those  responsible  Officials  in  the  Arab  Security  systems;  exchanging 
research,  studies  and  expertises  in  the  security  field  and  tracking  fugitive 
offenders;  and  harmonizing  bilateral  and  regional  security  agreements  among 
Arab  States.  They  should  co-operate  with  other  States  and  international 
organizations  specialized  in  combating  crimes  through  Arab  States  representation 
and  attendance  at  international  forums  and  meetings  discussing  security  matters. 
The  mechanisms  dealt  with  in  the  Arab  security  strategy  are(92):  To  consider,  after 
the  conference  of  the  Arab  Leaders,  the  C.  A.  M.  I.  as  the  head  of  the  Arab  security 
authorities.  To  consider  the  Council  and  its  affiliated  systems  as  the  organs 
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responsible  for  the  duties  related  with  the  collective  Arab  security  functions  and 
that  the  Arab  Collective  Fund,  affiliated  to  the  C.  A.  M.  I.,  is  the  body  to  finance  the 
programmes  dealt  with  in  this  Strategy  and  the  consultative  committees  within  the 
framework  of  the  Secretariat-General  for  the  C.  A.  M.  I.  for  the  promotion  of  the 
programme  of  discipline  in  the  penal  institutions  and  for  the  orientation  and 
assessment  of  the  educational  and  information  programmes  to  limit  its  negative 
effects  on  both  the  security  and  the  behavioural  levels. 
The  implementation  of  this  strategy  ended  on  December  31,1983,  and  an  Arab 
Security  Plan(93)  was  under  study.  In  fact,  the  third  session  of  the  Council  of  Arab 
Ministers  of  the  Interior  decided  to  establish  a  committee  to  prepare  this  plan. 
When  this  plan  was  made,  the  C.  A.  M.  I  approved  it  during  the  fourth  session  by 
virtue  of  Resolution  issued  on  5  February  1986(94). 
The  purposes  of  the  Arab  Security  Plan  are,  inter  alia,  The  reinforcement  of 
security  co-operation  among  the  Arab  States.  The  confrontation  of  organised 
crimes  within  the  framework  of  the  Arab  security  endeavours  and  the  connection 
of  the  security  systems  in  the  Arab  States  by  a  communication  network  and  seeing 
the  modem  technology  in  detecting  the  criminals  and  the  development  of 
registration  services  in  the  security  fields. 
This  plan  was  divided  into  two  main  programmes(95).  The  first  programme  is  to  be 
executed  by  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  C.  A.  M.  L.  This  programme 
encompasses  holding  meetings  and  communication  relations  for  co-ordination.  An 
annual  meeting  is  to  be  held  by  the  leaders  of  the  Arab  Police.  A  similar  meeting 
gathering  the  Secretary-general  of  the  Council,  the  Chairman  of  the  Arab  Centre 
for  the  Security  Studies  and  Training,  the  Secretary-general  of  the  Arab  Police 
Sports  Union,  the  Assistant  Secretary-general  of  the  Council,  the  directors  of  the 
specialised  offices  and  the  chiefs  of  communication  departments  in  the  Council  is 
also  proposed.  Another  meeting  to  be  held  once  every  two  years  gathering  the 
chiefs  of  the  criminal  investigations,  drugs,  civil  protection,  passports,  traffics, 
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ports  and  airports,  the  penal  institutions  and  general  relations.  The  Specialised 
Offices  and  Communication  Departments  should  be  developed  and  the  instantly 
exchanged  information  should  be  made  available  for  the  Arab  security  systems. 
The  second  programme  is  to  be  realised  by  the  Arab  Centre  for  the  Security 
Studies  and  Training.  The  Arab  Centre  for  Security  Studies  and  Training  makes 
many  programmes  charged  with  by  the  Arab  Security  Plan.  Among  these 
programmes:  a  lectures  and  seminars  programme,  a  studies  and  research 
programme,  an  exhibition  programme,  security  library  programme,  technical 
training  programme,  the  Centre  for  security  information  programme,  an 
information  means  programme  and  a  training  programme  including  six  terms 
dealing  with  security  items:  trainers  preparation,  the  promotion  of  the  competence 
of  the  personnel  of  the  security  administrative  system,  the  protection  of  important 
constructions,  the  use  of  criminal  laboratories,  the  use  of  means  of  communication 
in  security  duties  and  means  of  carrying  out  investigations  concerning  the 
commission  of  crimes. 
It  is  worth  remarking  that  this  plan  was  to  last  for  five  years  starting  from  the 
beginning  of  1987  until  the  end  of  1991,  and  the  implementation  was  supervised 
by  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  C.  A.  M.  I.  and  the  Arab  Centre  for  Security 
Studies  and  Training.  In  each  year  of  the  implementation  of  the  Plan,  the 
Secretariat-General  and  the  Arab  Centre  for  the  Security  Studies  and  Training 
submitted  reports  to  the  Council  of  Arab  Ministers  of  the  Interior  concerning  the 
steps  taken  as  far  as  the  Plan  is  concerned.  Pursuant  to  the  report  submitted  -  by  a 
working  team  formed  by  virtue  of  paragraph(2)  of  the  Resolution  issued  by  the 
Eighth  Conference  of  the  C.  A.  M.  I.  -  before  the  C.  A.  M.  I.  in  its  ninth  session  held  in 
Tunis  in  1991,  the  latter  decided  that  the  duration  of  the  Plan  would  be  prolonged 
for  a  sixth  year.  Consequently,  the  Plan  was  terminated  at  the  end  of  1992(96). 
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THE  SECOND  ARAB  SECURITY  PLAN. 
During  the  Tenth  Conference  of  the  Council  of  Arab  Ministers  of  the  Interior  held 
in  Tunis  at  the  beginning  of  1993,  the  Council  approved  a  Second  Arab  Security 
Plan  for  the  coming  five  years  ending  at  the  end  of  1997(97).  This  Plan  contains 
two  main  programmes.  The  first  to  be  carried  out  by  the  Secretariat-General  of  the 
Council  of  Arab  Ministers  of  the  Interior  and  the  second  by  the  Arab  Centre  for 
the.  Security  Studies  and  Training(98). 
It  is  important  to  note  that  this  Second  Plan  repeated  some  of  the  purposes  stated 
in  the  previous  plan  -because  these  purposes  were  not  fulfilled,  for  example,  the 
enhancement  of  co-operation  among  the  security  systems  in  the  Arab  States.  Other 
purposes  were  added,  the  most  important  of  which  were  those  related  with  the 
standardisation  of  security  terminology  and  the  pursuit  of  collective  security 
activities.  This  Second  Plan  widens  its  international  perspective  by  covering  both 
Arab  and  international  events(99). 
The  C.  A.  M.  I.  has  a.  crucial  role  in  the  field  of  the  combating  of  Drugs  since  it 
adopted  the  Arab  Strategy  for  Combating  Illegal  Use  of  Drugs  and  Narcotics 
during  the  fifth  session  held  in  Tunis  by  virtue  of  Resolution  issued  on  2 
December  1986(ioo).  The  Council  also  adopted  the  Model  Unified  Arab  Drugs 
Law  by  virtue  of  the  Resolution  issued  on  5  February  1986  during  the  fourth 
session  held  in  Casablanca.  The  Council  also  approved  the  Arab  Convention  for 
Combating  Illegal  Use  of  Drugs  and  Narcotics  at  the  beginning  of  1994(1  o  i).  This 
Convention  is  formed  of  twenty-six  articles.  What  concerns  this  study  is  that  its 
provisions  urge  the  Contracting  States  to  extradite  to  the  requesting  State  persons 
who  commit  drugs-related  offences.  Art.  6  of  this  Convention  explains  the 
relevant  extradition  procedures.  The  text  of  the  Convention  states  that  the 
provisions  of  the  Convention  are  obligatory  for  all  member  States.  Consequently, 
the  States  are  not  permitted  to  conclude  other  agreements  whose  provisions 
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contravene  those  of  this  Convention,  yet  they  are  permitted  to  conclude 
agreements  that  better  realise  security  co-operation  in  this  field(io2).  The 
Convention  entered  into  effect  ninety  days  after  the  deposition  of  the  instruments 
of  ratification  of  one  third  of  the  member  States(1o3);  on  30  June  1996(104). 
A  recommendation  of  the  Ninth  Co-ordinating  Meeting  of  the  organs  of  the 
C.  A.  M.  I.  held  in  Tunis  on  September  1994  requests  the  Secretariat-General  of  the 
C.  A.  M.  I.  to  prepare  a  Model  Act  for  the  Extradition  of  Criminals  and  Convicted 
Persons(io5).  This  is  to  be  considered  as  a  directive  for  the  member  States  while 
preparing  for  their  domestic  legislation  concerning  similar  extradition  or  while 
amending  appropriate  laws.  The  Council  of  Arab  Ministers  of  the  Interior  adopted 
the  recommendations  issued  by  this  Ninth  Co-ordinating  Meeting  by  virtue  of  a 
Resolution  outgoing  from  the  Twelfth  Session  held  in  Tunis  on  January  1995(106). 
The  author  confirmed  this  with  Dr.  Ahmed  Assalem,  the  Secretary-general  of  the 
C.  A.  M.  I.  (1o7). 
This  Model  Criminal  Extradition  Act  deals  with  matters  related  to  the  extradition. 
It  obliges  the  member  States  to  extradite  the  persons  who  are  convicted  or 
adjudicated  by  virtue  of  an  extraditable  offence(m).  It  stipulates  that  such  offence 
is  either  committed  in  the  territory  of  the  requesting  State  or  outside  the  territories 
of  both  requested  and  requesting  States  provided  that  their  laws  punish  offences 
committed  outside  their  territories(io9). 
It  also  discusses  the  offences  for  which  extradition  is  obligatory  and  the  persons 
whose  extradition  is  obligatory(i  io).  The  Model  Criminal  Extradition  Act  permits 
any  Member  State  to  avail  itself  of  the  right  not  to  extradite  its  nationals(I  i  i)  if  the 
requested  person  holds  its  nationality  at  the  time  of  the  crime's  commission 
provided  that  the  requested  State  tries  the  person  and  notifies  the  authorities  in  the 
requesting  State  about  the  extradition  request  presented  by  such  authorities(i  12). 
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It  deals  with  the  cases  in  which  extradition  is  not  permitted(113).  These  cases  are 
somewhat  similar  to  those  laid  down  in  the  Riyadh  Arab  Convention  on  the 
Judicial  Co-operation.  Its  subsequent  provisions  deal  with  other  matters  related  to 
exlradition(114). 
The  activities  of  the  C.  A.  M.  I.  and  its  organs  are  not  limited  only  to  Arab  activities, 
but  it  extends  also  to  international  organisations.  It  participates  in  the  international 
conferences  discussing  security.  In  fact,  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  C.  A.  M.  I. 
attends  the  gatherings  held  by  the  UN  Programme  For  Combating  Drugs;  these 
gatherings  are  attended  by  the  representatives  of  sixty  countries  and  a  group  of 
governmental  and  non-governmental  international  organisations(i  15).  The 
Secretariat-General  of  the  C.  A.  M.  I.  also  attended  the  UN  Ninth  Conference  On 
Crime  Prevention  and  the  Treatment  of  Criminals;  it  participated  in  the  Fourth 
Meeting  of  the  Committee  For  the  Protection  from  Crime  and  the  Criminal 
Justice,  and  it  attended  the  meetings  of  General  Assembly  of  the  International 
Criminal  Police;  and  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  Council  of  the  Arab  States  of 
the  Interior  attended  the  Fifth  Meeting  dealing  with  financial  resources  from  the 
criminal  activities  held  in  France. 
One  of  the  most  important  events  considered  by  the  members  of  the  League  of  the 
Arab  States  in  extradition  is  the  Lockerbie  case  which  has  international 
repercussions.  It  is  appropriate  to  analyse  the  unfortunate  event  because,  first,  it  is 
linked  with  extradition  and,  secondly,  it  shows  the  endeavours  of  the  League  of 
Arab  States  to  reach  a  reconciliation.  The  Lockerbie  tragedy  caused  a 
problem(regionally  and  internationally)  still  unsolved.  And  the  extradition 
requests  concerning  the  Libyan  nationals  are  not  satisfied.  In  this  sense,  the  UK. 
through  their  ambassador  in  Cairo,  Mr.  David  Laswick  who  met  the  Secretary- 
General  of  the  League  of  Arab  States,  still  insists  on  its  position  that  Libya  has  to 
extradite  the  convicted  persons(i  16).  This  attitude  reflects  the  importance  of  L.  A.  S. 
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in  resolving  the  problem  that  led  to  the  imposing  economic  and  political 
coercion(i  17). 
The  events  of  the  case  begin  with  the  tragic  explosion  of  Pan  Am  flight  103  over 
Lockerbie  in  Scotland  on  21  December  1988(118),  with  the  death  of  259  passengers 
and  crew  and  11  residents  of  Lockerbie.  Meanwhile,  the  French  UTA  Flight  772 
exploded  on  the  Nigerian  desert  with  the  loss  of  171  lives(i  19).  The  investigations 
carried  out  by  US  and  British  authorities  indicate  that  two  Libyan  nationals  were 
responsible  for  this  explosion  and  they  made  an  extradition  request  to  the  Libyan 
authorities  to  extradite  the  Libyan  nationals.  The  French  authorities  also  issued  a 
communique  in  which  they  accused  the  Libyan  nationals  for  the  explosion  of  the 
UTA  flight.  The  three  Western  States  requested  the  extradition  of  the  Libyan 
nationals  who  caused  the  explosions. 
The  Libyan  authorities  refused  to  extradite  their  nationals  because  there  is  no 
extradition  agreements,  either  bilateral  or  multilateral  between  Libya  and  the  US, 
Britain  or  France.  Had  there  been  extradition  agreements,  the  problem  then  lay  in 
the  Libyan  Constitution  which  prohibits  the  extradition  of  nationals. 
The  Libyan  refusal  compelled  the  Western  States  to  submit  the  case  before  the 
Security  Council  which  issued  Resolution  731  of  21  January  1992(120).  The 
Resolution  urges  the  Libyan  authorities  to  comply  with  the  Western  States 
request  since  the  terrorist  acts  committed  by  the  two  Libyan  nationals  should  be 
prosecuted. 
As  a  response  to  the  Libyan  s  refusal  and  failure  to  comply  with  S.  C.  Resolution 
731,  the  S.  C.  issued  the  Resolution  748(121).  This  Resolution  imposed  sanctions 
on  Libya,  inter  alia,  banning  of  flights  to  and  from  Libya  and  prohibiting  the 
export  of  all  kinds  of  arms  to  Libya.  This  Resolution  was  followed  by  the  S.  C. 
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Resolution  883  on  11  November  1993  which  extended  the  previous  sanctions 
imposed  on  Libya. 
The  Lockerbie  case  was  brought  before  the  ICJ  basically  to  decide  in  the  question 
of  Interpretation  and  Application  of  the  1971  Montreal  Convention  for  the 
Suppression  of  Unlawful  Acts  Against  the  Safety  of  Civil  Aviation(122), 
art.  14(1)(123).  On  3  March  1992,  Libya  instituted  proceeding  for  provisional 
measures  with  the  ICJ(124).  The  ICJ  issued  its  decision  92/8  of  14  April  1992:  The 
Court,  by  eleven  votes  to  five,  finds  that  the  circumstances  of  the  case  are  not  such 
as  to  require  the  exercise  of  its  power  under  Article  41  of  the  Statute  to  indicate 
provisional  measures  (125). 
The  ICJ  regarded  as  inappropriate  the  rights  claimed  by  Libya  under  the  Montreal 
Convention  for  protection  by  the  indication  of  provisional  measures.  The  decision 
of  the  ICJ  was  subject  to  conflicting  views(126).  Mr.  Oda,  the  Acting  President  of 
the  ICJ,  and  Judge  Lachs  agree  that  the  decision  of  the  Court,  as  being  the 
guardian  of  legality  for  the  international  community  as  a  whole(127),  should  not 
have  been  affected  by  the  consequences  of  the  Security  Council  Resolution  748 
which  suggested  the  possibility  that,  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  resolution,  the  ICJ 
could  have  reached  legal  conclusions  with  effects  incompatible  with  the  Council 
actions  and  the  ICJ  might  in  that  case  be  blamed  for  not  having  acted  sooner. 
Judge  Ni  supported  the  decision  of  the  ICJ  since  the  Libya's  request  should  be 
denied  due  to  the  non-fulfilment  of  the  six-month  period  required  by  virtue  of  the 
Montreal  Convention,  without  having  to  decide  at  the  same  time  on  the  other 
issues. 
Others  Judges(128)  agree  with  the  ICJ  decision  since  US  and  UK  are  liable  to 
request  extradition  of  the  accused  Libyan  with  respect  to  the  international  law  and, 
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Libyan  domestic  law  bans  the  extradition  of  nationals.  Regardless  of  these 
circumstances,  the  Security  Council  is  concerned  with  combating  international 
terrorism  by  virtue  of  Chapter  VII  of  the  UN  Charter.  Others  view(129)  that  the  ICJ 
decision  resulted  not  from  any  collision  between  the  competence  of  the  Security 
Council  and  the  competence  of  the  Court,  but  from  a  collision  between  the 
obligations  of  Libya  under  the  Resolution  of  the  S.  C.  and  any  obligations  which 
Libya  has  under  the  Montreal  Convention;  under  the  Charter,  the  obligations 
under  the  Resolution  of  the  S.  C.  prevailed. 
Other  opposing  views  consider  that  the  conflict  is  twofold,  legal  and  practical(130). 
The  legal  one  is  based  on  the  extradition  of  two  Libyan  nationals  which  is 
submitted  by  Libya(within  its  rights)  before  the  ICJ,  while  the  practical  is  mainly 
dealing  with  a  terrorism-implicated  State  which  is  submitted  by  the  UK  and  US 
(within  their  rights)  before  the  Security  Council.  Judge  Bedjaoui  is  of  the  view 
that  the  rights  claimed  by  Libya  exist  prima  facie  and  the  conditions  required  by 
the  ICJ  for  the  indication  of  provisional  measures  are  satisfied.  He  regretted  that 
the  ICJ  did  not  indicate  either  specific  provisional  measures  which  were  requested 
by  Libya,  proprio  motu,  general  measures  that  could  be  the  ICJ  contribution  to  the 
settlement  of  the  conflict.  On  the  same  side,  Judge  Weeramantry  (131)  based  his 
point  of  view  on  the  fact  that  both  ICJ  and  the  Security  Council  are  two  co- 
ordinating  bodies  within  the  UN  framework  who  have  been  approached  separately 
by  opposite  parties  to  the  same  dispute.  He  considered  that  proprio  motu 
provisional  measures  can  be  indicated  in  a  manner  that  it  would  not  collide  with 
the  Security  Council  Resolution  748  to  settle  the  dispute. 
Furthermore,  Judge  ad  hoc  El-Kosheri(1  32)  maintained  that  paragraph(1)  of  the 
Security  Council  Resolution  748  should  not  have  any  legal  effect  on  jurisdiction 
of  the  ICJ.  According  to  Judge  El-Kosheri,  the  Libyan  request  for  provisional 
measures  should  be  considered  in  accordance  with  habitual  pattern  of  the 
jurisprudence  of  the  ICJ  and  to  act  proprio  motu  to  indicate  measures. 
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The  judgements  of  the  ICJ  are  applicable  and  prevail  over  domestic 
regulations(133);  therefore,  the  US,  UK  and  France  insist  on  the  trial  of  the  two 
Libyan  nationals  for  the  explosion  of  the  two  flights  especially  after  the  decision 
of  the  ICJ. 
The  League  of  Arab  States  mediated  in  this  case  and  tried  to  convince  the  parties 
to  reach  a  peaceful  settlement.  In  fact,  Mr.  Ismat  Abdelmajid,  the  L.  A.  S. 
Secretary-General  held  meetings  in  the  permanent  member  States  of  the  S.  C.  and 
with  the  UN  Secretary-General  to  convince  the  Western  States  to  accept  the  LAS 
proposal  for  the  surrender  of  the  Libyan  nationals  for  trial  in  the  Hague,  the  seat  of 
the  ICJ,  by  Scot  judges  and  under  Scot  s  Law(134). 
The  L.  A.  S.  held  several  extraordinary  sessions  to  discuss  a  peaceful  solution  to  the 
conflict.  In  its  ordinary  sessions,  the  LAS  discussed  this  case  and  issued  many 
resolutions  concerning  this  case(135).  L.  A.  S.  Resolution  5161  of  March  1992  urged 
the  S.  C.  to  find  a  solution  to  the  crisis  through  negotiation,  mediation,  and  judicial 
settlement  by  virtue  of  art.  33  of  the  UN  Charter;  further,  L.  A.  S.  implored  the  S.  C 
not  to  adopt  resolutions  which  impose  sanctions  on  Libya  since  such  resolutions 
aggravate  and  complicate  the  conflict.  LAS  established  a  mechanism  (composed 
of  Ministers  from  Tunisia,  Algeria,  Egypt,  Morocco,  Libya,  Syria,  Mauritania  and 
the  Secretary-General  of  L:  A.  S.  )  to  hold  discussions  with  the  parties  of  the 
conflict  and  the  permanent  members  of  the  S.  C.  and  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
UN. 
In  27  March  1994,  the  Assembly  of  L.  A.  S.  issued  resolution  5373  which 
supported  the  proposal  of  the  L.  A.  S.  Secretary-General  and  urged  the  S.  C.  to  take 
the  proposal  seriously  since  it  would  ensure  peaceful  solution  which  would  avoid 
escalation  in  the  region.  As  the  Secretary-General  of  the  L.  A.  S.,  Mr.  Ismat 
Abdelmajid,  confirmed  to  the  author(136),  the  nucleus  of  the  crisis  is  the  absence of 
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an  extradition  agreement  between  Libya  and  the  requesting  States,  or  even 
between  LAS(since  Libya  is  a  member  of  LAS)  and  these  States.  Also  there  is  no 
international  extradition  convention  that  might  oblige  Libya  to  extradite  its  two 
accused  nationals. 
Other  international  and  regional  organizations  tried  to  offer  a  solution  to  the  crisis. 
In  fact,  the  non-alignment  States(137)  expressed  their  refusal  to  impose  sanctions 
on  Libya  since  Libya  provided  the  British  Government  with  information 
concerning  the  IRA  and  its  willingness  to  surrender  its  nationals  for  trial  in  an 
impartial  third  State.  The  Islamic  Conference  Organization  showed  its  solidarity 
with  the  Libyan  people  who  have  suffered  from  the  sanctions  imposed  on  Libya 
knowing  that  the  Libyan  Government  intended  to  reach  a  peaceful  solution  to  the 
crisis(138). 
The  Organization  of  African  Unity(OAU)  established  a  Ministerial  Committee 
composed  of  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  Ghana,  Tunisia,  Uganda,  Cameroon, 
Zimbabwe  and  two  assistants  of  the  Secretary-General  of  the  OAU.  This 
Committee  negotiated  with  the  US,  UK  and  France  concerning  the  application  of 
the  S.  C.  resolutions  without  prejudicing  Libyan  sovereignty(139). 
From  this  Crisis,  the  conclusion  of  an  international  agreement  on  extradition  is 
important.  With  the  existence  of  such  an  agreement,  the  conflict  could  have  been 
solved.  Political  considerations  may  well  end  this  crisis  since  from  the  legal 
perspective,  this  conflict  has  not  been  resolved(140). 
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NOTES 
1)  The  league  of  Arab  States  is  a  regional  organisation  gathering  the  Arab  States  as  members. 
Its  Charter  was  ratified  on  22  March,  1945  by  six  States:  Syria,  Lebanon,  The  Kingdom  of 
Saudi  Arabia,  Egypt,  Iraq  and  East  Jordan;  later  it  was  ratified  by  Yemen.  The  Charter 
entered  into  effect  on  11  May  1945.  The  rest  of  the  Arab  States  successively  adhered  to 
the  League  until  they  reached  twenty-two  States.  The  Charter  is formed  of  a  preamble  and 
twenty  Articles  dealing  with  the  purposes  of  the  League  and  their  means  of 
implementation.  The  League  of  Arab  States  consists  of  three  main  systems:  (1)  The 
Council  of  the  League  formed  by  the  representatives  of  the  member  States.  (2)  The 
Secretariat-General  of  the  League  of  Arab  States,  it  is  formed  by  the  Secretary-general 
assisted  by  the  Council  of  the  League,  the  assistant  secretaries  and  the  personnel  of  the 
Secretariat-general.  (3)  A  number  of  permanent  Committees.  For  more  details,  See:  Mofid 
Chihab,  OP  CIT,  PP.  438  Et  Seq.;  Mohammed  Talaat  Alghonimi,  OP  CIT,  PP.  1018  Et 
Seq.;  Ali  Sadek  Abuhif,  OP  CIT,  P.  685;  "The  League  of  Arab  States.. 
. 
Fifty  Years",  The 
Secretariat-General  of  the  League  of  Arab  States,  the  League  of  Arab  States  Press,  Cairo 
1995,  P.  242. 
2)  The  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan  ratified  the  Convention  on  17  February  1953  and 
approved  it  on  28  July  1954.  The  Syrian  Republic  ratified  the  Convention  on  19  April 
1953  and  approved  it  on  29  September  1956.  The  Egyptian  Kingdom  ratified  the 
Convention  on  9  June  1953  and  approved  it  on  8  March  1954.  The  Saudi  Kingdom 
ratified  the  Convention  on  22  May  1953  and  approved  it  on  5  April  1954.  The  Iraqi 
Kingdom  ratified  the  Convention  on  27  July  1953  and  approved  it  on  3  October  1957. 
The  Lebanese  republic  ratified  the  Convention  on  18  February  1953.  As  for  the  acceding 
States:  Libyan  Kingdom  on  19  May  1957,  Kuwait  on  20  May  1962,  The  Popular  Republic 
of  South  Yemen  on  7  March  1970,  The  UAE  on  5  February  1973,  Bahrain  on  4  December 
1973. 
3)  The  text  of  the  Convention  is  in:  Mahmoud  Zaki  Shems,  International  Judicial  and 
Extradition  Agreements(1926-1986),  OP  CIT;  Shearer  I.  A.,  Extradition  in  International 
Law,  University  of  Manchester,  Manchester  1971,  P.  52. 
4)  L.  A.  S.  Extradition  Convention,  Art.  1. 
5)  Ibid,  Art.  2. 
6)  Id. 
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7)  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  art  28. 
8)  L.  A.  S.  Extradition  Convention,  Art.  3. 
9)  See  Chapter  on  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention. 
10)Id. 
11)Id. 
12)The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  art.  28. 
13)L.  A.  S.  Extradition  Convention,  art.  3. 
14)Ibid,  art.  4. 
15)Egypt  disapproved  of  the  definition  of  extraditable  offences,  laid  down  in  Art.  4.  of  this 
Convention.  This  disapproval  was  expressed  through  the  Egyptian  reservations  on  the 
Convention.  See:  "The  Conventions  and  Agreements",  The  Legal  Affairs  Sector,  the 
Secretariat-General  of  the  L.  A.  S.,  Tunis  1985,  P.  102. 
16)L.  A.  S.  Extradition  Convention,  Art.  5. 
17)ld. 
18)Ibid,  Art.  6. 
19)Ibid,  Art.  7. 
20)Ibid,  Art.  8. 
21)Ibid,  Art.  10. 
22)Ibid,  Art.  11. 
23)Id. 
24)The  Egyptian  delegation  placed  a  reservation  on  this  article,  it  wanted  the  elimination  of 
the  term  "arrest",  and  supersedes  the  term  "imprisonment"  by  "placing  under  custody", 
see:  "The  Conventions  and  Agreements",  OP  CIT,  P.  102. 
25)L.  A.  S.  Criminal  Extradition  Convention,  Art.  12. 
26)Ibid,  Art.  13. 
27)Ibid,  Art.  14. 
28)Id. 
29)Ibid,  Art.  15. 
30)Ibid,  Art.  16. 
31)Ibid,  Art.  17. 
32)Ibid,  Art.  18. 
33)This  Convention  is  similar  to  the  Bilateral  Conventions  concluded  between  Saudi  Arabia 
and  other  Arab  States. 
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34)The  text  of  the  Convention  is  in:  Mohamed  Zaki  Shems,  International  Judicial  and 
Extradition  Agreements(  1926-1989),  Damascus  1989. 
35)"Security  and  Life"  Magazine,  1"  ed.,  1St  year,  July/August  1982,  The  Arab  Centre  for 
Security  Studies  and  Training,  Riyadh,  P  4.;  Ahmed  A.  Salama,  The  Arab  Riyadh 
Convention(1983)  and  International  Co-operation  in  Judicial  Procedure  Matters  a  paper 
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C*IAg  TER  SIX. 
THE  EUROPEAN  CONVENTION  AND  THE  UN  MOD  ; 
CONVENTIONS  ON  EXTRADMON(l) 
In  modern  history,  Europe  witnessed  bloody  conflicts  which  costed  many 
millions  of  lives  and  which  nurtured  a  population  receptive  to  the  emerging  belief 
that  Europe  as  a  whole  should  pursue  the  path  of  unity.  After  the  World  War  II, 
this  belief  was  faced  with  a  new  political  reality  in  the  European  States:  Europe 
was  divided  into  two  blocs.  Therefore,  only  the  western  bloc  could  pursue  the  road 
to  unity  with  US  financial  assistance(2).  As  a  response  to  the  Marshall  Plan(3),  the 
organization  for  European  Economic  Co-operation  (OEEC)  was  set  up  and  the 
Council  of  Europe  was  established(4). 
The  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community(ECSC)come  into  existence  when 
France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and 
Luxembourg  signed  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1951(5).  To  begin  the  process  of 
European  unity  by  ECSC  was  not  a  random  choice.  It  aimed  to  control  military 
industry  of  the  European  States  precisely  West  Germany  whose  problem  loomed 
large  for  all  the  States  involved  in  the  unity  process.  For  the  same  end,  European 
States  failed  to  create  a  unified  European  Army  within  a  European  Defence 
Community  and  defence  matters  were  left  for  intergovernmental  Co-operation(6). 
The  Messina  Conference  of  1955  set  up  an  inter-governmental  committee 
presided  by  the  Belgian  Foreign  Minister,  Paul-Henri  Spaak  to  examine  the 
institutional  requirements  for  the  economic  unity().  In  1958,  two  other 
communities  were  established:  the  European  Economic  Comrnunity(EEC)(8)  and 
the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community(Euratom)(9). 
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The  Council  of  Europe  (to)  is  another  important  European  Organization.  Its 
Charter  was  signed  on  5th  May  1949  in  St.  James  Palace  in  London  and  its 
headquarters  are  in  Strasbourg,  France(11).  it  is  considered  as  an  umbrella  for 
European  parliamentary  democracy  and  a  meeting  point  for  countries  respecting 
human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms(12).  The  Charter  was  initially  signed  by 
the  then  ten  original  European  States.  Later  other  European  States  acceded  to  the 
Council(13  ). 
With  the  exception  of  defence  issues,  the  Council  of  Europe  was  established  to 
foster  closer  ties  among  European  democratic  States  and  to  promote  multilateral 
Co-operation  on  all  matters  affecting  contemporary  societies.  The  Council  of 
Europe  is  charged  with  three  basic  functions:  to  protect  and  reinforce  democratic 
pluralism  and  human  rights,  to  seek  common  solutions  to  the  major  societal 
problems  confronting  its  members  and  to  encourage  a  sense  of  Europe's 
multicultural  identity(14). 
The  Council  of  Europe  is  formed  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers(15),  the 
Parliamentary  Assembly(16)  and  the  Secretariat(17).  The  Committee  of  Ministers 
acts  for  the  Council  of  Europe.  Each  of  these  member  States  has  one  vote.  The 
Committee  issues  its  resolutions  either  by  unanimity  or  by  a  majority  of  two- 
thirds,  or  any  majority  in  accordance  with  the  importance  of  the  subject  matter  of 
the  resolution  issued(18).  In  fact,  voting  varies.  The  subject  matter  may  necessitate 
a  unanimous  vote  of  the  member  States(i9);  matters  of  lesser  importance  may 
require.  a  majority  of  two-thirds(2o);  procedural  and  the  administrative  resolutions 
that  can  be  adopted  by  majority  vote(21).  This  Committee  is  competent  to  study 
appropriate  procedures  to  execute  recommendations  of  the  Parliamentary 
Assembly  or  proposals  submitted  by  Governmental  Experts  Committees,  either  by 
issuing  recommendations  or  ratifying  agreements  or  otherwise. 
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The  Parliamentary  Assembly  is  an  international  parliamentary  system,  consisting 
of  263  parliamentarians  and  an  equal  number  of  substitutes(22).  Representation  in 
the  Parliamentary  Assembly  is  determined  with  regard  to  member  States' 
population(23).  The  Assembly  consists  of  representatives  of  each  State  elected  by 
its  Parliament 
. 
or  appointed  in  such  manner  as  that  Parliament  shall  decide;  each 
representative  must  be  a  national  of  the  member  whom  he  represents,  but  shall  not 
at  the  same  time  be  a  member  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers(24).  The  Assembly 
issues  its  recommendations  by  a  two-third  majority  of  the  votes(25). 
The  Secretariat-General  is  the  coordinating  structure  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  It 
is  headed  by  the  Secretary-general.  The  Statute  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
surprisingly  says  nothing  of  the  powers  of  the  Secretary-General(26).  He  is 
appointed  by  the  Consultative  Assembly  and  recommended  by  the  Ministerial 
Committee.  The  Assistant  Secretary-general  is  similarly  appointed.  Within  the 
Secretariat,  there  are  about  1200  officials  of  thirty-eight  member  States  appointed 
by  the  Secretary-general(27). 
The  Council  of  Europe  aims  to  achieve  greater  unity  among  its  members  to 
realize  economic  and  social  development  and  to  ensure  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms  within  these  States(28).  The  Council  of  Europe  has 
succeeded  in  concluding  many  agreements  and  protocols.  The  most  important  of 
these  are  The  European  Convention  For  The  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and 
Fundamental  Freedoms  which  was  ratified  on  4  November  1950(29)  and  the 
European  Convention  on  Extradition  which  is  the  subject  of  this  study. 
Extradition  procedures  are  carried  out  amongst  the  European  States  in  conformity 
with  the  norms  of  the  International  Law;  or  by  virtue  of  the  principle  of 
reciprocity(30);  or  through  bilateral  agreements  regulating  such  circumstances.  In 
fact,  the  bilateral  Agreement  of  1174  concluded  between  Scotland  and  England  is 
considered  to  be  the  first  European  Bilateral  Extradition  Agreement(3  1). 
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In  Paris  on  13  December  1957,  some  member  States  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
ratified  the  European  Convention  on  Extradition(32)(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the 
European  Convention).  The  European  Convention  consists  of  a  preamble  and 
thirty-three  articles  dealing  with  different  aspects  of  extradition.  After  its  entry  in 
effect  on  18  April  1960(33),  it  became  apparent  that  it  should  be  amended  since  the 
provisions  no  longer  corresponded  to  the  requirements  for  inter-State  Co- 
operation  in  the  field  of  extradition.  Consequently,  in  9-11  June  1969  a  meeting 
was  held  by  those  responsible  at  national  level  for  the  application  of  the 
Convention.  The  participants  agreed  that  revision  of  some  provisions  were  needed 
to  reconsider  the  application  of  the  Convention(34). 
In  fact,  the  European  Committee  on  Crime  Problems  (ECCP)  held  a  series  of 
meetings  after  which  a  sub-committee  was  set  up,  under  the  chairmanship  of  Dr. 
R.  Linke  (Austria),  to  study  amendment  of  the  European  Convention  as  so 
required(35).  The  sub-committee  submitted  proposals  to  ECCP  during  the  23rd 
plenary  session  in  May  1974(36);  in  turn,  the  ECCP  submitted  the  text  of  the 
protocol  to  the  Ministerial  Committee  of  the  Council  of  Europe(37).  The 
Ministerial  Committee  approved  the  text  of  the  Additional  Protocol  on  May  1975 
which  was  opened  to  signature  on  15  October  1975(38).  The  Additional  Protocol 
amended  the  provisions  of  Articles  (3  &  9)  of  the  European  Convention. 
The  sub-committee  headed  by  Dr.  R.  Linke  met  again  in  September  1974,  April 
1975  and  March  1976  to  prepare  a  second  additional  protocol  to  the  European 
Convention  on  Extradition  and  to  study  other  matters(39).  The  draft  of  the  second 
additional  protocol  was  submitted  to  the  ECCP  during  its  26th  plenary  session  in 
May  1977  which  decided,  in  turn,  to  submit  the  text  of  the  protocol  to  the 
Ministerial  Committee  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  The  Ministerial  Committee 
approved  the  text  of  the  second  additional  Protocol  and  opened  it  to  signature  by 
the  member  states  who  sign  it  in  17  March  1978(40).  The  Second  Additional 
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Protocol  to  the  European  Convention  on  Extradition,  formed  of  twelve  articles, 
deals  mainly  with  fiscal  offences  and  judgments  in  absentia  recorded  in  the 
European  Convention. 
The  European  Convention  commences  its  provisions  by  requiring  the  member 
States  to  extradite  all  persons  whose  extradition  is  requested  by  another  member 
State  and  who  are  either  convicted  of  committing  an  offence  or  who  are  wanted  by 
the  requesting  Party  for  the  carrying  out  of  a  sentence  or  a  detention  order(41).  The 
Convention  defines  the  circumstances  in  which  extradition  is  to  be  granted(42).  In 
fact,  extradition  is  mandatory  with  regard  to  offences  punishable  under  the  laws  of 
both  the  requesting  Party  and  the  requested  Party  by  a  deprivation  of  liberty  or 
detention  order  for  a  period  of  at  least  one  year  or  by  a  more  severe  penalty.  Also, 
extradition  is  mandatory  where  a  conviction  and  prison  sentence  have  occurred  or 
a  detention  order  has  been  made  in  the  territory  of  the  requesting  State,  the 
punishment  awarded  must  have  been  for  a  period  of  at  least  four  months. 
It  is  obvious  that  there  is  a  difference  in  the  period  of  the  deprivation  of  liberty  in 
each  case.  In  the  first  case,  the  sentence  is  not  yet  rendered  or  a  warrant  of  arrest  is 
not  issued  concerning  the  offence;  therefore,  the  punishment  for  the  offence 
should  not  be  less  than  one  year.  In  the  second  case,  a  conviction,  prison  sentence 
or  a  detention  order  are  issued  in  respect  of  the  offence.  In  the  first  case,  the 
required  period  is  fixed  by  the  law  of  both  the  requesting  and  requested  States; 
whereas,  in  the  second  case,  the  period  is fixed  by  the  requesting  State. 
There  is  an  apparent  difference  between  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  and  the 
European  Convention  in  terms  of  the  cases  in  which  extradition  is  granted  since 
the  definition  of  "offence"  differs  in  the  two  Conventions.  In  the  European 
Convention,  there  are  no  offences  punishable  by  Divine  Ordinance,  retribution  and 
discretionary  punishment  stated  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention(art.  28).  The 
existence  of  such  offences  in  the  latter  Convention  is due  to  the  legal  system  in 
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force  in  the  G.  C.  C.  States,  which  is  derived  from  the  provisions  of  the  Islamic 
Sha'ria,  the  main  source  of  legislation  in  these  States. 
There  is  also  a  difference  between  the  European  Convention  and  the  G.  C.  C. 
Security  Convention  as  far  as  the  sentence  period  is  concerned.  By  virtue  of  the 
European  Convention,  extradition  would  not  apply  if  the  punishment  period  is less 
than  one  year;  whereas,  in  terms  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  extradition  is 
legal  if  the  offence  is  punishable  by  no  less  than  six  months  imprisonment. 
In  terms  of  to  the  European  Convention,  the  period  of  deprivation  of  liberty  is 
considered  by  the  laws  of  the  requesting  and  requested  States(43);  whilst  in  the 
framework  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  the  limitation  of  the  period  is  taken 
with  regard  to  the  law  of  the  requesting  State(44).  Another  difference  worth 
mention  is  the  case  of  a  conviction  and  prison  sentence  occurred  or  a  detention 
order  has  been  made  in  the  territory  of  the  requesting  Party,  the  punishment 
awarded  must  have  been  for  a  period  of  at  least  four  months(45);  whereas,  in  the 
G.  C.  C.  Convention,  the  period  (awarded  by  the  judicial  authorities  in  the 
requesting  State  for  an  offence  punished  by  Divine  Ordinance,  retribution  or 
discretionary  punishment,  or  an  offence  punished  by  a  deprivation  of  liberty) 
should  not  be  less  than  six  months(46). 
It  is  important  to  note  that the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  is  more  wide  ranging 
in  the  criminal  extradition  than  the  European  Convention.  In  fact,  the  former  adds 
to  the  extraditable  offences  those  offences  punishable  by  Divine  Ordinance, 
retribution  or  discretionary  punishment.  For  these  offences,  extradition  is 
obligatory  even  if  the  period  of  punishment  is  less  than  six  months  which  is 
recorded  in  the  Convention  and  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  the  requesting  State 
alone. 
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The  European  Convention  lays  down  circumstances  when  an  extradition  request 
includes  several  separate  offences  (each  of  which  is  punished)  in  the  law  of  the 
requesting  and  requested,  by  deprivation  of  liberty  or  such  under  a  detention  order. 
However,  some  of  which  are  punished  by  a  year  or  more  whilst  others  by  less.  In 
such  cases,  the  requested  State  is  obliged  to  extradite  for  a  former  category  of 
offences;  while  in  the  latter,  it  shall  have  the  right  to  grant  extradition(47). 
Art.  2(3)  tackles  the  circumstances  when  the  law  of  a  Contracting  State  conflicts 
with  the  cases  laid  down  in  the  previous  provisions  concerning  extradition.  When 
such  conflict  arises,  the  concerned  State  may  exclude  the  offences  for  which  its 
law  prohibits  extradition.  Such  contracting  States,  while  depositing  their 
instruments  of  ratification,  must  notify  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  of  the  offences  in  which  extradition  is  not  permissible  by  virtue  of  their 
law  and  of  the  excluded  offences(48).  The  Secretary-General  of  the  Council  of 
Europe,  in  turn,  must  notify  the  other  contracting  States.  Recording  such  provision 
is  necessary  to  avoid  requests  for  extradition  for  offences  which  are  excluded  from 
extradition  by  virtue  of  the  law  of  a  contracting  State.  If  the  law  concerning 
extradition  is  amended  in  a  contracting  Party,  this  Party  must  notify  the  Secretary- 
General  of  the  Council  of  Europe  of  the  amendment,  which  is  effective  only  after 
the  passage  of  three  months  of  such  notification(49). 
As  is  the  case  in  all  international  conventions  on  extradition  with  regard  to 
extradition  for  political  offences(so),  the  provisions  of  the  European  Convention 
do  not  permit  extradition  for  political  offences  or  offences  connected  with  a 
political  offences  i).  It  widens  the  scope  in  which  extradition  is  refused  if  the 
requested  State  has  substantial  proof  for  believing  that  a  request  for  an  ordinary 
criminal  offence  has  been  made  for  the  purpose  of  prosecuting  or  punishing  a 
person  because  of  his  race,  religion,  nationality  or  political  opinion,  or  that  that 
person's  position  may  be  prejudiced  for  any  of  these  reasons(52).  The  taking  or  the 
187 CHAPTER  SIX 
attempt  of  taking  the  life  of  a  Head  of  State  or  a  member  of  his  family  are 
excepted  from  being  considered  political  offences. 
In  the  Convention  there  is  limited  excluded  offences,  while  the  additional  Protocol 
(by  virtue  of  Chapter  I,  art  1)  adds  more  offences  to  be  excluded  from  being 
considered  as  political  offences.  Such  offences  are  crimes  against  humanity 
specified  in  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of 
Genocide  adopted  on  9  December  1948  by  the  General  Assembly  of  the  UN.;  any 
violations  specified  in  Art.  50  of  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  for  the 
Amelioration  of  the  Condition  of  the  Wounded  and  Sick  in  Armed  Forces  in  the 
Field,  Art.  51  of  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  for  the  Amelioration  of  the 
Condition  of  Wounded,  Sick  and  Shipwrecked  Members  of  Armed  Forces  at  Sea, 
Art.  130  of  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  relative  to  the  Treatment  of  Prisoners  of 
War  and  Art.  147  of  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  relative  to  the  Protection  of 
Civilian  in  Time  of  War;  and  any  comparable  violations  of  the  laws  of  war  having 
effect  at  the  time  when  the  Protocol  enters  into  effect  and  of  customs  of  war 
existing  at  this  time  which  are  not  provided  for  in  the  above-mentioned  provisions 
of  the  Geneva  Conventions. 
As  far  as  political  offences  are  concerned,  one  observes  a  closer  similarity 
between  the  European  Convention  and  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  since  they 
both  do  not  permit  extradition  for  political  offences.  The  European  Convention 
excludes  "The  taking  or  attempted  taking  of  the  life  of  a  Head  of  State  or  a 
member  of  his  family"  from  being  considered  political  offences;  while,  the  G.  C.  C. 
Convention  excludes,  from  being  considered  political  offences,  a  number  of 
offences  eg.  crimes  of  treason  and  sabotage  and  terrorism,  crimes  of  murder  and 
robbery  and  theft  committed  by  acts  of  force  by  one  or  a  group  of  persons,  all 
offences  committed  against  Heads  of  States,  or  their  ancestors  and  descendants  or 
their  wives,  crimes  committed  against  crown  Princes  and  Royal  families, 
principalities  and  ministers,  and  those  who  are  of  the  same  rank  and  any  attempt 
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or  acting  as  an  accomplice  in  these  crimes  if  punishable  under  the  laws  and 
regulations  of  the  requesting  Party(53). 
The  European  Convention  excludes  from  extradition  offences  under  Military 
Law(54).  The  European  Convention  states  this  provision  in  an  independent 
article(ss),  while  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  makes  a  similar  provision  which 
is  listed  within  the  offences  which  are  considered  not  to  be  political  offences(56). 
This  means  that  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  does  not  agree  with  the  European 
Convention  since  it  does  permit  the  extradition  of  military  offenders. 
The  European  Convention  considers  fiscal  offences  (in  connection  with  taxes, 
duties,  customs  and  exchange)  for  which  extradition  shall  be  granted  only  if  the 
Contracting  States  have  so  decided  in  respect  of  any  such  offence  or  category  of 
offences(57).  This  provision  has  been  amended  by  the  Second  Additional  Protocol 
by  virtue  of  Chapter  II  which  gives  the  provision  a  more  mandatory  form  since 
extradition  shall  be  granted  by  the  member  States  regardless  of  any  arrangements 
between  them  whenever  the  fiscal  offence,  under  the  law  of  the  requesting  State, 
corresponds,  under  the  law  of  the  requested  State,  to  an  offence  of  the  same 
nature.  Within  the  meaning  of  Chapter  II,  paragraph  (2)  of  the  Second  Additional 
Protocol,  the  fact  that  law  of  the  requested  State  does  not  impose  the  same 
category  of  tax  or  duty  as  the  law  of  the  requesting  State  is  not  significant. 
Extradition  may  not  be  refused  on  that  basis.  In  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention, 
fiscal  offences  are  totally  excluded  from  extradition. 
As  is  the  case  in  international  conventions  on  extradition,  the  European 
Convention  gives  the  contracting  States  the  right  to  refuse  extradition  of  their 
nationals(58).  The  Convention  gives  its  parties  the  right  to  define  for  themselves 
the  term  "nationals"(59).  If  the  requested  State  does  not  extradite  its  national,  it 
shall,  on  a  request  from  the  requesting  State,  submit  the  case  to  its  competent 
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authorities  so  that  the  proceedings  may  be  taken  if  they  are  considered 
appropriate(6o). 
The  difference  between  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention  and  the  European  Convention  is 
that  the  former  permits  extradition  of  nationals  who  have  committed  extraditable 
offences(61). 
Articles  7  to  11  of  the  European  Convention  goes  on  to  list  cases  in  which 
extradition  is  impermissible.  The  extradition  of  a  person  is  to  be  refused  if  such 
person  becomes  immune  from  punishment  or  prosecution,  according  to  the  law  of 
either  the  requesting  or  the  requested  State,  or  by  reason  of  lapse  of  time  (62). 
Extradition  of  a  person  is  to  be  refused  if  the  competent  authorities  in  the 
requested  State  are  proceeding  against  such  person  in  respect  of  the  offence(s) 
which  are  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request(63). 
Extradition  is  also  to  be  refused  if  the  offence  which  is  the  subject  of  the 
extradition  request  is  punishable  by  the  death  penalty(64)  by  virtue  of  the  law  of 
the  requesting  State  if  the  death  penalty  is  not  provided  for  by  the  law  of  the 
requested  State(65).  Extradition  may  be  granted  if  the  requested  State  receives 
sufficient  assurance  that  the  death-penalty  will  not  be  carried  out(66). 
Extradition  is  granted  if  the  extraditable  offence  is  committed  completely  or  partly 
in  the  territory  of  the  requested  State  or  committed  in  a  place  treated  as  a  territory 
of  such  State;  like  for  France,  if  the  offence  is  committed  in  Algeria,  France  would 
consider  that  the  offence  is  committed  in  its  territories(67). 
If  an  offence,  which  is  subject  of  the  extradition  request  has  been  committed 
outside  the  territory  of  the  requesting  State,  extradition  may  be  refused  if  the  law 
of  the  requested  State  does  not  permit  prosecution  for  the  same  category  of 
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offences  when  committed  outside  the  latter  State's  territory  or  does  not  permit 
extradition  for  the  offence  concerned(68). 
Extradition  may  also  be  refused  if  a  final  judgment  has  been  issued  by  the 
competent  authorities  of  the  requested  State  concerning  the  person  whose 
extradition  is  sought(69).  Extradition  may  also  be  refused  if  the  competent 
authorities  in  the  requested  State  have  decided  either  not  to  institute,  or  to 
terminate,  proceedings  in  respect  of  the  same  offence(s)(7o). 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  last  two  cases  are  laid  down  in  art.  9  which  has  been 
amended  by  virtue  of  the  1975  Protocol  in  which  the  two  cases  are  joined  to  form 
paragraph  1.  The  new  provisions,  paragraphs  (2,3,4)  list  cases  for  which 
extradition  may  not  be  granted.  These  cases  are  when  a  final  judgment  has  been 
rendered  in  a  third  Contracting  State  for  the  same  offence(s)  which  is  the  subject 
of  the  extradition  request.  Such  final  judgment  declares  the  person  innocent,  or  the 
period  of  deprivation  of  liberty  is  carried  out  by  the  person,  or  the  person  is 
subject  to  a  pardon  or  an  amnesty  or  if  the  person  is  tried  without  imposing 
sanctions. 
Though  these  previous  cases,  extradition  may  be  granted  if  the  offence(for  which  a 
final  judgment  has  been  issued)  is  committed  in  the  requesting  State  against  a 
person,  or  against  an  institution  or  against  any  thing  having  public  status.  If  the 
person  in  respect  of  whom  judgment  was  passed  had  himself  a  public  status  in  the 
requesting  State  and  if  the  offence  in  respect  of  which  judgment  was  passed  was 
committed  completely  or  partially  in  the  territory  of  the  requesting  State  or  in  a 
place  treated  as  its  territory. 
Among  the  cases  in  which  extradition  is  declined,  recorded  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  is  the  case  when  the  sanction  is  rescinded  by  virtue  of  the  law  of  the 
requesting  State.  The  same  case  is  provided  for  in  the  European  Convention,  but 
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the  sanction  is  determined  by  the  laws  of  the  requesting  and  requested  States.  In 
the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  in  the  case  when  the  crime  is  repealed,  it  is 
determined  with  regard  to  the  law  of  the  requesting  State(71). 
The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  omits  mentioning  if  extradition  is  granted  in  a 
case  when  a  final  judgment  is  pronounced  by  the  competent  authorities  in  the 
requested  State,  against  a  person  sought  for  extradition  for  such  offence  which  is 
the  subject  of  the  extradition  request,  or  a  decision  issued  by  this  authority  is  not 
to  proceed  against  the  person  for  the  same  offence.  Also  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  does  not  comment  upon  refusal  of  extradition  in  a  case  where  the 
offence  concerned  requires  death  penalty  in  the  requesting  State  and  not  liable  for 
such  punishment  in  the  requested  State,  extradition  is  applied. 
On  the  contrary,  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  provides  for  the  circumstance 
when  the  person  sought  for  extradition  enjoys  diplomatic  immunity(72),  such 
circumstance  is  absent  in  the  European  Convention. 
The  European  Convention  stipulates  that  any  extradition  request  shall  be  in 
writing  and  transmitted  through  diplomatic  channels(73).  Such  request  shall 
contain  original  or  an  authenticated  copy  of  the  conviction  and  sentence  with  any 
detention  order  or  authenticated  copy  of  the  warrant  of  arrest  or  any  other  orders 
of  the  same  effect,  against  the  person  sought  for  extradition  by  virtue  of  the  law  of 
the  requesting  State(74).  It  shall  also  contain  a  statement  of  the  offence(s)  which  is 
the  subject  of  the  extradition  request  and  the  legal  description  of  the  offence(s) 
committed  with  a  copy  of  any  relevant  enactment  or,  if  not  available,  a  statement 
of  the  relevant  law  and  description  of  the  person  sought  for  extradition.  It  is 
preferable  to  join  any  other  information  that  might  help  establish  the  nationality 
and  the  identity  of  the  person  whose  extradition  is  sought  such  is  recorded(75). 
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The  European  Convention  states  that  it  is  not  competent  to  proceed  against  a 
person  who  has  been  extradited  or  to  arrest  him  in  the  requesting  State(76)  for  any 
other  offence  which  he  has  committed  before  his  extradition.  However,  such 
authorities  may  proceed  against  him  for  an  offence  which  is  not  the  subject  of  the 
extradition  request  in  two  situations;  when  the  person  is  permitted  to  leave  the 
territories  of  the  State  to  which  he  was  extradited  and  he  fails  to  do  so  within 
forty-five  days  or  if  he  deliberately  returns  to  the  territory  of  the  State  after  his 
departure;  or  when  the  State  which  has  surrendered  the  person  consents  to  such 
procedure  (77).  In  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  the  period  within  which  the 
person  is  permitted  to  leave  the  territory  of  the  State  to  which  he  has  been 
extradited  is  thirty  days(78),  whilst  it  is  forty-five  days  in  the  European 
Convention. 
While  proceeding  against  a  person  whose  extradition  is  sought  and  the  crime 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  request  has  been  repealed,  such  person  would  be 
proceeded  against  if  the  new  description  falls  under  the  category  of  extraditable 
offences.  On  the  other  hand,  the  European  Convention  prohibits  re-extradition  to  a 
third  State  regardless  that  such  State  is  a  party  to  the  Convention  or  not  a  member, 
for  the  offence  the  person  has  committed  before  his  being  surrendered  by  the 
authorities  of  the  requesting  State;  thereby  his  re-extradition  to  a  third  State  is 
legalized(79). 
It  is  to  be  understood  that  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  omits  mentioning  the 
case  of  extradition  to  a  third  State;  it  declares,  however,  that  to  preserve  the 
confidentiality  of  the  exchanged  information,  the  member  States  are  not  permitted 
to  transmit  the  confidential-labeled  information  and  materials  to  a  third  State 
which  is  not  a  party  to  the  Convention  unless  agreed  by  the  State  from  which  the 
information  and  other  materials  originated(so). 
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The  competent  authorities  in  the  requesting  State  may  request  the  provisional 
arrest  of  the  person  whose  extradition  is  sought(81).  The  authorities  in  the 
requested  State  shall  consider  the  request  for  provisional  arrest  with  regard  to  its 
law.  Such  request  may  be  sent  through  diplomatic  means  or  directly  by  post, 
telegraph,  through  Interpol  or  through  any  other  means.  After  the  lapse  of  eighteen 
days,  any  provisional  arrest  may  be  terminated  if  the  competent  authorities  in  the 
requested  Party  have  not  received  the  extradition  request  file(82).  Such  provisional 
arrest  shall  not  exceed  forty  days(83).  The  release  of  the  person  shall  not  prejudice 
re-arrest  and  extradition  if  the  requested  State  receives  any  extradition  request 
subsequently(84).  In  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  when  the  requested  State 
does  not  receive  an  extradition  request  from  the  requesting  State,  the  provisional 
arrest  period  is  thirty  days(85)  and  the  period  for  renewal  of  provisional  arrest  is 
thirty  days;  whilst  by  the  European  Convention,  the  period  in  any  case  shall  not 
exceed  forty  days. 
The  European  Convention,  unlike  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  omits 
mentioning  that  the  period  spent  under  provisional  arrest  shall  be  deducted  from 
any  sanction  imposed  on  the  person  in  the  requesting  State.  In  fact,  Some 
European  States  do  not  adopt  the  principle  stating  that  the  period  spent  under 
provisional  arrest  shall  be  detracted  from  the  punishment  declared  in  the 
requesting  State.  As  in  Re  Frechengues  case;  the  person  spent  the  period  from  28 
December  1967  to  16  May  1968  under  arrest  in  Spain  waiting  for  his  extradition 
to  France.  The  French  Cour  de  cassation  did  not  consider  the  cosmic  judicial 
effects  of  the  warrant  of  arrest  issued  by  the  juge  d'instruction  on  extradition 
matter  and  the  French  authorities  considered  this  period  as  a  procedure  taken  by  a 
foreign  State  that  can  not  be  associated  with  the  procedure  taken  by  the  French 
authorities(86). 
Art.  17  of  the  European  Convention  deals  with  the  case  when  extradition  is 
requested  concurrently  by  more  than  one  State,  either  for  the  same  offence  or  for 
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different  separate  offences.  The  requested  State  gives  priority  of  extradition  to  the 
State  whose  interests  were  damaged  by  the  offence,  to  the  State  where  the  offence 
is  committed  and  in  accordance  with  the  respective  dates  of  the  requests  and  the 
nationality  of  the  person  requested.  In  this  regard,  there  is  a  similarity  between  the 
European  Convention  and  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention(s). 
The  requested  State  shall  inform,  either  positively  or  negatively,  the  requesting 
State  of  its  decision  about  the  extradition(88).  If  the  requested  State,  wholly  or 
partly,  declines  extradition,  it  shall  provide  its  reasons  in  taking  such  decision(89). 
If  extradition  is  granted,  the  competent  authorities  in  the  requested  State  shall 
inform  the  competent  authorities  in  the  requesting  State  of  the  place  and  date  of 
surrender  and  the  period  spent  by  the  person  in  detention  awaiting extradition(9o). 
If  the  competent  authorities  in  the  requesting  State  fail  to  make  arrangements  for 
the  collection  of  the  person  in  the  appointed  period,  the  authorities  in  the 
requested  State  may  release  the  person  after  the  expiry  of  fifteen  days(91).  If  there 
are  circumstances  that  prevent  the  authorities  of  the  requesting  State  to  present  for 
the  collection  of  the  person  who  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request,  then  such 
person,  in  any  way,  shall  be  released  after  the  termination  of  the  thirty  days  after 
arrest  and  the  requested  State  may  decline  extradition  of  the  person  for  the  same 
offence(92). 
When  the  requested  State  has  taken  a  decision  to  extradite,  it  may  postpone  the 
surrender  of  the  person  in  two  circumstances(93);  when  the  competent  authorities 
in  the  requested  State  are  proceeding  against  the  person,  or  when  he  is  tried  in  the 
requested  State  and  his  extradition  is  postponed  until  he  carries  out  the  imposed 
punishment(94). 
Art.  20  deals  with  handing  over  the  property  of  the  person  surrendered  to  the 
requesting  State.  Such  property  may  be  required  as  evidence  or  acquired  as  a  result 
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of  the  offence  and  which,  at  the  time  of  arrest,  is  found  in  the  possession  of  the 
person  or  discovered  subsequently.  When  extradition  is  granted,  the  handing  over 
the  property  takes  place  even  though  the  person  is  not  extradited  because  of  death 
or  escape(95).  When  the  said  property  is  liable  to  seizure  or  confiscation  in  the 
territory  of  the  requested  State,  such  State  may  temporarily  retain  the  property  or 
hand  it  over  provided  such  property  is  returned(96). 
Art.  20(4)  preserves  any  rights  which  the  requested  State  or  a  third  State  may  have 
acquired  in  the  property.  Where  these  rights  exist,  the  property  shall  be  returned 
without  charge  to  the  requested  State  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  trial.  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  there  is  a  similarity  between  this  article  and  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention(97). 
The  European  Convention  deals  with  expenses  incurred  by  the  extradition 
procedure.  The  expenses  are  borne  by  the  requested  State  within  the  limits  of  its 
territory,  while  the  transit  expenses  are  borne  by  the  requesting  State(98).  When 
extradition  is  from  a  non-metropolitan  territory  of  the  requested  State,  the 
expenses  are  borne  also  by  the  requesting  State(99).  It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  differs  from  the  European  Convention  concerning 
the  expenses  of  the  extradition  transaction,  providing  that  the  requesting  State 
assumes  all  the  expenses  incurred  by  the  extradition(ioo). 
The  European  Convention  limited  the  territorial  application  of  its  provisions.  They 
are  applied  to  the  metropolitan  territories  of  the  contracting  or  acceding  States. 
The  provisions  of  the  Convention  are  applied  also  to  French  overseas  departments 
and  to  Algeria(1  oi).  In  respect  to  the  United  Kingdom  and  Northern  Ireland,  the 
provisions  are  applied  to  the  Channel  Islands  and  -to  the  Isle  of  Man.  The 
contracting  parties  shall  notify  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Council  of  Europe  of 
such  extended  territorial  application  of  the  Convention's  provisions.  By  direct 
bilateral  or  multilateral  arrangements  between  the  member  States,  the  application 
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of  this  Convention  may  be  extended  to  other  territories  other  than  those  mentioned 
in  this  Convention  and  subject  to  the  conditions  recorded  in  the  arrangements(102). 
Art.  28  of  the  European  Convention  discusses  the  relation  between  this 
Convention  and  other  bilateral  agreements  concluded  by  the  member  States.  It 
supersedes  the  provisions  of  any  such  bilateral  treaties,  conventions  or  agreements 
that  govern  extradition  among  any  two  contracting  parties.  Bilateral  or  multilateral 
agreements  may  be  concluded  by  the  member  States  only  to  supplement  or  to 
facilitate  the  provisions  of  the  Convention.  In  this  respect,  there  is  a  broad 
difference  between  the  European  Convention  and  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention. 
The  provisions  of  the  latter  do  not  affect  bilateral  agreements  governing 
extradition  concluded  by  the  contracting  parties,  even  though  they  contravene  the 
provisions  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention.  Such  bilateral  agreements  are  not 
superseded  but  it  is  left  to  the  member  states  to  apply  the  provisions  which  are 
most  beneficial  to  comprehensive  security  co-operation(103). 
The  European  Convention  is  open  to  signature  and  it  is  possible  for  any  State, 
which  is  member  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  to  sign  and  ratify  the  Convention(1o4). 
Any  State  which  is  not  a  member  of  the  Council  of  Europe  may  accede  to  the 
Convention  by  means  of  an  invitation  sent  by  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council  of  Europe  to  such  a  State,  provided  that  the  invitation  receives  the 
unanimous  approval  of  the  member  States  of  the  Convention(105)  who  have 
ratified(1o6).  From  the  prelude  to  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  we  read  "The 
G.  C.  C.  Member  States  Have  Agreed  Upon  The  Following",  this  means  that  the 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  is  limited  to  the  six  States  who  are  members  of  the 
Gulf  Co-operation  Council.  While  the  European  Convention  has  open 
membership  enabling  the  European  States  which  are  Parties  to  the  Convention  to 
accede  to  it. 
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It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention(art.  44)  deals  with  the 
possibility  to  amend  the  provisions  of  the  convention  provided  that  the  Supreme 
Council  consents  to  such  amendments.  Similar  provision  is  absent  in  the  European 
Convention  yet  it  is  supplemented  by  two  additional  protocols  which  amended 
some  of  the  Convention's  provisions. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  European  Convention  focuses  on  criminal 
extradition  as  its  appellation  demonstrates  and  it  does  not  tackle  other  matters  as 
those  stated  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention,  eg.  the  integration  of  security  organs, 
illegal  entry  and  exit  and  smuggling  along  with  criminal  extradition. 
All  in  all,  there  are  similarities  and  substantial  differences  between  these  two 
conventions  due  to  the  fact  that  there  are  common  factors  that  unite  the  G.  C.  C. 
States,  eg.  a  common  source  of  legislation  namely  the  Islamic  Sha'ria,  common 
cultural  background,  tradition,  language  and  religion.  On  the  contrary,  the  Council 
of  Europe  is  formed  of  States  of  different  legal  systems,  traditions  and  culture; 
linguistic  difference.  Each  European  State  member  to  the  European  Convention 
tries  to  preserve  its  sovereignty  and  to  constrict  the  application  of  the  Convention 
as  far  as  the  criminal  extradition  is  concerned  as  it  is  stated  in  art.  6  of  the 
European  Convention;  whereas,  the  G.  C.  C.  States  waive  their  sovereignty  by 
permitting  the  extradition  of  their  nationals  and  facilitating  extradition  procedures. 
THE  UN  MODEL  CONVENTION  ON  EX  Al  'I  g  IONS 
The  United  Nations(UN)  is  an  international  organization  aimed  to  remedy  the 
defects  of  the  League  of  Nations.  It  emanated  out  of  a  series  of  wars  and 
international  conferences.  51  States,  of  those  States  who  attended  the  San 
Francisco  Conference,  adopted  the  UN  Charter(107).  It  was  established  for  the 
preservation  of  international  peace  and  security(108).  The  UN  is  formed,  inter  alia, 
of  the  Secretariat-general,  Security  Council,  and  the  General  Assembly. 
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In  security  matters,  the  Secretary  General  personally  works  with  the  Security 
Council.  He  has  the  power  under  the  UN  Charter(1o9)  to  bring  to  Security  Council 
any  matter  that  might  threaten  international  peace  and  security,  and  so  to  play  a 
major  role  in  setting  the  UN's  agenda  in  international  security  affairs.  The  UN 
staff  numbers  15,000  people(5,000  at  the  New  York  UN  headquarters  and  about 
10,000  more  around  the  world(i  i  o).  The  UN  staff  works  in  various  areas  including 
administrative  personnel  as  well  as  technical  experts  and  economic  advisors 
charged  with  various  programmes  and  projects  in  the  UN  member  Countries(i  i  i). 
The  Secretariat-General  is  the  executive  branch  of  the  UN,  it  is headed  by  the 
secretary  general  of  the  UN(i  12),  he  (it  has  never  yet  been  a  she)  is  the  chief 
administrative  officer  of  the  of  the  organization  and  represents  the  member  States. 
He  is  nominated  by  the  Security  Council(requiring  the  consent  of  all  five 
permanent  members)  and  approved  by  the  General  Assembly.  The  term  of  office 
is  five  years  liable  to  renewal. 
The  Security  Council  is  responsible  for  maintaining  international  peace  and 
security  and  for  restoring  peace  whenever  it  breaks  down(Art.  25).  Its  decisions  are 
binding  on  all  UN  member  States.  In  fifty  years,  the  Security  Council  has  passed 
only  about  700  Resolutions(i  13)  concerned  with  the  world's  various  security 
disputes,  especially  in  regional  conflicts.  The  five  permanent  members  of  the 
Council  are  the  US,  Britain,  France,  Russia(Soviet  Union),  China(i  14).  The 
Council  also  has  ten  non-permanent  members  who  rotates  onto  the  Council  for 
two  year  terms.  The  latter  members  are  elected(five  each  year)  by  the  General 
Assembly  from  a  list  of  nominees  prepared  by  informal  regional  caucuses.  The 
Security  Council  meets  irregularly  in  the  New  York  UN  headquarters  upon  request 
of  a  UN  member.  The  Military  Staff  Committee(MSC)  is  a  formal  mechanism 
under  the  supervision  of  the  Security  Council  for  coordinating  multilateral  military 
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action.  MSC  is  formed  of  military  officers  from  the  permanent  Security  Council 
members(i  15). 
The  General  Assembly  of  the  UN  is formed  of  185  member  States  each  with  one 
vote(116).  It  usually  meets  (once  a  year)  in  plenary  session  from  late  September 
through  January.  It  is  a  forum  in  which  the  States  put  forward  their  ideas  and 
arguments.  All  the  organs  of  the  General  Assembly(LJN)  other  than  the  ICJ  use  the 
five  working  and  official  languages  (English,  French,  Russian,  Chinese,  Spanish) 
to  which  Arabic  was  added  as  a  working  and  official  language  in  1973  (117).  The 
assembly  convenes  for  special  sessions  every  few  years  on  general  topics  such  as 
economic  co-operation.  The  assembly  has  met  in  emergency  sessions(nine  times) 
to  deal  with  an  immediate  threat  to  international  peace  and  security.  The  main 
source  of  power  of  the  General  Assembly  lies  in  its  control  of  finances  for  UN 
programmes  and  operations.  It  can  pass  resolutions  on  various  matters. 
The  General  Assembly  is  not  a  legislative  body  in  that  sense  and  its  resolutions  are 
purely  recommendations(118),  but  when  they  are  concerned  with  General  norms  of 
international  law,  then  acceptance  by  a  majority  vote  constitutes  evidence  of  the 
opinions  of  governments  in  the  widest  forum  for  the  expression  of  such 
opinions(i  19).  The  resolutions  of  General  Assembly,  being  advisory,  frustrate  the 
third  world  majority.  The  Assembly  elects  members  of  certain  UN  agencies  and 
programmes  through  its  own  system  of  committees,  commissions,  councils(120), 
etc. 
The  idea  of  the  UN  Model  Convention  on  Extradition  emerged  during  the  Seventh 
UN  Congress  on  the  Prevention  of  Crime  and  the  Treatment  of  Offenders  held  in 
Milan  on  26  August-6  September  1985(121).  The  congress  recommended  the 
promotion  of  international  activities  in  the  field  of  the  prevention  of  organized 
crime  by  means  of  concluding  bilateral  agreements  on  criminal  extradition.  The 
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General  Assembly  approved  the  Milan  Plan  of  Action  by  the  resolution  40/32  of 
29  November  1985(122). 
The  Eighth  Congress  on  the  Prevention  of  Crime  and  the  Treatment  of  Offenders 
held  in  Havana,  Cuba  during  27  August-7  September  1990  recommended  that  the 
General  Assembly  would  adopt  the  UN  Model  Convention  on  Criminal 
Extradition  by  virtue  of  the  resolution  45/116  of  14  December  1990(123). 
The  UN  Model  Convention  is  no  exception  to  the  common  Conventions  on 
Extradition.  It  is  formed  of  eighteen  articles.  Its  provisions  are  concerned  solely 
with  criminal  extradition.  However,  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  is  more 
general  since  it  deals  with  other  matters  in  addition  to  criminal  extradition.  The 
UN  Model  Convention  begins  with  the  obligation  on  the  Contracting  States  to 
extradite  a  person  who  is  wanted  in  the  requesting  State  for  prosecution  for  an 
extraditable  offence  or  for  the  imposition  or  enforcement  of  a  sentence  in  respect 
of  such  an  offence(124). 
The  offences  for  which  extradition  is  competent  are  those  offences  sanctioned  by 
the  laws  of  the  requesting  and  requested  States  by  imprisonment  or  other 
deprivation  of  liberty  for  no  less  than  one(or  two)year(s)  or  by  a  more  severe 
penalty(125).  In  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  the  sanction  must  not  be  less  than 
six  months  imprisonment  (126)  by  virtue  of  the  law  of  the  requesting  State.  The 
second  case  for  which  extradition  is  competent  when  the  person,  who  is  sought  for 
extradition,  is  tried  and  sentenced  by  a  deprivation  of  liberty  between  four  and  six 
months(127). 
The  UN  Model  Convention  provides  for  extradition  for  fiscal  offences(128),  this 
provision  being  similar  to  that  laid  down  in  the  European  Convention  on 
Extradition.  The  requested  State  would  not  refuse  extradition  just  because  its  own 
law  does  not  impose  taxation,  customs,  duties,  exchange  control  or  other  revenue 
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matters  similar  to  those  imposed  by  the  requesting  State.  The  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  is  silent  in  relation  to  fiscal  offences.  Within  the  prospect  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  Convention,  if  such  fiscal  offences  satisfy  the  appropriate  conditions  for 
extradition,  extradition  shall  be  granted. 
The  UN  Model  Convention  provides  for  requests  for  extradition  including  several 
separate  offences,  each  of  which  is  punished  by  the  laws  of  the  requesting  and 
requested  States.  Extradition  is  granted  for  in  those  cases  provided  that  the  person 
is  to  be  extradited  for  at  least  one  extraditable  offence(129). 
Extradition  must  be  declined  when  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested 
is  regarded  by  the  requested  State  as  an  offence  of  a  political  nature  or  when  the 
offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  is  a  military  offence(13o).  Extradition 
can  be  refused  if  a  final  judgment  is  rendered  in  the  requested  State  concerning  the 
offence  which  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request.  If  the  requested  State  has 
substantial  grounds  for  believing  that  the  request  for  extradition  has  been  made  for 
the  purpose  of  prosecuting  or  punishing  the  person  because  of  his  race,  ethnic 
origin,  sex,  status,  religion,  nationality,  political  opinions(131),  etc...  When  the 
person  is  immune  from  judgment  and  punishment,  this  means  if  the  person  enjoys 
diplomatic  immunity,  his  extradition  can  be  refused(132).  If  the  person  to  be 
extradited  would  be  subject  to  torture  or  to  a  degrading  treatment  in  the  requesting 
State(133).  When  a  judgment  in  absentia  is  rendered  against  this  person  or  if  a 
judgment  is  issued  against  him  in  his  presence  and  the  person  does  not  have  the 
opportunity  to  arrange  his  defence,  therefore,  extradition  can  be  refused(134). 
The  UN  Model  Convention  lists  the  optional  grounds  in  which  extradition  may  be 
declined.  They  are  if  the  person  requested  holds  the  nationality  of  the  requested 
State.  If  the  competent  authorities  in  the  requested  State  decide  not  to  institute  or 
terminate  proceedings  against  the  person.  If  the  prosecution  (concerning  the 
offence)  is  pending  in  the  requested  State.  If  the  offence  is  sanctioned  by  death 
202 CHAPTER  SIX 
penalty  provided  that  the  requesting  State  gives  sufficient  assurance  that  the 
capital  punishment  will  not  be  imposed.  If  the  offence  is  committed  outside  the 
territories  of  both  States  and  the  law  of  the  requested  State  does  not  impose 
sanction  on  a  person  if  he  has  committed  an  offence  outside  its  territory.  If  the 
requested  State  considers  the  offence  is  committed  in  whole  or  in  part  in  its 
territory.  If  a  judgment  is  rendered  against  the  person  in  the  requesting  State,  or  if 
the  person  would  be  subject  to  a  judgment  by  an  ad  hoc  Court  in  the  requesting 
State  or  if  his  extradition  is  declined  due  to  humanitarian  reasons(i35). 
Concerning  these  circumstances  and  if  extradition  is  refused,  the  requested  State 
shall,  if  the  requesting  State  so  requests,  submit  the  case  to  its  competent 
authorities  in  order  to  take  the  appropriate  action  against  the  person  who  is  sought 
for  extradition(136). 
In  terms  of  the  cases  in  which  extradition  is  either  granted  or  declined,  it  is 
apparent  that  the  UN  Model  Convention  provides  for  more  cases  than  the  G.  C.  C. 
Security  Convention.  From  the  author  s  point  view,  the  drawbacks  of  art.  4(d)  is 
that  it  categorizes  death  penalty  as  an  optional  case  for  which  extradition  may  be 
declined  and  this  may  encourage  the  commission  of  crimes  since  most  of  the  great 
crimes  compel  the  offender  to  escape  for  example  such  crimes  as  murder, 
terrorism  and  drug  related  crimes  which  are  sanctioned  by  the  laws  of  some  States 
by  death  penalty.  Whilst  the  less  serious  do  not  always  compel  the  offender  to  flee 
to  other  Countries.  Therefore,  the  UN  Model  Convention  protects  fugitive 
criminals  from  being  extradited  to  their  States  for  prosecution  on  the  ground  that 
the  law  of  their  States  imposes  death  penalty. 
It  is  also  noticed  that  the  UN  Model  Convention  ignores  stating  the  political 
offences  as  an  exception  to  extradition  as  opposed  to  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention(137).  Another  substantial  difference  between  the  two  Conventions 
concerns  the  military  offences;  in  the  UN  Model  Convention,  the  military  offence 
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falls  under  the  offences  for  which  extradition  is  not  permitted;  while,  it  is  possible 
to  grant  extradition  for  military  offence  by  virtue  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention(138).  The  UN  Model  Convention  states  that  extradition  is  to  be  refused 
if  it  is  requested  to  prosecute  the  person  because  of  race,  religion  or  ethnic  origin; 
such  provision  is  completely  absent  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention. 
The  UN  Model  Convention  permits  the  requested  State  to  refuse  extradition  of  its 
nationals.  On  the  other  hand,  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention  allows  the  extradition  of 
nationals(139).  There  is  no  exception  to  what  is  common  in  the  international 
conventions  on  extradition,  the  UN  Model  Convention  records  almost  the  same 
papers  contained  in  an  extradition  request  file(140).  They  include  any  information 
that  may  help  establish  the  identity  and  nationality  of  the  person  requested  and  his 
location;  the  text  of  the  relevant  provision  of  the  law  creating  the  offence,  or  a 
statement  of  the  law  relevant  to  the  offence  and  a  statement  of  the  penalty  for  the 
offence;  a  copy  of  warrant  of  arrest  issued  by  the  authorities  in  the  requesting 
State  or  a  certified  copy  of  the  warrant.  The  extradition  request  shall  be  in  writing 
and  transmitted  through  diplomatic  channels(141). 
The  UN  Model  Convention  discusses  provisional  arrest.  In  case  of  emergency,  it 
is  permitted  that  the  requesting  State  may  apply  for  provisional  arrest  of  the  person 
sought  for  extradition  before  presenting  the  extradition  request(142).  The  requested 
State  would  consider  the  extradition  request  in  accordance  with  its  legal  system  in 
force(143).  If  the  requested  State  does  not  receive  the  extradition  request  file  within 
forty  days,  it  must  release  the  person(t44).  Such  release  shall  not  prejudice  the  later 
re-arrest  and  institution  of  proceedings  with  a  view  to  extraditing  the  person 
requested(i  45).  The  requested  State  will  consider  the  extradition  request  file.  If 
extradition  is  declined,  partially  or  wholly,  the  requested  State  shall,  without 
delay,  justify  its  decision(146). 
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There  is  a  difference  concerning  the  period  of  provisional  arrest  in  both 
Conventions.  It  is  forty  days  in  the  UN  Model  Convention,  while  it  is  thirty  days 
in  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention.  In  addition,  the  UN  Model  Convention  does  not 
mention  any  reduction  of  the  period  of  provisional  arrest  spent  in  the  requested 
State  from  any  sanction  imposed  in  the  requesting  State.  The  G.  C.  C.  Convention 
contains  such  a  provision(147). 
By  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  the  UN  Model  Convention,  the  requested  State  must 
consider  the  request  for  extradition  under  its  law(148).  It  shall  notify  the  requesting 
State  of  its  decision  either  positively  or  negatively(149).  In  this  regard,  there  is  a 
difference  between  the  two  Conventions.  The  G.  C.  C.  Convention  gives  the 
requested  State  two  months  time  after  the  receipt  to  the  extradition  request  to 
justify  its  decision(i5o).  The  UN  Model  does  not  state  any  similar  period. 
Art.  11  deals  with  the  surrender  of  the  person  requested.  The  requested  and 
requesting  States  shall  prepare  appropriate  conditions  for  extradition.  The 
authorities  in  the  requested  State  must  inform  their  counterparts  in  the  requesting 
State  of  the  length  of  time  which  the  person  has  spent  in  detention  in  the 
requesting  State(1s1).  The  person  must  be  released  if  he  is  not  surrendered  in  the 
appointed  time.  If  circumstances,  beyond  its  control,  oblige  one  of  the  two  States 
to  delay  the  delivery  of  the  person,  such  a  State  shall  inform  the  other  party  of  the 
circumstances  and  both  parties  would  specify  another  date  for  the  delivery. 
In  terms  of  the  UN  Model  Convention,  extradition  of  a  person  may  be  postponed 
if  he  is  requested  for  trial  or  the  imposition  of  a  sentence  in  the  requested  State  for 
offences  other  than  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  sought  and  the  requesting 
State  must  be  informed  of  such  situation  accordingly(152).  If  extradition  is  granted, 
the  requested  State  may  hand  over  the  person's  property  if  the  requesting  State 
requests  so,  provided  that  such  property  would  be  returned  to  the  requested  State  if 
the  latter  so  requires(153). 
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As  is  the  case  in  most  international  conventions  on  extradition,  the  UN  Model 
Convention  states  that  the  extradited  person  shall  not  be  tried  except  for  the 
offence  which  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request(154).  However,  a  person  can 
be  tried  for  offences  other  than  the  one  which  is  subject  of  the  extradition  request 
if  the  requested  State  consents  and  provided  that  the  other  offences  shall  fall  under 
the  category  of  the  extraditable  offences  listed  in  the  UN  Model  Convention(155). 
The  "rule  of  speciality"  is  not  applicable  by  virtue  of  (art.  14(3))except  in  two 
cases:  when  the  person  is  given  the  opportunity  to  leave  the  territory  of  the 
requesting  State  and  he  does  not  leave  it  within  thirty  to  forty-five  days  of  the  final 
discharge;  or  when  the  person  voluntarily  returns  to  requesting  State.  If  one  of 
these  two  cases  are  satisfied,  the  person  can  be  prosecuted  for  offences  other  than 
the  offence  which  is  the  subject  of  the  extradition  request. 
There  is  a  close  similarity  between  this  provision  and  art.  38  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention.  The  latter  article  states  the  case  when  the  requested  person  consents 
to  be  tried  or  he  is  given  the  opportunity  to  leave  the  requesting  State  and  he  fails 
to  do  so  within  thirty  days. 
Art.  16  of  the  UN  Model  Convention  deals  with  concurrent  requests  for 
extradition.  The  UN  Model  Convention  does  not  give  priority  to  any  request  and 
the  consideration  of  the  requests  is  left  to  the  competent  authorities  in  the 
requested  State  to  decide.  This  text  differs  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  which 
gives  priority  to  some  extradition  requests(156)  as  we  have  discussed  in  a  previous 
chapter. 
The  UN  Model  Convention  states  that  the  requested  State  bears  the  expenses 
incurred  by  the  extradition  within  the  limit  of  its  territorial  jurisdiction(157).  The 
requesting  State  would  meet  the  charges  and  expenses  incurred  by  the  extradition 
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process  from  the  territory  of  the  requested  State,  including  the  transport  charges 
and  transit  costs(158).  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  when  dealing  with  the 
extradition  costs,  states  that  the  requesting  State  must  meet  all  the  costs  of  the 
extradition  procedure(159). 
INTERPOL 
As  far  as  extradition  is  concerned,  Interpol  is  considered  as  a  mechanism  or  a 
channel  of  communication  between  the  requested  and  requesting  States  with  the 
absence  or  presence  of  an  extradition  agreement.  The  European  Convention  on 
Extradition,  the  UN  Model  Convention  on  Extradition  and  the  Commonwealth 
Scheme  for  the  Rendition  of  Fugitive  Offenders(16o),  to  state  the  least, 
acknowledge  Interpol  as  a  mechanism  of  extradition.  It  is  appropriate  to  discuss  its 
structure  and  functions. 
The  first  step  towards  the  establishment  of  INTERPOL  was  taken  in  1893,  when 
Sir.  Francis  Galton  published  his  views  on  fingerprint.  A  German  criminologist 
Franz  Von  Liszt  argued  that  crime  covers  the  world.  In  1914,  by  an  invitation  of 
Prince  Albert  I.  A.  of  Monaco,  police  officials  from  twenty  four  nations  met  to 
discuss  the  establishment  of  International  Police  Co-operation(161). 
The  establishment  of  Interpol  goes  back  to  7  April  1923.  It  was  called  the 
International  organization  of  Criminal  Police(162).  Mr.  Florent  Louwage(163),  one 
of  the  most  senior  and  respected  policemen  in  Belgium,  invited  delegations  to  the 
Brussels  Conference  on  June  1946  in  which  it  was  decided  that  the  headquarters 
of  the  organization  would  be  in  Rue  Paul  Valery  in  Paris(164).  In  June  1956,  a 
constitution  for  INTERPOL  was  agreed  upon  to  organize  its  principal  provisions. 
Since  1990,  it  has  over  150  members  worldwide(165). 
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By  virtue  of  art.  3  of  its  constitution,  Interpol  is  charged  with  functions  away  from 
activities  of  political,  military  or  religious  nature(166)  and  without  intervention  in 
the  member  States'  affairs.  INTERPOL  is  charged  with,  inter  alia,  gathering 
information  about  crime  and  criminals  from  the  National  Central  Bureaux  (NCB). 
Such  information  are  used  in  combating  crime  and  to  co-ordinate  the  actions  of 
States  in  tracking  and  apprehending  suspects  and  fugitive  criminals(167). 
INTERPOL  is  composed  of  the  executive  committee,  the  advisers,  a  general 
assembly  of  all  members,  the  General  Secretariat  (based  at  Lyons),  and  the 
NCB(based  in  the  member  force  in  each  State)(168). 
INTERPOL's  general  secretariat  is  formed  by  many  permanent  departments 
related  to  the  organization  and  directed  by  the  general  secretary.  Among  these 
departments  is  the  general  administration  sector  dealing  with  financial  matters  of 
the  organization;  police  co-operation  sector  concerned  with  the  international  co- 
operation  in  crime  combating  including  extradition;  studies  and  research  sector;  a 
special  sector  for  the  International  Criminal  Police  Magazine(169). 
The  INTERPOL  NCBs  are  formed  by  the  authorities  of  the  member  States 
according  to  their  laws.  NCBs  are  responsible  for  collecting  data  which  are 
necessary  for  combating  crime.  These  bureaux  are  charged  with  tracking  the 
requested  fugitive  persons(17o).  In  practice,  the  requesting  State  sends  to 
INTERPOL  a  memoranda  containing  the  details  concerning  a  fugitive  person 
requested  for  extradition.  INTERPOL  issues  its  red  "wanted"  notices  to  all  NCBs 
in  the  member  States.  The  NCB  in  the  State  in  whose  territories  the  person  is 
found  out  informs  its  counterpart  in  the  requesting  State. 
NCBs  play  an  important  role  in  criminal  extradition.  even  in  the  absence  of  an 
extradition  agreement  between  the  requesting  and  requested  States.  However, 
since  resolutions  of  INTERPOL  are  not  legally  binding,  experience  unfortunately 
shows  that  when  national  self-interest  is  involved  it  usually  prevails  and  the 
208 CHAPTER  SIX 
governments  which  sponsor  terrorists  would  certainly  not  co-op  er4te(171).  The 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  does  not  mention  INTERPOL.  This  does  not  mean 
that  the  G.  C.  C.  States  do  not  acknowledge  the  role  of  INTERPOL  in  criminal 
extradition.  On  the  contrary,  most  of  the  Arab  States,  including  the  G.  C.  C.  States, 
are  members  of  the  organization(172). 
INTERPOL  is  an  efficient  mechanism  in  the  execution  of  criminal  extradition.  In 
addition,  the  G.  C.  C.  States  have  organs  (belonging  to  the  Ministries  of  the 
Interior)  in  collaboration  with  the  judicial.  authorities  charged  with  the  criminal 
extradition. 
The  importance  of  INTERPOL  is  clear  in  the  field  of  extradition.  In  practice, 
INTERPOL  helped  in  the  apprehension  of  1355  fugitive  offenders  in  33  States  for 
the  purpose  of  extraditing  them  to  the  requesting  States.  Annually,  the  sector  of 
crime  general  problems  investigated  in  3115  cases  dealing  with  properties 
peculation(173).  A  distinctive  trait  of  INTERPOL  is  the  "speedy"  arrest  of  fugitive 
offenders.  In  fact,  there  is  one  case  recorded  where  a  suspected  forger  was  arrested 
in  France  one  hour  after  the  British  NCB  sent  the  information  to  INTERPOL(174). 
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CONCLUSION 
The  concept  of  a  G.  C.  C.  comprehensive  Security  Convention  passed  through 
many  important  stages  and  developments  and  through  many  drafts  before  its 
signature  in  December  1994.  There  arose  appropriate  conditions  that  compelled 
the  emergence  of  such  a  Convention.  In  fact,  the  G.  C.  C.  States  are  bound  by  many 
common  elements:  government  systems,  habits,  religion,  language,  customs, 
geographic  proximity  and  flourishing  economies  are  common  to  all  these  States. 
However,  these  common  factors  could  not  achieve  security  by  other  arrangements, 
as  we  have  seen  in  discussing  the  League  of  Arab  States,  the  Council  of  Europe 
and  the  United  Nations  Organization.  In  these  organizations,  there  are  huge 
differences  between  their  members,  either  on  religious  or  linguistic  levels  or  in  the 
legal  systems  adopted  in  each  member  State. 
These  similarities,  the  great  petroleum  reserves,  the  superpowers  endeavour  to 
intervene  in  the  G.  C.  C.  States'  internal  affairs,  the  Iranian  military  intervention  in 
Bahrain  and  UAE  and  its  occupation  of  the  three  UAE  islands,  the  bloody  wars 
that  the  Middle  East  has  witnessed,  particularly  the  two  Gulf  Wars,  all  in  some 
way  prompted  the  adoption  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  so  that  the  member 
States  could  enjoy  stability  and  security  within  their  territories. 
There  was  security  co-operation  between  the  G.  C.  C.  States  before  the  adoption  of 
the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  and  even  before  the  establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C. 
Such  co-operation  relied  on  the  exchange  of  security  information,  extradition  and 
other  matters(i).  The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  emerged  to  rationalise  and 
systematise  this  co-operation  within  a  legal  framework  in  respect  of  legal 
procedures  which  enable  the  security  organs  in  the  G.  C.  C.  States  to  pursue 
security  co-operation  and  harmony. 
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Extradition  was  applied  among  the  G.  C.  C.  States  before  the  conclusion  of  bilateral 
conventions  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  other  G.  C.  C.  States,  the  ratification  of 
the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security  Convention  and  even  before  the 
establishment  of  the  G.  C.  C.  (2). 
Co-operation  in  the  field  of  extradition  is  still  maintained  with  the  non-signatory 
States,  such  as  Kuwait  to  whom  Bahrain  granted  extradition  in  1995(3).  This 
demonstrates  the  overall  strength  of  security  co-operation  ever  in  the  absence  of 
extradition  agreements  between  the  G.  C.  C.  member  States. 
Throughout  this  study,  the  focus  has  been  on  the  importance  of  transforming 
security  co-operation  among  the  G.  C.  C.  States  into  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention. 
Because  this  subject  matter  has  never  been  tackled  before,  many  difficulties  were 
encountered,  mainly  in  collecting  materials  for  this  study,  since  few  writers  have 
dealt  with  it  except  in  scattered  journalistic  articles.  Such  writings  and  others  deal 
with  the  G.  C.  C.  in  general  and  no  single  writer  has  tackled  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  as  such,  since  the  subject  matter  is  concerned  with  a  critically 
sensitive  subject,  namely  security.  With  such  subject  matter,  confidentiality 
prevails  and  it  is  not  possible  for  most  writers  to  become  acquainted  with  the 
critical  details. 
Because  of  the  trust  of  the  decision-makers  in  the  G.  C.  C.  States  in  the  author,  they 
were  prepared  to  provide  information  concerning  the  confidential  background  of 
the  Convention.  However,  they  made  sure  that  the  author  did  not  use  the 
information  in  contravention  of  the  security  of  the  G.  C.  C.  States. 
Meeting  such  important  officials  in  their  own  countries  was  not  easy  since  it  was 
very  hard  to  co-ordinate  meetings  because  of  the  functions  they  have  assumed  and 
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the  importance  of  their  responsibilities.  The  author  was  keen-  to  hold  such 
meetings  to  obtain  the  information  directly  from  its  source  and  use  the  information 
in  its  appropriate  place. 
The  translation  of  the  Convention  from  Arabic  into  English  was  another  difficulty. 
There  is  no  official  translation  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  available  from 
the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General.  The  translation  took  around  eight  months  and  it 
compelled  meetings  with  officials  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General  to  discuss  the 
use  of  the  correct  legal  terms  and  the  interpretation  of  some  equivocal  parts  of  the 
Arabic  text. 
When  the  translation  was  finished,  the  text  was  submitted  to  officials  in  the 
G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General(4)  which  approved  the  translated  text  of  the 
Convention  by  means  of  an  official  letter  from  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General 
which  acknowledges  the  conformity  and  reliability  of  my  translated  version  with 
the  Arabic  text  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security  Convention  (See  Appendix 
ib). 
There  were  many  difficulties  translating  into  the  English  language.  In  art.  1, 
(CI;  I  tr 
.)I  -i-  II)  [outlaws]  appears;  this  description  is  wide 
enough  to  include  a  range  of  meanings  in  the  English  language.  In  art.  14,  in 
the  Arabic  version,  the  word  (  [to  employ]  appears  without  specifying 
the  nature  of  the  employment,  either  provisionally  or  permanently.  In  art.  17(b), 
we  read  in  the  Arabic  text(ö 
.  -ý  ci 
.II 
Al  iS  j  . -]  I  jJ 
IA  I 
iiYI  ; L-.  i  9.1  ý  19..  ý  .'IN  .I, 
I.  J  I 
LsI.  9  I-  j  `=-  9°  d---Lja  o.  Is1.. 
_ýI 
L,  '  1ý  ;..  J  y  -- 
ä-I  j  ý-I  14-9  A  ",  ;  4-11  L:  314  ýI,  U='&.  I  a.  ,  ".  JI  äßl  t 
1¬  I  ý.  ý  . ma  lI),  [Unidentified  persons  and  illegal  entrants  are  those 
who  have  illegally  entered  the  territory  of  a  member  State  and  the  territory  of 
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one  or  more  member  States  by  the  same  means.  The  last  State  entered  illegally, 
when  arresting  them,  should  deal  with  them  after  informing  the  competent 
authorities  in  the  State(s)  through  which  they  have  passed.  ]  This  Arabic 
paragraph  is  very  difficult  to  translate  because  of  its  complexity. 
Also  in  art.  27  which  requests  the  member  States  to  extradite  persons  sought 
for  extradition,  there  appears  a  verb  (ý  ￿)from  which  we  can  not  understand 
whether  extradition  is  obligatory  or  optional.  In  art.  28  the  words(  I 
y.  :,  tIjw  I-  'I  19  9  _I  )  [divine  ordinance  punishment  or  retribution 
punishment  or  discretionary  punishment]  appear,  for  which  it  is  very  hard  to 
find  equivalents  the  in  English  language  because  such  terms  are  specific  to 
Islamic  Shari'ah. 
Through  detailed  analysis,  important  conclusions  came  out  of  this  study.  The 
positive  and  negative  remarks  with  regard  to  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  and 
my  recommendations  shall  be  discussed,  which  it  is hoped  would  be  implemented 
by  the  security  systems  in  G.  C.  C.  States  in  particular  and  to  all  the  security  organs 
in  general. 
Attention  has  been  drawn  in  his  study  to  the  fact  that  Kuwait  and  Qatar  have  not 
signed  the  Convention  and  UEA  has  signed  but  not  ratified  the  Convention. 
Kuwait  has  not  signed  because  art.  28  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  which 
obliges  the  requested  State  to  extradite  its  own  nationals,  contravenes  the  Kuwait 
Constitution,  art.  28,  which  forbids  the  deportation  of  nationals.  However,  the 
author  has  clarified  the  difference  between  extradition  and  deportation.  Although 
the  UAE  and  Oman  Constitutions  also  ban  the  deportation  of  nationals,  these  two 
States  signed  the  Convention;  therefore,  the  Kuwaiti  arguments  for  declining  to 
sign  the  Convention  are  mere  pretext. 
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On  the  other  hand,  Qatar  approved  the  conclusion  of  this  Convention.  However,  it 
insisted  on  reservations  during  the  drafting  of  the  Convention.  The  problematic 
reservations  have  been  resolved;  as  discussed  before,  the  Qatar  Ministerial 
Council  approved  and  has  submitted  the  Convention  to  Shoura  Council  which  still 
has  not  issued  any  decision  about  the  approval  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention(s).  The  circumstances  witnessed  recently  by  Qatar,  the  change  that  has 
occurred  in  the  leadership  of  the  State  and  the  consequent  political  fluctuations, 
delayed  Qatar's  signature  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security  Convention. 
During  a  meeting  with  Sheikh  Abdullah  Al-Thani,  the  Qatar  Prime  Minister  and 
Minister  of  the  Interior  (in  the  new  Government),  the  author  was  informed  that 
Qatar  would  sign  the  Convention  in  the  four  next  months(6).  However,  this  period 
is  over  and  Qatar  still  has  not  signed  the  Convention.  The  recent  unrest  in  Qatar 
requires  a  period  of  time  for  conditions  to  stabilize  and  then  the  Convention  could 
be  signed. 
Although  the  UAE  signed  the  Convention,  it  did  not  ratify  it.  The  UAE  Minister 
of  the  Interior  confirmed  to  the  author  that  there  is  no  problem  in  ratifying  the 
Convention.  From  this  study,  the  author  realized  that  the  cause  for  UAE's  delay  in 
ratifying  the  Convention  resides  in  its  Constitution,  art.  37,  which  forbids  the 
deportation,  and  art.  38  which  forbids  extradition,  of  nationals.  The  latter  article 
contravenes  art.  28  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  which  obliges  the  requested 
Party  to  extradite  its  own  nationals.  The  UAE's  Government  may  overcome  this 
obstacle  by  an  appropriate  reconciliation  between  the  UAE's  Constitution  and  the 
G.  C.  C.  Convention  since  UAE  officials  are  keen  to  adopt  the  provisions  of  the 
Convention  to  realize  comprehensive  security  co-operation  among  the  G.  C.  C. 
States. 
From  the  previous  discussion,  the  signatory  States  are  UAE,  Bahrain,  Oman  and 
Saudi  Arabia;  the  States  who  have  ratified  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  are 
Bahrain,  Oman  and  Saudi  Arabia.  The  Convention  became  effective  one  month 
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after  the  ratification  of  two-thirds  of  the  member  Parties;  it  entered  into  effect  on 
22  June  1995. 
In  this  study  the  author  has  discovered  a  requirement  to  change  Art.  28  of  the  1994 
Convention  as  discussed  in  Chapter  3.  It  is  clearly  impossible  to  satisfy  the  two 
conditions  stated  in  Art.  28;  a  person  cannot  be  alleged  to  have  committed  and  be 
convicted  of  an  offence  at  the  same  time.  Only  one  of  the  two  conditions  referred 
to  can  be  satisfied. 
The  Ministerial  Councils  of  the  G.  C.  C.  States  should  take  action  to  rectify  the 
problem  of  Art.  28. 
Among  the  characteristics  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  in  comparison  with 
other  extradition  agreements,  is  the  inclusion  of  all  security  matters:  security  co- 
operation;  exchange  of  security  information;  holding  training  sessions, 
conferences  and  forums;  coordination  in  taking  Arab  and  international  decisions; 
harmonization  of  regulations  governing  security  matters;  non-intervention  in 
domestic  affairs  of  the  member  States;  combating  illegal  entry  or  exit  and 
smuggling;  combating  crime  in  all  its  forms;  and  dealing  with  extradition. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  tackles  all  these  various  fields  of  security, 
whereas  the  other  conventions  are  limited  to  extradition  only;  for  example,  the 
extradition  conventions,  which  have  been  discussed,  concluded  within  the 
framework  of  the  League  of  Arab  States,  the  Council  of  Europe  and  the  UN 
Model  Convention  adopted  by  the  UN  General  Assembly  all  deal  exclusively  with 
extradition. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  deals  with  legal  and  Islamic  Law  provisions, 
while  other  Conventions  are  limited  to  pure  legal  provisions  only.  This  shows  that 
the  common  factor  enjoyed  by  the  G.  C.  C.  States  is  the  Islamic  Shari'ah  which  is 
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the  main  source  of  their  Constitutions.  Therefore,  it  is  not  strange  to  find  religious 
provisions  included  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  such  as:  "It  is  prohibited  to 
import  or  circulate  or  export  pamphlets,  printed  materials  or  books  or  any  publication  in 
contravention  of  the  Islamic  faith,..  "(7)  and  "..  crimes  of  divine  ordinance  punishment, 
retribution  punishment  or  discretionary  punishment,..  "(8).  Such  judgment  is  issued  by 
the  Islamic  Judicial  Courts  in  the  G.  C.  C.  States. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  is  characterized  by  the  obligation  to  extradite  the 
nationals  of  Contracting  Parties.  This  provision  is  absent  in  the  other  international 
conventions  since  extraditing(or  not  extraditing)  a  national  is  part  of  the  State's 
rights  and  sovereignty.  However,  the  G.  C.  C.  States  waive  parts  of  their 
sovereignty  to  strengthen  security  co-operation. 
The  principle  of  the  extradition  of  nationals,  stated  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive 
Security  Convention,  is  not  new;  it  was  known  at  the  beginning  of  the  Islamic 
realm.  In  fact,  Prophet  Mohammed(Peace  Be  Upon  Him)  concluded  an  extradition 
agreement  with  Quoraish.  This  principle  is  still  maintained  by  the  systems  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  States  which  adopt  the  Islamic  Shari'ah  as  a  basis. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  as  with  other  extradition  conventions,  deals  with 
political  offences.  However,  it  does  not  define  this  term.  Nonetheless,  it  excludes 
various  offences  from  being  considered  political  offences  and,  in  doing  so,  the 
Convention  narrowed  the  flexible  definition  of  political  offences  so  that  the 
persons  who  commit  extraditable  offences  would  not  escape  extradition  by  virtue 
of  the  provisions  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention. 
To  widen  the  scope  of  the  application  of  extradition,  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention  excludes  military  crimes  from  being  considered  political  offences. 
Therefore,  persons  who  commit  military  crimes  are  liable  to  extradition;  whereas, 
in  other  extradition  agreements,  extradition  is  not  competent  for  military  crimes. 
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The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  explicitly  states  that  terrorism  is  not  categorized 
as  a  political  offence.  This  would  avoid  any  dispute  as  to  whether  a  terrorist  is 
liable  to  extradition  or  not.  Other  extradition  conventions  do  not  state  whether 
terrorism  would  be  categorized  as  a  political  offence,  as  the  European  Convention 
on  Extradition  does. 
When  an  offence  is  committed  outside  the  territories  of  both  the  requesting  and 
requested  States,  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  stipulates  that  extradition  is 
competent  if  the  legal  system  of  the  requesting  State  alone  punishes  such  an 
offence  if  committed  outside  its  territory,  regardless  of  the  legal  system  in  force  in 
the  requested  State.  This  is  unlike  common  extradition  agreements  which  stipulate 
that  the  legal  systems  in  both  States  must  punish  such  an  offence  if  committed 
outside  their  territories  before  extradition  is  competent. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security  Convention  is  also  characterized  by  the 
obligation  of  extradition  for  offences  punishable  by  the  death  penalty.  In  fact,  art. 
28  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Convention  provides  for  the  obligation  of  extradition  for 
offences  punishable  by  divine  ordinance,  retribution  or  discretionary  punishments. 
The  death  penalty  is  applicable  in  terms  of  such  decrees  for  punishment,  derived 
as  they  are  from  the  Islamic  Shari'  ah.  The  application  of  these  provisions  has 
reduced  the  rate  of  criminality  in  comparison  with  other  States  which  do  not  apply 
such  provisions.  On  the  contrary,  the.  European  Convention  on  Extradition  and  the 
UN  Model  Convention  on  Extradition  prohibit  extradition  for  offences  punishable 
by  the  death  penalty.  According  to  the  author,  such  a  prohibition  may  well 
encourage  criminality,  organized  crime  and  Mafia  activities. 
Undoubtedly,  bilateral  or  multilateral  extradition  conventions  play  a  major  role  in 
tracking  and  prosecuting  fugitive  offenders.  This  does  not  prejudice  other  means 
of  extradition  such  as  extradition  through  the  principle  of  reciprocity  and 
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international  customary  law.  Nevertheless,  the  presence  of  such  extradition 
conventions  is  preferable. 
Any  international  legal  text,  by  itself,  is  not  sufficient  to  realize  the  purposes 
required.  It  must  be  supplemented  by  conscious  will  and  good  faith  in  applying 
such  text.  The  G.  C.  C.  States  enjoy  this  will  and  faith.  From  the  author's 
perspective,  there  will  be  no  major  problems  in  applying  the  provisions  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  in  future. 
The  bilateral  conventions  concluded  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  other  G.  C.  C. 
States  had  an  important  effect  on  drafting  the  G.  C.  C.  Comprehensive  Security 
Convention.  The  decision  to  consider  bilateral  conventions  a  lesser  degree  of 
security  co-operation  and  an  integral  part  in  setting  the  text  of  the  G.  C.  C. 
Convention  was  taken  during  the  meeting  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Ministers  of  the  Interior 
held  in  Riyadh  on  February  1982(9). 
Among  the  characteristics  of  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  is  the  fact  that  it  does 
not  supersede  previous  bilateral  convention  concluded  between  Contracting 
Parties.  In  the  case  of  a  conflict  between  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  with 
those  of  the  bilateral  conventions,  the  provisions  which  best  realize  the 
comprehensive  security  co-operation  are  to  be  applied.  This  flexibility  is  not 
common  in  extradition  agreements  which,  most  of  the  time,  supersede  previous 
agreements,  particularly  if  the  former  provisions  contravene  the  latter.  However, 
the  G.  C.  C.  States  deemed  it  beneficial  to  maintain  the  previous  bilateral 
extradition  conventions  where  they  are  thought  to  be  more  effective. 
In  each  G.  C.  C.  member  State,  there  is  a  special  bureau  charged  with  sending  and 
receiving  extradition  requests.  Nonetheless,  the  author  proposes  that  there  should 
be  one  central  office,  located  in  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General,  charged  with  the 
coordination  of  extradition  requests.  It  would  assist  in  the  standardisation  and 
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processing  of  information  whenever  necessary  and  the  settlement  of  disputes  as 
may  arise  with  regard  to  application  of  the  provisions  of  the  G.  C.  C.  Security 
Convention. 
The  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  is  unique  in  being  comprehensive  and  because  of 
important  measures  it  provides  to  facilitate  extradition.  It  is  confidently  expected 
that,  with  the  convention  in  effect  and  its  structures  in  place,  it  will  prove 
successful  in  achieving  its  goals.  It  is  possible  that  other  regional  organization 
with  similar  security  concerns  could  use  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention  as  a 
model. 
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NOTES 
1)  This  was  confirmed  by  the  G.  C.  C.  Interior  Ministers  to  the  author  during  his  meeting  with 
them:  the  Bahrain  Minister  of  the  Interior  on  16  and  18  March  1996,  the  Oman  Minister  of  the 
Interior  on  24  March  1996,  the  Qatar  Minister  of  the  Interior  on  25  March  1996,  the  Kuwait 
Minister  of  the  Interior  on  27  March  1996,  the  UAE  Minister  of  the  Interior  on  30  March  1996 
and  the  Saudi  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Prince  Naif  Ben  Abdel-Aziz,  on  2  October  1996. 
2)  The  author's  meeting  with  Prince  Naif  Ben  Abdel-Aziz,  on  2  October  1996. 
3) The  author's  meeting  with  the  Bahrain  Minister  of  the  Interior  on  16  and  18  March  1996. 
4)  Dr.  Mohammed  Bin  Saud  A1-Sayari,  the  director-General  of  Legal  Affairs;  Mr.  Mohammed  Al-Dossari, 
the  deputy  Director  of  the  security  affairs. 
5)  This  was  approved  during  the  author's  meeting  with  the  Qatar  Minister  of  Justice. 
6)  The  author's  interview  with  the  Qatar  Minister  of  the  Interior  on  25  March  1996. 
7)  the  G.  C.  C.  Security  Convention,  art.  3. 
8)  Ibid,  art.  28. 
9)  The  author's  meeting  with  Prince  Naif  Ben  Abdel-Aziz,  the  Saudi  Minister  of  the  Interior. 
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ý_  Secretariat  General 
Saudi  Arabia.  Riyadh  11462  P0  Box  7153  Telex  203635  Tawin  SJ  Tel  482  "￿  -Fax  4829089 
Ref.  49108 
March  5,1996 
Attn.  His  Highness  Bandar  Ben  Salman 
Ben  Mohammed  Al-Saud 
Your  Highness: 
Thank  you  for  your  letter  1289/KH/569  dated 
20/7/1416  along  with  the  translation  of  the  GCC  Security 
Agreement.  Please  be  informed  that  the  translation  section 
in  the  GCC  Secretariat  General  has  reviewed  your 
translation  of  the  GCC  Security  Agreement  and  found  it  to 
be  in  conformity  with  the  Arabic  text  and  reliable. 
Thank  you  and  accept  our  best  regards. 
Sincerely  yours, 
11 
Dr.  Moh'd  Bin  Saud  Al-Sayari 
Director-General  of  Legal 
Affairs FIr  The  Cooperation  Council  for  The  Arab  States  Of  The  Gulf 
Secretariat  General 
Saudi  Arabia.  Riyadh:  11462  -  P.  O.  Box  7153  -  Telex:  203635  Tawini  S.  J.  -  Tel.  4827777  -  Fax  4829089 
To  whom  it  may  concern: 
This  is  to  state  that  the  English  version  of  the  security  agreement  is 
the  true  translation  of  the  Arabic  version. 
Bearing  in  mind  that  the  Arabic  version  avails  in  the  case  of 
contradiction. 
Sincerely, 
Dr.  Mohamed  A1-Sayari 
Director-General  of 
Legal  Affairs  Sector APPENDIX  1 
THE  SECURITY  CONVENTION  WITHIN  THE  G.  C.  C. 
(1994) 
To  further  the  spirit  of  true  brotherhood,  in  conformity  with  the  fundamental 
principles  established  by  the  G.  C.  C.;  and 
To  guarantee  the  preservation  of  the  security  and  stability  of  the  G.  C.  C.  States 
relying  on  their  own  capacities  and  available  energies  to  maintain  security  and 
stability,  believing  in  the  forgiving  Sha'ria  principles;  and 
To  preserve  the  highest  principles  from  destructive  and  blasphemous  ideas  and 
prejudicial  activities;  and 
To  promote  security  Co-operation  within  the  G.  C.  C.  to  the  complete  and  perfect 
level,  hoping  that  brother  Arab  countries  would  follow;  and 
To  strengthen  existing  Co-operation; 
THE  G.  C.  C.  MEMBER  STATES  HAVE  AGREED  UPON  THE  FOLLOWING: 
CHAPTER  ONE:  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES. 
Article  1. 
The  member  States  shall  not  shelter  outlaws  who  are  citizens  of  the  G.  C.  C.  States 
or  others,  nor  encourage  them  further  in  their  harmful  behaviour  towards  the 
security  of  their  countries,  nor  supply  them  with  weapons  or  money  or  training  in 
acts  of  violence  and  destruction;  and  the  member  States  shall  curb  such  persons' 
hostile  activities  towards  any  of  the  G.  C.  C.  States  and  shall  return  them  to  their 
home  States  after  taking  suitable  measures  against  them  if  they  are  citizens  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  States. 
Article  2. 
Each  member  State  shall  take  appropriate  measures  which  are  sufficient  to  prevent 
its  citizens  or  its  residents  from  intervening  in  the  internal  affairs  of  any  of  the 
member  States. 
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Article  3. 
It  is  prohibited  to  import  or  circulate  or  export  pamphlets,  printed  materials  or 
books  or  any  other  publication  in  contravention  of  the  Islamic  faith,  or  public 
morality,  or  the  security  and  territorial  integrity  of  any  of  the  member  States, 
which  shall  also  ban  the  movement  or  exportation  of  weapons,  munitions  and 
explosives  and  their  components  unless  permitted  by  the  competent  authorities 
and  in  accordance  with  legal  procedures. 
Article  4. 
Contracting  parties  should  exchange  information  and  experience  to  promote  ways 
of  preventing  and  combating  crimes  of  different  types  and  extending  technical 
help  in  all  manner  of  security  affairs  in  order  to  obtain  the  desired  integration. 
Article  5. 
There  should  be  the  exchange  of  laws  and  acts  and  regulations  concerning 
activities  of  the  Ministries  of  the  Interior  and  other  security  organs  related  to 
research,  books,  and  printed  materials,  papers  which  are  produced  by  the 
Ministries  and  similar  bodies;  and  by  any  other  explanatory  material,  and  training 
and  vocational  films  at  their  disposal. 
Article  6. 
Necessary  facilities  in  the  field  of  education  and  training  should  be  extended  to  the 
personnel  of  Ministries  of  the  Interior  and  similar  organs  in  the  member  States,  in 
institutions,  faculties  and  specialized  institutes. 
Article  7. 
Member  States  should,  wherever  possible,  unify  the  laws  or  acts  and  procedures  in 
the  penal  field  and  simplify  security  measures  which  combat  different  forms  of 
crimes  and  their  means  of  commission  in  order  to  realize  the  security  of  the 
G.  C.  C.  States. 
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Article  8. 
Each  member  State  of  the  G.  C.  C.  should  inform  other  member  States  willing  to 
participate  at  least  one  month  prior  to  its  commencement  of  conferences  and 
educational  seminars  in  the  field  of  the  Ministries  of  the  Interior  and  other  security 
agencies  related  in  particular  to  combating  crimes,  traffic  safety  education,  and 
training.  These  procedures  should  be  accomplished  by  direct  contact  between  the 
organs  concerned,  and  meetings  should  be  held  between  competent  authorities  in 
order  to  realize  this  objective. 
Article  9. 
Member  States'  Ministries  of  the  Interior  and  similar  security  organs  should  be 
consulted  in  advance  and  their  representatives  should  co-operate  to  co-ordinate 
and unify  their  stance  towards  the  subjects  brought  forward  on  the  working  agenda 
of  regional  and  international  conferences. 
Article  10. 
Member  States  should,  wherever  possible,  act  to  unify  laws  or  regulations 
concerning  immigration,  passports,  residence  permits  and  other  matters  which 
come  within  the  competence  of  the  Ministries  of  the  Interior  and  similar  security 
organs  in  member  States. 
CHAPTER  TWO:  INTEGRATION  OF  SECURITY  ORGANS. 
Article  11. 
Member  States  should  co-operate  in  order  to  furnish  the  security  organs  in  the 
States  with  up-to-date  technological  instruments  and  training  of  personnel  through 
collective  training  sessions, undertaken  under  the  organization  of  the  Secretariat- 
General  of  the  G.  C.  C.  who  will  be  responsible  for  ensuring  the  necessary  finance 
for  them. 
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Article  12. 
Member  States  should  establish  a  dedicated  modem  communication  network 
serving  the  Ministries  of  the  Interior  and  the  other  security  organs  in  the  member 
States,  with  the  proviso  that  the  Secretariat-General  shall  invite  experts  to 
establish  an  integrated  study  in  respect  of  this  network  and  the  measures  for 
obtaining  the  necessary  financial  resources  for  its  implementation. 
Article  13. 
Member  States  should  act  to  establish  specialized  security  training  centres  in 
various  fields  as  needed  by  the  security  organs  in  the  member  States,  with  the 
proviso  that  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General  shall  invite  experts  to  undertake  an 
integrated  study  concerning  such  centres  and  their  specialization  and  their 
locations  in  the  member  States,  as  well  as  proposing  the  means  of  implementation. 
Article  14. 
It  is  prohibited  to  employ  any  person  whatsoever  his  nationality,  except  its  own 
citizens,  who  has  worked  in  the  security  organs  of  a  member  State  without 
securing  the  consent  of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  of  the  State  where  he  has 
previously  worked. 
Article  15. 
Member  States  should  hold  regular  meetings  and  exchange  field  visits  between 
personnel  in  security  organs  at  all  levels  and  in  all  different  activities  in  order  to 
further  the  relationship  and  co-operation  and  to  acquaint  them  with  the  systems 
adopted  and  the  instruments  used. 
CHAPTER  THREE:  ILLEGAL  ENTRY  OR  EXIT,  AND  SMUGGLING. 
Article  16. 
Member  States  shall  exert  their  utmost  endeavours  necessary  to  combat  illegal 
entry  or  exit  and  smuggling  through  their  borders  and  shall  take  all  appropriate 
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legal  measures  against  those  who  commit  such  acts  or  are  proved  to  have 
participated  in  them. 
Article  17. 
The  competent  authorities  in  the  member  States  shall  arrest  persons  entering 
through  illegal  means  and  take  appropriate  measures  against  them  in  accordance 
with  the  following: 
A)  Illegal  entrants  to  one  of  the  member  States  who  have  entered  the  territory  of 
another  of  the  member  States  by  legal  means  shall  be  returned  to  the  security 
post  at  the  border  of  that  State  which  they  have  entered  by  legal  means. 
B)  Unidentified  persons  and  illegal  entrants  are  those  who  have  illegally  entered 
the  territory  of  a  member  State  and  the  territory  of  one  or  more  member  States 
by  the  same  means.  The  last  State  entered  illegally,  when  arresting  them, 
should  deal  with  them  after  informing  the  competent  authorities  in  the  States 
through  which  they  have  passed. 
Article  18. 
All  neighbouring  member  States  shall  organize  and  coordinate  meetings  and  joint 
patrols  within  the  border  regions  of  the  member  States,  as  well  as  convening,  if 
needed,  regular  meetings  for  that  purpose  between  those  responsible  for  the  border 
posts  in  the  member  States. 
Article  19. 
All  neighbouring  member  States  shall  extend  their  utmost  endeavors  in  pursuing 
fugitive  persons  who  are  being  pursued  by  a  member  State,  where  they  pass, 
through  the  boundaries  between  the  two  States. 
The  pursuing  patrols  of  any  member  State  are  not  permitted  to  penetrate  into  the 
territory  of  a  neighboring  State  except  to  a  distance  where  the  meeting  point  of  the 
patrols  on  land  or  at  sea  shall  be  agreed  upon  between  the  two  neighboring  States. 
After  being  informed  of  such  pursuit,  the  patrol  of  the  entered  State  is  empowered 
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to  pursue,  arrest  and  deliver  the  fugitive  persons  along  with  their  possessions  and 
their  means  of  transportation  to  the  nearest  post  of  the  State  in  whose  territories 
the  pursuit  started. 
Article  20. 
In  any  pursuit,  the  following  shall  be  observed: 
A)  The  pursuing  cars  or  cruisers  shall  display  the  official  emblem  and  be  clearly 
distinguishable. 
B)  The  pursuing  cars  shall  not  exceed  three  in  number  and  the  cruisers  shall  not 
exceed  two. 
C)  The  pursuing  land  patrols  shall  not  exceed  twelve  persons  and  the  pursuing 
marine  patrols  shall  not  exceed  the  registered  crew  of  the  two  cruisers. 
D)  The  pursuing  patrols,  whether  persons,  cruisers  or  cars,  shall  be  lightly  armed 
in  accordance  with  the  agreement  of  the  Ministers  of  the  Interior. 
CHAPTER  FOUR:  COMBATING  CRIME. 
Article  21. 
Member  States  shall  exchange  the  names  of  dangerous  criminals  and  those  with 
previous  convictions,  as  well  as  persons  suspected  of  being  dangerous,  reporting 
their  movements  and  in  particular  banning  their  travel  and,  where  possible  and  in 
circumstances  in  which  these  procedures  are  needed,  in  addition  exchange  a  list 
of  names  of  persons  whose  presence  is  undesirable  in  accordance  with  the 
prevailing  Laws  and  regulations. 
Article  22. 
Member  States  should  enhance  contact  between  the  competent  organs  responsible 
for  criminal  investigation  and  inquiry  in  the  member  States  in  order  to 
communicate  information  obtained  on  criminal  operations  which  have  been 
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committed  or  might  be  committed  in  the  territories  of  the  member  States  or 
abroad. 
Article  23. 
The  competent  authority  in  each  member  State  is  required  to  inform  its 
counterparts  in  the  other  member  States  about  new  types  of  crimes  which  have 
been  committed  and  the  means  of  their  commission,  as  well  as  the  procedures 
which  have  been  taken  to  combat  and  to  reduce  them. 
Article  24. 
Each  member  State  shall  allow  the  officials  of  the  organs  of  inquiry  and 
investigation  of  another  member  State  to  attend  the  preliminary  interrogation  and 
charge  in  respect  of  crimes  which  have  been  committed  in  that  State  or  which 
relate  to  its  security  or  to  similar  crimes  committed  in  its  territory,  or  in  respect  of 
criminals  of  its  nationality  or  accomplices  who  are  residents  or  crimes  whose 
consequences  extend  to  its  territory. 
Article  25. 
The  competent  authorities  in  each  member  State  should  take  steps  in  accordance 
with  its  existing  Laws  and  Statutes  to  extend  the  necessary  assistance  at  the  stage 
of  detection  and  preliminary  interrogation  in  respect  of  crimes  whose  punishment 
is  within  the  competence  of  one  of  the  member  States,  in  particular  in  respect  of  a 
warrant  for  extradition  or  attendance  or  the  execution  of  a  motion  for  a  hearing  of 
the  accused  persons  and  the  witnesses  or  in  respect  of  other  services  such  as, 
inspection,  search  and  investigation. 
Article  26. 
Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary  measures  in  order  to  maintain  the 
confidentiality  of  exchanged  information  when  so  by  the  State  in  possession  of  the 
information.  Member  States  are  not  permitted  to  give  such  information  and  other 
234 APPENDIX  1 
materials  obtained  in  accordance  with  this  Convention  to  another  State  which  is 
not  a  member  of  the  G.  C.  C.  unless  agreed  by  the  State  from  which  the  information 
and  other  material  originated. 
CHAPTER  FIVE:  EXTRADITION  OF  CRIMINALS. 
Article  27. 
Each  member  State  is  obliged  to  extradite  persons  in  its  territory  who  are  accused 
or  have  been  convicted  by  the  competent  authorities  of  any  of  the  member  States 
in  accordance  with  the  rules  and  conditions  laid  down  in  this  Chapter. 
Article  28. 
Extradition  shall  be  obligatory  between  the  member  States  if  the  request  satisfies 
two  conditions: 
A)  the  acts  alleged  to  have  been  committed  by  the  accused,  in  accordance  with  the 
Laws  and  Statutes  of  the  requesting  State,  constitute  crimes  which  are  within  the 
crimes  of  divine  ordinance  punishment,  retribution  punishment  or  discretionary 
punishment,  or  crimes  which  are  punishable  by  a  deprivation  of  liberty  of  not  less 
than  six  months. 
This  provision  shall  apply  even  if  the  crime  has  been  committed  outside  the 
territories  of  the  two  States  provided  the  Laws  or  Regulations  of  the  requesting 
State  provide  for  the  punishment  of  this  crime  if  committed  inside  or  outside  its 
territory. 
B)  judgment  has  been  passed  by  the  judicial  authority  in  the  requesting  State, 
whether  in  the  accused  person's  presence  or  in  absentia,  in  relation  to  crimes 
punishable  by  divine  ordinance  punishment  or  retribution  punishment  or 
discretionary  punishment,  or  deprivation  of  liberty  of  a  period  of  not  less  than 
six  months. 
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The  last  two  paragraphs  shall  be  applied  even  if  the  accused  -person  whose 
extradition  is  sought  is  a  citizen  of  the  requested  State. 
Article  29. 
Extradition  shall  not  take  place  if  the  crime  has  been  repealed  or  the  penalty 
rescinded  in  accordance  with  Laws  or  Regulations  of  the  requesting  State. 
Article  30. 
Extradition  shall  not  be  permitted  in  the  following  cases: 
1)  If  the  crime  is  political.  The  following  shall  not  be  considered  political  crimes: 
A)  Crimes  of  treason  and  sabotage  and  terrorism,  and  crimes  of  murder  and 
robbery  and  theft  committed  by  acts  of  force  whether  committed  by  one  person 
or  more. 
B)  All  offences  committed  against  Heads  of  States,  or  their  ancestors  and 
descendants,  or  their  wives. 
C)  Crimes  committed  against  Crown  Princes  and  Royal  Families,  principalities 
and  ministers,  and  those  who  are  of  the  same  rank  in  the  member  States. 
D)  Military  crimes. 
E)  Any  attempt  or  acting  as  an  accomplice  in  these  crimes  if  punishable  under  the 
Laws  and  Regulations  of  the  requesting  State. 
2)  If  the  crime  is  committed  in  the  territory  of  the  requested  State. 
3)  If  the  person  whose  extradition  is  requested  has  diplomatic  status  and  is  entitled  to 
diplomatic  immunity  or  any  other  person  entitled  by  such  immunity  in  conformity 
with  International  Law  or  any  pact  or  other  charter. 
4)  If  the  person  whose  extradition  is  requested  has  been  sentenced  or  is  under 
interrogation  or  trial  with  regard  to  the  crime  which  is  the  subject  of  the 
extradition  request,  either  in  the  requested  State  or  in  the  State  in  whose 
territory  the  crime  has  been  committed,  provided  that  the  latter  is  not  the 
requesting  State. 
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Article  31. 
A)  Requests  for  extradition  shall  be  conveyed  from  the  competent  authority  in  the 
requesting  State  to  the  competent  authority  in  the  requested  State. 
B)  The  requesting  file  shall  contain: 
1)  A  detailed  report  in  respect  of  the  identification  of  the  requested  person  and 
his  description  and  all  data  that  help  identify  the  requested  person. 
2)  A  memorandum  produced  from  the  competent  authority  if  the  person  has  not 
been  sentenced. 
3)  A  certified  copy  of  the  relevant  Law  which  penalizes  the  act  as  well  as  a 
detailed  report  from  the  competent  authority  that  has  been  handling  the  case 
with  the  proviso  that  this  shall  apply  to  those  facts  and  evidence  which  prove 
the  responsibility  of  the  requested  person. 
4)  A  certified  copy  of  the  judgment  if  the  requested  person  has  been  sentenced 
whether  the  judgment  is final  or  not. 
5)  A  report  from  the  competent  authority  that  is  handling  the  case  stating  that  the 
crime  has  not  been  repealed  or  the  penalty  rescinded  in  conformity  with  the 
Laws  or  Regulations  of  the  requesting  State. 
6)  A  statement  that  the  request  is  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  this 
Convention. 
Article  32. 
In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  previous  Article,  the  requested  State  is 
under  the  obligation  to  extradite  the  requested  person  if  he  has  confessed  to  the 
criminal  act  with  which  he  has  been  charged  and  the  State  has  concluded  that  the 
crime  is  within  the  category  for  which  extradition  is  obligatory  in  conformity  with 
the  provisions  of  this  Convention. 
Article  33. 
With  due  consideration  to  the  provisions  of  this  Convention, 
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A)  The  competent  authority  in  each  member  State  shall  deal  with  requests  for 
extradition  in  accordance  with  the  Laws  and  Regulations  in  effect  at  the  time  of 
the  request. 
B)  The  competent  authority  in  the  requested  State  shall  inform  the  competent 
authority  in  the  requesting  State  of  the  decision  taken  in  respect  of  the  extradition 
whether  negative  or  positive,  with  the  proviso  that  reasons  shall  be  given  in  the 
case  of  the  negative  reply  within  a  period  of  not  more  than  two  months  from  the 
date  of  receiving  the  request  for  the  extradition. 
Article  34. 
A)  If  the  requested  State  receives  a  number  of  requests  from  different  States  in 
respect  of  a  particular  person  and  the  same  particular  crime,  priority  in  the 
extradition  shall  be  given  to  the  State  whose  interests  have  been  more  harmed  by 
the  crime,  and  thereafter  to  the  State  in  whose  territory  the  crime  has  been 
committed. 
B)  If  the  requests  relate  to  different  crimes,  the  priority  shall  be  determined  by  the 
facts  and  circumstances  and  facts,  and  particularly  to  the  seriousness  of  the  crime 
and  the  place  of  its  commission  as  well  as  to  the  date  of  receipt  of  the  requests  and 
to  any  commitment  which  has  been  given  to  a  requesting  State  to  extradite  the 
requested  person. 
Article  35. 
If  the  requested  person  is  being  tried  or  sentenced  in  respect  of  other  crimes  in  the 
requested  State,  this  State  shall  take  a  decision  concerning  his  extradition  which 
shall  be  postponed  until  the  end  of  his  trial,  or  a  decision  is  taken  not  to 
adjudicate,  or  the  accused  is  found  innocent  or  irresponsible,  or  the  sentence  is 
completed,  or  he  is  exempted  from  the  sentence  or  his  detention  is  terminated 
owing  to  the  omission  of  necessary  grounds.  Nonetheless,  it  is  permitted  to  deliver 
the  requested  person  temporarily  to  the  requesting  State  to  appear  before  its 
competent  authorities,  provided  that  the  said  authorities  are  committed  to  deliver 
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him  back  after  interrogation  or  sentence  with  regard  to  the  crime  which  is  the 
subject  of  the  extradition  request  and  that  his  liberty  is  suspended  in  conformity 
with  the  judgment  or  decision  issued  by  the  authorities  of  the  State  which 
extradited  him. 
Article  36. 
It  is  not  permitted  to  extend  the  period  of  detention  of  a  person  whose  extradition 
is  requested  as  a  precaution  in  the  requested  State  for  more  than  thirty  days  after 
which  he  must  be  released,  particularly  if  his  file  of  extradition  has  not  been 
received  during  this  period,  or  for  another  thirty  days  at  most  where  the  requesting 
State  requests  a  renewal  with  the  proviso  that  the  period  of  precautionary 
detention  shall  be  deducted  from  any  custodial  sentence  that  might  be  imposed  by 
the  requesting  State. 
It  is  permitted  for  the  competent  authority  in  the  requested  State  to  receive  the 
request  for  the  renewal  of  the  detention  by  telex,  or  telegram,  or  by  telephone,  the 
-genuineness  of  which  must  be  certified  from  the  competent  authority  in  the 
requesting  State. 
Article  37. 
There  shall  be  delivery  to  the  requesting  State  of  all  items  in  the  possession  of  the 
requested  person  at  the  time  of  the  arrest  which  are  pertinent  to  the  crime  within 
the  provisions  of  the  Laws  or  Regulations  of  the  requested  State. 
Article  38. 
No  person  shall  be  tried  in  the  requesting  State  except  in  respect  of  the  crime  for 
which  he  has  been  extradited  and  associated  activities  as  well  as  any  subsequent 
crimes  committed  after  the  extradition.  It  is  also  permissible  to  adjudicate  in 
respect  of  other  crimes  not  subject  to  the  extradition  request  and  their  associated 
activities  where  he  consents,  or  where,  within  thirty  days,  he  has  not  taken 
advantage  of  permission  to  leave  the  territory  of  the  requesting  State. 
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Article  39. 
The  requesting  State  shall  pay  all  the  expenses  which  are  necessary  to  implement 
the  extradition  request  as  well  as  all  expenses  of  returning  the  requested  person  to 
the  place  where  he  was  at  the  time  of  the  extradition  if  he  is  found  irresponsible  or 
innocent  of  the  crime. 
Article  40. 
The  requesting  State  is  obliged  to  collect  the  requested  person  within  thirty  days 
from  the  date  of  dispatch  of  the  telegram  to  it  confirming  the  positive  decision  for 
the  extradition.  If  the  requesting  State  fails  in  this  obligation,  the  requested  State 
may  release  the  requested  person  and  it  is  not  permitted  to  arrest  him  again  or  to 
take  any  measures  against  him  except  only  in  the  case  of  a  renewed  request. 
CHAPTER  SIX:  CONCLUDING  PROVISIONS. 
Article  41. 
Without  prejudice  to  bilateral  Conventions  that  have  been  concluded  between 
some  of  the  member  States,  in  case  of  conflict  between  this  Convention  and  the 
provisions  of  any  bilateral  Convention,  the  two  States  shall  apply  in  their 
reciprocal  relationship  the  provisions  which  are  most  beneficial  to  comprehensive 
security  Co-operation. 
Article  42. 
This  Convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  signatory  States,  in  conformity  with  their 
constitutional  Laws  in  effect,  within  four  months  from  the  date  of  signature,  and 
they  shall  deposit  the  instruments  of  ratification  with  the  Secretariat-General  of 
the  G.  C.  C.  which  shall  prepare  a  report  on  the  deposit  of  instruments  of 
ratification  of  each  State  and  notify  the  member  States. 
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Article  43. 
This  Convention  shall  come  into  effect  after  the  expiry  of  one  month  from  the  date 
of  the  deposit  of  the  instruments  of  ratification  of  two  thirds  of  the  Signatory 
States. 
Article  44. 
It  is  permitted  to  amend  this  Convention  by  the  consent  of  the  Supreme  Council. 
Article  45. 
Each  Contracting  Party  to  this  Convention  shall  have  the  right  to  withdraw  from  it 
by  a  declaration  to  be  sent  to  the  Secretary-General  of  G.  C.  C.,  and  such 
withdrawal  shall  not  have  any  effect  until  the  expiry  of  six  months  from  the  date 
of  intimation,  and  this  Convention  shall  be  in  effect  in  respect  of  requests  of 
extradition  which  are  delivered  before  the  end  of  the  said  period. 
And  in  conformity  with  the  mandate  of  the  Supreme  Council,  in  its  14th  session 
held  in  Riyadh  in  RAGHAB  1414  H.  corresponding  to  DECEMBER  1993,  to  the 
Ministers  of  the  Interior  in  order  to  revise  the  drafting  of  the  security  Convention 
and  to  sign  it,  therefore,  the  signing  of  this  Convention  took  place  in  Riyadh  on 
Monday  25th  of  JUMAD  AL-AKHRA  1415  H.  corresponding  to  NOVEMBER 
28th,  1994,  by: 
THE  MINISTER  OF  INTERIOR  OF  U.  A.  E.. 
THE  MINISTER  OF  INTERIOR  OF  BAHRAIN. 
THE  MINISTER  OF  INTERIOR  OF  K.  S.  A.. 
THE  MINISTER  OF  INTERIOR  OF  SULTANATE  OF  OMAN. 
THE  MINISTER  OF  INTERIOR  OF  QATAR. 
THE  MINISTER  OF  INTERIOR  OF  KUWAIT. 
Signed. 
Signed. 
Signed. 
Signed. 
No  signature. 
No  signature. 
NB.  THE  TRANSLATION  OF  THE  DOCUMENT  IS  ONL  YA  GUIDELINE  FOR 
EASE  OF  REFERENCE.  THE  A  VAILING  IS  THE  ARABIC  VERSION  IN  THE 
CUSTODY  OF  THE  G.  C.  C  SECRETARIAT-GENERAL,  IN  RIYADH,  K  S.  A. 
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CO-OPERA  TION  COUNCIL  FOR  THE  ARAB  STATES 
OF  THE  GULF. 
The  United  Arab  Emirates 
The  State  of  Bahrain 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia 
The  Sultanate  of  Oman 
The  State  of  Qatar  and 
The  State  of  Kuwait 
Being  fully  aware  of  the  ties  of  special  relations,  common  characteristics  and 
similar  systems  founded  on  the  creed  of  Islam  which  bind  them;  and  Believing  in 
the  common  destiny  and  the  unity  of  aim  which  link  their  peoples;  and  Desiring  to 
effect  co-ordination,  integration  and  interconnection  between  them  in  all  fields; 
and  Having  the  conviction  that  co-ordination,  Co-operation,  and  integration 
between  them  serve  the  sublime  objectives  of  the  Arab  Nation;  and,  In  pursuit  of 
the  goal  of  strengthening  Co-operation  and  reinforcement  of  the  links  between 
them;  and  In  an  endeavor  to  complement  efforts  already  begun  in  all  essential 
areas  that  concern  their  peoples  and  realize  their  hopes  for  a  better  future  on  the 
path  to  unity  of  their  States;  and  In  conformity  with  the  Charter  of  the  League  of 
Arab  States  which  calls  for  the  realization  of  closer  relations  and  stronger  bonds; 
and  In  order  to  channel  their  efforts  to  reinforce  and  serve  Arab  and  Islamic 
causes,  Have  agreed  as  follows: 
ARTICLE  ONE 
The  Establishment  of  the  Council 
A  Council  shall  be  established  hereby  to  be  named  the  Co-operation  Council  for 
the  Arab  States  of  the  Gulf  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  Co-operation  Council 
(G.  C.  C.  ). 
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ARTICLE  TWO 
Headquarters 
The  Co-operation  Council  shall  have  its  headquarters  in  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia. 
ARTICLE  THREE 
Co-operation  Council  Meetings 
The  Council  shall  hold  its  meetings  in  the  State  where  it  has  its  headquarters,  and 
may  convene  in  any  member  State. 
ARTICLE  FOUR 
Objectives 
The  basic  Objectives  of  the  Co-operation  Council  are: 
1.  To  effect  co-ordination,  integration  and  inter-connection  between  Member 
States  in  all  fields  in  order  to  achieve  unity  between  them. 
2.  To  deepen  and  strengthen  relations,  links  and  areas  of  Co-operation  now 
prevailing  between  their  peoples  in  various  fields. 
3.  To  formulate  similar  regulations  in  various  fields  including  the  following: 
a.  Economic  and  financial  affairs 
b.  Commerce,  customs  and  communications 
c.  Education  and  culture 
d.  Social  and  health  affairs 
e.  Information  and  tourism 
f.  Legislative  and  administrative  affairs. 
4.  To  stimulate  scientific  and  technological  progress  in  the  fields  of  industry, 
mining,  agriculture,  water  and  animal  resources;  to  establish  scientific  research;  to 
establish  joint  ventures  and  encourage  Co-operation  by  the  private  sector  for  the 
good  of  their  peoples. 
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ARTICLE  FIVE 
Council  Membership 
The  Co-operation  Council  shall  be  formed  of  the  six  States  that  participated  in  the 
Foreign  Ministers'  meeting  held  at  Riyadh  on  4  February  1981. 
ARTICLE  SIX 
Organizations  of  the  Co-operation  Council 
The  Co-operation  Council  shall  have  the  following  main  organizations: 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  to  which  shall  be  attached  the  commission  for  Settlement 
of  disputes. 
2.  The  Ministerial  Council. 
3.  The  Secretariat-General. 
Each  of  these  organizations  may  establish  sub-agencies  as  may  be  necessary. 
ARTICLE  SEVEN 
Supreme  Council 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  is  the  highest  authority  of  the  Co-operation  Council  and 
shall  be  formed  of  heads  of  member  States.  Its  presidency  shall  be  rotatory  based 
on  the  alphabetical  order  of  the  names  of  the  member  States. 
2.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  hold  one  regular  session  every  year.  Extraordinary 
sessions  may  be  convened  at  the  request  of  any  member  seconded  by  another 
member. 
3.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  hold  its  sessions  in  the  territories  of  member  States. 
4.  A  Supreme  Council's  meeting  shall  be  considered  valid  if  attended  by  two- 
thirds  of  the  member  States. 
ARTICLE  EIGHT 
The  Functions  of  the  Supreme  Council 
The  Supreme  Council  shall  endeavour  to  realize  the  objectives  of  the  Co- 
operation  Council,  particularly  as  concerns  the  following: 
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1.  Review  matters  of  interest  to  the  member  States. 
2  Lay  down  the  higher  policy  for  the  Co-operation  Council  and  the  basic  lines  it 
should  follow. 
3.  Review  the  recommendations,  reports,  studies  and  joint  ventures  submitted  by 
the  Ministerial  Council  for  approval. 
4.  Review  reports  and  studies  which  the  Secretary-General  is  charged  to  prepare. 
5.  Approve  the  bases  for  dealing  with  other  States  and  international  organizations. 
6.  Approve  the  rules  of  procedure  of  the  commission  for  the  settlement  of 
disputes  and  nominate  its  members. 
7.  Appoint  the  Secretary-General. 
8.  Amend  the  Charter  of  the  Co-operation  Council. 
9.  Approve  the  Council's  internal  rules  of  procedure. 
I  O.  Approve  the  budget  of  the  Secretariat-General. 
ARTICLE  NINE 
Voting  in  the  Supreme  Council 
1.  Each  member  of  the  Supreme  Council  shall  have  one  vote. 
2.  Resolutions  of  the  Supreme  Council  in  substantive  matters  shall  be  carried  by 
unanimous  approval  of  the  member  States  participating  in  the  voting,  while 
resolutions  on  procedural  matters  shall  be  carried  by  majority  vote. 
ARTICLE  TEN 
Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes. 
1.  The  Co-operation  Council  shall  have  a  commission  called  "The  Commission 
for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes"  which  shall  be  attached  to  the  Supreme  Council. 
2.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  establish  the  composition  of  the  Commission  for 
every  case  on  an  "ad  hoc"  basis  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  the  dispute. 
3.  If  a  dispute  arises  over  interpretation  or  implementation  of  the  Charter  and  such 
dispute  is  not  resolved  within  the  Ministerial  Council  or  the  Supreme  Council,  the 
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Supreme  Council  may  refer  such  dispute  to  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of 
Disputes. 
4.  The  Commission  shall  submit  its  recommendations  or  opinions  applicable  to 
the  Supreme  Council  for  such  action  as  the  Supreme  Council  deems  appropriate. 
ARTICLE  ELEVEN 
Ministerial  Council 
1.  The  Ministerial  Council  shall  be  formed  of  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  member 
States  or  other  delegated  Ministers.  The  Council  presidency  shall  be  for  the 
member  State  which  presided  the  last  ordinary  session  of  the  Supreme  Council,  or 
if  necessary,  for  the  State  which  is  next  to  preside  the  Supreme  Council. 
2.  The  Ministerial  Council  shall  convene  every  three  months  and  may  hold 
extraordinary  sessions  at  the  invitation  of  any  member  seconded  by  another 
member. 
3.  The  Ministerial  Council  shall  determine  the  venue  of  its  next  session. 
4.  A  Council's  meeting  shall  be  deemed  valid  if  attended  by  two-thirds  of  the 
member  States. 
ARTICLE  TWELVE 
Functions  of  the  Ministerial  Council 
1.  Propose  policies,  prepare  recommendations,  studies  and  projects  aimed  at 
developing  Co-operation  and  co-ordination  between  member  States  in  various 
fields  and  adopt  the  resolutions  or  recommendations  required  in  this  regard. 
2.  Endeavour  to  encourage,  develop  and  co-ordinate  activities  existing  between 
member  States  in  all  fields.  Resolutions  adopted  in  such  matters  shall  be  referred 
to  the  Ministerial  Council  for  further  submission,  with  recommendations,  to  the 
Supreme  Council  for  appropriate  action. 
3.  Submit  recommendations  to  the  Ministers  concerned  to  formulate  policies 
whereby  the  Co-operation  Council's  resolutions  may  be  put  into  effect. 
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4.  Encourage  means  of  Co-operation  and  co-ordination  between  the  various 
private  sector  activities,  develop  existing  Co-operation  between  the  member 
States'  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry,  and  encourage  the  movement  within 
the  G.  C.  C.  of  workers  who  are  citizens  of  the  member  States. 
5.  Refer  any  of  the  various  aspects  of  Co-operation  to  one  or  more  technical  or 
specialized  committee  for  study  and  presentation  of  appropriate  recommendations. 
6.  Review  proposals  related  to  amendments  to  this  Charter  and  submit  appropriate 
recommendations  to  the  Supreme  Council. 
7.  Approve  Rules  of  Procedure  of  both  the  Ministerial  Council  and  the  Secretariat- 
General. 
8.  Appoint  the  Assistant  Secretaries-General,  as  nominated  by  the  Secretary- 
General,  for  a  period  of  three  years,  renewable. 
9.  Approve  periodic  reports  as  well  as  internal  rules  and  regulations  relating  to 
administrative  and  financial  affairs  proposed  by  the  Secretary-General,  and  submit 
recommendations  to  the  Supreme  Council  for  approval  of  the  budget  of  the 
Secretariat-General. 
10.  Make  arrangements  for  meetings  of  the  Supreme  Council  and  prepare  its 
agenda. 
11.  Review  matters  referred  to  it  by  the  Supreme  Council. 
ARTICLE  THIRTEEN 
Voting  in  the  Ministerial  Council 
1.  Every  member  of  the  Ministerial  Council  shall  have  one  vote. 
2.  Resolutions  of  the  Ministerial  Council  in  substantive  matters  shall  be  carried  by 
unanimous  vote,  and  in  procedural  matters  by  majority  vote. 
ARTICLE  FOURTEEN 
The  Secretariat-General 
1.  The  Secretariat-General  shall  be  composed  of  a  Secretary-General  who  shall  be 
assisted  by  assistants  and  a  number  of  staff  as  required. 
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2  The  Supreme  Council  shall  appoint  the  Secretary-General,  who  shall  be  a 
citizen  of  one  of  the  Co-operation  Council  States,  for  a  period  of  three  years 
which  may  be  renewed  once  only. 
3.  The  Secretary-General  shall  nominate  the  assistant  Secretaries-General. 
4.  The  Secretary-General  shall  appoint  the  Secretary-General's  staff  from  among 
the  citizens  of  member  States,  and  may  not  make  exceptions  without  the 
approval  of  the  Ministerial  Council. 
5.  The  Secretary-General  shall  be  directly  responsible  for  the  work  of  the 
Secretariat-General  and  the  smooth  flow  of  work  in  its  various  organizations. 
He  shall  represent  the  Co-operation  Council  with  other  parties  within  the  limits 
of  the  authority  vested  in  him. 
ARTICLE  FIFTEEN 
Functions  of  the  Secretariat-General 
The  Secretariat-General  shall: 
1.  Prepare  studies  related  to  Co-operation  and  co-ordination,  and  to  integrated 
plans  and  programmes  for  member  States'  action. 
2.  Prepare  periodic  reports  on  the  work  of  the  Co-operation  Council. 
3.  Follow  up  the  implementation  by  the  member  States  of  the  resolutions  and 
recommendations  of  the  Supreme  Council  and  Ministerial  Council. 
4.  Prepare  reports  and  studies  requested  by  the  Supreme  Council  or  Ministerial 
Council. 
5.  Prepare  the  draft  of  administrative  and  financial  regulations  commensurate  with 
the  growth  of  the  Co-operation  Council  and  its  expanding  responsibilities. 
6.  Prepare  the  budgets  and  closing  accounts  of  the  Co-operation  Council. 
7.  Make  preparations  for  meetings  and  prepare  agendas  and  draft  resolutions  for 
the  Ministerial  Council. 
8.  Recommend  to  the  Chairman  of  the  Ministerial  Council  the  convening  of  an 
extraordinary  session  of  the  Council  when  necessary. 
9.  Any  other  tasks  entrusted  to  it  by  the  Supreme  Council  or  Ministerial  council. 
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ARTICLE  SIXTEEN 
The  Secretary-General  and  the  assistant  Secretaries-General  and  all  the 
Secretariat-General's  staff  shall  carry  out  their  duties  in  complete  independence 
and  for  the  joint  benefit  of  the  member  States. 
They  shall  refrain  from  any  action  or  behaviour  that  is  incompatible  with  their 
duties  and  from  divulging  confidential  matters  relating  to  their  appointments 
either  during  or  after  their  tenure  of  office. 
ARTICLE  SEVENTEEN 
Privileges  and  Immunities 
1.  The  Co-operation  Council  and  its  organizations  shall  enjoy  on  the  territories  of 
all  member  States  such  legal  competence,  privileges  and  immunities  as  are 
required  to  realize  their  objectives  and  carry  out  their  functions. 
2.  Representatives  of  the  member  States  on  the  Council,  and  the  Council's 
employees,  shall  enjoy  such  privileges  and  immunities  as  are  specified  in 
agreements  to  be  concluded  for  this  purpose  between  the  member  States.  A 
special  agreement  shall  organize  the  relation  between  the  Council  and  the  State 
in  which  it  has  its  headquarters. 
Until  such  time  as  the  two  agreements  mentioned  in  item  2  above  are  prepared 
and  put  into  effect,  the  representatives  of  the  member  States  in  the  Co- 
operation  Council  and  its  Staff  shall  enjoy  the  diplomatic  privileges  and 
immunities  established  for  similar  organizations. 
ARTICLE  EIGHTEEN 
Budget  of  the  Secretariat-General 
The  Secretariat-General  shall  have  a  budget  to  which  the  member  States  shall 
contribute  in  equal  amount. 
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ARTICLE  NINETEEN 
The  Implementation  of  the  Charter 
1.  This  Charter  shall  go  into  effect  as  of  the  date  it  is  signed  by  the  Heads  of  States 
of  the  six  member  States  named  in  this  Charter's  preamble. 
2.  The  original  copy  of  this  Charter  shall  be  deposited  with  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia  which  shall  act  as  custodian  and  shall 
deliver  a  true  copy  thereof  to  every  member  State,  pending  the  establishment  of 
the  Secretariat-General,  at  which  time  the  latter  shall  become  depository. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY 
Amendments  to  the  Charter 
1.  Any  member  State  may  request  an  amendment  of  this  Charter. 
2.  Request  for  Charter  amendments  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Secretary-General 
who  shall  refer  them  to  the  member  States  at  least  four  months  prior  to 
submission  to  the  Ministerial  Council. 
3.  An  amendment  shall  become  effective  if  unanimously  approved  by  the 
Supreme  Council. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY-ONE 
Closing  Provisions 
No  reservations  may  be  voiced  in  respect  to  the  provisions  of  this  Charter. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY-TWO 
The  Secretariat-General  shall  arrange  to  deposit  and  register  copies  of  this  Charter 
with  the  League  of  Arab  States  and  the  United  Nations,  by  resolution  of  the 
Ministerial  Council 
This  Charter  is  signed  on  one  copy  in  the  Arabic  Language  at  Abu  Dhabi  City, 
United  Arab  Emirates,  on  21  Rajab  1401  corresponding  to  25  May  1981. 
The  United  Arab  Emirates 
The  State  of  Bahrain 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia 
The  Sultanate  of  Oman 
The  State  of  Qatar,  The  State  of  Kuwait 
250 APPENDIX  2 
THE  CO-OPERATION  COUNCIL 
For  The  Arab  States  of  the  Gulf  Rules  of  Procedure 
of  the  Supreme  Council 
ARTICLE  ONE 
Definitions 
These  regulations  shall  be  called  Rules  of  procedure  of  the  Supreme  Council  of 
the  Gulf  Arab  States  Co-operation  Council  and  shall  encompass  the  rules  that 
govern  procedures  for  convening  the  Council  and  the  exercise  of  its  functions. 
ARTICLE  TWO 
Membership 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  be  composed  of  the  Heads  of  State  of  the  member 
States  of  the  Co-operation  Council.  The  presidency  shall  rotate  on  the  basis  of  the 
alphabetical  order  of  the  names  of  the  member  States. 
2.  Each  member  State  shall  notify  the  Secretary-General  of  the  names  of  the 
members  of  its  delegation  to  the  Council  meeting,  at  least  seven  days  prior  to  the 
date  set  for  opening  the  meeting. 
ARTICLE  THREE 
With  due  regard  to  the  objectives  of  the  Co-operation  Council  and  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Supreme  Council  as  specified  in  Articles  4and  8  of  the  Charter,  the 
Supreme  Council  may:. 
1.  Form  technical  committees  and  select  their  members  from  member  States' 
nominees  who  specialize  in  the  committees'  respective  fields. 
2.  Call  upon  one  or  more  of  its  members  to  study  a  specific  subject  and  submit  a 
report  thereon  to  be  distributed  to  the  members  sufficiently  in  advance  of  the 
meeting  arranged  to  discuss  that  subject. 
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ARTICLE  FOUR 
Convening  the  Supreme  Council 
La.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  hold  one  regular  session  every  year,  and  may  hold 
extraordinary  sessions  at  the  request  of  any  one  member  seconded  by  another 
member. 
b.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  hold  its  sessions  at  the  level  of  Heads  of  States. 
c.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  hold  its  sessions  in  the  member  States'  territories. 
d.  Prior  to  convening  the  Supreme  Council,  the  Secretary-General  shall  hold  a 
meeting  to  be  attended  by  delegates  of  the  member  States  for  consultation  on 
matters  related  to  the  agenda  of  the  said  meeting. 
2.  a.  The  Secretary-General  shall  set  the  opening  date  of  the  Council's  session  and 
suggest  a  closing  date. 
b.  The  secretary-General  shall  issue  the  invitations  for  convening  a  regular 
session  no  less  than  thirty  days  in  advance,  and  for  convening  an  extraordinary 
session,  within  no  more  than  five  days. 
ARTICLE  FIVE 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  at  the  start  of  every  session  decide  whether  the 
meetings  shall  be  in  closed  or  open  session. 
2.  A  meeting  shall  be  considered  valid  if  attended  by  the  Heads  of  State  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  member  States.  Its  resolutions  in  substantive  matters  shall  be  carried 
by  unanimous  agreement  of  the  member  States  present  and  participating  in  the 
vote,  while  resolutions  in  procedural  matters  shall  be  carried  by  majority  vote. 
Any  member  abstaining  shall  record  that  he  is  not  bound  by  the  resolution. 
ARTICLE  SIX 
1.  The  Council  shall  hold  an  extraordinary  session  in  the  event  of: 
* 
a.  A  resolution  passed  in  a  previous  session. 
b.  A  request  by  a  member  State  seconded  by  another  State.  In  this  case,  the 
Council  shall  convene  within  no  more  than  five  days  from  the  date  of  issue  of  the 
invitation  for  holding  the  extraordinary  session. 
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2.  No  matters  may  be  placed  on  the  agenda  for  the  extraordinary  session  other  than 
those  which  the  session  was  convened  to  discuss. 
ARTICLE  SEVEN 
1.  Presidency  of  the  Supreme  Council  shall,  at  the  opening  of  each  regular  session, 
go  to  a  Head  of  State  by  rotation  based  on  the  alphabetical  order  of  the  member 
States'  names.  The  President  shall  continue  to  exercise  the  functions  of  the 
Presidency  until  such  functions  are  entrusted  to  his  successor  at  the  beginning  of 
the  next  regular  session. 
2.  The  Head  of  State  of  a  country  which  is  party  to  a  dispute  outstanding  may  not 
preside  over  a  session  or  meeting  called  to  discuss  the  subject  of  the  dispute.  In 
such  case,  the  Council  shall  designate  a  temporary  president. 
3.  The  President  shall  declare  the  opening  and  closing  of  sessions  and  meetings, 
the  suspension  of  meetings,  and  closures,  and  shall  see  that  the  Co-operation 
Council  Charter  and  these  rules  of  procedure  are  duly  complied  with.  He  shall 
give  the  floor  to  speakers.  based  on  the  order  of  their  requests,  submit  suggestions 
for  acceptance  by  the  membership,  direct  voting  procedures,  give  final  decisions 
on  points  of  order,  announce  resolutions,  follow  up  on  the  activities  of 
committees,  and  inform  the  Council  of  all  incoming  correspondence. 
4.  The  President  may  take  part  in  deliberations  and  submit  suggestions  in  the 
name  of  the  State  which  he  represents  and  may,  for  this  purpose,  assign  a  member 
of  his  State's  delegation  to  act  on  his  behalf  in  such  instances. 
ARTICLE  EIGHT 
Supreme  Council  Agenda 
1.  The  Ministerial  Council  shall  prepare  a  draft  agenda  shall  be  conveyed  by  the 
Secretary-General,  together  with  explanatory  notes  and  documentation,  to  the 
member  States  under  cover  of  the  letter  of  convocation  at  least  thirty  days 
before  the  date  set  for  the  meeting. 
2.  The  draft  agenda  shall  include  the  following: 
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a.  A  report  by  the  Secretary-General  on  the  activities  of  the  Supreme  Council 
between  the  two  sessions,  and  actions  taken  to  carry  out  its  resolutions. 
b.  Reports  and  matters  received  from  the  Ministerial  Council  and  the 
Secretariat-General. 
c.  Matters  which  the  Supreme  Council  had  previously  decided  to  include  on  the 
agenda. 
d.  Matters  suggested  by  a  member  State  as  being  in  need  of  review  by,  the 
Supreme  Council. 
3.  Every  member  State  may  request  inclusion  of  additional  items  on  the  draft 
agenda  provided  such  request  is  tabled  at  least  fifteen  days  prior  to  the  date  set 
for  opening  the  session.  Such  matters  shall  be  listed  in  an  additional  agenda 
which  shall  be  sent,  along  with  relevant  documentation,  to  the  member  States, 
at  least  five  days  before  the  date  set  for  the  session. 
Any  member  State  may  request  inclusion  of  extra  items  on  the  draft  agenda  as 
late  as  the  date  set  for  opening  a  session,  if  such  matters  are  considered  both 
important  and  urgent. 
5.  The  Council  shall  approve  its  agenda  at  the  start  of  every  session. 
6.  The  Council  may,  during  the  session,  add  new  items  that  are  considered  urgent. 
7.  The  ordinary  session  shall  be  adjourned  after  completion  of  discussions  of  the 
items  placed  on  the  agenda.  The  Supreme  Council  may  decide  to  suspend  the 
session's  meetings  before  completion  of  discussions  on  agenda  items,  and 
resume  such  meetings  at  a  later  date. 
ARTICLE  NINE 
Office  and  Committees  of  the  Supreme  Council 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  Office  shall  comprise,  in  every  session,  the  Council 
President,  the  Chairman  of  the  Ministerial  Council  and  the  Secretary-General.  The 
Office  shall  be  headed  by  the  Supreme  Council  President. 
2.  The  Office  shall  carry  out  the  following  functions: 
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a.  Review  the  form  of  resolutions  passed  by  the  Supreme  Council  without 
affecting  their  contents. 
b.  Assist  the  President  of  the  Supreme  Council  in  directing  the  activities  of  the 
session  in  general. 
c.  Other  tasks  indicated  in  these  Rules  of  Procedure  or  other  matters  entrusted  to 
it  by  the  Supreme  Council. 
ARTICLE  TEN 
1.  The  Council  may,  at  the  start  of  every  session,  create  any  committees  that  it 
deems  necessary  to  allow  adequate  study  of  matters  listed  on  the  agenda. 
Delegates  of  member  States  shall  take  part  in  the  activities  of  such  committees. 
2.  Meetings  of  committees  shall  continue  until  they  complete  their  tasks,  with  due 
regarded  for  the  date  set  for  closing  the  session.  Their  resolutions  shall  be 
carried  by  majority  vote. 
3.  Every  committee  shall  start  its  work  by  selecting  a  chairman  and  a  reporter 
from  among  its  members.  The  reporter  of  the  committee  shall  act  for  the 
chairman  in  directing  the  meeting  in  the  absence  of  the  chairman.  The 
chairman,  or  the  reporter  in  the  chairman's  absence,  shall  submit  to  the  Council 
all  explanations  that  it  requests  on  the  committee's  reports.  The  chairman  may, 
with  the  approval  of  the  session's  President,  take  part  in  the  discussions, 
without  voting,  so  long  as  he  is  not  a  member  of  the  Supreme  Council. 
4.  The  Council  may  refer  any  of  the  matters  included  in  the  agenda  to  the 
committees,  based  on  their  specialization  for  study  and  reporting.  Any  one  item 
may  be  referred  to  more  than  one  committee. 
5.  Committee  may  neither  discuss  any  matter  not  referred  to  them  by  the  Council, 
nor  adopt  any  recommendation  which,  if  approved  by  the  Council,  may  entail  a 
financial  obligation,  before  the  committee  receives  a  report  from  the  Secretary- 
General  regarding  the  financial  and  administrative  results  that  may  ensue  from 
adopting  the  resolution. 
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ARTICLE  ELEVEN 
The  Process  of  Deliberation  and  Putting  Forward  Proposals 
1.  Every  member  State  may  participate  in  the  deliberation  of  the  Supreme  Council 
and  its  committees  in  the  manner  provided  for  in  these  Rules  of  Procedure. 
2.  The  president  shall  direct  discussion  of  items  as 
, 
presented  in  order  on  the 
agenda  of  the  meeting  and  may,  when  necessary,  call  upon  the  Secretary- 
General  or  his  representative  in  the  meeting  to  provide  such  clarification  as  he 
sees  fit. 
3  The  President  shall  give  the  floor  to  speakers  in  the  order  of  their  requests.  He 
may  give  priority  to  the  Chairman  or  reporter  of  a  committee  to  submit  a  report 
or  explain  specific  points. 
Every  member  may,  during  deliberations,  raise  points  of  order  on  which  the 
president  shall  pronounce  immediately  and  his  decisions  shall  have  effect 
unless  voted  by  a  majority  of  the  Supreme  Council  member  States. 
ARTICLE  TWELVE 
1.  Every  member  may,  during  the  discussion  of  any  subject,  request  suspension  or 
adjournment  of  the  meeting  or  discussion  of  the  subject,  or  closure.  Such  requests 
may  not  be  discussed  but  the  President  shall  put  them  to  the  vote,  if  duly 
seconded,  and  decision  shall  be  by  majority  of  the  member  States. 
2.  With  due  regard  to  provisions  of  item  4  of  the  preceding  Article,  suggestions 
indicated  in  item  1  of  this  Article  shall  be  given  priority  over  all  others  based  on 
the  following  order: 
ü 
a.  Suspension  of  the  meeting. 
b.  Adjournment  of  the  meeting. 
c.  Postponement  of  discussion  of  the  matter  in  hand. 
d.  Closure  of  discussion  of  the  matter  in  hand. 
3.  Apart  from  suggestions  on  formulation  or  procedural  matters,  draft  resolutions 
and  substantive  amendments  shall  be  submitted  in  writing  to  the  Secretary- 
General  or  his  representative  who  shall  distribute  them  as  soon  as  possible  to  the 
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delegations.  No  draft  resolution  may  be  submitted  for  discussion  or  voting  before 
the  next  thereof  is  distributed  to  all  the  delegations. 
4.  A  proposal  on  which  a  decision  has  been  taken  may  not  be  reconsidered  in  the 
same  session  unless  the  Council  decides  otherwise. 
ARTICLE  THIRTEEN 
The  President  shall  follow  up  on  the  activities  of  the  committees,  inform  the 
Supreme  Council  of  correspondence  received,  and  formally  announce  before 
members  all  the  resolutions  and  recommendations  arrived  at. 
ARTICLE  FOURTEEN 
Voting 
Every  member  State  shall  have  one  vote  and  no  State  may  represent  another  State 
or  vote  on  its  behalf. 
ARTICLE  FIFTEEN 
l  Noting  shall  be  by  calling  the  names  in  the  alphabetical  order  of  the  States' 
names,  or  by  raising  hands.  Voting  shall  be  secret  if  so  requested  by  a  member  or 
by  decision  of  the  President. 
The  Supreme  Council  may  decide  otherwise.  The  vote  of  every  member  shall  be 
documented  in  the  minutes  of  the  meeting  if  voting  is  effected  by  calling  the 
names.  The  minutes  shall  indicate  the  result  of  voting,  if  the  vote  is  secret  or  by 
show  of  hands. 
2.  A  member  may  abstain  from  vote  or  express  reservations  over  a  procedural 
matter  or  part  thereof,  in  which  case  the  reservation  shall  be  read  at  the  time  the 
resolution  is  announced  and  shall  be  duly  documented  in  writing.  Members  may 
present  explanations  about  their  stand  in  the  voting  after.  voting  is  completed. 
3.  Once  the  President  announces  that  voting  has  started,  no  interruption  may  be 
made  unless  the  matter  relates  to  a  point  of  order  relevant  to  the  vote. 
257 APPENDIX  2 
ARTICLE  SIXTEEN 
1.  If  a  member  request  amendment  of  a  proposal,  voting  on  the  amendment  shall 
be  carried  out  first.  If  there  is  more  than  one  amendment,  voting  shall  first  be 
made  on  the  amendment  which  in  the  President's  opinion  is  farthest  from  the 
original  proposal,  then  on  the  next  farthest,  and  so  on  until  voting  is  completed  on 
all  proposed  amendments.  If  one  or  more  such  amendments  is  passed,  then  voting 
shall  be  made  on  the  original  proposal  as  amended. 
2.  Any  new  proposal  shall  be  deemed  to  be  an  amendment  to  the  original  proposal 
if  it  merely  entails  an  addition  to,  omission  or  change  to  a  part  of  the  original 
proposal. 
ARTICLE  SEVENTEEN 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  may  create  technical  committees  charged  with  giving 
advice  on  the  design  and  implementation  of  Supreme  Council  programmes  in 
specific  fields. 
2.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  appoint  the  members  of  the  technical  committees 
from  specialists  who  are  citizens  of  the  member  States. 
3  The  technical  committees  shall  meet  at  the  invitation  of  the  Secretary-General 
and  shall  draw  up  their  work  plans  in  consultation  with  him. 
4.  The  Secretary-General  shall  prepare  the  agenda  of  the  committees  after 
consultation  with  the  chairman  of  the  committee  concerned. 
ARTICLE  EIGHTEEN 
Amendment  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure 
1.  Any  member  State  may  propose  amendments  to  the  Rules  of  Procedure. 
2.  No  proposed  amendments  may  be  considered  unless  the  relevant  proposal  has 
been  circulated  to  the  member  States  by  the  Secretariat-General  at  least  thirty 
days  prior  to  submission  to  the  Ministerial  Council. 
3  No  basic  changes  may  be  introduced  to  the  proposed  amendment  mentioned  in 
the  preceding  paragraph  unless  the  text  of  such  proposed  changes  has  been 
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circulated  to  the  member  States  by  the  Secretary-General  at  least-fifteen  days 
before  submission  to  the  Ministerial  Council. 
4.  Except  for  items  based  on  the  provisions  of  the  Charter,  and  with  due  regard  to 
the  provisions  of  preceding  paragraphs  these  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  be 
amended  by  a  resolution  of  the  Supreme  Council  approved  by  a  majority  of  the 
members. 
ARTICLE  NINETEEN 
Effective  Date 
These  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  go  into  effect  as  of  the  date  of  approval  by  the 
Supreme  Council  and  may  not  be  amended  except  in  accordance  with  procedures 
set  forth  in  the  preceding  Article. 
These  Rules  of  Procedure  are  signed  at  Abu  Dhabi  City,  United  Arab  Emirates  on 
31  Raghab  1401  AH  Corresponding  to  25  May  1981  AD. 
The  United  Arab  Emirates 
The  State  of  Bahrain 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia 
The  Sultanate  of  Oman 
The  State  of  Qatar 
The  State  of  Kuwait. 
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THE  CO-OPERATION  COUNCIL 
For  The  Arab  States  of  the  Gulf  Rules  of  Procedure 
of  the  Ministerial  Council 
ARTICLE  ONE 
1.  These  regulations  shall  be  called  Rules  of  procedure  of  the  Ministerial  Council 
of  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Co-operation  Council  and  shall  encompass  rules 
governing  meetings  of  the  Council  and  the  exercise  of  its  functions. 
2.  The  following  terms  as  used  herein  shall  have  the  meanings  indicated  opposite 
each: 
Co-operation  Council  :  The  Gulf  Arab  States  Co-operation  Council. 
Charter  :  Statute  establishing  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Co-operation  Council. 
Supreme  Council  :  The  highest  body  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Co-operation 
Council. 
Council  :  Ministerial  Council  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Co-operation  Council. 
Secretary-General  :  The  Secretary-General  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Co-operation 
Council. 
Chairman  :  The  Chairman  of  the  Ministerial  Council  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States 
Co-operation  Council. 
ARTICLE  TWO 
-States  Representation 
1.  The  Ministerial  Council  shall  be  composed  of  the  member  States'  Foreign 
Ministers  or  other  delegated  Ministers. 
2.  Every  member  State  shall,  at  least  one  week  prior  to  the  convening  of  every 
ordinary  session  of  the  Ministerial  Council  convey  to  the  Secretary-General  a  list 
of  the  name  of  the  members  of  its  delegation.  For  extraordinary  sessions,  the  list 
shall  be  submitted  three  days  before  the  date  set  for  the  session. 
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ARTICLE  THREE 
Convening  the  Sessions 
1.  The  Ministerial  Council  shall  decide  in  every  meeting  the  venue  of  its  next 
regular  session  . 
2.  The  Secretary-General  shall  decide,  in  consultation  with  the  member  States,  the 
venues  of  extraordinary  sessions. 
3.  If  circumstances  should  arise  that  preclude  the  convening  of  an  ordinary  or 
extraordinary  session  at  the  place  set  for  it,  the  Secretary-General  shall  so 
inform  the  member  States  and  shall  set  another  place  for  the  meeting  after 
consultation  with  them. 
ARTICLE  FOUR 
Ordinary  Sessions 
1.  The  Council  shall  convene  in  ordinary  session  once  every  three  months. 
2.  The  Secretary-General  shall  set  the  date  for  opening  the  session  and  suggest  the 
date  of  its  closing. 
3  The  Secretary-General  shall  address  the  invitation  to  attend  a  Council  ordinary 
session  at  least  fifteen  days  in  advance,  and  shall  indicate  therein  the  date  and 
place  set  for  the  meeting,  as  well  as  attaching  thereto  the  agenda  of  the  session, 
explanatory  notes  and  other  documentation. 
ARTICLE  FIVE 
Extraordinary  Sessions 
1.  The  Council  shall  hold  an  extraordinary  session  at  the  request  of  any  member 
State  seconded  by  another  member. 
2.  The  Secretary-General  shall  address  the  invitation  to  the  Council's 
extraordinary  session  and  attach  a  memorandum  containing  the  request  of  the 
member  State  which  has  requested  the  meeting. 
3.  The  Secretary-General  shall  specify  in  the  invitation  the  place,  date  and  agenda 
of  the  session. 
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ARTICLE  SIX 
1.  The  Council  may  itself  decide  to  hold  extraordinary  sessions,  in  which  case  it 
shall  specify  the  agenda,  time  and  place  of  the  session. 
2.  The  Secretary-General  shall  send  out  to  the  member  States  the  invitation  to 
attend  the  extraordinary  meeting  of  the  Council  along  with  a  memorandum 
containing  the  resolution  of  the  Council  to  this  effect,  and  specifying  the  date 
and  agenda  of  the  session. 
3.  The  extraordinary  session  shall  be  convened  within  a  maximum  of  five  days 
from  the  date  of  issue  of  the  invitation. 
ARTICLE  SEVEN 
No  matters,  other  than  those  for  which  the  extraordinary  session  was  called,  may 
be  included  on  its  agenda. 
ARTICLE  EIGHT 
Agenda 
The  Secretary-General  shall  prepare  a  draft  agenda  for  a  council's  ordinary  session 
and  such  draft  shall  include  the  following: 
1.  The  report  of  the  Secretary-General  on  the  work  of  the  Co-operation  Council. 
2.  Matters  referred  to  him  by  the  Supreme  Council. 
3.  Matters  which  the  Council  had  previously  decided  to  include  on  the  agenda. 
4.  Matters  which  the  Secretary-General  believes  should  be  reviewed  by  the 
Council. 
5.  Matters  suggested  by  a  member  State. 
ARTICLE  NINE 
Member  States  shall  convey  to  the  Secretary-General  their  suggestions  on  matters 
they  wish  to  include  on  the  Council's  agenda  at  least  thirty  days  prior  to  the  date 
of  the  Council's  ordinary  session. 
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ARTICLE  TEN 
Member  States  or  the  Secretary-General  may  request  the  inclusion  of  additional 
items  on  the  Council's  draft  agenda  at  least  ten  days  prior  to  the  date  set  for 
opening  an  ordinary  session.  Such  items  shall  be  listed  on  an  additional  schedule 
which  shall  be  conveyed  along  with  relevant  documentation  to  the  member  States 
at  least  five  days  prior  to  the  date  of  the  session. 
ARTICLE  ELEVEN 
Member  States  or  the  Secretary-General  may  request  inclusion  of  additional  items 
on  the  agenda  for  the  Council's  ordinary  session  up  to  the  date  set  for  opening  the 
session  if  such  matters  are  both  important  and  urgent. 
ARTICLE  TWELVE 
The  Council  shall  approve  its  agenda  at  the  beginning  of  every  session. 
ARTICLE  THIRTEEN 
A  Council's  ordinary  session  shall  end  upon  completion  of  discussion  of  matters 
listed  on  the  agenda.  The  Council  may,  when  necessary,  decide  to  suspend  its 
meetings  temporarily  before  discussion  of  agenda  items  is  completed  and  resume 
at  a  later  date. 
ARTICLE  FOURTEEN 
The  Council  may  defer  discussion  of  certain  items  on  its  agenda  and  decide  to 
include.  them  with  the  others,  when  necessary,  on  the  agenda  of  a  subsequent 
session. 
ARTICLE  FIFTEEN 
Chairmanship  of  the  Council 
1.  Chairmanship  of  the  Council  shall  be  entrusted  to  the  member  State  which 
presided  the  last  ordinary  session  of  the  Supreme  Council,  or,  if  necessary,  to 
the  State  which  is  next  to  preside  the  Supreme  Council. 
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2  The  Chairman  shall  exercise  his  functions  until  he  passes  his  post  on  to  his 
successor. 
3.  The  Chairman  shall  also  preside  over  extraordinary  sessions. 
4.  The  representative  of  a  State  that  is  party  to  an  outstanding  dispute  may  not 
chair  the  session  or  meeting  assigned  for  discussing  such  dispute,  in  which  case 
the  Council  shall  name  a  temporary  Chairman. 
ARTICLE  SIXTEEN 
1.  The  Chairman  shall  announce  the  opening  and  closing  of  sessions  and 
meetings,  the  suspension  of  meetings  and  closure  of  discussions,  and  shall 
ensure  respect  for  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  and  these  Rules  of  Procedure. 
2.  The  Chairman  may  participate  in  the  Council's  deliberations  and  vote  in  the 
name  of  the  State  he  represents.  He  may,  for  such  purpose,  delegate  another 
member  of  his  delegation  to  act  on  his  behalf. 
ARTICLE  SEVENTEEN 
Office  of  the  Council 
1.1.  The  office  of  the  Council  shall  include  the  Chairman,  Secretary-General,  and 
heads  of  working  sub-committees  which  the  Council  has  resolved  to  set  up. 
2.  The  Chairman  of  the  Council  shall  preside  over  the  Office. 
ARTICLE  EIGHTEEN 
The  Office  shall  carry  out  the  following  tasks: 
1.  Assist  the  Chairman  to  direct  the  proceeding  of  the  session. 
2.  Co-ordinate  the  work  of  the  Council  and  the  sub-committees. 
3.  Supervise  the  drafting  of  the  resolutions  passed  by  the  Council. 
4.  Other  tasks  indicated  in  these  Rules  of  Procedure  or  entrusted  to  it  by  the 
Council. 
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ARTICLE  NINETEEN 
Sub-committees 
1.  The  Council  shall  call  upon  preparatory  and  working  committees  to  assist  in 
accomplishing  its  tasks. 
2.  The  Secretariat-General  shall  participate  in  the  work  of  the  committees. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY 
1.  The  Secretary-General  may,  in  consultation  with  the  Chairman  of  the  session, 
form  preparatory  committees  charged  with  the  study  of  matters  listed  on  the 
agenda. 
2.  Preparatory  committees  shall  be  composed  of  delegates  of  member  States  and 
may,  when  necessary,  seek  the  help  of  such  experts  as  they  may  deem 
appropriate. 
3.  Each  preparatory  committee  shall  meet  at  least  three  days  prior  to  the  opening 
of  the  session  by  invitation  of  the  Secretary-General.  The  work  of  the 
committee  shall  end  at  the  close  of  the  session. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY-  ONE 
1.  The  Council  may,  at  the  start  of  each  session,  form  working  committees  and 
charge  them  with  specific  tasks. 
2.  The  work  of  the  working  committees  shall  continue  until  the  date  set  for 
closing  the  session. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY-TWO 
1.  Each  sub-committee  shall  start  its  work  by  electing  a  chairman  and  a  reporter 
from  among  its  members.  When  the  chairman  is  absent,  the  reporter  shall  act 
for  him  in  directing  the  meetings. 
2.  The  chairman  or  reporter  of  each  sub-committee  shall  submit  a  report  on  its 
work  to  the  Council. 
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3  The  chairman  or  reporter  of  a  sub-committee  shall  present  to  the  Council  all 
explanations  required  regarding  the  contents  of  the  sub-committee's  report. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY-THREE 
1.  The  Secretariat-General  shall  organize  the  technical  secretariat  and  sub- 
committees  of  the  Council. 
2.  The  Secretariat-General  shall  prepare  minutes  of  meetings  documenting 
discussions,  resolutions  and  recommendations.  Such  minutes  shall  be  prepared 
for  all  meetings  of  the  Council  and  its  sub-committees. 
3.  The  Secretary-General  shall  supervise  the  organization  of  the  Council's 
relations  with  the  information  media. 
4.  The  Secretary-General  shall  convey  the  Council's  resolutions  and 
recommendations  and  relevant  documentation  to  the  member  States  within 
fifteen  days  after  the  end  of  the  session. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY-FOUR 
The  Council's  Secretariat  and  sub-committees  shall  receive  and  distribute 
documents,  reports,  resolutions  and  recommendations  of  the  Council  and  its  sub- 
committees  and  shall  draw  up  and  distribute  minutes  and  daily  bulletins  in 
addition  to  safeguarding  documents  and  performing  other  tasks  required  by  the 
Council's  work. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY-FIVE 
Texts  of  resolutions  or  recommendations  made  by  the  Council  may  not  be 
announced  or  published  except  by  resolution  of  the  Council. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY-SIX, 
Deliberations 
Every  member  State  may  take  part  in  the  deliberations  of  the  Council  and  its  sub- 
committees  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  these  Rules  of  procedure. 
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ARTICLE  TWENTY-SEVEN 
1.  The  Chairman  shall  direct  deliberations  on  matters  on  hand  in  the  order  they 
are  listed  on  the  Council's  agenda. 
2.  The  Chairman  shall  give  floor  to  speakers  in  the  order  of  their  requests.  Priority 
may  be  given  to  the  chairman  or  reporter  of  a  particular  committee  to  present 
its  report  or  explain  certain  points  therein.  The  floor  shall  be  given  to  the 
Secretary-General  or  his  representative  whenever  it  is  necessary. 
3.  The  Council  Chairman  may,  during  deliberations,  read  the  list  of  the  names  or 
members  who  have  requested  the  floor,  and  with  the  approval  of  the  Council, 
close  the  list.  The  only  exception  is  exercise  of  the  right  of  reply. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY-EIGHT 
The  Council  shall  decide  whether  the  meetings  shall  be  held  in  open  or  close 
session. 
ARTICLE  TWENTY-NINE 
1.  Every  member  state  may  raise  a  point  of  order,  on  which  the  chairman  shall 
pronounce  immediately  and  his  decision  shall  take  effect  unless  vetoed  by  a 
majority  of  the  member  states. 
2.  A  member  who  raises  point  of  order  may  not  go  beyond  the  point  he  has  raised. 
ARTICLE  THIRTY 
1.  Every  member  may,  during  discussion  of  any  matter,  propose  the  suspension  or 
adjournment  of  the  meeting,  or  discussion  of  the  matter  on  hand,  or  closure.  The 
Chairman  shall  in  such  cases  put  the  proposal  to  the  vote  directly,  if  the  proposal 
is  seconded  by  another  member.  Such  proposal  requires  the  approval  of  the 
majority  of  the  member  States  to  pass. 
2.  With  due  regard  to  the  provisions  of  the  preceding  paragraph  proposals 
indicated  therein  shall  be  submitted  to  the  vote  in  the  following  order: 
i)  Suspension  of  meeting. 
ii)  Adjournment  of  meeting. 
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iii)Postponement  of  discussion  of  the  matter  in  hand. 
iv)  Closure  of  discussion  of  the  matter  in  hand. 
ARTICLE  THIRTY-ONE 
1.  Member  states  may  suggest  draft  resolutions  or  recommendations,  or 
amendments  thereto,  and  may  withdraw  all  such  unless  they  are  voted  upon. 
2.  Draft  indicated  in  the  preceding  item  shall  be  submitted  in  writing  to  the 
Secretariat-General  for  distribution  to  delegations  as  soon  as  possible. 
3.  Except  for  proposals  concerning  formulation  or  procedures,  drafts  indicated  in 
this  Article  may  not  be  discussed  or  voted  upon  before  their  texts  are 
distributed  to  all  delegations. 
4.  A  proposal  already  decided  upon  may  not  be  reconsidered  in  the  same  session 
unless  the  Council  decides  otherwise. 
ARTICLE  THIRTY-TWO 
The  Chairman  shall  follow  up  the  work  of  the  committees,  inform  the  Council  of 
incoming  correspondence,  and  formally  announce  before  members  the  resolutions 
and  recommendations  arrived  at. 
ARTICLE  THIRTY-THREE 
Voting 
1.  The  Council  shall  pass  its  resolutions  with  the  unanimous  approval  of  the 
member  states  present  and  participating  in  the  vote,  while  decisions  in 
procedural  matters  shall  be  passed  by  majority  vote.  Any  member  abstaining 
from  voting  shall  record  the  fact  that  he  is  not  bound  by  the  vote. 
2  If  members  of  the  Council  should  disagree  on  the  definition  of  the  matter  being 
put  to  the  vote,  the  matter  shall  be  settled  by  majority  vote  of  the  member  states 
present. 
ARTICLE  THIRTY-FOUR 
1.  Every  member  state  shall  have  one  vote. 
2.  No  member  state  may  represent  another  state  or  vote  on  its  behalf. 
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ARTICLE  THIRTY-FIVE 
1.  Voting  shall  be  by  the  names  in  the  alphabetical  order  of  the  states'  names,  or 
by  show  of  hands. 
Voting  shall  be  by  secret  ballot  if  so  requested  by  a  member  or  by  decision  of 
the  chairman.  The  Council,  however,  may  decide  otherwise. 
3.  The  vote  of  every  member  shall  be  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  the  meeting  if 
voting  is  by  calling  the  names.  The  minutes  shall  indicate  the  result  of  voting  if 
the  vote  is  secret  or  by  show  of  hands. 
4.  Member  states  may  explain  their  positions  after  the  vote  and  such  explanations 
shall  be  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  the  meeting. 
5.  Once  the  Chairman  announces  that  voting  has  started,  no  interruption  may  be 
made  except  for  a  point  of  order  relating  to  the  vote  or  its  postponement  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Article  and  the  next. 
ARTICLE  THIRTY-SIX 
1.  The  Council  Chairman  with  the  help  of  the  Secretary-General  shall  endeavour 
to  reconcile  the  positions  of  member  states  on  disputed  matters  and  obtain  their 
agreement  to  a  draft  resolution  before  submitting  it  to  the  vote. 
2.  The  Council  Chairman,  the  Secretary-General  or  any  member  state  may  request 
postponement  of  a  vote  for  a  specific  period  during  which  further  negotiations 
may  take  place  on  the  item  submitted  to  the  vote. 
ARTICLE  THIRTY-SEVEN 
1.  If  a  member  requests  amendment  of  a  proposal,  voting  on  the  amendment  shall 
be  carried  out  first.  If  there  is  more  than  one  amendment,  voting  shall  first  be 
made  on  the  amendment  which  the  Chairman  considers  to  be  farthest  from  the 
original  proposal,  then  on  the  next  farthest,  and  .  so  on  until  all  proposed 
amendment  have  been  voted  upon.  If  one  or  more  amendment  have  been  voted 
upon.  If  one  or  more  amendment  is  passed,  then  voting  shall  be  made  on  the 
original  proposal  as  amended. 
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2.  A  new  proposal  shall  be  deemed  to  be  an  amendment  to  the  original  proposal  if 
it  merely  entails  an  addition  to,  omission  from,  or  change  to  a  part  of  the  original 
proposal. 
ARTICLE  THIRTY-EIGHT 
1.  Any  member  state  or  the  Secretary-General  may  propose  amending  these  Rules 
of  Procedure. 
No  proposed  amendment  to  these  Rules  of  Procedure  may  be  considered  unless 
the  relevant  proposal  is  circulated  to  the  member  states  by  the  Secretariat- 
General  at  least  thirty  days  before  submission  to  the  Council. 
3.  No  basic  changes  may  be  introduced  to  the  proposed  amendment  mentioned  in 
the  preceding  item  unless  the  texts  of  such  proposed  change  have  been 
circulated  to  the  member  states  at  least  fifteen  days  prior  to  submission  to  the 
Council. 
4.  Except  for  items  based  on  provisions  of  the  Charter,  and  with  due  regard  to 
preceding  items,  these  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  be  amended  by  a  resolution  of 
the  Council  approved  by  a  majority  of  its  members. 
ARTICLE  THIRTY-NINE 
Effective  date 
These  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  go  into  effect  as  of  the  date  of  approval  by  the 
Council  and  may  not  be  amended  except  in  accordance  with  procedures  set  forth 
in  the  preceding  article. 
Thus,  these  Rules  of  Procedure  are  signed  at  Abu  Dhabi  City,  United  Arab 
Emirates,  on  21  Rajab  1401  H.  corresponding  to  25  May  1981  AD. 
The  United  Arab  Emirates 
The  State  of  Bahrain 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia 
The  Sultanate  of  Oman 
The  State  of  Qatar 
The  State  of  Kuwait. 
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CO-OPERATION  COUNCIL 
For  the  Arab  States  of  Gulf  Rules  of  Procedure 
Commission  for  Settlement  of  disputes 
Preamble 
In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  Six  of  the  Charter  of  the  Gulf  Arab 
States  Co-operation  Council;  and 
In  implementation  of  the  Provisions  of  Article  Ten  of  the  Co-operation  Council 
Charter, 
A  commission  for  Settlement  of  Disputes,  hereinafter  referred  to  as  Commission, 
shall  be  set  up  and  its  jurisdiction  and  rules  for  its  proceeding  shall  be  as  follows: 
ARTICLE  ONE 
Terminology 
Terms  used  in  these  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  have  the  same  meanings  as  those 
established  in  the  Charter  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Co-operation  Council. 
ARTICLE  TWO 
The  Location  and  Session  of  the  Commission 
The  commission  shall  have  its  headquarters  at  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  shall 
hold  its  meetings  on  the  territory  of  the  state  where  its  headquarters  is  located,  but 
may  hold  its  meetings  elsewhere,  when  necessary. 
ARTICLE  THREE 
Jurisdiction 
The  Commission  shall,  once  installed,  have  jurisdiction  to  consider  the  following 
matters  referred  to  it  by  the  Supreme  Council: 
i)  disputes  between  member  States. 
ii)  Differences  of  opinion  as  to  the  interpretation  or  implementation  of  the  Co- 
operation  Council  Charter. 
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ARTICLE  FOUR 
Membership  of  the  Commission 
i)  The  Commission  shall  be  formed  of  an  appropriate  number  of  citizens  of  the 
member  states  not  involved  in  the  dispute.  The  Council  shall  select  members  of 
the  commission  in  every  case  separately  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  dispute, 
provided  that  the  number  shall  be  no  less  than  three. 
ii)  The  Commission  may  seek  the  advice  of  such  experts  and  consultants  as  it  may 
deem  necessary. 
ii  )Unless  the  Supreme  Council  resolves  otherwise,  the  Commission's  task  shall 
end  with  the  submission  of  its  recommendations  or  opinion  to  the  Supreme 
Council  which,  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Commission's  task,  may  summon  it 
at  any  time  to  explain  or  elaborate  on  its  recommendations  or  opinions. 
ARTICLE  FIVE 
Meetings  and  Internal  Procedures 
i)  A  meeting  of  the  Commission  shall  be  valid  if  attended  by  all  members. 
ii)  The  Secretariat-General  of  the  Co-operation  Council  shall  prepare  procedures 
required  to  conduct  the  Commission's  affairs,  and  such  procedures  shall  go  into 
effect  as  of  the  date  of  approval  by  the  Ministerial  Council. 
iii  Each  party  to  the  dispute  shall  send  representatives  to  the  Commission  who 
shall  be  entitled  to  follow  proceedings  and  present  their  defense. 
ARTICLE  SIX 
Chairmanship 
The  Commission  shall  select  a  chairman  from  among  its  members. 
ARTICLE  SEVEN 
Voting 
Every  member  of  the  Commission  shall  have  one  vote,  and  shall  issue  its 
recommendations  or  opinions  on  matters  referred  to  it  by  a  majority  of  the 
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members.  In  the  event  of  an  indecisive  vote  the  party  with  whom  the  Chairman 
has  voted  shall  prevail. 
ARTICLE  EIGHT 
The  Secretariat  of  the  Commission 
i)  The  Secretariat-General  shall  appoint  a  Secretary  for  the  Commission,  and  a 
sufficient  number  of  officials  to  carry  out  the  work  of  the  Commission's 
Secretariat. 
ii)  The  Supreme  Council  may  if  necessary  create  an  independent  organization  to 
carry out  the  work  of  the  Secretariat  of  the  Commission. 
ARTICLE  NINE 
Recommendations  and  Opinions 
i)  The  Commission  shall  issue  its  recommendations  or  opinions  in  accordance 
with  the  Co-operation  Council's  Charter,  with  international  laws  and  practices, 
and  the  principles  of  Islamic  Shari'ah.  The  Commission  shall  submit  its 
findings  on  the  case  in  hand  to  the  Supreme  Council  for  appropriate  action. 
ii)  The  Commission  may,  while  considering  any  dispute  referred  to  it  and  pending 
the  issue  of  its  final  recommendations  thereon,  ask  the  Supreme  Council  to  take 
interim  action  called  for  by  necessity  or  circumstances. 
iii)The  Commission's  recommendations  or  opinions  shall  specify  the  reasons  on 
which  they  were  based  and  shall  be  signed  by  the  Chairman  and  secretary. 
iv  If  an  opinion  is  not  passed  wholly  or  partially  by  unanimous  vote  of  the 
members,  the  dissenting  members  shall  be  entitled  to  record  their  dissenting 
opinion. 
ARTICLE  TEN 
Immunities  and  Privileges 
The  Commission  and  its  members  shall  enjoy  such  immunities  and  privileges  in 
the  territories  of  the  member  states  as  are  required  to  realize  its  objectives  in 
accordance  with  Article  Seventeen  of  the  Co-operation  Council  Charter. 
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ARTICLE  ELEVEN 
The  Budget  of  the  Commission 
The  commission's  budget  shall  be  considered  part  of  the  Secretariat-General's 
budget.  Remuneration  of  the  Commission's  members  shall  be  established  by  the 
Supreme  Council. 
ARTICLE  TWELVE 
Amendments 
i)  Any  member  state  may  request  for  amendments  to  these  Rules  of  Procedure. 
ii)  Requests  for  amendments  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Secretary-General  who 
shall  relay  them  to  the  member  states  at  least  four  months  before  submission  to 
the  Ministerial  Council. 
i  i)An  amendment  shall  be  effective  if  approved  unanimously  by  the  Supreme 
Council. 
ARTICLE  THIRTEEN 
Effective  Date 
These  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  go  into  effect  as  of  the  date  of  approval  by  the 
Supreme  Council. 
These  Rules  of  Procedure  were  signed  at  Abu  Dhabi  City,  United  Arab  Emirates 
on  21  Rajab  1401  H.  corresponding  to  25  May  1981  AD. 
The  United  Arab  Emirates 
The  State  of  Bahrain 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia 
The  Sultanate  of  Oman 
The  State  of  Qatar 
The  State  of  Kuwait. 
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EUROPEAN  CONVENTION  ON  EXTRADITION. 
The  governments  signatory  hereto,  being  Members  of  the  Council  of  Europe, 
Considering  that  the  aim  of  the  Council  of  Europe  is  to  achieve  a  greater  unity 
between  its  Members; 
Considering  that  this  purpose  can  be  attained  by  the  conclusion  of  agreements  and 
by  common  action  in  legal  matters; 
Considering  that  the  acceptance  of  uniform  rules  with  regard  to  extradition  is 
likely  to  assist  this  work  of  unification, 
Have  agreed  as  follows: 
ARTICLE  1 
Obligation  to  extradite 
The  Contracting  Parties  undertake  to  surrender  to  each,  subject  to  the  provisions 
and  conditions  laid  down  in  this  Convention,  all  persons  against  whom  the 
competent  authorities  of  the  requesting  Party  are  proceeding  for  an  offense  or  who 
are  wanted  by  the  said  authorities  for  the  carrying  out  of  a  sentence  or  detention 
order. 
ARTICLE  2 
Extraditable  offences 
1.  Extradition  shall  be  granted  in  respect  of  offences  punishable  under  the  laws  of 
the  requesting  Party  and  the  requested  Party  by  deprivation  of  liberty  or  under  a 
detention  order  for  a  maximum  period  of  at  least  one  year  or  by  a  more  severe 
penalty.  Where  a  conviction  and  prison  sentence  have  occurred  or  detention 
order  has  been  made  in  the  territory  of  the  requesting  Party,  the  punishment 
awarded  must  have  been  for  a  period  of  at  least  four  months. 
2.  If  the  request  for  extradition  includes  several  separate  offences  each  of  which  is 
punishable  under  the  laws  of  the  requesting  Party  and  the  requested  Party  by 
deprivation  of  liberty  or  under  the  detention  order,  but  of  which  some  do  not 
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fulfill  the  condition  with  regard  to  the  amount  of  punishment  which  may  be 
awarded,  the  requested  Party  shall  also  have  the  right  to  grant  extradition  for 
the  latter  offences. 
3.  Any  Contracting  Party  whose  law  does  not  allow  extradition  for  certain  of  the 
offences  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  of  this  article  may,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
concerned,  exclude  such  offences  from  the  application  of  this  Convention. 
4.  Any  Convention  Party  which  wishes  to  avail  itself  of  the  right  provided  for  in 
paragraph  3  of  this  article  shall,  at  the  time  of  the  deposit  of  its  instrument  of 
ratification  or  accession,  transmit  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  either  a  list  of  the  offences  for  which  extradition  is  allowed  or  a  list  of 
those  for  which  it  is  excluded  and  shall  at  the  same  time  indicate  the  legal 
provisions  which  allow  or  exclude  extradition.  The  Secretary  General  of  the 
Council  shall  forward  these  lists  to  the  other  Signatories. 
5.  If  extradition  is  subsequently  excluded  in  respect  of  other  offences  by  the  law 
of  a  Contracting  Party,  that  Party  shall  notify  the  Secretary  General.  The 
Secretary  General  shall  inform  the  other  Signatories.  Such  notification  shall  not 
take  effect  until  three  months  from  the  date  of  its  receipt  by  the  Secretary 
General. 
6.  Any  Party  which  avails  itself  of  the  right  provided  for  in  paragraphs  4  or  5  of 
this  article  may  at  any  time  apply  this  Convention  to  offences  which  have  been 
excluded  from  it.  It  shall  inform  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  such 
changes,  and  the  Secretary  General  shall  inform  the  other  Signatories. 
7.  Any  Party  may  apply  reciprocity  in  respect  of  any  offences  excluded  from  the 
application  of  the  Convention  under  this  article. 
ARTICLE  3 
Political  offences 
1.  Extradition  shall  not  be  granted  if  the  offence  in  respect  of  which  it  is  requested 
is  regarded  by  the  requested  Party  as  a  political  offence  or  as  an  offence 
connected  with  a  political  offence. 
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2.  The  same  rule  shall  apply  if  the  requested  Party  has  substantial  grounds  for 
believing  that  a  request  for  extradition  for  an  ordinary  criminal  offence  has 
been  made  for  the  purpose  of  prosecuting  or  punishing  a  person  on  account  of 
his  race,  religion,  nationality  or  political  opinion,  or  that  that  person's  position 
may  be  prejudiced  for  any  of  these  reasons. 
3.  The  taking  or  attempted  taking  of  the  life  of  a  Head  of  State  or  a  member  of  his 
family  shall  not  be  deemed  to  be  a  political  offence  for  the  purposes  of  this 
Convention. 
4.  This  article  shall  not  affect  any  obligations  which  the  Contracting  Parties  may 
have  undertaken  or  may  undertake  under  any  other  international  convention  of 
a  multilateral  character. 
ARTICLE  4 
Military  offences 
Extradition  for  offences  under  military  law  which  are  not  offences  under  ordinary 
criminal  law  is  excluded  from  the  application  of  this  Convention. 
ARTICLE  5 
Fiscal  offences 
Extradition  shall  be  granted,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Convention, 
for  offences  in  connection  with  taxes,  duties,  customs  and  exchange  only  of  the 
Contracting  Parties  have  so  decided  in  respect  of  any  such  offence  or  category  of 
offences. 
ARTICLE  6 
Extradition  of  nationals 
1.  a)  A  Contracting  Party  shall  have  the  right  to  refuse  extradition  of  its  nationals. 
b)  Each  Contracting  Party  may,  by  a  declaration  made  at  the  time  of  signature  or 
of  deposit  of  its  instrument  of  ratification  or  accession,  define  as  far  as  it  is 
concerned  the  term  "nationals"  within  the  meaning  of  this  Convention. 
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c)  Nationality  shall  be  determined  as  at  the  time  of  the  decision  concerning 
extradition.  If,  however,  the  person  claimed  is  first  recognised  as  a  national  of 
the  requested  Party  during  the  period  between  the  time  of  the  decision  and  the 
time  contemplated  for  the  surrender,  the  requested  Party  may  avail  itself  of  the 
provision  contained  in  sub-paragraph  (a)  of  this  article. 
2.  If  the  requested  Party  does  not  extradite  its  national,  it  shall  at  the  request  of  the 
requesting  Party  submit  the  case  to  its  competent  authorities  in  order  that 
proceedings  may  be  taken  if  they  are  considered  appropriate.  For  this  purpose,  the 
files,  information  and  exhibits  relating  to  the  offence  shall  be  transmitted  without 
charge  by  the  means  provided  for  in  Article  12,  paragraph  1.  The  requesting  Party 
shall  be  informed  of  the  result  of  its  request. 
ARTICLE  7 
Place  of  Commission 
1.  The  requested  Party  may  refuse  to  extradite  a  person  claimed  for  an  offence  which 
is  regarded  by  its  law  as  having  been  committed  in  whole  or  in  part  in  its  territory 
or  in  place  treated  as  its  territory. 
2.  When  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  has  been  committed  outside 
the  territory  of  the  requesting  Party,  extradition  may  only  be  refused  if  the  law  of 
the  requested  Party  does  not  allow  prosecution  for  the  same  category  of  offence 
when  committed  outside  the  latter  Party's  territory  or  does  not  allow  extradition 
for  the  offence  concerned. 
ARTICLE  8 
Pending  proceedings  for  the  same  offences 
The  requested  Party  may  refuse  to  extradite  the  person  claimed  if  the  competent 
authorities  of  such  Party  are  proceeding  against  him  in  respect  of  the  offence  or 
offences  for  which  extradition  is  requested. 
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ARTICLE  9 
Non  bis  in  idem 
Extradition  shall  not  be  granted  if  final  judgment  has  been  passed  by  the 
competent  authorities  of  the  requested  Party  upon  the  person  claimed  in  respect  of 
the  offence  or  offences  for  which  extradition  is  requested.  Extradition  may  be 
refused  if  the  competent  authorities  of  the  requested  Party  have  decided  either  not 
to  institute  or  to  terminate  proceedings  in  respect  of  the  same  offence  or  offences. 
ARTICLE  10 
Lapse  of  time 
Extradition  shall  not  be  granted  when  the  person  claimed  has,  according  to  the  law 
of  either  the  requesting  or  the  requested  Party,  become  immune  by  reason  of  lapse 
of  time  from  prosecution  or  punishment. 
ARTICLE  11 
Capital  punishment 
If  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  is  punishable  by  death  under  the 
law  of  the  requesting  Party,  and  if  in  respect  of  such  offence  the  death-penalty  is 
not  provided  for  by  the  law  of  the  requested  Party  or  is  not  normally  carried  out, 
extradition  may  be  refused  unless  the  requesting  Party  gives  such  assurance  as  the 
requested  Party  considers  sufficient  that  the  death-penalty  will  not  be  carried  out. 
ARTICLE  12 
The  request  and  supporting  documents 
1.  The  request  shall  be  in  writing  and  shall  be  communicated  through  the  diplomatic 
channel.  Other  means  of  communication  may  be  arranged  by  direct  agreement 
between  two  or  more  Parties. 
2.  The  request  shall  be  supported  by: 
a)  the  original  or  an  authenticated  copy  of  the  conviction  and  sentence  or  detention 
order  immediately  enforceable  or  of  the  warrant  of  arrest  or  other  order  having 
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the  same  effect  and  issued  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  laid  down  in  the 
law  of  the  requesting  Party; 
b)  a  statement  of  the  offences  for  which  extradition  is  requested.  The  time  and 
place  of  their  commission,  their  legal  descriptions  and  a  reference  to  the 
relevant  legal  provisions  shall  be  sent  out  as  accurately  as  possible;  and 
c)  a  copy  of  the  relevant  enactments  or,  where  this  is  not  possible,  a  statement  of 
the  relevant  law  and  as  accurate  a  description  as  possible  of  the  person  claimed, 
together  with  any  other  information  which  help  to  establish  his  identity  and 
nationality. 
ARTICLE  13 
Supplementary  information 
If  the  information  communicated  by  the  requesting  Party  is  found  to  be 
insufficient  to  allow  the  requested  Party  to  make  a  decision in  pursuance  of  this 
Convention,  the  latter  Party  shall  request  the  necessary  supplementary  information 
and  may  fix  a  time-limit  for  the  receipt  thereof. 
ARTICLE  14 
Rule  of  speciality 
1.  A  person  who  has  been  extradited  shall  not  be  proceeded  against,  sentenced  or 
detained  with  a  view  to  the  carrying  out  of  a  sentence  or  detention  order  for  any 
offence  committed  prior  to  his  surrender  other  than  that  for  which  he  was 
extradited,  nor  shall  he  be  for  any  other  reason  restricted  in  his  personal  freedom, 
except  in  the  following  cases: 
a)  When  the  Party  which  surrendered  him  consents.  A  request  for  consent  shall  be 
submitted,  accompanied  by  the  documents  mentioned  in  Article  12  and  a  legal 
record  of  any  statement  made  by  the  extradited  person  in  respect  of  the  offence 
concerned.  Consent  shall  be  given  when  the  offence  for  which  it  is  requested  is 
itself  subject  to  extradition  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this 
Convention; 
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b)  When  that  person,  having  had  an  opportunity  to  leave  the  territory  of  the  Party 
to  which  he  has  been  surrendered,  has  not  done  so  within  45  days  of  his  final 
discharge,  or  has  returned  to  that  territory  after  leaving  it. 
2.  The  requesting  Party  may,  however,  take  any  measures  necessary  to  remove  the 
person  from  its  territory,  or  any  measures  necessary  under  its  law,  including 
proceedings  by  default,  to  prevent  any  legal  effects  of  lapse  of  time. 
3.  When  the  description  of  "  the  offence  charged  is  altered  in  the  course  of 
proceedings,  the  extradited  person  shall  only  be  proceeded  against  or  sentenced  in 
so  far  as  the  offence  under  its  new  description  is  shown  by  its  constituent  elements 
to  be  an  offence  which  would  allow  extradition. 
ARTICLE  15 
Re-extradition  to  a  third  State 
Except  as  provided  for  in  Article  14,  paragraph  1(b),  the  requesting  Party  shall 
not,  without  the  consent  of  the  requested  Party,  surrender  to  another  Party  or  to  a 
third  State  a  person  surrendered  to  the  requesting  Party  and  sought  by  the  said 
other  Party  or  third  State  in  respect  of  offences  committed  before  his  surrender. 
The  requested  Party  may  request  the  production  of  the  documents  mentioned  in 
Article  12,  paragraph  2. 
ARTICLE  16 
Provisional  arrest 
1.  In  case  of  urgency  the  competent  authorities  of  the  requesting  Party  may  request 
the  provisional  arrest  of  the  person  sought.  The  competent  authorities  of  the 
requested  Party  shall  decide  the  matter  in  accordance  with  its  law. 
2.  The  request  for  provisional  arrest  shall  state  that  one  of  the  documents  mentioned 
in  Article  12,  paragraph  2(a),  exists  and  that  it  is  intended  to  send  a  request  for 
extradition.  It  shall  also  state  for  what  offence  extradition  will  be  requested  and 
when  and  where  such  offence  was  committed  and  shall  so  far  as  possible  give  a 
description  of  the  person  sought. 
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3.  A  request  for  provisional  arrest  shall  be  sent  to  the  competent  authorities  of  the 
requested  Party  either  through  the  diplomatic  channel  or  direct  by  post  or 
telegraph  or  through  the  International  Criminal  Police  Organization  (Interpol)  or 
by  any  other  means  affording  evidence  in  writing  or  accepted  by  the  requested 
Party.  The  requesting  authority  shall  be  informed  without  delay  of  the  result  of  its 
request. 
4.  Provisional  arrest  may  be  terminated  if,  within  a  period  of  18  days  after  arrest,  the 
requested  Party  has  not  received  the  request  for  extradition  and  the  documents 
mentioned  in  Article  12.  It  shall  not,  in  any  event,  exceed  40  days  from  the  date  of 
such  arrest.  The  possibility  of  provisional  release  at  any  time  is  not  excluded,  but 
the  requested  Party  shall  take  any  measures  which  it  considers  necessary  to 
prevent  the  escape  of  the  person  sought. 
5.  Release  shall  not  prejudice  re-arrest  and  extradition  if  a  request  for  extradition  is 
received  subsequently. 
ARTICLE  17 
Conflicting  requests 
If  extradition  is  requested  concurrently  by  more  than  one  State,  either  for  the  same 
offence  or  for  different  offences,  the  requested  Party  shall  make  its  decision 
having  regard  to  all  the  circumstances  and  especially  the  relative  seriousness  and 
place  of  commission  of  the  offences,  the  respective  dates  of  the  requests,  the 
nationality  of  the  person  claimed  and  the  possibility  of  subsequent  extradition  to 
another  State. 
ARTICLE  18 
Surrender  of  the  person  to  be  extradited 
1.  The  requested  Party  shall  inform  the  requesting  Party  by  the  means  mentioned  in 
Article  12,  paragraph  1,  of  its  decision  with  regard  to  the  extradition. 
2.  Reasons  shall  be  given  for  any  complete  or  partial  rejection. 
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3.  If  the  request  is  agreed  to,  the  requesting  Party  shall  be  informed  of  the  place  and 
date  of  surrender  and  of  the  length  of  time  for  which  the  person  claimed  was 
detained  with  a  view  to  surrender. 
4.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  5  of  this  article,  if  the  person  claimed  has 
not  been  taken  over  on  the  appointed  date,  he  may  be  released  after  the  expiry  of 
15  days  and  shall  in  any  case  be  released  after  the  expiry  of  30  days.  The  requested 
Party  may  refuse  to  extradite  him  for  the  same  offence. 
5.  If  circumstances  beyond  its  control  prevent  a  Party  from  surrendering  or  taking 
over  the  person  to  be  extradited,  it  shall  notify  the  other  Party.  The  two  Parties 
shall  agree  a  new.  date  for  surrender  and  the  provisions  of  paragraph  4  of  this 
article  shall  apply. 
ARTICLE  19 
Postponed  or  conditional  surrender 
1.  The  requested  Party  may,  after  making  its  decision  on  the  request  for  extradition, 
postpone  the  surrender  of  the  person  claimed  in  order  that  he  may  be  proceeded 
against  by  that  Party.  or,  if  he  has  already  been  convicted,  in  order  that  he  may 
serve  his  sentence  in  the  territory  of  that  Party  for  an  offence  other  than  that  for 
which  extradition  is  requested. 
2.  The  requested  Party  may,  instead  of  postponing  surrender,  temporarily  surrender 
the  person  claimed  to  the  requesting  Party  in  accordance  with  conditions  to  be 
determined  by  mutual  agreement  between  the  Parties. 
ARTICLE  20 
Handing  over  of  property 
1.  The  requested  Party  shall,  in  so  far  as  its  law  permits  and  at  the  request  of  the 
requesting  Party,  seize  and  hand  over  property: 
a)  which  may  be  required  as  evidence  or 
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b)  which  has  been  acquired  as  a  result  of  the  offence  and  which,  at  the  time  of  the 
arrest,  is  found  in  the  possession  of  the  person  claimed  or  is  discovered 
subsequently. 
2.  The  property  mentioned  in  paragraph  1  of  this  article  shall  be  handed  over  even  if 
extradition,  having  been  agreed  to,  cannot  be  carried  out  owing  to  the  death  or 
escape  of  the  person  claimed. 
3.  When  the  said  property  is  liable  to  seizure  or  confiscation  in  the  territory  of  the 
requested  Party,  the  latter  may,  in  connection  with  pending  criminal  proceedings, 
temporarily  retain  it  or  hand  it  over  on  condition  that  it  is  returned. 
4.  Any  rights  which  the  requested  Party  or  third  parties  may  have  acquired  in  the  said 
property  shall  be  preserved.  Where  these  rights  exist,  the  property  shall  be 
returned  without  charge  to  the  requested  Party  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  trial. 
ARTICLE  21 
Transit 
1.  Transit  through  the  territory  of  one  of  the  Contracting  Parties  shall  be  granted  on 
submission  of  a  request  by  means  mentioned  in  Article  12,  paragraph  1,  provided 
that  the  offence  concerned  is  not  considered  by  the  Party  requested  to  grant  transit 
as  an  offence  of  a  political  or  purely  military  character  having  regard  to  Articles  3 
and  4  of  this  Convention. 
2.  Transit  of  a  national,  within  the  meaning  of  Article  6,  of  a  country  requested  to 
grant  transit  may  be  refused. 
3.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  4  of  this  article,  it  shall  be  necessary  to 
produce  the  documents  mentioned  in  Article  12,  paragraph  2. 
4.  If  air  transport  is  used,  the  following  provisions  shall  apply: 
a)  when  it  is  not  intended  to  land,  the  requesting  Party  shall  notify  the  Party  over 
whose  territory  the  flight  is  to  be  made  and  shall  certify  that  one  of  the 
documents  mentioned  in  Article  12,  paragraph  2(a)  exists.  In  the  case  of  an 
unscheduled  landing,  such  notification  shall  have  the  effect  of  a  request  for 
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provisional  arrest  as  provided  for  in  Article  16,  and  the  requesting  Party  shall 
submit  a  formal  request  for  transit; 
b)  when  it  is  intended  to  land,  the  requesting  Party  shall  submit  a  formal  request 
for  transit. 
5.  A  Party  may,  however,  at  the  time  of  signature  or  of  the  deposit  of  its  instrument 
of  ratification  of,  accession  to,  this  Convention,  declare  that  it  will  only  grant 
transit  of  a  person  on  some  or  all  of  the  conditions  on  which  it  grants  extradition. 
In  that  event,  reciprocity  may  be  applied. 
6.  The  transit  of  the  extradited  person  shall  not  be  carried  out  through  any  territory 
where  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  his  life  or  his  freedom  may  be  threatened  by 
reason  of  his  race,  religion,  nationality  or  political  opinion. 
ARTICLE  22 
Procedure 
Except  where  this  Convention  otherwise  provides,  the  procedure  with  regard  to 
extradition  and  provisional  arrest  shall  be  governed  solely  by  the  law  of  the 
requested  Party. 
ARTICLE  23 
Language  to  be  used 
The  documents  to  be  produced  shall  be  in  the  language  of  the  requesting  or 
requested  Party.  The  requested  Party  may  require  a  translation  into  one  of  the 
official  languages  of  the  Council  of  Europe  to  be  chosen  by  it. 
ARTICLE  24 
Expenses 
1.  Expenses  incurred  in  the  territory  of  the  requested  Party  by  reason  of  extradition 
shall  be  borne  by  that  Party. 
2.  Expenses  incurred  by  reason  of  transit  through  the  territory  of  a  Party  requested  to 
grant  transit  shall  be  borne  by  the  requesting  Party. 
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3.  In  the  event  of  extradition  from  a  non-metropolitan  territory  of  the  requested  Party, 
the  expenses  occasioned  by  travel  between  that  territory  and  the  metropolitan 
territory  of  the  requesting  Party  shall  be  borne  by  the  latter.  The  same  rule  shall 
apply  to  expenses  occasioned  by  travel  between  the  non-metropolitan  territory  of 
the  requested  Party  and  its  metropolitan  territory. 
ARTICLE  25 
Definition  of  "detention  order" 
For  the  purposes  of  this  Convention,  the  expression  "detention  order"  means  any 
order  involving  deprivation  of  liberty  which  has  been  made  by  a  criminal  court  in 
addition  to  or  instead  of  a  prison  sentence. 
ARTICLE  26 
Reservations 
1.  Any  Contracting  Party  may,  when  signing  this  Convention  or  when  depositing  its 
instrument  of  ratification  or  accession,  make  a  reservation  in  respect  of  any 
provision  or  provisions  of  the  Convention. 
2.  Any  Contracting  Party  which  has  made  a  reservation  shall  withdraw  it  as  soon  as 
circumstances  permit.  Such  withdrawal  shall  be  made  by  notification  to  the 
Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe. 
3.  A  Contracting  Party  which  has  made  a  reservation  in  respect  of  a  provision  of  the 
Convention  may  not  claim  application  of  the  said  provision  by  another  Party  save 
in  so  far  as  it  has  itself  accepted  the  provision. 
ARTICLE  27 
Territorial  application 
1.  This  Convention  shall  apply  to  the  metropolitan  territories  of  the  Contracting 
Parties. 
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2.  In  respect  of  France,  it  shall  also  apply  to  Algeria  and  to  the  overseas  Departments 
and,  in  respect  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland,  to 
the  Channel  Islands  and  to  the  Isle  of  Man. 
3.  The  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  may  extend  the  application  of  this  Convention 
to  the  Land  of  Berlin  by  notice  addressed  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council 
of  Europe,  who  shall  notify  the  other  Parties  of  such  declaration. 
4.  By  direct  arrangement  between  two  or  more  Contracting  Parties,  the  application  of 
this  Convention  may  be  extended,  subject  to  the  conditions  laid  down  in  the 
arrangement,  to  any  territory  of  such  Parties,  other  than  the  territories  mentioned 
in  paragraphs  1,2  and  3  of  this  article,  for  whose  international  relations  any  such 
Party  is  responsible. 
ARTICLE  28 
Relations  between  this  Convention 
and  bilateral  Agreements 
1.  This  Convention  shall,  in  respect  to  those  countries  to  which  it  applies,  supersede 
the  provisions  of  any  bilateral  treaties,  conventions  or  agreements  governing 
extradition  between  any  two  Contracting  Parties. 
2.  The  Contracting  Parties  may  conclude  between  themselves  bilateral  or  multilateral 
agreements  only  in  order  to  supplement  the  provisions  of  this  Convention  or  to 
facilitate  the  application  of  the  principles  contained  therein. 
3.  Where,  as  between  two  or  more  Contracting  Parties,  extradition  takes  place  on  the 
basis  of  a  uniform  law,  the  Parties  shall  be  free  to  regulate  their  mutual  relations  in 
respect  of  extradition  exclusively  in  accordance  with  such  a  system 
notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  this  Convention.  The  same  principle  shall  apply 
as  between  two  or  more  Contracting  Parties  each  of  which  has  in  force  a  law 
providing  for  the  execution  in  its  territory  of  warrants  of  arrest  issued  in  the 
territory  of  the  other  Party  or  Parties.  Contracting  Parties  which  exclude  or  may  in 
the  future  exclude  the  application  of  this  Convention  as  between  themselves  in 
accordance  with  this  paragraph  shall  notify  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of 
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Europe  accordingly.  The  Secretary  General  shall  inform  the  other  Contracting 
Parties  of  any  notification  received  in  accordance  with  this  paragraph. 
ARTICLE  29 
Signature,  ratification  and  entry  into  force 
1.  This  Convention  shall  be  open  to  signature  by  the  Members  of  the  Council  of 
Europe.  It  shall  be  ratified.  The  instruments  of  ratification  shall  be  deposited  with 
the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council. 
2.  The  Convention  shall  come  into  force  90  days  after  the  date  of  deposit  of  the  third 
instrument  of  ratification. 
3.  As  regards  any  signatory  ratifying  subsequently,  the  Convention  shall  come  into 
force  90  days  after  the  date  of  deposit  of  its  instrument  of  ratification. 
ARTICLE  30 
A  i'rPCCinn 
1.  The  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  may  invite  any  State  not  a 
Member  of  the  Council  to  accede  to  this  Convention,  provided  that  the  resolution 
containing  such  invitation  receives  the  unanimous  agreement  of  the  Members  of 
the  Council  who  have  ratified  the  Convention. 
2.  Accession  shall  be  by  deposit  with  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  an 
instrument  of  accession,  which  shall  take  effect  90  days  after  the  date  of  its 
deposit. 
ARTICLE  31 
Denunciation 
Any  Contracting  Party  may  denounce  this  Convention  in  so  far  as  it  is  concerned 
by  giving  notice  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  Denunciation 
shall  take  effect  six  months  after  the  date  when  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
Council  received  such  notification. 
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ARTICLE  32 
Notifications 
The  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe  shall  notify  the  Members  of  the 
Council  and  the  government  of  any  State  which  has  acceded  to  this  Convention  of. 
a)  the  deposit  of  any  instrument  of  ratification  or  accession; 
b)  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  this  Convention; 
c)  any  declaration  made  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  6,  paragraph 
1,  and  of  Article  21  paragraph  5; 
d)  any  reservation  made  in  accordance  with  Article  26,  paragraph  1; 
e)  the  withdrawal  of  any  reservation  in  accordance  with  Article  26,  paragraph  2; 
f)  any  notification  of  denunciation  received  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Article  31  and  by  the  date  on  which  such  denunciation  will  take  effect. 
In  witness  whereof  the  undersigned,  being  duly  authorised  thereto,  have  signed 
this  Convention. 
Done  at  Paris,  this  13th  day  of  December  1957,  in  English  and  French,  both  texts 
being  equally  authentic,  in  a  single  copy  which  shall  remain  deposited  in  the 
archives  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  The  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  shall  transmit  certified  copies  to  the  signatory  governments. 
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TEXT  OF  THE  ADDITIONAL  PROTOCOL 
TO  THE 
EUROPEAN  CONVENTION  ON  EXTRADITION 
The  member  States  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  signatory  to  this  Protocol, 
Having  regard  to  the  provisions  of  the  European  Convention  on  Extradition 
opened  for  signature  in  Paris  on  13  December  1957  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  "the 
Convention")  and  in  particular  Articles  3  and  9  thereof; 
Considering  that  it  is  desirable  to  supplement  these  articles  with  a  view  to 
strengthening  the  protection  of  humanity  and  of  individuals, 
Have  agreed  as  follows: 
CHAPTER  I 
Article  1 
For  the  application  of  Article  3  of  the  Convention,  political  offences  shall  not  be 
considered  to  include  the  following: 
a)  the  crimes  against  humanity  specified  in  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and 
Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide  adopted  on  9  December  1948  by  the 
General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations; 
b)  the  violations  specified  in  Article  50  of  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  for  the 
Amelioration  of  the  Condition  of  the  Wounded  and  Sick  in  Armed  Forces  in 
the  Field,  Article  51  of  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  for  the  Amelioration  of 
the  Condition  of  Wounded,  Sick  and  Shipwrecked  Members  of  Armed  Forces 
at  Sea,  Article  130  of  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  relative  to  the  Treatment  of 
Prisoners  of  War  and  Article  147  of  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  relative  to 
the  Protection  of  Civilian  Persons  in  Time  of  War; 
c)  any  comparable  violations  of  the  laws  of  war  having  effect  at  the  time  when  this 
Protocol  enters  into  force  and  of  customs  of  war  existing  at  that  time,  which  are 
not  already  provided  for  in  the  above-mentioned  provisions  of  the  Geneva 
Conventions. 
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CHAPTER  H 
Article  2 
Article  9  of  the  Convention  shall  be  supplemented  by  the  following  text,  the 
original  Article  9  of  the  Convention  becoming  paragraph  1  and  the  under- 
mentioned  provisions  becoming  paragraphs  2,3  and  4: 
"2.  The  extradition  of  a  person  against  whom  a  final  judgment  has  been  rendered  in  a 
third  State,  Contracting  Party  to  the  Convention,  for  the  offence  or  offences  in 
respect  of  which  the  claim  was  made,  shall  not  be  granted: 
a.  if  the  afore-mentioned  judgment  resulted  in  his  acquittal; 
b.  if  the  term  of  imprisonment  or  other  measure  to  which  he  was  sentenced: 
i.  has  been  completely  enforced; 
ii.  has  been  wholly,  or  with  respect  to  the  part  not  enforced,  the  subject  of  a 
pardon  or  an  amnesty; 
c.  if  the  court  convicted  the  offender  without  imposing  a  sanction. 
3.  However,  in  the  cases  referred  to  in  paragraph  2,  extradition  may  be  granted: 
a.  if  the  offence  in  respect  of  which  judgment  has  been  rendered  was  committed 
against  a  person,  an  institution  or  any  thing  having  public  status  in  the 
requesting  State; 
b.  if  the  person  on  whom  judgment  was  passed  had  himself  a  public  status  in  the 
requesting  State; 
c.  if  the  offence  in  respect  of  which  judgment  was  passed  was  committed 
completely  or  partly  in  the  territory  of  the  requesting  State  or  in  a  place  treated 
as  its  territory. 
4.  The  provisions  of  paragraphs  2  and  3  shall  not  prevent  the  application  of  wider 
domestic  provisions  relating  to  the  effect  of  ne  bis  in  idem  attached  to  foreign 
criminal  judgments.  " 
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CHAPTER  III 
Article  3 
1.  This  Protocol  shall  be  open  to  signature  by  the  member  States  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  which  have  signed  the  Convention.  It  shall  be  subject  to  ratification, 
acceptance  or  approval.  Instruments  of  ratification,  acceptance  or  approval 
shall  be  deposited  with  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe. 
2.  The  protocol  shall  enter  into  force  90  days  after  the  date  of  the  deposit  of  the 
third  instrument  of  ratification,  acceptance  or  approval. 
3.  In  respect  of  a  signatory  State  ratifying,  accepting  or  approving  subsequently, 
the  protocol  shall  enter  into  force  90  days  after  the  date  of  the  deposit  of  its 
instrument  of  ratification,  acceptance  or  approval. 
4.  A  member  State  of  the  Council  of  Europe  may  not  ratify,  accept  or  approve  this 
protocol  without  having,  simultaneously  or  previously,  ratified  the  Convention. 
Article  4 
1.  Any  State  has  acceded  to  the  Convention  may  accede  to  this  Protocol  after  the 
Protocol  has  entered  into  force. 
2.  Such  accession  shall  be  effected  by  depositing  with  the  Secretary  General  of 
the  Council  of  Europe  an  instrument  of  accession  which  shall  take  effect  90 
days  after  the  date  of  its  deposit. 
Article  5 
1.  Any  State  may,  at  the  time  of  signature  or  when  depositing  its  instrument  of 
ratification,  acceptance  or  accession,  specify  the  territory  or  territories  to  which 
this  Protocol  shall  apply. 
2.  Any  State  may,  when  depositing  its  instrument  of  ratification,  acceptance, 
approval  or  accession  or  at  any  later  date,  by  declaration  addressed  to  the 
Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  extend  this  Protocol  to  any  other 
territory  or  territories  specified  in  the  declaration  and  for  whose  international 
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relations  it  is  responsible  or  on  whose  behalf  it  is  authorised  to  give 
undertakings. 
3.  Any  declaration  made  in  pursuance  of  the  preceding  paragraph  may,  in  respect 
of  any  territory  mentioned  in  such  declaration,  be  withdrawn  according  to  the 
procedure  laid  down  in  Article  8  of  this  Protocol. 
Article  6 
1.  Any  State  may,  at  the  time  of  signature  or  when  depositing  its  instrument  of 
ratification,  acceptance,  approval  or  accession,  declare  that  it  does  not  accept 
one  or  the  other  of  Chapters  I  or  II. 
2.  Any  Contracting  Party  may  withdraw  a  declaration  it  has  made  in  accordance 
with  the  foregoing  paragraph  by  means  of  a  declaration  addressed  to  the 
Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe  which  shall  become  effective  as 
from  the  date  of  its  receipt. 
3.  No  reservation  may  be  made  to  the  provisions  of  this  Protocol. 
Article  7 
The  European  Committee  on  Crime  Problems  of  the  Council  of  Europe  shall  be 
kept  informed  regarding  the  application  of  this  Protocol  and  shall  do  whatever  is 
needful  to  facilitate  a  friendly  settlement  of  any  difficulty  which  may  arise  out  of 
its  execution. 
Article  8 
1.  Any  Contracting  Party  may,  in  so  far  as  it  is  concerned,  denounce  this  Protocol 
by  means  of  a  notification  addressed  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of 
Europe. 
2.  Such  denunciation  shall  take  effect  six  months  after  the  date  of  receipt  by  the 
Secretary  General  of  such  notification. 
3.  Denunciation  of  the  Convention  entails  automatically  denunciation  of  this 
Protocol. 
293 APPENDIX  3 
Article  9 
The  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe  shall  notify  the  member  States  of 
the  Council  and  any  State  which  has  acceded  to  the  Convention  of: 
a)  any  signature; 
b)  any  deposit  of  an  instrument  of  ratification,  acceptance,  approval  or  accession; 
c)  any  date  of  entry  into  force  of  this  Protocol  in  accordance  with  Article  3 
thereof; 
d)  any  declaration  received  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  Article  5  and  any 
withdrawal  of  such  a  declaration; 
e)  any  declaration  made  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  Article  6,  paragraph  1; 
f)  the  withdrawal  of  any  declaration  carried  out  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of 
Article  6,  paragraph  2; 
g)  any  notification  received  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  Article  8  and  the 
date  on  which  denunciation  takes  effect. 
In  witness  whereof,  the  undersigned,  being  duly  authorised  thereto,  have  signed 
this  Protocol. 
Done  at  Strasbourg,  this  15th  day  of  October  1957,  in  English  and  in  French,  both 
texts  being  equally  authoritative,  in  a  single  copy  which  shall  remain  deposited  in 
the  archives  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  The  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  shall  transmit  certified  copies  to  each  of  the  signatory  and  acceding  States. 
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TEXT  OF  THE  SECOND  ADDITIONAL  PROTOCOL 
TO  THE  EUROPEAN  CONVENTION  ON  EXTRADITION 
The  member  States  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  signatory  to  this  Protocol, 
Desirous  of  facilitating  the  application  of  the  European  Convention  on  Extradition 
opened  for  signature  in  Paris  on  13  December  1977  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  "the 
Convention")  in  the  field  of  fiscal  offences; 
Considering  it  also  desirable  to  supplement  the  Convention  in  certain  other 
respects, 
Have  agreed  as  follows: 
CHAPTER  I 
Article  1 
Paragraph  2  of  Article  2  of  the  Convention  shall  be  supplemented  by  the  following 
provision: 
"This  right  shall  also  apply  to  offences  which  are  subject  only  to  pecuniary 
sanctions.  " 
CHAPTER  II 
Article  2 
Article  5  of  the  Convention  shall  be  replaced  by  the  following  provisions: 
"Fiscal  offences 
1.  For  offences  in  connection  with  taxes,  duties,  customs  and  exchange,  extradition 
shall  take  place  between  the  Contracting  Parties  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  the  Convention  if  the  offence,  under  the  law  of  the  requested  Party,  corresponds 
to  an  offence  of  the  same  nature. 
2.  Extradition  may  not  be  refused  on  the  ground  that  the'law  of  the  requested  Party 
does  not  impose  the  same  kind  of  tax  or  duty  or  does  not  contain  a  tax,  duty, 
customs  or  exchange  regulation  of  the  same  kind  as  the  law  of  the  requesting 
Party. 
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CHAPTER  III 
Article  3 
The  Convention  shall  be  supplemented  by  the  following  provisions: 
"Judgments  in  Absentia 
1.  When  a  Contracting  Party  requests  from  another  Contracting  Party  the  extradition 
of  a  person  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  a  sentence  or  detention  order  imposed 
by  a  decision  rendered  against  him  in  absentia,  the  requested  Party  may  refuse  to 
extradite  for  this  purpose  if,  in  its  opinion,  the  proceedings  leading  to  the 
judgment  did  not  satisfy  the  minimum  rights  of  -defence  recognised  as  due  to 
everyone  charged  with  criminal  offence.  However,  extradition  shall  be  granted  if 
the  requesting  Party  gives  an  assurance  considered  sufficient  to  guarantee  to  the 
person  claimed  the  right  to  a  retrial  which  safeguards  the  rights  of  defence.  This 
decision  will  authorise  the  requesting  Party  either  to  enforce  the  judgment  in 
question  if  the  convicted  person  does  not  make  an  opposition  or,  if  he  does,  to 
take  proceedings  against  the  person  extradited 
2.  When  the  requested  Party  informs  the  person  whose  extradition  has  been  requested 
of  the  judgment  rendered  against  him  in  absentia,  the  requesting  Party  shall  not 
regard  this  communication  as  a  formal  notification  for  the  purposes  of  the  criminal 
procedure  in  that  State.  " 
CHAPTER  IV 
Article  4 
The  Convention  shall  be  supplemented  by  the  following  provisions: 
"Amnes 
Extradition  shall  not  be  granted  for  an  offence  in  respect  of  which  an  amnesty  has 
been  declared  in  the  requested  State  and  which  that  State  had  competence  to 
prosecute  under  its 
. own  criminal  law.  " 
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CHAPTER  V 
Article  5 
Paragraph  1  of  Article  12  of  the  Convention  shall  be  replaced  by  the  following 
provisions: 
"The  request  shall  be  in  writing  and  shall  be  addressed  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice 
of  the  requesting  Party  to  the  Ministry  of  Justice  of  the  requested  Party;  however, 
use  of  diplomatic  channel  is  not  excluded.  Other  means  of  communication  may  be 
arranged  by  direct  agreement  between  two  or  more  Parties.  " 
CHAPTER  VI 
Article  6 
1.  This  Protocol  shall  be  open  to  signature  by  the  member  States  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  which  have  signed  the  Convention.  It  shall  be  subject  to  ratification, 
acceptance  or  approval.  Instruments  of  ratification,  acceptance  or  approval  shall 
be  deposited  with  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe. 
2.  The  Protocol  shall  enter  into  force  90  days  after  the  date  of  the  deposit  of  the  third 
instrument  of  ratification,  acceptance  or  approval. 
3.  In  respect  of  a  signatory  State  ratifying,  accepting  or  approving  subsequently,  the 
Protocol  shall  enter  into  force  90  days  after  the  date  of  the  deposit  of  its 
instrument  of  ratification,  acceptance  or  approval. 
4.  A  member  State  of  the  Council  of  Europe  may  not  ratify,  accept  or  approve  this 
Protocol  without  having.  simultaneously  or  previously,  ratified  the  Convention. 
Article  7 
1.  Any  State  which  has  acceded  to  the  Convention  may  accede  to  this  Protocol  after 
the  Protocol  has  entered  into  force. 
2.  Such  accession  shall  be  effected  by  depositing  with  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
Council  of  Europe  an  instrument  of  accession  which  shall  take  effect  90  days  after 
the  date  of  its  deposit. 
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Article  8 
1.  Any  State  may,  at  the  time  of  signature  or  when  depositing  its  instrument  of 
ratification,  acceptance,  approval  or  accession,  specify  the  territory  or  territories  to 
which  this  Protocol  shall  apply. 
2.  Any  State  may,  when  depositing  its  instrument  of  ratification,  acceptance,  approval 
or  accession  or  at  any  later  date,  by  declaration  addressed  to  the  Secretary  General 
of  the  Council  of  Europe,  extend  this  Protocol  to  any  other  territory  or  territories 
specified  in  the  declaration  and  for  whose  international  relations  it  is  responsible 
or  on  whose  behalf  it  is  authorised  to  give  undertakings. 
3.  Any  declaration  made  in  pursuance  of  the  preceding  paragraph  may,  in  respect  of 
any  territory  mentioned  in  such  declaration,  be  withdrawn  by  means  of  a 
notification  addressed  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  Such 
withdrawal  shall  take  effect  six  months  after  the  date  of  receipt  by  the  Secretary 
General  of  the  Council  of  Europe  of  the  notification. 
Article  9 
1.  Reservations  made  by  a  State  to  a  provision  of  the  Convention  shall  be  applicable 
also  to  this  Protocol,  unless  that  State  otherwise  declares  at  the  time  of  signature 
or  when  depositing  its  instrument  of  ratification,  acceptance,  approval  or 
accession. 
2.  Any  State  may,  at  the  time  of  signature  or  when  depositing  its  instrument  of 
ratification,  acceptance,  approval  or  accession,  declare  that  it  reserves  the  right: 
a)  not  to  accept  Chapter  I; 
b)  not  to  accept  Chapter  II,  or  to  accept  it  only  in  respect  of  certain  offences  or 
certain  categories  of  the  offences  referred  to  in  Article  2; 
c)  not  to  accept  Chapter  III,  or  to  accept  only  paragraph  1  of  Article  3; 
d)  not  to  accept  Chapter  IV; 
e)  not  to  accept  Chapter  V. 
3.  Any  Contracting  Party  may  withdraw  a  reservation  it  has  made  in  accordance  with 
the  foregoing  paragraph  by  means  of  a  declaration  addressed  to  the  Secretary 
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General  of  the  Council  of  Europe  which  shall  become  effective  as  from  the  date  of 
its  receipt. 
4.  A  Contracting  Party  which  has  applied  to  this  Protocol  a  reservation  made  in 
respect  of  a  provision  of  the  Convention  or  which  has  made  a  reservation  in 
respect  of  a  provision  of  this  Protocol  may  not  claim  the  application  of  that 
provision  by  another  Contracting  party;  it  may,  however,  if  its  reservation  is 
partial  or  conditional,  claim  the  application  of  that  provision  in  so  far  as  it  has 
itself  accepted  it. 
5.  No  other  reservation  may  be  made  to  the  provisions  of  this  Protocol. 
Article  10 
The  European  Committee  on  Crime  Problems  of  the  Council  of  Europe  shall  be 
kept  informed  regarding  the  application  of  this  Protocol  and  shall  do  whatever  is 
needful  to  facilitate  a  friendly  settlement  of  any  difficulty  which  may  arise  out  of 
its  execution. 
Article  11, 
1.  Any  Contracting  Party  may,  in  so  far  as  it  is  concerned,  denounce  this  Protocol  by 
means  of  a  notification  addressed  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of 
Europe. 
2.  Such  denunciation  shall  take  effect  six  months  after  the  date  of  receipt  by  the 
Secretary  General  of  such  notification. 
3.  Denunciation  of  the  Convention  entails  automatically  denunciation  of  this 
Protocol. 
Article  12 
The  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe  shall  notify  the  member  States  of 
the  Council  and  any  State  which  has  acceded  to  the  Convention  of 
a)  any  signature  of  this  Protocol; 
b)  any  deposit  of  an  instrument  of  ratification,  acceptance,  approval  or  accession; 
299 APPENDIX  3 
c)  any  date  of  entry  into  force  of  this  Protocol  in  accordance  with  Articles  6  and  7; 
d)  any  declaration  received  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  paragraphs  2  and  3  of 
Article  8; 
e)  any  declaration  received  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  paragraph  1  of 
Article  9; 
f)  any  reservation  made  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  paragraphs  2.  of 
Article  9; 
g)  the  withdrawal  of  any  reservation  carried  out  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of 
paragraph  3  of  Article  9 
h)  any  notification  received  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  Article  11  and  the 
date  on  which  denunciation  takes  effect. 
In  witness  whereof  the  undersigned,  being  duly  authorised  thereto,  have  signed 
this  Protocol. 
Done  at  Strasbourg  this  17th  day  of  March  1978,  in  English  and  in  French,  both 
texts  being  equally  authoritative,  in  a  single  copy  which  shall  remain  deposited  in 
the  archives  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  The  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of 
Europe.  Shall  transmit  certified  copies  to  each  of  the  signatory  and  acceding 
States. 
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UN  MODEL  TREATY  ON  EXTRADITION. 
The---------------------------------------------  and  the---------------------------------------- 
Desirous  of  making  more  effective  the  co-operation  of  the  two  countries  in  the 
control  of  crime  by  concluding  a  treaty  on  extradition, 
Have  eed  as  follows: 
ARTICLE  1. 
Obligation  to  extradite 
Each  Party  agrees  to  extradite  to  the  other,  upon  request  and  subject  to  the 
provisions  of  the  present  Treaty,  any  person  who  is  wanted  in  the  requesting  State 
for  prosecution  for  an  extraditable  offence  or  for  the  imposition  or  enforcement  of 
a  sentence  in  respect  of  such  an  offence. 
ARTICLE  2 
Extraditable  offences 
1.  For  the  purposes  of  the  present  Treaty,  extraditable  offences  are  offences  that  are 
punishable  under  the  laws  of  both  Parties  by  imprisonment  or  other  deprivation  of 
liberty  for  a  maximum  period  of  at  least  [one/two]  years(s),  or  by  a  more  severe 
penalty.  Where  the  request  for  extradition  relates  to  a  person  who  is  wanted  for  the 
enforcement  of  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  or  other  deprivation  of  liberty  imposed 
for  such  an  offence,  extradition  shall  be  granted  only  if  a  period  of  at  least 
[four/six]  months  of  such  sentence  remains  to  be  served. 
2.  In  determining  whether  an  offence  is  an  offence  punishable  under  the  laws  of  both 
Parties,  it  shall  not  matter  whether: 
a)  The  laws  of  the  Parties  place  the  acts  or  omissions  constituting  the  offence 
within  the  same  category  of  offence  or  denominate  the  offence  by  the  same 
terminology; 
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b)  Under  the  laws  of  the  Parties  the  constituent  elements  of  the  offence  differ,  it 
being  understood  that  the  totality  of  the  acts  or  omissions  as  presented  the 
requesting  State  shall  be  taken  into  account. 
3.  Where  extradition  of  a  person  is  sought  for  an  offence  against  a  law  relating  to 
taxation,  customs  duties,  exchange  control  or  other  revenue  matters,  extradition 
shall  not  be  refused  on  the  ground  that  the  law  of  the  requested  State  does  not 
impose  the  same  kind  of  tax  or  duty  or  does  not  contain  a  tax,  customs  duty  or 
exchange  regulation  of  the  same  kind  as  the  law  of  the  requesting  State. 
4.  If  the  request  for  extradition  includes  several  separate  offences  each  of  which  is 
punishable  under  the  laws  of  both  Parties,  but  some  of  which  do  not  fulfill  other 
condition  set  out  in  paragraph  1  of  the  present  article,  the  requested  Party  may 
grant  extradition  for  the  latter  offences  provided  that the  person  is  to  be  extradited 
for  at  least  one  extraditable  offence. 
ARTICLE  3 
Mandatory  grounds  for  refusal 
Extradition  shall  not  be  granted  in  any  of  the  following  circumstances: 
a)  If  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  is  regarded  by  the  requested 
State  as  an  offence  of  a  political  nature; 
b)  If  the  requested  State  has  substantial  grounds  for  believing  that  the  request  for 
extradition  has  been  made  for  the  purpose  of  prosecuting  or  punishing  a  person 
on  account  of  that  person's  race,  religion,  nationality,  ethnic  origin,  political 
opinions,  sex  or  status,  or  that  that  person's  position  may  be  prejudiced  for  any 
of  those  reasons; 
c)  If  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  is  an  offence  under  military 
law,  which  is  not  also  an  offence  under  ordinary  criminal  law; 
d)  If  there  has  been  a  final  judgment  rendered  against  the  person  in  the  requested 
State  in  respect  of  the  offence  for  which  the  person's  extradition  is  requested; 
302 APPENDIX  4 
e)  If  the  person  whose  extradition  is  requested  has,  under  the  law  of  either  Party, 
become  immune  from  prosecution  or  punishment  for  any  reason,  including 
lapse  of  time  or  amnesty; 
f)  If  the  person  whose  extradition  is  requested  has  been  or  would  be  subjected  in 
the  requesting  State  to  torture  or  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or 
punishment  or  if  that  person  has  not  received  or  would  not  receive  the 
minimum  guarantees  in  criminal  proceedings,  as  contained  in  the  International 
Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  Article  14; 
g)  If  the  judgment  of  the  requesting  State  has  been  rendered  in  absentia,  the 
convicted  person  has  not  had  sufficient  notice  of  the  trial  or  the  opportunity  to 
arrange  for  his  or  her  defence  and  he  has  not  had  or  will  not  have  the 
opportunity  to  have  the  case  retried  in  his  or  her  presence. 
ARTICLE  4 
Optional  grounds  for  refusal 
Extradition  may  be  refused  in  any  of  the  following  circumstances: 
a)  If  the  person  whose  extradition  is  requested  is  a  national  of  the  requested  State. 
Where  extradition  is  refused  on  this  ground,  the  requested  State  shall,  if  the 
other  State  so  requests,  submit  the  case  to  its  competent  authorities  with  a  view 
to  taking  appropriate  action  against  the  person  in  respect  of  the  offence  for 
which  extradition  had  been  requested; 
b)  If  the  competent  authorities  of  the  requested  State  have  decided  either  not  to 
institute  or  to  terminate  proceedings  against  the  person  for  the  offence  in 
respect  of  which  extradition  is  requested; 
c)  If  a  prosecution  in  respect  of  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  is 
pending  in  the  requested  State  against  the  person  whose  extradition  is 
requested; 
d)  If  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  carries  the  death  penalty  under 
the  law  of  the  requesting  State,  unless  that  State  gives  such  assurance  as  the 
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requested  State  considers  sufficient  that  the  death  penalty  will  not  be  imposed 
or,  if  imposed,  will  not  be  carried  out; 
e)  If  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  has  been  committed  outside  the 
territory  of  either  Party  and  the  law  of  the  requested  State  does  not  provide  for 
jurisdiction  over  such  an  offence  committed  outside  its  territory  in  comparable 
circumstances; 
f)  If  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  is  regarded  under  the  law  of  the 
requested  State  as  having  been  committed  in  whole  or  in  part  within  that  State. 
Where  extradition  is  refused  on  this  ground,  the  requested  State  shall,  if  the 
other  State  so  requests,  submit  the  case  to  its  competent  authorities  with  a  view 
to  taking  appropriate  action  against  the  person  for  the  offence  for  which 
extradition  has  been  requested; 
g)  If  the  person  whose  extradition  is  requested  has  been  sentenced  or  would  be 
liable  to  be  tried  or  sentenced  in  the  requesting  State  by  an  extraordinary  or  ad 
hoc  court  or  tribunal; 
h)  If  the  requested  State,  while  also  taking  into  account  the  nature  of  the  offence 
and  the  interests  of  the  requesting  State,  considers  that,  in  the  circumstances  of 
the  case,  the  extradition  of  that  person  would  be  incompatible  with 
humanitarian  considerations  in  view  of  age,  health  or  other  personal 
circumstances  of  that  person. 
ARTICLE  5 
Channels  of  communication  and  required  documents 
1.  A  request  for  extradition  shall  be  made  in  writing.  The  request,  supporting 
documents  and  subsequent  communications  shall  be  transmitted  through  the 
diplomatic  channel,  directly  between  the  ministries  of  justice  or  any  other 
authorities  designated  by  the  Parties. 
2.  A  request  for  extradition  shall  be  accompanied  by  the  following: 
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a)  In  all  cases, 
i)  As  accurate  a  description  as  possible  of  the  person  sought,  together  with  any 
other  information  that  may  help  to  establish  that  person's  identity,  nationality 
and  location; 
ii)  The  text  of  the  relevant  provision  of  the  law  creating  the  offence  or,  where 
necessary,  a  statement  of  the  law  relevant  to  the  offence  and  a  statement  of 
the  penalty  that  can  be  imposed  for  the  offence; 
b)  If  the  person  is  accused  of  an  offence,  by  a  warrant  issued  by  a  court  or  other 
competent  judicial  authority  for  the  arrest  of  the  person  or  a  certified  copy  of 
that  warrant,  a  statement  of  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  and  a 
description  of  the  acts  or  omissions  constituting  the  alleged  offence,  including 
an  indication  of  the  time  and  place  of  its  commission; 
c)  If  the  person  has  been  convicted  of  an  offence,  by  a  statement  of  the  offence  for 
which  extradition  is  requested  and  a  description  of  the  acts  or  omissions 
constituting  the  offence  and  by  the  original  or  certified  copy  of  the  judgment  or 
any  other  document  setting  out  the  convicted  and  the  sentence  imposed,  the  fact 
that  the  sentence  is  enforceable,  and  the  extent  to  which  the  sentence  remains  to 
be  served; 
d)  If  the  person  has  been  convicted  of  an  offence  in  his  or  her  absence,  in  addition 
to  the  documents  set  out  in  paragraph  2(c)  of  the  present  article,  by  a  statement 
as  to  the  legal  means  available  to  the  person  to  prepare  his  or  her  defence  or  to 
have  the  case  retried  in  his  or  her  presence; 
e)  If  the  person  has  been  convicted  of  an  offence  but  no  sentence  has  been 
imposed,  by  a  statement  of  the  offence  for  which  extradition  is  requested  and  a 
description  of  the  acts  or  omissions  constituting  the  offence  and  by  a  document 
setting  out  the  convicted  and  a  statement  affirming  that  there  is  an  intention  to 
impose  a  sentence. 
3.  The  documents  submitted  in  support  of  a  request  for  extradition  shall  be 
accompanied  by  a  translation  into  the  language  of  the  requested  State  or  in  another 
language  acceptable  to  that  State. 
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ARTICLE  6 
Simplified  extradition  procedure 
The  requested  State,  if  not  precluded  by  its  law,  may  grant  extradition  after  receipt 
of  a  request  for  provisional  arrest,  provided  that  the  person  sought  explicitly 
consents  before  a  competent  authority. 
ARTICLE  7 
Certification  and  authentication 
Except  as  provided  by  the  present  Treaty,  a  request  for  extradition  and  the 
documents  in  support  thereof,  as  well  as  documents  or  other  material  supplied  in 
response  to  such  a  request,  shall  not  require  certification  or  authentication. 
ARTICLE  8 
Additional  information 
If  the  requested  State  considers  that  the  information  provided  in  support  of  a 
request  for  extradition  is  not  sufficient,  it  may  request  that  additional  information 
be  furnished  within  such  reasonable  time  as  it  specifies. 
ARTICLE  9 
Provisional  arrest 
1.  In  case  of  urgency  the  requesting  State  may  apply  for  the  provisional  arrest  of  the 
person  sought  pending  the  presentation  of  the  request  for  extradition.  The 
application  shall  be  transmitted  by  means  of  the  facilities  of  the  International 
Criminal  Police  Organization,  by  post  or  telegraph  or  by  any  other  means 
affording  a  record  in  writing. 
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2.  The  application  shall  contain  a  description  of  the  person  sought,  a  statement  that 
extradition  is  to  be  requested,  a  statement  of  the  existence  of  one  of  the  documents 
mentioned  in  paragraph  2  of  article  5  of  the  present  Treaty,  authorizing  the 
apprehension  of  the  person,  including  the  time  left  to  be  served  and  a  concise 
statement  of  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  a  statement  of  the  location,  where  known,  of 
the  person. 
3.  The  requested  State  shall  decide  on  the  application  in  accordance  with  its  law  and 
communicate  its  decision  to  the  requesting  State  without  delay. 
4.  The  person  arrested  upon  such  an  application  shall  be  set  at  liberty  upon  the 
expiration  of  [40]  days  from  the  date  of  arrest  if  a  request  for  extradition, 
supported  by  the  relevant  documents  specified  in  paragraph  2  of  article  5  of  the 
present  Treaty,  has  not  been  received.  The  present  paragraph  does  not  preclude  the 
possibility  of  conditional  release  of  the  person  prior  to  the  expiration  of  the  [40] 
days. 
5.  The  release  of  the  person  pursuant  to  paragraph  4  of  the  present  article  shall  not 
prevent  re-arrest  and  institution  of  proceedings  with  a  view  to  extraditing  the 
person  sought  if  the  request  and  supporting  documents  are  subsequently  received. 
ARTICLE  10 
Decision  on  the  request 
The  requested  State  shall  deal  with  the  request  for  extradition  pursuant  to  the 
procedures  provided  by  its  own  law,  and  shall  promptly  communicate  its  decision 
to  the  requesting  State. 
Reasons  shall  be  given  for  any  complete  or  partial  refusal  of  the  request. 
ARTICLE  11 
Surrender  of  the  person 
1.  Upon  being  informed  that  extradition  has  been  granted,  the  Parties  shall,  without 
undue  delay,  arrange  for  the  surrender  of  the  person  sought  and  the  requested  State 
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shall  inform  the  requesting  State  of  the  length  of  time  for  which  the  person  sought 
was  detained  with  a  view  to  surrender. 
2.  The  person  shall  be  removed  from  the  territory  of  the  requested  State  within  as  a 
reasonable  period  as  the  requested  State  specifies  and,  if  the  person  is  not  moved 
within  that  period,  the  requested  State  may  release  the  person  and  may  refuse  to 
extradite  that  person  for  the  same  offence. 
3.  If  circumstances  beyond  its  control  prevent  a  Party  from  surrendering  or  removing 
the  person  to  be  extradited,  it  shall  notify  the  other  Party.  The  two  Parties  shall 
mutually  decide  upon  a  new  date  of  surrender,  and  the  provisions  of  paragraph  2 
of  the  present  art  icle  shall  apply. 
ARTICLE  12 
Postponed  or  conditional  surrender 
1.  The  requested  State  may,  after  making  its  decision  on  the  request  for  extradition, 
postpone  the  surrender  of  a  person  sought,  in  order  to  proceed  against  that  person, 
or,  of  that  person  has  already  been  convicted,  in  order  to  enforce  a  sentence 
imposed  for  an  offence  other  than  that  for  which  extradition  is  sought.  In  such  a 
case  the  requested  State  shall  advise  the  requesting  State  accordingly. 
2.  The  requested  State  may,  instead  of  postponing  surrender,  temporarily  surrender 
the  person  sought  to  the  requesting  State  in  accordance  with  conditions  to  be 
determined  between  the  Parties. 
ARTICLE  13 
Surrender  of  property 
1.  To  the  extent  permitted  under  the  law  of  the  requested  State  and  subject  to  the 
rights  of  third  parties,  which  shall  be  duly  respected,  all  property  found  in  the 
requested  State  that  has  been  acquired  as  a  result  ofthe  offence  or  that  may  be 
required  as  evidence  shall,  if  the  requesting  State  so  requests,  be  surrendered  if 
extradition  is  granted. 
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2.  The  said  property  may,  if  the  requesting  State  so  requests,  be  surrendered  to  the 
requesting  State  even  if  the  extradition  agreed  to  cannot  be  carried  out. 
3.  When  the  said  property  is liable  to  seizure  or  confiscation  in  the  requested  State,  it 
may  retain  it  or  temporarily  hand  it  over. 
4.  Where  the  law  of  the  requested  State  or  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  third  parties 
so  require,  any  property  so  surrendered  shall  be  returned  to  the  requested  State  free 
of  charge  after  the  completion  of  the  proceedings,  if  that  State  so  requests. 
ARTICLE  14 
Rule  of  specialty 
1.  A  person  extradited  under  the  present  Treaty  shall  not  be  proceeded  against, 
sentenced,  detained,  re-extradited  to  a  third  State,  or  subjected  to  any  other 
restriction  of  personal  liberty  in  the  territory  of  the  requesting  State  for  any  offence 
committed  before  surrender  other  than: 
a)  An  offence  for  which  extradition  was  granted; 
b)  Any  other  offence  in  respect  of  which  the  requested  State  consents.  Consent 
shall  be  given  if  the  offence  for  which  it  is  requested  is  itself  subject  to 
extradition  in  accordance  with  the  present  Treaty. 
2.  A  request  for  the  consent  of  the  requested  State  under  the  present  article  shall  be 
accompanied  by  the  documents  mentioned  in  paragraph  2  of  article  5  of  the 
present  Treaty  and  a  legal  record  of  any  statement  made  by  the  extradited  person 
with  respect  to  the  offence. 
3.  Paragraph  1  of  the  present  article  shall  not  apply  if  the  person  has  had  an 
opportunity  to  leave  the  requesting  State  and  has  not  done  so  within  [30/45]days 
of  final  discharge  in  respect  of  the  offence  for  which  that  person  was  extradited  or 
if  the  person  has  voluntarily  returned  to  the  territory  of  the  requesting  State  after 
leaving  it. 
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ARTICLE  15 
Transit 
1.  Where  a  person  is  to  be  extradited  to  a  Party  from  a  third  State  through  the 
territory  of  the  other  Party,  the  Party  to  which  the  person  is  to  be  extradited  shall 
request  the  other  Party  to  permit  the  transit  of  that  person  through  its  territory. 
This  does  not  apply  where  air  transport  is  used  and  no  landing  in  the  territory  of 
the  other  Party  is  scheduled. 
2.  Upon  receipt  of  such  a  request,  which  shall  contain  relevant  information,  the 
requested  State  shall  deal  with  this  request  pursuant  to  procedures  provided  by  its 
own  law.  The  requested  State  shall  grant  the  request  expeditiously  unless  its 
essential  interests  would  be  prejudiced  thereby. 
3.  The  State  of  transit  shall  ensure  that  legal  provisions  exist  that  would  enable 
detaining  the  person  in  custody  during  transit. 
4.  In  the  event  of  an  unscheduled  landing,  the  Party  to  be  requested  to  permit  transit 
may,  at  the  request  of  the  escorting  officer,  hold  the  person  in  custody  for  [48] 
hours,  pending  receipt  of  the  transit  request  to  be  made  in  accordance  with 
paragraph  1  of  the  present  article. 
ARTICLE  16 
Concurrent  requests 
If  a  Party  receives  requests  for  extradition  for  the  same  person  from  both  the  other 
Party  and  a  third  State  it  shall,  at  its  discretion,  determine  to  which  of  those  States 
the  person  is  to  be  extradited. 
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ARTICLE  17 
Costs 
1.  The  requested  State  shall  meet  the  cost  of  any  proceedings  in  its  jurisdiction 
arising  out  of  a  request  for  extradition. 
2.  The  requested  State  shall  also  bear  the  costs  incurred  in  its  territory  in  connection 
with  the  seisure  and  handing  over  of  property,  or  the  arrest  and  detention  of  the 
person  whose  extradition  is  sought. 
3.  The  requesting  State  shall  bear  the  costs  incurred  in  conveying  the  person  from  the 
territory  of  the  requested  State,  including  transit  costs. 
ARTICLE  18 
Final  provisions 
1.  The  present  Treaty  is  subject  to  [ratification,  acceptance  or  approval].  The 
instruments  of  [ratification,  acceptance  or  approval]  shall  be  exchanged  as  soon  as 
possible. 
2.  The  present  Treaty  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  thirtieth  day  after  the  day  on  which 
the  instruments  of  [ratification,  acceptance  or  approval]  are  exchanged. 
3.  The  present  Treaty  shall  apply  to  requests  made  after  its  entry  into  force  even  if  the 
relevant  acts  or  omissions  occurred  prior  to  that  date. 
4.  Either  Contracting  Party  may  denounce  the  present  Treaty  by  giving  notice  in 
writing  to  the  other  Party.  Such  denunciation  shall  take  effect  six  months 
following  the  date  on  which  such  notice  is  received  by  the  other  Party. 
IN  WITNESS  WHEREOF  the  undersigned,  being  duly  authorized  thereto  by 
their  respective  Governments,  have  signed  the  present  Treaty. 
DONE  at  on  in  the 
and  languages,  [both/all]  texts  being  equally  authentic. 
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MEETINGS  AND  INTERVIEWS. 
From  UAE: 
1)-Lieutenant  Adjutant  General  Dr.  Mohammed  Said  Al-Badi,  the  UAE  Minister 
of  the  Interior(30  March  1996). 
2)-Saker  Ghobash,  the  UAE  Under-Secretary  of  the  Interior  (30  March  1996). 
3)-Mr.  Saleh  Mohammed  Al-Ghafali,  the  Saudi  ambassador  in  UAE(30  March 
1996). 
From  Bahrain: 
4)-H.  H.  Sheikh  Mohammed  Ben  Khalifa  Al-Khalifa,  the  Bahrain  Minister  of  the 
Interior(16,18  March  1996). 
5)-H.  H.  Sheikh  Abdel-Aziz  Al-Khalifa,  the  president  of  Bahrain  border  guards(28 
November  1995,17  March  1996). 
6)-Lieutenant  General  Abdullah  Al-Sheikh,  the  Saudi  Ambassador  in  Bahrain  and 
the  ex-director  of  Saudi  general  security(16,18  March  1996). 
From  Saudi  Arabia: 
7)-H.  R.  H.  Prince  Naif  Ben  Abdel-Aziz,  the  Saudi  Minister  of  the  Interior(2 
October  1996). 
8)-H.  R.  H.  Prince  Ahmed  Ben  Abdel-Aziz,  the  Saudi  Under-Secretary  of  the 
Interior(  3  April  1996). 
9)-Dr.  Mattlab  Neffissa,  constitutional  law  reader,  Minister  of  State  and  member 
of  the  Ministerial  Council(5  October  1996). 
10)-Dr.  Mossaed  Al-Aiban,  international  law  reader,  Minister  of  State  and 
member  of  the  Ministerial  Council(  7  September  1996). 
11)-Dr.  Saad  Assediri,  the  Secretary-general  of  Saudi-national  security  Council, 
the  Saudi  Under-Secretary  of  the  Interior  in  charge(  2  January,  7  April  1996). 
12)-Dr.  Ibrahim  Al-Owaji,  the  ex-Under-Secretary  of  the  Interior(  6  April  1996). 
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13)-Dr.  Bashir,  director  of  the  legal  sector  in  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior(  7  April 
1996). 
From  Kuwait: 
14)-H.  H.  Sheikh  Saad  Al-Abdullah  Assabah,  the  Crown  Prince  and  President  of 
the  Ministerial  Council  (6  December  1995,26  March  1996). 
15)-H.  H.  Sheikh  Ali  Assabah,  the  Kuwait  Minister  of  the  Interior(  27  March 
1996). 
16)-Ahmed  As-saadoun,  President  of  the  Kuwait  Parliament(  4  December  1995; 
26  March  1996). 
17)-Jamal  Chihab,  the  under-secretary  of  Justice(  5  December  1995). 
18)-Tarrat  Mohammed  Al-Hariti,  the  Saudi  Ambassador  in  Kuwait(  27  March 
1996). 
From  Qatar: 
19)-H.  H.  Sheikh  Abdullah  Al-Thani,  Qatar  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  of  the 
Interior(  25  March  1996). 
20)-Dr.  Najib  Anaimi,  Qatar  Minister  of  Justice(  10  December  1995). 
21)-Abdul-Rahman  Al-Hamad  Al-Shobaili,  the  Saudi  Ambassador  in  Qatar  (25 
March  1996). 
From  Oman  Sultanate: 
22)-Badr  Saud  Hareb,  the  Oman  Minister  of  the  Interior(  24  March  1996). 
23)-Mohammed  Al-Fahd  Al-aissa,  the  Saudi  ambassador  in  Oman(  24  March 
1996). 
From  the  G.  C.  C.  Secretariat-General: 
24)-His,  Excellency  Jamil  Al-Hojailan,  the  actual  G.  C.  C.  Secretary-General(25 
March  1996). 
25)-Sheikh  Fahem  Al-Kassimi,  the  former  G.  C.  C.  Secretary-General(23 
December  1995;  3  March  1996). 
26)-Dr.  Mohammed  Assayari,  Director  General  of  legal  affairs(23  December 
1995;  9,12  March  1996;  25  December  1996). 
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27)-Mohammed  Ad-dossari,  vice-director  of  security  department-  in  the  G.  C.  C. 
Secretariat-General(  8  April  1996,18  September  1996). 
28)-Dr.  Ismaat  Abdelmaj  id,  the  Secretary-General  of  the  League  of  Arab  States(10 
April  1996). 
29)-Dr.  Ahmed  Mohammed  Assalem,  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Council  of 
Arab  Ministers  of  the  Interior,  in  Tunis(  8  July  1996) 
30)-Saleh  Bakr  Attayar,  the  director  of  the  Euro-Arab  studies  centre,  in  Paris(  7 
May  1996). 
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